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The night just walked by and dragged its black hair across my face. 
  
The moon was tangled up in it like a diamond  
Dragged up from the dirt.  
  
And I'm sitting here, 
Thinking of you. 
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The ethnographic process of fieldwork and writing is incredibly humbling, 
depending in no small part upon a constant self-reflection about our own positions and 
opinions, about the profound limits of our knowledge and understanding. As they say, the 
more you learn, the more you realize how little you actually know. This is especially true 
when a project undergoes substantial changes during, through, and with the very process 
of conducting research. Not being able to interpret the array of new experiences and 
knowledge can be simultaneously exciting, frustrating, and at times disorienting. I 
consider myself extremely lucky to have been surrounded by so many individuals and 
communities, in the United States and Peru, who have shared with me in the excitement 
and who have guided me through and beyond those moments of frustration and 
disorientation. I am deeply grateful for their presence – physical, emotional, and 
intellectual – in all the different junctures of this long journey. I credit the strengths of 
this dissertation to the incredible range of their contributions – from individual to 
collective, from particular to expansive, from the momentary to the ongoing, from the 
subtle to the essential. 
By virtue of the twists and turns in local events, and the effect those changing 
circumstances had on the direction of my field research, I was fortunate to be able to 
forge many meaningful friendships, collaborations, and relationships in Ayacucho. For 
many of the neighborhood organizations and government officials whose stories are told 
here, their presence in the center of the spotlight of this dissertation may come as 
something of a surprise. And for many other people, particularly members of youth 
organizations and countless musicians, the absence of their stories may come equally as a 
surprise, as it does even to me on occasion. I am grateful to all those Ayacuchanos who 
joined me on my path through town, who accepted me into their communities with such 
openness and honesty, with incredible warmth, with trust and friendship throughout, even 
when doing so created challenges for them that far surpassed what I could ever help with 
in return. While my rendition of life in their city may not be the version(s) they would 
tell, I have tried to apply their spirit of honesty and transparency, and, all the while, 
communicate and do justice to their sense of concern and commitment to their city and its 
future. 
In the introductory chapter that opens this dissertation, I describe the range of 
experiences – mundane and extraordinary alike – that made up my “ethnographic days 
and nights,” the activities and settings that most defined my own partial socialization into 
Ayacucho. For integrating me into their vibrant and energizing communities, sharing 
their knowledge and enthusiasm with me, and incorporating me into their latest 
adventures, I especially wish to thank Michel, Rafael, and Rodolfo (and the other 
members of the Mesa), as well as Eulogio, Romulo, Edwin, and Otto (together with their 
families and their colleagues at the Escuela de Música Condorcunca and the Coro de 
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Caballeros). In sharing information and life experiences, we crossed many boundaries 
between “informant” and friend. Far more than making my fieldwork “productive,” they 
made the experience both meaningful and enjoyable. 
From my first days in Ayacucho, I was gifted an adopted family; Adela and her 
family supported my research and my endeavors in Ayacucho in more ways than I can 
mention, from helping me find housing (and even housing me at times!) to bringing food 
when I was sick, providing companionship and laughter, encouraging and supporting my 
musical odysseys, hosting my family when they visited Ayacucho, and welcoming me 
into the most intimate moments in the life of her own family. Faustino, Meche, and their 
beautiful children also grew to feel like my own extended family. Their warmth and 
affection touched my soul, their determination and optimism were an inspiration, and 
their laughter was contagious and healing. Finally, my deepest appreciation and gratitude 
go to Fredy, for his astute eye toward the social and the political, for his quiet generosity 
of spirit and for all the help he offered in my field research: accompanying me to chicha 
concerts and unending municipal meetings, taking his own fieldnotes to compare with 
mine and tirelessly discussing local events with me, spending hours walking through the 
city helping me with a musical map and many more hours listening as I would try to 
make sense of the world around me.  
My fieldwork experience also would not have been the same without the 
supportive friendship of Caroline Yezer, who opened her home in Ayacucho to me during 
preliminary research and introduced me to her precious network of friends and adopted 
family, and Jamie Heilman, who always managed to appear in town at just the right 
moment, offering the rare opportunity to eat pizza and drink beer, along with a healthy 
dose of gossiping and reflecting upon the research experience. My parents, Linda and 
Daniel, and my husband, Dan, also played key roles in the strange world of fieldwork. I 
am not entirely sure how I convinced Linda to play cello with us on the first concert that 
we organized with musicians from the local School of Music, but I will never forget her 
face when she walked in to the packed Cathedral, the crowds of people spilling into the 
side aisles. Dan accompanied me to the radio stations, violins in tow, serenaded the 
listening audience and, with impressive skill, enticed listeners to weather the rain and 
come out to watch and listen. That was the same summer that Dan’s parents, Frank and 
Ann, came to visit us in Ayacucho as well. I will also never forget how we “narrowly 
escaped” getting both of our mothers killed in one summer, in the most routine of 
Ayacuchano activities! But I will save those stories for our own memories…. 
For all of their work on behalf of graduate students in Anthropology and Latin 
American Studies at the University of Michigan, my utmost respect goes to Laurie Marx 
and David Frye (who, coincidentally, also advised my undergraduate thesis with great 
patience for my naiveté). I cannot imagine getting from start to finish without their 
support, their creativity in finding funding and solving bureaucratic tangles, and – just as 
important – their wonderful sense of humor. I received financial support for the research 
upon which this dissertation is based (2002-2005) from a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral 
Dissertation Fellowship and a National Science Foundation Graduate Research 
Fellowship, as well as a University of Michigan Humanities Research Fellowship. 
Follow-up research (2007) was funded by a grant from the Rackham Graduate School. 
Several of the most significant components of this dissertation can be directly 
traced to influential conversations with my advisor Bruce Mannheim and committee 
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members Fernando Coronil and Kelly Askew. I am immensely grateful for Fernando’s 
insistence that I begin to theorize the night, for Bruce’s insights and suggestions about 
thinking through urban Andean sociality, and for Kelly’s precise and informed questions 
about urban security and the citizen security system. As I worked to better incorporate 
these different strands, the shape of the dissertation changed dramatically, and, much 
more importantly, I found renewed excitement about the project. I am particularly 
appreciative of the unparalleled amount of thought and time that committee member Julia 
Paley invested into providing detailed and specific comments on the dissertation. I will 
continue to grapple with their most significant observations long after this dissertation is 
submitted, and their questions and discussions will undoubtedly inspire and guide my 
research and thought for many years to come. 
Many of the ideas circulating in this dissertation were shared – in various states of 
completion – with the “círculo andino” at the University of Michigan; I have enjoyed 
their thoughtful feedback and learned from their critical minds. From this group, I 
especially wish to thank Molly Callahan, Nick Emlen, Randy Hicks, Sergio Miguel 
Huarcaya, Margarita Huayhua, Kenneth Sims, and Howard Tsai, as well as Fernando 
Coronil, David Frye, and Bruce Mannheim. Amy Mortensen read and commented upon 
various pieces of the dissertation along the way and offered invaluable insights (and 
humor) at critical moments, especially about Peru and politics. Cecilia Tomori also read 
and edited some portions, and was a critical muse in my preliminary inquiries into the 
night.  
The writing and the ideas found in this dissertation also benefited tremendously 
from being filtered through the refreshingly non-academic eyes of Dan Stachyra and 
Linda Marquardt, who didn’t hesitate to look at a wall of jargon and tell me “this is total 
gibberish!” My dear mother, Linda, patiently, carefully, lovingly, and enthusiastically 
read and edited nearly every word of this dissertation, temporarily putting aside her life 
to work with my crazy deadlines. How does one say thank you for such help?  
Similarly, I cannot adequately thank Mollie Callahan and Karen Faulk, who have 
accompanied me along this whole journey, from recruitment visits in Ann Arbor to 
fieldsite visits in the Andes, from long hours of social theory to long hours of swimming 
in lakes and dancing, from writing groups to political rallies, from navigating academia to 
navigating parenthood, over ten years and across life and research in four states and six 
countries. I am inordinately proud to have them as my colleagues and friends. 
This dissertation is in honor of my grandmother, Marjorie Gaston, who inspired 
me to go to the Andes for the first time, who passed on her own passion for music and 
anthropology to her daughter, who then shared it with me. I know she would be proud. 
And this dissertation is dedicated to my family, my foundation.  
From my parents, I have inherited a love for music, travel, and ideas – the 
cornerstones of my life. (I have also inherited from them the odd combination of 
unrelenting curiosity and stubborn determination that make starting a project such as this 
imaginable in the first place!) Their unwavering faith in me has sustained me through so 
many transitions and life decisions; despite this apparently foolish support of my 
decisions, my parents are my life’s role-models, as individuals and as a team. 
Dan has filled my life with dreams and adventures, trust and spontaneity, road 
trips and wilderness backpacking, and of course music (“music lubricates the thinking 
cap,” he once told me after a conceptual insight came to me while I was working upstairs 
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and he was teaching violin to a series of small children in the downstairs living room). I 
so admire his patience and calm manner, and I would not have been able to plow through 
this long process – let alone emerge intact – without his stability and fortitude. His labor 
of love during this process allowed our family to spend so much time together, and words 
cannot possibly covey the significance of our mornings together, our candlelight family 
dinners every night, our cooking and spontaneous walks in the park … right up to the 
very end. 
Finally, seeing the transparency with which my little Emil experiences the world 
renews my own sense of wonder, infusing my life with the momentary sensation that the 
whole world is yet to be discovered. Through his hugs and kisses, his songs and games, 
his creativity and pure joy in playing with language, I am reminded that the mundane and 
the familiar can, in fact, be novel and marvelous every time. With full sincerity, and not a 
trace of irony, Emil sends me off to a long day of writing with an enthusiastic 
exclamation: “Have a GREAT day, mama!” 
Yes, this crazy project is dedicated to my family, who remind me always of 
what’s important in life.  
To my family: I love you. 
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In this dissertation, I tackle questions of urban citizenship and participatory 
governance through an ethnographic study of the regulation of space and time in the 
historic city center of Ayacucho, Peru. Drawing upon two and a half years of 
ethnographic fieldwork, I trace how “nightlife” emerged as a social crisis and was 
transformed from a normative ideology of socially acceptable nighttime activities into a 
political agenda for maintaining urban order. By examining how the struggles to control 
nightlife became entwined with the apparatus of citizen security and the doctrine of 
democratic participation, this dissertation reveals new dimensions to the layered 
imbalances of citizenship. 
I argue that the “night,” though under-theorized in the anthropological literature, 
is a significant realm of sociality and subjectivity, and a critical site of power relations 
and social distinction. This in-depth look at the public controversies, debates, and policies 
regarding urban nightlife further reveals the various experiential connections between 
“nightlife ideologies” and corresponding regulatory politics of urban planning and urban 
zoning. In doing so, I demonstrate how the night is not only ideologized but, often, also 
highly politicized. The discourse of a nightlife crisis presented certain forms of music and 
entertainment (namely nightclubs and concerts referred to locally as fiestas chichas) as 
morally and physically dangerous, thus creating an urban politics that blended moral 
judgments with ideas about social transgression and criminality. Among the tools adopted 
in the campaign against nightlife was the discourse of “citizen security” (seguridad 
ciudadana) which was circulating within the wider interdiscursive field of governance 
and urban order, in the Andes and across Latin America. In 2004, the provincial 
municipality issued an ordinance declaring a security emergency, following the 
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prominent murder of a high school student as he left a city center nightclub late at night. 
This emergency ordinance firmly situated the political crisis over nightlife entertainment 
within a nascent system of citizen security that was intimately tied to existing 
frameworks of participatory democracy.  
In the concluding chapters, I focus on the missions and the concrete strategies 
developed within local municipal security programs, which I have termed “participatory 
security” in order to draw attention to the complicated relationships between the doctrines 
of citizen security and the philosophies underpinning participatory democracy. 
Government campaigns promoting citizen security as “everybody’s task” (“tarea de 
todos”) masked the experiential and embodied disjunctures of participatory governance. 
In practice, “responsibility” to solve problems of urban insecurity was allocated 
differentially, such that peripheral and city center neighborhoods were expected to 
participate in markedly different fashions. While city center residents participated 
through indirect security activities such as filing police reports or “witnessing” police 
interventions, residents of the peripheral community were expected to participate directly 
and physically through manual labor such as building their own community center or 
performing their own neighborhood night security patrols. As geographies of social 
distinction mapped onto geographies of urban insecurity in these ways, deep existing 
social inequalities were naturalized and depoliticized, in spite of the rhetoric of 
inclusivity. Moreover, these municipal “participatory security” programs have effectively 
institutionalized social inequalities in new and highly consequential ways. This dynamic 
raises important questions regarding the effectiveness of programs of participatory 






“Huamanga has always been a city of bohemians, of women and liquor” 
exclaimed one elegant older woman, giggling.1 Residents of the historic city center of 
Ayacucho, or Huamanga as they affectionately call it, often reminisce about how 
“everybody” used to play guitar and sing their traditional music, especially the huayno 
genre, said to be the greatest expression of sentimiento, of huamanguino feeling and 
sentiment. These huamanguinos, members of the region’s historical and contemporary 
elite, are proud of their longstanding reputation as being especially “musical,” and the 
older generations recount endless stories of long – and sometimes raucous – nights of 
music and dance, especially the late-night or early-morning serenades that made 
huamanguino men legendary.  
She was quick to add, however, that those traditional “bohemian” nights were 
livened up with “healthy” liquor (trago sano), with which the men drinking would go 
home nice and peacefully (“vuelven tranquilitos a su casa”). She reminded me 
emphatically, how things had changed: now kids get drunk and go out to commit crime 
and murder. 
Leaning against the exterior wall of a building, stone on bottom and whitewashed 
on top, she explained how the nights had changed and why these women were protesting. 
                                               
1 Author interview, September 2, 2004. 
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We were standing on the sidewalk of Jirón Asamblea, the prominent street radiating out 
from the main plaza in the highland city of Ayacucho, Peru. That evening I had joined 
her and a handful of other women as they publically observed a municipal operation to 
forcibly close one of the numerous night clubs along this street. That evening they were 
closing La Noche (literally “The Night”), a discoteca that featured prominently in the 
public controversies surrounding the city center’s growing night life scene.  
Barely a week before, these women had formally registered as a neighborhood 
organization (Junta Vecinal), intent on joining forces in their struggle to have their 
demands against the nightlife industry heard and to expose inept governance. These 
women were instrumental in defining the changing nightlife scene as a “social 
emergency.” In their fight to bring their concerns into public consciousness, they 
occasionally took their place among the stream of protest marches through the city’s 
main plaza to the seat of power. 
Just the day before, on September 1, 2004, the provincial municipality had issued 
Ordenanza 054, an official declaration of a citizen security emergency (seguridad 
ciudadana), targeted directly at the urban night scene. 
§ 
Visit Ayacucho, City of the 33 Churches! 2  
 
Come to Ayacucho and you will be guaranteed a personal and direct experience 
with the local customs of this magnificent city: every day you will witness a 
traditional funeral procession in the morning, an afternoon protest in the plaza, 
and a religious procession at night. 
This satirical commentary, from a cynical Ayacuchano who ran a local tourist 
agency, succinctly captured the irony – and reality – of trying to uphold the city’s 
reputation as a historical, traditional, and religious society – and market it as a tourist 
destination – while simultaneously using public protest to disseminate the rhetoric of a 
                                               
2 “City of the 33 churches” has become a de facto tourism name for Ayacucho. The figure represents the 




Huamanguino nights are not necessarily most distinguished for their bohemian 
musical affairs or serenades, as declared by the women in the opening quote. Even they 
would insist that the city’s nights are known for their displays of traditional religious 
revelry and elaborate processions. Marketed by tourist agencies as the “city of 33 
churches” (supposedly representing one for each year of Christ’s life), visitors and locals 
have long observed that the city seems to have more churches than houses and more 
processions than there are days in the year. These embellishments aside, the single 
strongest economic engine in the city resides in the unmatched festivities of Holy Week. 
The ten days of festivities include a bull run in the main plaza, as well as special food 
stalls and countless concerts and parties, which combine to make for near-24-hour 
merriment for locals and visitors alike. In the midst of these secular activities, however, 
the long and highly structured night-time processions – each with its own part in 
recounting the Passion, its own well-worn route, and its own elite club of sponsors and 
musicians – are what serve as the most potent symbol in the city’s self-representation, 
locally and abroad. 
§ 
Not long after the emergency was declared, I was heading home from a rehearsal 
in the School of Music on Jirón 28 de Julio, one of the city center’s main commercial 
streets just off of the Plaza de Armas. Walking along the recently-converted pedestrian 
walkway, I ran into the city’s State Attorney for Crime Prevention (Fiscal de la 
Prevención del Delito). After many formal meetings and interviews – including several 
with members of a neighborhood organization and countless reunions in the municipality 
– we had a friendly working relationship. That afternoon he invited me to a cup of tea 
across the street from the Jesuit church of La Compañía, and sitting there watching the 
afternoon crowd stream past was a sharp contrast from our previous encounters. He was 
surprised to see me carrying a violin and excited to hear about my experiences playing 
with local musicians. Like many, he first wondered why I was not researching 
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Huamanga’s musical traditions, the guitar, or even the harp, the musical genres of huayno 
or yaraví. We had an interesting conversation about the city’s youth and the socio-
cultural meanings of their musical interests and practices, but at the end, he made a 
comment that struck a chord with me. He asked simply: why are you studying nightlife 
when seguridad ciudadana [citizen security] is what is most urgent? 
This comment, which earlier in my research may have felt like a direct challenge 
to the validity of my project, was music to my ears on that day. It was confirmation of the 
deep and rich potentiality of studying the city’s nightlife as a problematic: a social crisis 
transformed into a “public problem” of governance. From this vantage point I could grasp 
so many critical issues that were relevant not only to Huamanga, to Ayacucho, but which 
were also key themes in contemporary Latin America and critical topics of public policy 
and intellectual inquiry.  
§ 
During the time of my fieldwork, from December 2002 through May 2005, I was 
witness to a radical transformation in the public discourse of nightlife in the city center. 
As “nightlife” suddenly became a powerful lightening rod for public controversies and 
debates, it became the new face of a social crisis with historical roots.3 In a short period 
of time, “nightlife” was carefully molded into a political “problematic” (la problemática 
was a phrase used often in Ayacucho), framed so as to encompass – even absorb – an 
impressive breadth of social concerns and political priorities: from tradition and decency 
to moral and physical dangers, from evaluations of authority to disagreements over 
democratic responsibility, from the doctrine of citizen security to the inequities of 
participatory governance. With my lens already carefully focused on the nightlife scene, I 
witnessed a historical moment when the politics of nightlife became public and potent in 
a new way, a peculiar zone of political activity surrounding popular culture in which 
                                               
3 There is not an expression that directly correlates to my use of “nightlife”; the phrases most commonly 
used as generic references are either “discotecas” (which technically refers specifically to night clubs and 
does not include concerts or bars), “establecimientos nocturnos” (“night establishments”), or “centros 
nocturnos” (“night centers”). 
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nightlife became the catalyst for an official emergency declaration, complete with 
curfews and prohibitions on night entertainment. 
The dissertation begins with a locally contextualized discussion of “nightlife 
ideologies”: the spectrum of ideas about nightlife, from time and space, to people and 
social actions. Over the course of the dissertation we see not only how these interrelated 
ideas about “nightlife” emerge from historical experiences of power and social inequity 
but also how these ideas are embodied and enacted upon in ways that create new 
experiences of social distinction and inequality. We end in a radically different sphere, 
examining citizen security programs and the disjunctures of citizen participation. The 
story, about how these politics of prejudice are converted into concrete strategies of 
governance, is organized and unified through the broad concepts of nightlife ideologies 
and an emerging nightlife problematic. 
In the first half of the dissertation, I focus on the process of “problematization,” 
meaning the ways in which the ideas and practices associated with nightlife became the 
object of concern and reflection, entangled in ideological struggles that Foucault 
eloquently referred to as “games of truth” (Foucault 1988). However, framing nightlife as 
a problematic was not only an ideological process; it was also a political one that 
demanded response, engagement, and action. In the words of Gusfield: 
All social problems do not necessarily become public ones. They do not become 
matters of conflict or controversy in the arenas of public action. … Issues and 
problems may wax and wane in public attention, may disappear or appear. How is 
it that an issue or problem emerges as one with a public status, as something 
about which ‘someone ought to do something’? (Gusfield 1981:5, emphasis 
added) 
In the second half of the dissertation we turn our attention to how the ideological 
construction of a social crisis was translated into a public problem; how nightlife became 
a problematic that “someone” had to solve. In tracing the layered politics of Ayacucho’s 
nightlife, the dissertation also follows the interplay between the dual nature of the socio-
political nightlife problematic – at once an ideology of social distinction and a political 
agenda of governance.  
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The nightlife emergency of the dissertation’s title is partially a reference to the 
“emergence” of the nightlife problematic within an ideologically mediated system of 
social distinction, prestige, power, and inequality. At the same time, nightlife emergency 
is also a reference to the 2004 emergency declaration, together with the set of policies, 
programs, and relationships that ensued. The emergency declaration marked a watershed 
moment, defining the problematic not just as a social problem but as a public problem. 
First, by declaring a security emergency, the declaration formalized the ideological 
framework that defined the nightlife scene as a social crisis, singling it out as a decisive 
realm of urban insecurity. Second, it institutionalized the public problem by situating the 
debates over governance within a nascent political system of citizen security (seguridad 
ciudadana) and participatory democracy. From many angles, this was an unusual 
ordinance. Within the litany of government resolutions aimed at controlling night 
entertainment businesses, including contradictory regulations and ineffective resolutions, 
Ordenanza 054 stood apart through the rhetorical and symbolic power of declaring an 
emergency, a giant leap beyond all existing legislation. On the other hand, through its 
focused aim on nightlife, made explicit in the accompanying council agreement, the 
ordinance also stood out among the existing record of emergency declarations, 
establishing a critical set of priorities for the citizen security apparatus, not even a year 
old.  
The emergency ordinance was, in some ways, the culmination of the nightlife 
problematic that was quickly gaining ground in the public consciousness; in other ways 
the ordinance injected the problematic with a dramatic raison d’être, a weighty 
justification and strong sense of purpose. The evolution of the nightlife problematic – 
which is the thread unifying this dissertation – gave direction to an astoundingly large 
slice of local politics, shaping debates over traditions of sociality and forms of urban 
subjectivity at the same time as it shaped expectations of participatory governance and 
policies of citizen security. 
Several interrelated questions underlie this dissertation. First, how did nightlife 
and citizen security become so entangled that it became plausible for the municipality to 
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declare a citizen security emergency due to the city’s nightlife scene? Second, given that 
the campaign against nightlife in the city center originated as an effort to raise awareness 
of what was perceived (by some) to be a broad social emergency, how and why did it 
then coalesce around the much narrower citizen security doctrine? Third, alternatively, 
since the political agenda of “citizen security” could, in theory, prioritize any of a number 
of issues (indeed, Huamanga’s citizen security office defined 41 relevant “factors”), why 
did nightlife, specifically, achieve such prominent attention and legislation? And finally, 
once the citizen security doctrine (as a set of political beliefs, priorities, and laws) was 
mobilized as a resource in this way, providing the scaffolding for the nightlife 
problematic, what were the practical consequences of the concomitant citizen security 
system (as a set of concrete political imperatives and structured relationships) upon the 
development of the nightlife problematic? 
Problems of the Night 
Problems have histories. 
-- Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems (1981:4) 
The evolution of the nightlife problematic that is at the heart of this dissertation 
occurred largely in the domain of the day – in visits to morning, noontime, and 
(occasionally) early evening news programs, along a well-worn path connecting one 
governmental institution to another, during governmental special committee meetings and 
endless foros (forums), and in mid-day protests around the plaza. But the topic itself – 
nightlife entertainment – resided firmly in the domain of the night. As such, this 
dissertation about the politics of nightlife in highland Peru begins with the premise that 
local conceptions of the “night” as a social-spatial realm directly shape perceptions of 
changing sociality and recent urban cultural developments.  
Through the first two chapters, I propose a theoretical approach to considering 
“nightlife ideologies” as a way to explore the meanings and interpretations of life 
(subjectivity and sociality) in and of the night. These night ideologies encompass a 
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complex set of interrelated ideas about time and space, from ideas about the multiplicity 
of activities through space and across time to ideas about the people involved in those 
diverse night activities.4 Night ideologies are also about the imagined and perceived role 
of night-life in social experience, including those unmarked normative activities as well 
as those marked as transgressive or threatening to social decency and societal peace. As 
such, night ideologies are fundamentally about social relations, moral interests, and 
political motivations. More specifically, through these night ideologies we see social 
distinction as it is envisioned, structured, and legitimated in and through time and space. 
In referring to these sets of ideas as ideologies, my first goal is to emphasize that these 
ideas are patterned and structured in historically significant ways. Moreover, in referring 
to these historically patterned ideas as ideologies, I wish to emphasize as well that these 
ideational systems are interest-laden, partial and contested. In other words, night 
ideologies are not “merely” about the night; they are, ultimately, about power and 
inequality.  
To be sure, there are qualifiable and experiential differences between life during 
the day and during the night, and the use and occupation of Ayacucho’s urban space 
provide visible signs of the changes that accompany the arrival of each night in the city 
center: bureaucracy winds down and the government offices surrounding the plaza close 
their old wooden doors; businesses are shuttered and those corner stores that remain open 
lock their heavy gates, selling drinks, snacks, or cigarettes through the metal slots; the 
daytime street venders selling ice cream, popcorn, or newspapers pack up their goods and 
another group sets up their portable carts selling salchipapas (French fries with hotdog 
pieces) or emolientes (hot herbal teas, often spiked with alcohol); the public 
transportation buses and micros come to a virtual halt, leaving transportation throughout 
the city in the hands of a relatively small collection of taxis and mototaxis; and of course, 
the night clubs and bars open their doors, turn on their lights, set the ambiance, and crank 
                                               
4 In envisioning a specific ideological system – night ideologies – I am taking my cue from the well-
researched and analyzed literature on language ideologies. See for example: Gal and Irvine 1995; Irvine 
2001; Irvine and Gal 2000; Schieffelin, et al. 1998; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994 
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up the volume. As the purpose changes from an area of transience, of business and 
bureaucracy, to one of destination and pleasure, the crowds, the clothes, the sounds, the 
smells, and the mood in the street all change accordingly. 
It comes as no surprise, surely, that while there is little contest over the use of this 
urban space for bureaucracy and business during the day (with the exception of periodic 
disagreements over how close to the main plaza mototaxis should be permitted, or 
occasional confrontations between municipal security and street venders of the informal 
market), there is immense controversy over the use of this urban space at night. The fight 
against the nightlife scene rests upon the conviction that the night is, fundamentally, for 
sleeping; this nighttime economy, the “restless sensibility” characteristic of cities, “severs 
the link between sleep and night” (Blum 2003:153). Many residents share powerful 
stories about the psychological or physiological impacts of living – and trying to sleep – 
on the other side of the wall from a night club which possesses no form of noise control. 
In addition to ulcers from worrying about walls or ceilings collapsing from unauthorized 
modification, the most heart-wrenching personal stories are those recounting young kids 
being continually frightened by fights outside their window or front door, children with 
failing progress in school and behavioral manifestations due to lack of sleep and 
accumulated stress in the family. After many long conversations with the residents who 
were the driving force behind the campaigns to close nighttime businesses, in the city 
center, I came to see that these unspoken intimacies are represented in dry public 
documents through the frequent mention of the Peruvian constitution and its guarantee of 
the right “to peace, tranquility, to enjoy free time and rest, as well as a stable environment 
suitable for developing one’s life.”5 
Like many cities across the globe, space in Ayacucho’s historic center is claimed, 
occupied, and embodied in a different fashion at night, with a different fervor and a 
special enthusiasm. Indeed without these differences between life during the day and life 
at night, the very day-night binary itself would deflate. Therefore, my intent is not to 
                                               
5 Constitución Política del Perú (1992) Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Inc. 22. 
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deny these differences but to use the nightlife emergency – this particular social and 
political “problematization” of nighttime use of the city center – to study how space and 
time are politicized together; or in other words, how the politicization of geography and 
temporality are interwoven with one another. 
Ayacucho’s nightlife problematic was motivated by an ideological struggle to 
define and control the city center – during the day and during the night. Thus I begin, in 
Chapter 1, by laying out the historical and political dynamics of the city center as an elite 
social space. Studying the city center’s physical – and symbolic – boundaries reveals a 
set of temporal, spatial, and social divides, all of which are at the heart of an ideologically 
mediated system of social distinction. The center/periphery dichotomy that is featured in 
this chapter sets the stage for considering the layered transpositions of parallel 
dichotomies (center/periphery, day/night, decent/deviant, victim/perpetrator). As will be 
illustrated ethnographically throughout the dissertation, this ideology of distinction serves 
as the backbone for the nightlife problematic: it lends meaning and consistency to the 
rhetoric of “emergency” by inextricably linking diverse socio-cultural realms, from 
segmented space to youth entertainment, from informality to effective governance, from 
political responsibility to democratic participation. 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide an ethnographic look at how the problematic has come 
to present the city’s changing nightlife scene as responsible for an array of social 
transgressions. As in many cities, Ayacucho’s emerging nightlife scene is viewed by 
residents of the historic center as an unpleasant combination of social ills, including 
alcoholism, prostitution, drugs, crime, street brawls, rape, and even murder. The 
definition and control of socially meaningful space, in this case confined to the city 
center, entailed complex politics of prejudice and judgment. Moreover, it depended in 
large part upon the impression of rupture, of a radical change in the existing – or, perhaps 
more accurately, “traditional” – state of affairs.  
Chapter 2 offers an ethnographic consideration of the proliferation of dance clubs, 
known as discotecas. Since these were at the very center of the nightlife emergency, I use 
this chapter as an entryway for examining the dyadic of day and night. More precisely, 
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what we see is a dyadic of daytime social norms and nighttime transgressions, in which 
the latter is consistently presumed to “threaten” the former. Although “common sense” 
tells us that night is the opposite of day, and we are taught to be “afraid of the dark,” in 
fact the night is arguably one of the most significant spaces for the enactment of 
Ayacucho’s identity as a traditional and religious center. The imagery of Ayacucho – 
including its traditional and religious “night” – is of a space that is morally “decent.” 
Given the point of pride in the city’s traditional music and parties, it is not night 
entertainment per se that concerns these city center residents, but rather what they see to 
be a different way of life, a essential change in the their sociality. These clubs, far from 
traditional venues of night socialization, are interpreted through the problematic as 
spreading a “global” urban youth entertainment style: highly sexualized, where heavy 
alcohol consumption seems to be equal between males and females, where the 
atmosphere is dark, urban and loud, where the sole purpose seems to be drunkenness, 
“dirty” dancing, and promiscuity. 
The sensation of radical change is further examined in Chapter 3 through ideas of 
danger, both moral and physical. In contrast to the night club scene described above, the 
fiestas chichas described in this chapter are live concerts that feature two distinctly 
Peruvian musical styles (música chicha and huayno norteño). These fiestas chichas are 
strongly associated in the national mind with the social margins, the poor and migrant 
youth, are marked as being dangerous to the city’s historical and religious traditions. This 
discussion introduces the overlap between geographies of social distinction and 
geographies of criminality and insecurity. In this way, the perceived moral dangers 
presented by the city center discotecas are contrasted with the feared physical dangers 
(crime and violence) that are overwhelmingly attributed to the city’s periphery. As the 
problematic was increasingly framed in terms of differential moral and physical dangers, 
the discourse of “nightlife” came into alignment with the newly popular doctrine of 
citizen security. 
Once the perceived moral and physical dangers of the nightlife scene were framed 
as a concern of insecurity for the city as a whole, the social crisis was transformed into a 
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public debate over effective governance. Chapter 4 is dedicated to addressing how the 
entrenched social and moral hierarchies, the local politics of judgment, were converted 
into official policies of prohibition and exclusion. To begin the discussion of moral 
governance, I present the example of temporary regulations designed for Holy Week 
2004. From there, we move into the ongoing stream of attempts to permanently regulate, 
with particular attention on the spectacular and controversial forced closures of popular 
night clubs. Through persistent attempts to regulate night businesses, to spatially and 
temporally control these “corrupting spaces,” residents and authorities were placing 
different kinds of political imperatives on moral judgments, institutionalizing one brand 
of morality through increasingly focused measures of temporal and spatial governance.  
Controlling the Night, Governing the Emergency 
A central narrative unifying the dissertation concerns the production of a moral 
panic and its subsequent transformation into a political crisis. As residents of Jirón 
Asamblea became increasingly engaged as activists in their fight against nightclubs in the 
city center, they gradually shifted their tactical focus from the abstract discourse of 
“moral corruption” to the politically powerful doctrine of “citizen security.” When 
combined with a prominent murder tied to the city center’s nightlife scene, the moral 
panic was catapulted into public consciousness and translated, virtually overnight, into a 
public problem. The second half of the dissertation is concerned with the practical 
implications of a public problem, namely the expectations for formal responses to the 
newly-identified social and political ‘crisis’ and the contentious struggle over who is 
responsible for remedying the crisis and restoring social order. 
Chapter 5 begins with a detailed look at Ordenanza O54, the citizen security 
emergency that was declared in response to the nightlife problematic. Although the 
emergency declaration was issued in direct response to the concerns over nightlife, it 
radically changed the political dynamics surrounding the problematic by formalizing the 
ideological social crisis as a public problem. More significantly, by declaring a citizen 
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security emergency (seguridad ciudadana) the ordinance explicitly channeled the 
problematic through the official doctrines of participatory governance and the 
institutional system of Seguridad Ciudadana. The public sphere in which the nightlife 
problematic emerged was also, at that same time, saturated with a national – and even 
international – political agenda and discourse of that presented citizen security as the 
ultimate “public good” and as a right of urban citizenship to be guaranteed by the state. 
Within this interdiscursive public sphere of nightlife and security, the concepts of 
“authority” and “governance” also circulated on the same plane as “citizenship” and 
“responsibility.” Thus the moral debates over tradition and deviance, and the 
delimitations of the city center, were coterminous with debates over the boundaries of 
government authority and citizen responsibility in a transforming democracy. 
Most people following the problematic agreed with, and adopted, the rhetoric of a 
public or social crisis – even the club owners, albeit for different reasons. However, 
significant criticism emerged over the decision to declare an official emergency. In 
Chapter 5, I contextualize these criticisms within the city’s experiences with the recent 
civil war with Shining Path (1980-1993) and the authoritarian approach to governing 
security under President Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). Through the debates and 
disagreements over the meaning, power, and purpose of emergency declarations, we can 
reflect upon the imagined relationships between social order, security, authority and 
democratic governance, which combine to form the foundation of the subsequent 
chapters. 
Once the problems of nightlife were firmly established as a public priority, the 
nightlife problematic was redirected towards a debate over what was to be done to solve 
the problems and, equally challenging, who was responsible for doing so. Chapters 6 and 
7 present two different angles on the debate over political responsibility. Chapter 6 
focuses on the perspective of the city center residents. Now formally organized into 
neighborhood organizations (juntas vecinales), they began taking to the streets, joining 
the groundswell of protest marches in the main plaza. These marches were not only to 
draw attention to the nightlife industry; they were also designed to publically and 
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forcefully criticize local officials for their inability to exercise their authority and to 
demand that officials demonstrate personal and political “commitment” (compromiso) to 
defining – and solving – the city’s social problems. In response, a few local government 
officials made a surprising move: they organized their own protest march against 
nightlife, and they called on the neighborhood organizations to join them. In this ironic 
turn of events, which almost seems to caricature the role of protest marches in Peru’s 
democracy, government officials adopted the protest idiom for themselves as part of a 
calculated display that the community and the government were united in confronting 
nightlife. 
Chapter 7 refocuses our consideration of political responsibility in the nightlife 
problematic. This chapter details the missions and the concrete strategies developed 
within local municipal security programs. In a twist on the official terms “citizen 
security” and “citizen participation,” I have termed these municipal security programs 
“participatory security” in order to draw attention to the complicated relationships 
between the doctrines of citizen security and the philosophies underpinning participatory 
democracy. Through the discourse and institutional system promoting citizen security as 
tarea de todos, everybody’s obligation, government institutions were reframing the 
debate as one of shared responsibility. Beginning with an ethnographic description of 
how individual government authorities placed limits on what they were willing to 
sacrifice or risk in the implementation of citizen security policies, I then move on to 
contextualize these debates with the recent history of civil participation in Peru. As we 
see, the value of the notion of “responsibility” was being set concurrently with a 
philosophy espousing the “rights and responsibilities” of democracy (derechos y deberes) 
by which government officials attempt to transfer some of the risks of governance onto 
the community. 
Continuing to follow the political engagement of the city center neighborhood 
organizations, Chapter 8 offers an ethnographic look at how the doctrines of “citizen 
participation” and “citizen security” play out in practice. This final chapter brings us full 
circle to the initial discussions of the ideological system of social distinction: as these 
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participatory security programs prominently feature neighborhood organizations tied to 
urban geographic sectors, we have a final appearance of the layered geography of 
criminality and insecurity explored in the first three chapters. The theories of causal 
responsibility for the city’s insecurity are now directly translated directly into political 
obligation to solve those problems, and peripheral neighborhoods are expected to 
participate in a radically different fashion than city center organizations. As we see with 
surprising clarity, these government programs of “citizen participation” that profess 
democratic “inclusion” in public governance are in fact depoliticizing and 
institutionalizing historical patterns of inequity. 
As we see over the course of the dissertation, the ideological and discursive 
framing devices behind the formulation of the nightlife emergency not only shaped 
thinking about the control of deviance and regulation through governance; they also had a 
significant impact on a set of contentious inter-personal relationships and the 
corresponding expectations of democratic governance. This dynamic can be traced in part 
to the Habermassian-like public sphere in which the nightlife problematic itself 
developed: a markedly political realm in which individuals come together within 
institutionalized (though theoretically “open”) settings – formats – to discuss and debate 
issues of “the public good” and to engage official authorities in dialogue over concerns of 
governance. As we will see throughout, these institutional settings for dialogue and 
political debate are anything but open and inclusive. 
On the surface, this is a story that could be told for many urban areas of the world. 
It weaves together a growing nightlife complete with alcohol, drugs, and prostitution, 
with increasingly-public youth cultures with their musical tastes and practices; it takes 
account of a heightened sense of common crime, a fear of proliferating gangs, and the 
circulating discourse of urban insecurity; and it incorporates convoluted governmental 
efforts to regulate and control night spaces in the hopes of preserving the city’s image 
and, at the same time, maintaining security. However much this story resonates 
elsewhere, it nonetheless belongs to single city and a particular moment that city’s 
history, embedded in certain patterns of social, cultural, and political change in an 
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extremely condensed period of time. As hinted at in the Conclusion’s epilogue, the 
idiosyncrasies of the dynamics explored in this story had already changed only a few 
years later. 
Ethnographic Nights 
In recounting the daily routines of my fieldwork experience, I could begin with 
the most fundamental components of research, such as formal interviews and informal 
discussions, long-winded conversations and on-the-fly exchanges, everywhere from the 
far reaches of the outlying shantytowns to government offices on the city’s main plaza. 
This account would also, necessarily, include the endless (and endlessly tiring) trips to 
government offices to get updates and to inquire about upcoming events or meetings, but 
it would also include the endlessly enjoyable visits to the office/hang-out of a large youth 
group to check in and offer a hand in organizing events or articulating their position to 
government agencies. But the list of research activities would be an incomplete picture of 
the fieldwork experience without also including the day-to-day and mundane activities of 
shopping in the market for fresh produce, or buying newspapers from my favorite 
venders (my caseras), or joining a friend for ice cream in the plaza (a favorite activity of 
mine). Furthermore, like all fieldwork experiences, mine was not all routine, but rather 
peppered with patterned spontaneity and everyday surprises, the unexpected adventures 
that arise from running into acquaintances in the street. Thus, unable to resist the friendly 
pressures of “acompañame!” (come with me!), I found myself in the most unexpected 
circumstances, such as a colossal search for donkeys. 
My fieldwork routines were not only day-to-day, however; they were equally 
night-to-night, owing to the exigencies of my own project, as well as a good dose of 
inquisitiveness, and combined with the somewhat separate path by which I integrated 
myself into the community as a musician. I regularly partook in night-time entertainment 
of all sorts, whether hanging out in restaurants and dancing in clubs in the city center, or 
attending concerts and social parties in temporarily converted mechanic shops or in 
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makeshift venues overlooking the city on Acuchimay hill. Night-time was also when I 
frequently joined neighborhood organizations or youth organizations for their gatherings, 
participating in the meetings in which they would update each other on recent 
developments, strategize for upcoming activities, design and coordinate projects, or go 
over the results of their own investigations and inquiries. Night-time also played host to a 
vast part of my fieldwork life that makes no formal appearance in this dissertation but 
gave my life there so much meaning, most importantly the years I played violin with 
musicians in the School of Music, sharing my knowledge of classical music and 
attempting to learn the intricacies of traditional Peruvian ornamentation.  
Like day-time, night-time also hosted many less mundane experiences, and some 
of the most treasured memories I have. Night-time was the scene for the three concerts I 
organized with my musician friends, mixing the standards of Western classical music 
with traditional Peruvian songs before a packed Cathedral. Night-time was also when I 
stayed up to “accompany” (acompañar) close friends who had lost a loved one, playing 
my violin over a casket throughout the all-night funerary vigil. 
The activities described thus far were the public (or semi-public) events that 
regularly filled my fieldwork evenings and nights. Equally significant, however, were the 
non-public nightly, mundane, activities that happened at home (mine or of close friends), 
the conversations that emerged over the nightly fare of hot tea and fresh bread, or 
conversations about local television and radio news programs. And then there were the 
long nights when the electricity was out, with nothing to do but light candle after candle 
and wile away the night hours chatting. These night-time rituals fostered all-together 
different kinds of conversation, as well as different kinds of relationships, ones that are 
much less public and much more familial and intimate, much less random and much 
more selective.  
All of these stories, combined, are the backdrop for this dissertation. My own 
sociality (albeit incomplete) as a community member (albeit temporary), emerged from 
these daily and nightly encounters; importantly, my own subjectivity as an ethnographer 
emerged from these same relationships that spanned public and private settings. These 
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were the most formative settings for my own socialization. They were the temporal and 
physical spaces in which I took the greatest risks to expose my utter confusion after a 
long day of fieldwork. It was during such unstructured occasions, for example, that I was 
educated on the histories of relationships in a relatively small city where these stories 
were (largely) common knowledge but often hard for me to decipher. Within the confines 
of these “safe” places, friends would also educate me on how to act, behave, talk, and 
respond, especially when in “public.” With the ethnographic experience as dialogically 
emergent as all social interaction and cultural knowledge (Mannheim and Tedlock 1995), 
these night-time exchanges and relationships proved to be essential intimate and private 
domains of sociality and subjectivity. 
Ethnographic Urgency 
When I first arrived in Ayacucho in December of 2002, I immediately began 
collecting articles from the local newspapers. It was a way to ground myself in local 
events, but I was also saving them for future reference, sure that I would not be able to 
keep up with life in this new setting. As time went on and the stack grew unruly, I began 
to organize the articles into folders according to big (and predictable) “topics,” most of 
which sort of related to my project on youth musical practices in the city. One of the first 
folders I created was called “Carnival,” documenting the upcoming celebrations that had 
everybody highly energized. But somewhere along the way I also labeled a folder 
“Marches, strikes, and protests.” At the time, I couldn’t fully interpret the daily public 
displays of demands and discontent, and I certainly didn’t know how it related to my own 
project. But these forms of social unrest were such a prominent feature life in Ayacucho 
that I continued stuffing article after article into the folder. Over time, the generic file 
category multiplied and, in some cases, split into much more specific topics. This was 
perhaps the beginning of the major shift in my research focus, though I was unaware of it 
at the time. 
In the dizzying and exhausting progression of fieldwork, it is surprisingly easy to 
lose sight of the “big questions” that launched the project in the first place. Although 
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straying too far into the web of tangentially related topics has the potential to be 
profoundly disorienting, it ultimately allowed for the most rewarding moment in my 
fieldwork transition, when the project began to take on a life of its own, no longer forced 
along by a blind researcher. It was quite abrupt when it dawned on me that I was, quite 
literally, now following the project. After often wondering whether the questions that I 
was trying to answer simply weren’t meant to be, it suddenly felt like my project had just 
fallen out of the clear blue Ayacuchano sky and I happened to be there to catch it. In 
terms of ethnographic research, the shift was not necessarily all that dramatic; with my 
focus still on youth nightlife in the city center, the basic process of fieldwork changed 
very little. But the perfectly satisfying “aha!” moments were more frequent, when the 
pieces started to fall naturally into place, when I could not miss what I was seeing in that 
one little corner of the puzzle and, more exciting still, from that little corner I could now 
make out the full image coming together. More importantly, I gradually began to feel that 
through my small project on nightlife I was beginning to understand much more 
substantial concerns of humanity and sociality. 
By shattering the confines of a pre-designed “project,” the research was made 
relevant, capable of illuminating much broader and more pertinent questions. So it is that 
by the end of my two and a half years of ethnographic fieldwork on the politics of 
nightlife in the city of Ayacucho, I could confidently answer the question about why 
study nightlife when seguridad ciudadana was more pressing. The urgency that now 
guided my research not only added theoretical depth to the project but, more importantly, 
added meaning to the fieldwork experience of waking up each morning and going to bed 
each night, the routines and adventures of research in that particular city in highland Peru. 
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PART 1: NIGHTLIFE 
Social Crisis of the Night 
CHAPTER 1 
Huamanga:  
The City (Center) and its Problematic 
Emergence of a Problematic,  
Evolution of an Emergency 
“Pueblo pequeño, infierno grande”: the smaller the town, the bigger the hell. As if 
summed up by this frequent refrain on small town politics, Ayacucho’s whole nightlife 
problematic seemed to be encapsulated by one local family. One brother was often cited 
as owning the “first” night club (though his bore little resemblance to contemporary 
clubs). One sister and their mother currently lived right on the other side of the wall from 
one of the most infamous night clubs; the sister was embroiled in legal battles with the 
club owner and served as a public face to the newly formed neighborhood organization of 
Jirón Asamblea that was so strongly pressuring the provincial municipality. Another 
brother was, at the very same time, serving as Huamanga’s deputy mayor; as head of the 
Provincial Citizen Security Committee he was the municipality’s front man in the 
struggles to regulate the night clubs, and was often personally responsible for answering 
the accusations from neighborhood organizations and other angry residents. Although the 
extent of the entwined relationships in this one family is unique in degree, it highlights 
the key reality that political life in the city of Ayacucho largely remains in the hands of a 
few influential families who live, work, and entertain in the city center, who occupy the 
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historic quarter in a profoundly physical and symbolic way, and who in rhetoric and in 
practice not only claim it as their own but also present it as the most important domain of 
the metropolitan city: “If the historic center has no future, neither does Ayacucho.”1 
As a social and political struggle, the nightlife problematic was embedded in local 
historical dynamics of influence, including the deep layers of symbolic, economic, and 
political power. As would be expected, the distribution of influence over the definition of 
the nightlife “crisis” was decidedly imbalanced, following the critical fault lines of these 
local social asymmetries. In defining the crisis and setting the parameters for the nightlife 
problematic, a relatively small set of residents with traditional influence and privilege 
were in a critical position to guide the political imperatives of the day (and night). Their 
ideological evaluations of nightlife activities (among a set of related issues) had 
substantial influence over official attempts to control and delimit the historic quarter. The 
politics and policies that arose out of the nightlife problematic constituted a certain brand 
of spatial and temporal governance that blended issues of security – broadly defined – 
with those of morality – narrowly defined. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of how the historicity of Huamanga as an 
elite, urban center stands out as a particular vision of order, as well as a classic model of 
space that is intentionally designed to be at once religious and bureaucratic, at once 
constitutive of the (“homogenous”) collective and yet highly exclusive (c.f. Lund 2001). 
From there, the chapter moves into a discussion of how the political development of the 
nightlife problematic was ideologically mediated through sets of dualities and transposed 
social distinctions. As a paradigm for social and political action, the nightlife problematic 
was fundamentally concerned with the representation of the city center against and 
through its constructed limits (c.f. Gandolfo 2009); whether along the lines of religion, 
sex, race, or class, it concerned the dialectical play and mutual definition of the city 
“center” and its margins, at once social, physical and temporal. 
                                               
1 Linea Roja, February 18, 2004, page 9 
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Therefore: Record, Publish, Fulfill 
At 10am on the morning of September 1, 2004, the Provincial Municipality of 
Huamanga convened a press conference to publically announce Ordenanza 054. At one 
end of the large Salón Consistorial on the second floor of the old and creaky municipal 
building, upon a stage separated more symbolically than physically by one modest step 
and a precarious wooden railing, sat the Mayor of the Provincial Municipality of 
Huamanga (Alcalde de la Municipalidad Provincial de Huamanga). To his right sat the 
region’s State Attorney General (Fiscal Decano) and to his left sat the Deputy Mayor 
(Teniente Alcalde), and the District Mayor of San Juan Bautista, one of the four districts 
in the metropolitan city of Ayacucho (Alcalde del Distrito de San Juan Bautista). Around 
them, on chairs along the wall, sat another two dozen local officials, including members 
of the Municipal Council (Consejo Municipal), the regional Justice Department (Poder 
Judicial), and the National Police (Policía Nacional del Perú).  
 
 
PHOTO 1.1 - Press conference announcing the declaration of Ordenanza 054. (Municipalidad 
Provincial de Huamanga, September 1, 2004.) 
Also represented were the human rights ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo), and the 
government’s commissioner for Peace and Development (Comisionado para la Paz y el 
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Desarrollo). The event was moderated by the province’s first Director of Citizen Security 
(Subgerente de Seguridad Ciudadana), who stood at a podium to the side of the stage.  
Facing the authorities, on the other side of the wooden railing, the worn wooden 
benches were full of members of the press and representatives of a few related NGOs. 
Amidst the crowd was also the powerful presence of a family affected by crime 
associated with the night clubs. And there were several prominent residents from the city 
center, long-time opponents of the nightlife scene. Just days before, these residents had 
formally organized as a junta vecinal, a neighborhood organization for Jirón Asamblea, 
the area with the highest concentration of night clubs. They had set as their mission to put 
an end to the entertainment industry that they claimed had converted their few city blocks 
from an ideal of historic and religious significance to a zone infamous for unlicensed and 
illegal nighttime businesses, that were destroying the residents’ constitutional right to live 
in peace and tranquility with all-night racket and frequent street brawls outside their 
windows, that were corrupting the youth and destroying the city’s future through 
promiscuity, alcoholism, crime, and violence. Sitting as close to the front of the room as 
they could, they drew attention to their presence and their demands by holding hand-
made signs, reading:  
Discotecas y Prostíbulos / Fuera del Centro Histórico [Night clubs and Brothels / 
Out of the Historic Center] 
No a la Promiscuidad / Dentro de las Discotecas [No to the promiscuity / Inside 
the Nightclubs] 
Queremos la Paz / No a la Bulla [We want Peace / No to the Racket] 
Many of the questions and comments from the public and the press were direct 
challenges to the officials on the stage: Why aren’t the night clubs closed, for once and 
for all, and who is “truly responsible” for not enforcing the closure? What are you doing 
about the corrupt officials within the municipality and the Justice Department (Poder 
Judicial)? This is a social problem, so what are you doing besides passing ineffective 
resolutions for the closure of clubs? We’re tired of security “forums” and workshops – 
it’s time that you take some real steps, so what are your concrete plans? The response 
from the authorities on that morning was characteristic of most such encounters. When 
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pressed for specifics (say, on the number of corruption cases) they responded by saying 
“this meeting is not about statistics, it’s about plans for the future.” When pressed for 
concrete plans they deftly turned the debate back to its social roots, arguing that they 
cannot do this work alone, that the work has to be done “as a team with civil society,” 
that since the origins of the problematic stem from “mental health,” a “torn social fabric,” 
and a “culture of violence,” even their forced closures of night clubs are not the full 
solution, that everybody is responsible. 
Throughout the meeting the different officials, clearly on the defensive, reiterated 
their commitment to solving the city’s problems with security, with youth violence and 
gangs, with illegal night clubs. They announced another “citizen security” workshop 
(taller) organized for that weekend (the fourth such workshop that year), as well as a few 
upcoming meetings in which tackling the concerns of citizen security, or seguridad 
ciudadana, were the main agenda. They ended the press conference by outlining the 
plans for implementing and fulfilling the Ordinance, including a 30-day prohibition of all 
non-sport events and a limited curfew in which all businesses must close at 11pm. They 
also announced another round of forced closures (clausuras) of unlicensed night clubs 
along Jirón Asamblea, to be held later that afternoon.2 
Consistent with the historic dynamics of prestige and power in Ayacucho, the 
attendance and opinions expressed at the press conference were in many ways rather 
predictable, and over time these patterns became more and more entrenched through the 
frequent planning meetings and repeated “forums” (foros) or “workshops” (talleres) on 
citizen security. While these events were often hosted by the provincial municipality, and 
organized by the Provincial Committee for Citizen Security (Comité Provincial de 
Seguridad Ciudadana, COPROSEC) together with the governmental Commission for 
Peace and Development (Comisionado para la Paz y el Desarrollo), they were often 
facilitated by one of a small number of NGOs that were active in the issues of citizen 
                                               
2 Please see the appendix for a timeline of ordinances and major events pertaining to the nightlife 
emergency. These forced closures will be described in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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security.3 The invite list for these events was dominated by formally registered 
neighborhood organizations and some of the established youth organizations of the city 
center. Noticeably absent from virtually all such planning meetings or seminars were 
those community organizations or youth groups that that were not registered with the 
municipality (which were many), most of whom represented areas outside of the city 
center. Also conspicuously absent (with one highly-orchestrated exception) were the club 
owners and others involved in the nightlife scene itself. 
The members of the Asamblea junta were the beating heart of nightlife 
emergency, defining, from the very beginning, the “reality” of life at night in the city 
center. They were the select group who formulated and publically articulated the 
ideological foundation of the social crisis. They were predominantly professionals 
(lawyers, nurses, instructors of secondary education) or business-owners, as were their 
spouses. However, most of these women (and the active members were, with one 
occasional exception, all women) were not otherwise politically motivated; despite their 
relative prestige of power in the city, they were not socialites, and they were not 
otherwise public figures. As the problematic took shape, the time commitment involved 
in maintaining their fight increased substantially, and many concerned residents fell into 
backseat roles. Although their total membership numbered over 50, only half a dozen 
active members sustained their cause. These core members were key players in the 
development of the social crisis as well as the public problem. Their engagement in the 
problematic resurfaces throughout the dissertation, from their initial complaints of moral 
corruption, to their persistent presence in the State Attorney’s office; from public forums 
to media appearances; from their marches against the municipality to their reluctant 
engagement with (mostly resistance to) the Citizen Security apparatus. Because of their 
centrality in the problematic, these women were practically hurled into the limelight, not 
always according to their plans or wishes.4  
                                               
3 At the time, the NGOs with most involvement in these activities were: Instituto de Defensa Legal, Centro 
de Promoción y Desarrollo Poblacional, Servicio Alemán de Cooperación Social Técnica, as well as Paz y 
Esperanza and Transparencia. 
4 As a result, a curious reader, or one familiar with the city center, would undoubtedly have little problem 
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The Very Noble and Loyal City of Huamanga 
The officials at the press conference were surrounded by the standard symbols of 
Huamanga’s municipal authority: on the miniature flags standing proudly on the table, on 
the podium, on larger flags hanging on the wall behind them, on the stained glass 
window, and on the weathered wooden coat of arms which hung high on the wall above. 
The ornate colonial title with which the ordinance is declared official, the Very Noble and 
Loyal City of Huamanga, still graces the municipality with its beautiful semantic excess, 
serving as an especially poignant site for considering the overlaps between social, 
temporal, and geographic boundaries in the city, for exploring the contours and layers of 
physical and social geographies.  
The city of Ayacucho sits at 9000 feet in a dry and wide Andean valley, in the 
department with the same name, Ayacucho. The city was founded by the Spaniards in 
1540, just five years after Francisco Pizarro founded the capital city of Lima, and given 
the official title of The Very Noble and Loyal City of Huamanga (La Muy Noble y Leal 
Ciudada de Huamanga).5 Immediately established as an important colonial center, the 
first church was constructed in 1540, the year the city was founded, and in less than thirty 
years, the Spaniards had constructed approximately seven churches, including three 
monasteries, and a hospital (Urrutia 1985:90, 104). By the 1670s, Huamanga was a 
diocese with a Cathedral, and it was an intellectual center that boasted its own University. 
The region again figured prominently in the new nation’s history for the defining battle of 
independence, fought in 1824 roughly 20 miles away from Huamanga. Honoring what 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
identifying them. Nonetheless, I have opted to preserve their identity; despite their public position, their 
fight was profoundly personal and intimate. At the end of the day (literally and figuratively), these women 
went home to their residences next door to night clubs, and there, alone with their families, they fought 
what was for them the real fight: surviving in the midst of the city center’s small but vibrant nightlife 
scene. 
5 These are the dates officially celebrated, but each April, as the municipality organizes anniversary 
celebrations, a debate resurfaces over which of the “true” beginnings of Huamanga should be celebrated. 
The Spanish initially founded San Juan de la Frontera on January 29, 1539, though there is disagreement 
over whether this was in the nearby town of Quinua (as Cieza de Leon argues) or Huamanguilla. In any 
case, the Spaniards relocated to the current location on April 25 of the following year, and named the city 
San Juan de la Frontera de Huamanga. This original name, “Saint John of the Frontier,” was a rhetorical 
barrier against Manco Inca and his followers. The title of La Muy Noble y Leal Ciudada de Huamanga was 
given in 1544. 
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came to be known as the Battle of Ayacucho, in 1825 Simón Bolivar ceremoniously 
changed the city’s official name to Ayacucho.  
 
 
PHOTO 1.2 – Ayacucho and the surrounding valley. View from the hills above Huamanguilla. 
During the colonial years, the economic and political systems governing the 
provincial city of Huamanga allied with the strong “political arm” of Spanish Viceroy 
Toledo’s colonization design in which Spaniards and elite mestizos consistently exploited 
Indian labor and monopolized the regional patrimony (Stern 1982). The city of 
Huamanga was limited to the five-block radius surrounding the main plaza – home to the 
Cathedral, the Municipality, the Court and other important government buildings – and 
populated by Spanish, elite and wealthy mestizos, and their Indian servants. Nonetheless, 
by the seventeenth century an influential Indian elite minority managed to unrest some of 
the colonial power structures enough to advance economically and socially in the 
dominant society, planting firm roots in urban spheres. The result was a “growing sector 
of ladino Indians. The ladinos were people of Indian parentage whose culture, demeanor 
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and lifeways took on a more mestizo or even Spanish character” (Stern 1982:167). The 
“tragedy of success” of this model of advancement was that the path towards urban social 
and political influence was paved by a distinct valorization of Hispanic culture over those 
characteristics deemed Indian and rural. In effect, the Indian elite acquired measures of 
success without radically altering the structures of hierarchy and judgment that continued 
to subjugate the non-elite, non-urban, non-Hispanicized population (c.f. de la Cadena 
2000). The “most dramatic creation – and legacy – of the first century of colonization,” 
concludes Stern, “was Indian poverty” (1982:185). 
In Ayacucho, a predominantly rural region, this legacy of structured poverty only 
intensified over the years. The province of Huamanga, and specifically the historic city 
center of Ayacucho (referred to at that time as the cercado de Ayacucho) was heavily 
dependent upon nearby Indian communities and traveling tradesmen for food and other 
necessary goods. With pack animals as the only form of commercial transportation 
available to Ayacucho until 1921 (Contreras 1987:57), these tradesmen and mule drivers 
(arrieros) were an integral component of the region’s economic system, travelling for 
months at a time, mostly to other highland cities such as Cuzco, Arequipa or Huancayo, 
and returning with goods to sell and barter in Ayacucho’s markets. The districts of 
Carmen Alto and San Juan Bautista, today part of the metropolitan city of Ayacucho, 
were colonial communities dedicated overwhelmingly to long-distance trade and the 
slaughtering of animals. Located only a few miles from the city’s main plaza and seat of 
power, and commanding a fully integrated and dynamic economy, many of the arriero 
families were financially very successful. Nonetheless, these predominantly Quechua-
speaking communities with strong ties to rural subsistence agriculture remained largely 
marginalized from the cercado of Ayacucho, culturally, socially, and, especially, 
politically. In many instances, these communities had tense relationships with the 
municipality of the cercado (which was in a position to dictate trading practices such as 
market locations and prices), and they were known for instigating several well-
remembered protests and uprisings (c.f. Contreras 1987; Mayer 1990; Trigos Jayo, et al. 
2004). 
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For cities throughout Peru, the 20th century was characterized by unprecedented 
urban migration, and Huamanga was no exception. In 1940, the city’s total population 
numbered only 17,000 inhabitants and the population nearly quadrupled over the 
following four decades, reaching roughly 63,000 people in 1981. Although the 1960s 
marked the highest rate of urbanization in the department before or since (at a rate of 3.5, 
INEI 2003a), other calculations indicate that the population that left Huamanga in the 
1960s and 70s amounted to more than three times the incoming population, giving it the 
highest overall outgoing rate in the nation (Degregori 1986:46). Following the collapse of 
the relatively small but strong mining industry in the region, the economic market of 
Ayacucho fell into greater isolation and hardship. By the end of the 20th century, out of 
Peru’s twenty-four departments, only neighboring Huancavelica consistently faired 
poorer than Ayacucho in standard of living, illiteracy, per capita income, and 
participation in the national market (Degregori 1986, 1990). 
In many other ways, however, the 1960s and 70s were also golden years for 
Ayacucho’s regional elite. Arguably the most significant factor was the reopening of the 
university, originally founded in 1677 as a part of the Spanish Crown’s catholic 
university system but closed in 1876. In 1959, as part of the government’s regional 
revitalization programs, the doors were triumphantly reopened, now as a public 
institution under the name Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga (UNSCH), 
bringing to the small provincial city some of Peru’s most prominent intellectuals, 
including Jorge Basadre, Luis Valcárcel, and José María Arguedas (Degregori 1990:41). 
In keeping with a strong renaissance of indigenismo and regionalism across Peru (c.f. de 
la Cadena 2000 and Valverde 1984), naming the “new” university with reference to 
Huamanga, instead of changing it to match the official name of the city and the 
department, Ayacucho, can be interpreted in part as move towards re-affirmation of 
regional history and culture. The ability of a provincial university to break the intellectual 
and political dominance of Lima and become an important educational center in its own 
right, especially in one of the country’s poorest and most isolated regions, resulted in 
nothing short of what Degregori refers to as a societal “earthquake” (Degregori 1990:43). 
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Indeed, university enrollment at the UNSCH grew from 228 in 1959 to 7,209 in 1978, an 
increase of over 3100%, compared to a 690% increase on the national level in the same 
time period (Degregori 1990:Appendix Chart 4).  
La Batalla de Huamanga: War in the City 
During the 1970s, UNSCH philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán and a cohort 
of fellow professors and students at the university in Huamanga split from the Peruvian 
Communist Party (Partido Comunista del Perú) to form their own broad political 
campaign, known as Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path.6 After years developing an 
ideological position and gaining a stronghold among the local intelligentsia and activists, 
the Maoist rebel group rather quietly initiated their so-called “popular war” in 1980 by 
ransacking and burning the ballot boxes in Chuschi, a village in the hinterland of the 
department of Ayacucho, during the first general elections in which illiterate peasants 
could vote for president. Not only was Ayacucho the birthplace of the Shining Path, it 
was also the main battleground of the ensuing civil war (1980-1993). Of the nearly 
70,000 Peruvians estimated to have been killed or disappeared (Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación 2003), over 50% of those were in the department of Ayacucho. While the 
vast majority of the violence occurred in the rural areas, the city of Ayacucho was 
profoundly affected by civil war and, as we will see at numerous points throughout the 
dissertation, the city’s experiences during the years of political violence continue to cast a 
shadow upon on local debates of governance, security, and cultural change. 
Within two years, the Shining Path had control over the city of Ayacucho, as well 
as complete control over all but a fifth of the department of Ayacucho. Following the 
murder of Huamanga’s provincial mayor in December of 1982, military involvement 
brought on some of the bloodiest years in Ayacucho, as the state frantically tried to make 
                                               
6 There are many sources on the Shining Path and different aspects of the political struggles of the civil 
war, among them: Acevedo Rojas 2002; Burt 1998; Burt 2007; Degregori 1986; Degregori 1989; Degregori 
1990; Degregori 1996; Degregori and Rivera 1994; Degregori 2003; Fumerton 2002; Gorriti 1999; Hilario 
Valenzuela 1997; Kirk 1993; McCormick 1992; Palmer 1994; Peralta Ruiz 2000; Starn 1996; Stern 1998; 
Tapia 1997; Taylor 1998; Wilson 2000; Yezer 2007 
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up for two and a half years of neglect.7 By 1984 the navy, the Civil Guard, the army, and 
the local and regional police forces were all joined under one nationwide, army-
controlled “anti-subversive” campaign. This immense and internally divided apparatus 
had its headquarters in the city of Huamanga. 
One of the Shining Path’s fundamental beliefs was the incompatibility of the city 
and the countryside, and they vehemently insisted on the contaminating influence of the 
urban, mestizo culture on the rural, indigenous peasantry. In their military strategy to 
strangle the urban areas and stamp out capitalism, de la Cadena notes that “it comes as 
little surprise that one of Sendero Luminoso’s first actions in Ayacucho was to close 
peasant fairs and market participation, ignoring [their] mercantile and cultural needs” (de 
la Cadena 1998:54). These actions, combined with the attacks on public works projects 
and infrastructure, especially roads or electrical sources, meant that cities such as 
Ayacucho suffered regular food shortages and chronic power outages, and residents often 
felt trapped in the city without access to roads and the rest of the country. As we will hear 
at other points in the dissertation, many other less tangible side effects are also among the 
most frequently cited memories of the years of war for residents of the city, especially 
drastic curfews mandating that the streets be emptied by 8pm and extreme censorship and 
restrictions on all public gatherings. 
At the same time as the Shining Path was “strangling” the city of Huamanga, it 
also advanced a strong urban campaign on the city, and a high urban conflict index, 
which refers to “the ratio of the percentage of actions carried out in or around local 
capital to percentage of department population living in same area” (McCormick 1992: 
40, 42). According to the Truth and Reconciliation estimates, nearly 50% of the country’s 
total deaths and disappearances were in the department of Ayacucho. Of those actually 
reported cases, over 17% of the deaths and disappearances in the department occurred in 
the province of Huamanga alone; from another perspective, over 8% of all the deaths and 
disappearances reported in the country occurred in the province of Huamanga, the small 
                                               
7 Patterns of violence were slightly different in Ayacucho than in Lima, where the violence peaked in the 
early 1990s (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003) 
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area surrounding this city. 
During the years of political violence, the city also witnessed extremely volatile 
migration. Between the years of 1988 and 1993 (the last five years of active civil war), 
some 17,000 people migrated into the province of Huamanga but nearly 28,000 people 
emigrated out of the province. During these five years, migration alone caused a roughly 
10% population drop surrounding the city (INEI 2003b). The refugees that were now 
settling in the city, however, were arriving in dramatically different circumstances from 
the migrants of previous decades: many were traumatized by their experiences with 
violence and devastated by dead or missing loved ones, families were torn apart, children 
were arriving without parents, families were cut off from their resources and their land. 
Although many of these asymmetrical migration patterns were not necessarily new (c.f. 
Leinaweaver 2005), the “torn social fabric” resulting from the combined pressures of 
political violence and migration had a profound impact on the city. Many in the city 
continue a long and honorable fight for increased resources and support, especially for a 
generation of youth who they see as never knowing any way other than violence to deal 
with their immense anger, frustration, and desperation (c.f. Madre Covadonga in Vivas 
1999, Yaranga 2000). 
As the war drew on, Ayacucho became increasingly stigmatized and 
Ayacuchanos consistently relay how they felt discriminated against as Ayacuchano 
became equated in the national (and international) imagination with “terrorist.” The 
simplified and misleading idea that Ayacucho is inherently rebellious has widespread 
currency, perhaps most evident in the oft-mentioned cliché that “Ayacucho” means 
corner of the dead in Quechua, the region’s indigenous language.8 Even well-regarded 
and comprehensive works on the Shining Path exploit such popular images of chronic 
insurgency and a “culture of violence” in Ayacucho: “Revolutions begin in Arequipa … 
but when they reach Ayacucho they are serious matters” (Gorriti 1999:v; see also Kay 
                                               
8 This meaning comes from translations of aya as dead and cucho as corner. An alternative meaning of 
Ayacucho as “home of the soul” translates aya as soul and cucho as dwelling. This meaning, which I only 
occasionally heard, draws inspiration not from the stereotypes of a violent character but rather from 
Ayacucho’s artistic and musical reputation. 
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1999:2).9 Just as the Shining Path attempted to legitimize their armed struggle in part 
through the argument that violence was a “universal law” of Peruvian history (Poole 
1994), contemporary explanations of “culture of violence” revive the postulation that 
Ayacuchanos are by nature disorderly, asocial, and violent, perpetuating the false 
dichotomy between those who are considered “violence prone” and those who are not.10 
This vision, an analytical trap, effectively naturalizes violence by implying that it has its 
own logic, converting society’s members from decision-makers to automated agents with 
violent impulses. 
Within the national rhetoric of victory in the years since the civil war, Ayacucho 
continues to be identified as the place of “insurgency,” and it still endures a national 
reputation as socially volatile, as an obstacle to Peru’s peaceful development. Today, the 
idea that Ayacucho is dominated by a “culture of violence” is not as directly related to 
historical concerns of terrorism; instead, it is largely fueled by what some call 
“convulsión social,” social upheaval, referring to the continuous stream of marches, 
strikes, and other such protests in the city. Locally, however, discussions about insecurity 
in the city are more likely to draw attention to typical urban problems with crime or 
gangs. In other words, Ayacucho’s tainted reputation as a place of insecurity includes 
everything from political violence and insurgency, to civil protest and even to youth 
delinquency. These experiential connections between different forms of insecurity are 
palpable within the nightlife problematic: a significant component of the sensation of 
crisis is through emotional claims that crime and urban violence have made it felt like a 
return to the years of civil war, when nights were dangerous, when the innocent could get 
caught in the wrong place at the wrong time, when parents worried about where their 
children would end up. 
Accounts of Ayacucho’s experiences with contemporary violence often seem to 
paint an ethnographic picture documenting another of Latin America’s transitions from 
                                               
9 See de la Cadena 2000 for a comprehensive discussion of the history of such stereotypes, and Poole 1994 
for a theoretical discussion of such a problematic concept of a “culture of violence.” 
10 See Woodward 2000 for a discussion of the effects of dichotomies that mark certain people as “violence 
prone,” as well as other articles in Das, et al. 2000. 
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war to crime, rather than war to peace (c.f. Moodie 2002; Warren 2000; see also Kynoch 
2003, Steinberg 2001). Locally, the heightened perception of contemporary urban 
insecurity is directly shaped by the intervening period of Alberto Fujimori’s authoritarian 
rule (1990-2000). These years, especially after following his 1992 self-coup and the 1993 
capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman, are seen almost as an eerie seven-year 
calm after the storm. As will be discussed in greater detail later in the dissertation, this is 
critical to understanding the indignation over contemporary insecurity and the evaluations 
of local governance. Many have explained it this way: under the “firm hand” (mano 
dura) with which Fujimori governed, some democratic rights were threatened (such as 
the right to publicly organize) but the society as a whole was stable, calm, and peaceful. 
This stability is often cited as a fundamental right for all citizens. In fact, a particular line 
in the Peruvian constitution is frequently cited by organized residents in the city center in 
their case for greater regulation against the nightlife: the right “to peace, tranquility, to 
enjoy free time and rest, as well as a stable environment suitable for developing one’s 
life.”11  
We cannot begin to understand Ayacucho – and contemporary desires to preserve 
the city and protect it from insecurity – without an understanding of its intimate history 
with political violence and efforts to control and repress social upheaval in all forms. As 
suggested in the above quote that “we’re huamanguinos who stayed,” these experiences 
are often called upon in highly charged encounters, invoked with the full weight of 
“commitment” to the imagined city, of “sacrifice” for the city. Inevitably, such references 
and interpretations of experiences with the years of violence resurface throughout this 
story. Nonetheless, the dissertation as a whole involves a continuous exercise to counter 
the dominant meta-narrative of “violence in Ayacucho.” In part, this exercise is embodied 
in the design of the project itself (stemming from the heart-felt belief that such a story 
does an injustice to the Ayacuchanos I came to know and love), and in part this exercise 
is the topic of study. On the one hand, the dissertation conscientiously assumes the 
                                               
11 Constitución Política del Perú (1992) Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Inc. 22. 
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perspective that what makes the topic of seguridad ciudadana in Ayacucho unique has, 
ultimately, little to do with the degree or the kind of urban insecurity present in the city. 
(What city doesn’t struggle with concerns such as crime?) For that matter, the public 
formulations of strong moral and traditionalist, or socially conservative, reactions to 
nightlife and the presumed social ills that accompany it are also not entirely unique to 
Ayacucho.12 Nonetheless, the global exchange of cultural practices and ideas take on 
markedly local hues and nuances (c.f. Appadurai 1996, Mignolo 2000, Miller 1995). The 
crisscrossing histories of global and local influences and constraints that combine to 
shape the unique dynamic of Ayacucho’s nightlife problematic are the foundation of this 
project, visible not only in the nightlife scene that is the content of the problematic but 
just as much in the discourse of citizen security that provides a framework for 
problematization. 
Throughout this dissertation, we find examples of how residents are continuously 
grappling with national and international stereotypes about Ayacucho as “inherently 
violent,” sometimes falling in line with parallel discourses but other times actively 
confronting the meta-narrative of violence in the city. This can be seen in the very 
problematization of nightlife, which reframes the city’s insecurity from being the natural 
outcome of a “violence-prone” society to being a direct result of distinctly non-local 
cultural influences (such as nightclubs and fiestas chichas, for example, examined in the 
following chapters) that are corrupting the youth and threatening the city’s future. This 
perspective on Ayacucho’s problematization of nightlife affords an inquiry that stretches 
far beyond questions of violence per se, revealing the interconnectedness of moral 
politics and spatial-temporal governance, the interpretive power of the seguridad 
ciudadana discourse, the strength of citizen security as an organizing principle, and the 
depoliticization of histories of inequality despite, and indeed through, participatory 
governance and citizen security programs. 
                                               
12 Of course, the inter-relatedness of politics, power, and morality is by no means unique to Ayacucho 
either. Closer to home, “moral values” has become a familiar concept in U.S. politics as well, as 
“conservatives” and “liberals” alike have seized upon the political manipulation of this concept in the 
polemic over the limits and potential for cultural and social control or regulation. 
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The City (Center) and its Margins 
“We’re not just anybody. We’re huamanguinos. And we’re huamanguinos who 
stayed in [the] time of violence.” 
-- Local city center organizer13 
One of the most fascinating aspects of the nightlife problematic is the overlap between 
geographies of social distinction – the very concept that being “huamanguino” means 
something – and contemporary geographies of (in)security. As will be illustrated 
ethnographically throughout the dissertation, this kind of overlap – the layered 
transposition of significant dichotomies – serves as the backbone of the nightlife 
problematic. Specifically it lends meaning and consistency to the rhetoric of “emergency” 
by inextricably linking diverse socio-cultural realms such as youth culture, segmented 
urban space, displays of authority, democratic citizenship, and political engagement. By 
exploring these geographies, and locating the city center’s symbolic and ideological 
boundaries, therefore, we tap into the themes of social difference and equality, authority 
and stability, governance and democracy that underlie this entire story. 
As we will see in the following chapters, city center dissatisfaction with urban 
insecurity intersects with local and national politics within marked geographical spaces, 
relationships, and hierarchies. The middle-class and elite neighbors of the city center are 
not responding to concerns of crime and security in the same way as they have in other 
Latin American cities. They are not exactly forming security brigades (brigadas) nor 
hiring personal security, nor moving in waves to “modern” suburban compounds 
separated from the rest of the city with walls if not also by distance (c.f. Caldeira 2000; 
Coronil and Skurski 2004; Low 2001; Dinzey-Flores 2005). Instead, they have limited 
their campaign to advocating for the expulsion of undesirable activities (and their 
practitioners) from the city center, thereby further differentiating social categories 
through geographical space. They are doing so by defining what is morally and culturally 
acceptable in the city center during highly ideologized time-frames, deciding who are the 
                                               
13 Personal communication, September 2, 2004. (“No somos cualquiera. Somos huamanguinos. Y somos 
huamanguinos que nos hemos quedado en tiempo de violencia.”) 
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victims and the perpetrators of crime and violence, and determining the parameters of 
legal entertainment in the city center, or what forms of activities must instead be 
excluded and contained within the peripheral areas (such as through proposed 
“entertainment districts”).  
Today, the metropolitan city of Ayacucho is comprised of four districts, all of 
which fall under the jurisdiction of the Provincial Municipality of Huamanga. Overall, 
the 2003 population of the metropolitan city was approximately 140,000 people (INEI 
2003a), over double the population of nearly 63,000 that the city had in 1981, when the 
civil war was just beginning, though this growth was not distributed evenly across the 
urban districts. The district of Ayacucho, which includes the historic city center and the 
seat of the provincial and departmental governments, doubled in population, extending 
far into the north region of the city through a series of now-formalized communities of 
organized land-grabs. Of the remaining three districts within the metropolitan city, San 
Juan Bautista is the closest to the city center, just to the southeast. This historic district 
more than doubled over the past two decades. Carmen Alto, the smallest of the four 
districts but equally historic, spreads out to the east of the city center. Carmen Alto nearly 
tripled in population since the initiation of the civil war (INEI 2009).14 The newest 
district of Jesús Nazareno, to the northeast of the main plaza, was only established as a 
district in 2003.  
Interestingly, the formally designated district of Ayacucho, which encompasses 
the colonial city center, in fact has no district government, but is directly and solely 
represented by the Provincial Municipality of Huamanga. As a result, the provincial 
municipality has a notably partial inclination towards representing the historic center and 
governing according to its needs and priorities. While many residents affectionately refer 
                                               
14 Population figures are by district, and each of the four districts comprising the metropolitan area also 
includes a small portion of rural population which are included in the census numbers. 1981 Population 
Figures: Ayacucho 49,224 (this area included what is currently designated Jesús Nazareno); Carmen Alto 
3,970; San Juan Bautista 9,785; Metropolitan Area 62,979. 2003 Population Figures: Ayacucho 87,896; 
Carmen Alto 11,379; San Juan Bautista 26,397; Jesús Nazareno 16,491; Metropolitan Area 142,163. 
Growth over these years: Ayacucho and Jesús Nazareno 212%; Carmen Alto 287%; San Juan Bautista 
270%; Metropolitan Area 226% 
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to the city as Huamanga, in fact, “Huamanga” first and foremost indexes the historic city 
center, complete with the multiplicity of social distinctions that are afforded a provincial 
elite center of power. Without ascribing undue significance to district political 
boundaries, it is overwhelmingly evident that residents of the outlying districts, the 
marginal neighborhoods, the communities of migrants, do not carry the prestige of 
Huamanga, they are not huamanguinos. Quite simply, one can be a resident of the city 
(even multiple generations) without embodying this conceptualization of huamanguino.15 
 
 
PHOTO 1.3 – Panorama view of the city of Ayacucho. View from Cerro La Picota, with the 
approximate boundaries of the “historic city center” marked and the location of the main plaza 
indicated with an arrow.  
                                               
15 Locally, the names Ayacucho and Huamanga are often used interchangeably to refer to the city. For all 
the reasons that I have laid out here, this can be quite misleading. In my own terminology, I have tried to 
use the terms as follows: “Ayacucho” as a generic term for the city and “Huamanga” when referring 








PHOTO 1.5  – Map of Historic Center of the City of Huamanga. Map distributed by the new 
“Technical Office for the Centro Histórico” for purposes of the historical preservation of homes 
and buildings. The main plaza is marked with a star; Jirón Asamblea extends to the right (north) 




Considering the meanings ascribed to “Huamanga” raises further questions about 
the metaphors of geography that are used in the language of power, beginning with the 
naturalized and established concept of the “city center,” a term that is applied to cities 
across the globe. This blatant geographical and spatial reference only occasionally 
resembles the geographical “reality” of urban layout (a physical “center”); instead it is 
figurative language for privilege and power. Commenting on the equally geographic term 
“inner city,” Ulf Hannerz pointedly stated that it is a “popular contemporary euphemism 
for slums, but often a less appropriate term, as the areas are often more rundown than 
centrally located” (Hannerz 1969:11). Municipal officials in Ayacucho who refer 
continuously to the casco urbano (roughly referring to the city center) or the even more 
exclusive and contained centro histórico (historic center) contrast this with the rest of the 
city: the cinturón de la ciudad, literally the belt of the city. While referring spatially to 
the “surrounding” or outlying areas, the symbolism of a belt conjures up images of a city 
being restricted, constrained, tightened, and contained. 
Within just a few blocks of the city’s main plaza, the smaller urban streets are 
unpaved; they are lined with stones or, more often, tightly packed dirt. Traveling out 
through most of the city, the narrow, curved and tightly packed streets of the historic 
center turn into wide and dusty streets, with only a handful of paved arteries connecting 
the furthest perimeters. Many of the streets in the “zonas altas” (high areas), especially 
on the western side, where the city crawls up Cerro La Picota, would hardly meet the 
standard American idea of a “street” – they are unnamed, unstable and eroded, steep dirt 
paths, impassible by any way except on foot. Addresses are identified through a cryptic 
system of blocks and lots, a system that confounds even local residents. My inquiries 
about specific addresses were usually met with a laugh and a shrug, as if to say who 
knows where such numbers can be found. But when I mentioned the family name that I 
was looking for I receive carefully explained directions that were complete with hand 
gestures but rarely seemed to clarify much: “oooh, it’s waaay up there, just keep on 
going” (“oooof, es arriiiiba todavía, sigue defrente nomá”) or “it’s a simple construction 
[i.e. not brick] with a metal door” (“es de construcción simple con puertita de metal”) 
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where most houses fit this description of adobe with tin doors, since the brick house was 
by far the exception in these areas. As we will see throughout the dissertation, the 
marginality of these areas is far more about social, political, and economic 
disempowerment than it is about spatial remoteness. 
As otherness is continually projected onto the barrios, the impression is 
continually reinscribed that these geographical spaces threaten the “civilized order” of the 
city center (c.f. Coronil and Skurski 2004:98; Stallybrass and White 1986), in this case 
disrupting the social peace of huamanguinos. As we will see by the end of this 
dissertation, the semiotic correlations of social difference that disproportionally place 
causal responsibility for Ayacucho’s patterns of insecurity within communities on the 
city’s periphery have resulted in policies and practices that continually reinscribe 
physical and symbolic social boundaries along this same us/they dichotomy.  
Nightlife Ideologies & Social Crisis 
In understanding the development of the nightlife problematic – from its 
ideological core of morality and social distinction to its political instantiations in spatial-
temporal regulations and participatory security programs – I begin by conceptualizing 
nightlife ideologies. First, this concept of “nightlife ideologies” is intended to encapsulate 
a set of normative ideas about “nightlife”: about time and space collectively, or about 
social and non-social activities in night spaces; “night ideologies” is further meant to 
capture the patterns within ideas about the people involved in such activities; likewise, it 
is designed to include ideas about the very significance of night experiences to our 
subjectivity and sociality. In doing so, it highlights the connections between all of these 
ideas, how they inform one another and play off one another in historically patterned and 
systematic ways, across socio-cultural realms. Second, through this concept of “nightlife 
ideologies,” the essential dimensions of power and inequality that underlie such ideas 
become evident, drawing our attention to experiential human relationships, moral 
interests and political motivations. As such, it demonstrates how these structured ideas 
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about “nightlife” are fundamentally ideas about social distinction. Finally, this concept of 
“nightlife ideologies” is mean to draw connections between ideas about “nightlife” and 
the social and political responses to nightlife. Importantly, this concept emphasizes not 
only how these ideologies emerge from the socio-political world (from the circumstances 
of night-life, as the case may be) but also how they structure the socio-political world as 
they are embodied and enacted in highly consequential ways.  
Through the development of Ayacucho’s nightlife emergency, a repertoire of 
socially and culturally meaningful signs were drawn from the particularities of the socio-
political world of the city center’s nightlife scene and organized within an integrated 
ideological field of interpretation and representation. In other words, through the process 
of problematizing the city’s nightlife scene as a social crisis, an ideology of “nightlife” 
emerged that was cohesive enough – despite being inherently partial and contested – to 
serve as a much broader interpretive framework of the social world: “nightlife” and its 
components readily indexed other meaningful social phenomena. Moreover, while this 
nightlife ideology operated through the logic of social distinction, “nightlife” was 
simultaneously capable of masking other deep-seated markers of social distinction and 
historical patterns of inequality. While these nightlife ideologies were informed by the 
social world in which they emerged, they in turn carry significant pragmatic effect, 
structuring social debates, legitimizing inequalities, rationalizing a “social crisis,” 
motivating social and political responses, orienting social relations, and thus creating 
particular power dynamics. 
Structuring a Social Crisis 
“Granted that disorder spoils pattern, it also provides the material of pattern.”  
-- Purity and Danger (Mary Douglas 1966:95) 
 
“Those whose understanding of society is ruled by such ideology [based on 
A/Not-A dichotomy] find it very hard to conceive of the possibility of alternative 
forms of social order (third possibilities). Within such thinking, the only 
alternative to the one order is disorder”  
-- Gender and Dichotomy (Nancy Jay 1981:54, quoted in Massey 1992:72) 
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While it is often observed that during times of crisis we begin to reflect upon the “norm” 
or the ideal, it is also true that the active construction of an “ideal” cultural model against 
a model of transgression or disorder is part and parcel of the perception – and definition – 
of an emergent “crisis.” Through the problematization of nightlife – the ideological 
conception of a social crisis and the political formulation of a “public problem” in the 
city center – local politics of judgment, discrimination, and social hierarchy were codified 
and translated into public policies of social control.  
The nightlife ideology driving the articulation of a “crisis” in Ayacucho garnered 
its social and political weight precisely through a dichotomous formulation of order and 
disorder. Within a cohesive ideology, these conceptualizations of order and disorder were 
recursively projected across realms, taking with them the power to interpret the full 
spectrum of ideas about nightlife, from time and space, to people and social actions.  
As an ideology, “nightlife” and its components could systematically map onto 
“people, events, and activities that are significant to them” (Irvine and Gal 2000: 35). In 
considering how this process occurs, I have been influenced by scholars demonstrating 
how semiotic ideologies formalize social categories, lending consistency to patterns of 
social distinction (c.f. Irvine 2001; Irvine and Gal 2000; Agha 1998; Feld 1994). 
According to Irvine, these distinctions are ideologically mediated through processes 
“which operate on many levels, from the gross to the subtle” (Irvine 2001: 31). First, 
these oppositional differences are essentialized and naturalized (what Irvine refers to as 
iconization). They are then projected, recreated, transposed, and replicated through 
various social domains (recursivity). Along the way, the inconsistencies within the 
categories are erased, rendering internal complexities invisible. The individual 
components of “nightlife” gain meaning through an ideological system of distinction that 
depends precisely upon processes of distortion, simplification, essentialism, and erasure, 
all of which result in the appearance of exclusive categories. In the process, a pattern of 
social categorization and structural inequality emerges, one that is fully modern but not 
ahistorical. 
While the inconsistencies of these dichotomies permeate the dissertation, these 
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oppositions are the ideological foundation for the nightlife problematic. Within the 
nightlife emergency and the articulation of a social crisis, the conceptualizations of order 
and disorder were potent enough to imbue the interpretations of “nightlife” with a 
correlated logic about appropriate responses, political and social, formal and informal. 
In other words, while the dichotomies may not accurately represent the social world, they 
very effectively informed a politics of prejudice and judgment about certain night 
entertainment practices. Through their transposition across other social, political and 
cultural realms, they were converted into formalized public policies, specifically to 
control night spaces and govern security in the urban area. Throughout, we see clearly 
how the nightlife problematic relies upon reified categories, and, in turn, how binarisms 
were operationalized as a “key organizing principle of political inequality” (Herzfeld 
1997:15). 
Dichotomous Nightlife Ideologies 
The symbolisms of nightlife entertainment, especially those that relate to social 
and cultural “problems” such as alcohol, drugs, and sex, lend themselves easily to a long 
list of simplified oppositional dualities: social/antisocial, community-oriented/hedonistic, 
controlled/uncontrolled, moral/disreputable, decent/polluted, civilized/vulgar, 
rational/irrational….16 As representations of particular aspects of “nightlife,” these 
dichotomies are invested with further meanings and recursively linked to other salient 
and relevant social features. As these parallel dichotomies are transposed across 
sociocultural domains in this way, one side of the dichotomy – that which is consistently 
patterned after ambiguity, transgression and disorder – is consistently interpreted as 
threatening the other. Put differently, as these key social values seem infinitely 
transposable onto other meaningful distinctions, the constructed stereotypes and social 
images of nighttime entertainment (and those who are involved with it) acquire enough 
                                               
16 Gusfield has a similar list related to drunkenness, which also includes sober/drunken, 
obedient/disobedient, wise/foolish, work/play (Gusfield 1981:156-7). 
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weight to repeatedly invoke the potential for uncontrollable social disorder, contributing 
to the formulation of an emergent crisis.  
 
 
 Day Center 
Norm Order Decent 
Night Marginal 
Transgression Chaos Threat 
Casco urbano, centro histórico   
 




Barrios periféricos, marginales, zonas 
alejadas,cinturón de la ciudad   
Peripheral barrios, marginal neighborhoods , 
remote zones, the city’s belt   
Invasion (spatial as well as socio -cultural)  
New, haphazard  
Decente, sano, moral, valores   
 Decent, healthy, moral, values   
Moral community, del pueblo 
Religious  
Vulgar, perver tido, aberrante, mal vivir, asocial   
 Deviant, vulgar, disreputable, antisocial   
Hedonistic (self-gratifying, pleasure -seeking)  








Legal, legitimate (licensed business)  
 
Transparent and visible  
Measurable, recorded, k nown 
 (municipal records, bureaucracy)  
Structured  
Informal, Illicit (discotecas illegales, sin 
licencia)  
Occult, hidden 
Unmeasured, uncountable  
 (unknown number of clubs, gangs, brothels)  
Unstructured 
Victims of the inseguridad 
 
Gobernabilidad (Governability) 
Source of inseguridad (the socio-cultural 
 source, even if not actual perpetrators)  










Participación formal, justicia legal  
 Formal participation, legal justice  
Legal justice (denuncias, solicitudes ) 
Relies on education, professional skills  
Rational, within the system  
Colaboración informal, justicia popular  
 Informal collaboration, popular justice  
Night patrols, physical labor  
Untrained, makeshift, manual labor  
Outside of the system, potential for violence  
 (vigilantism) 
 
Chart 1.1 – Transposable Oppositions of the Nightlife Emergency 
While this chapter has featured the city “center” and its margins, the circulating 
trope of a nightlife crisis builds heavily upon a suite of constructed oppositions that are 
recursively projected (and recreated and reinforced) across many sociocultural realms. 
Thus in addition to the most basic oppositions of center/periphery or night/day, we will 
explore other salient dichotomies. The first half of the dissertation features those 
dichotomies most frequently used to represent the nightlife scene, such as decent/vulgar 
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socio-cultural practices (Chapters 2-3), and legal/illicit businesses (Chapters 2-4). As the 
problematic is framed increasingly in terms of urban security/insecurity, we see how 
socio-cultural cultural dichotomies dovetail with those portraying the victim/perpetrator 
of delinquency or criminality (Chapter 3). As residents begin to demand more and more 
political response to the crisis, we see how the duality of governability/chaos surfaces as 
a key organizing principle in the evaluation of democratic authority (Chapters 4-5). 
Eventually the ideas of victim/perpetrator re-emerge in considerations of political 
responsibility and participatory democracy (Chapters 6-7), tying in with further 
dichotomies of formal/informal and legal/physical political engagement (Chapters 7-8). 
Moments of crisis – as moments of transition – are alarming and concerning to 
those involved not only because the outcome is as yet unrecognizable but because quite 
often the entire game feels undetermined: the goal is not necessarily agreed upon, the 
rules are ambiguous, and even the players are also unidentified. We are talking about 
moments that feel like a crisis, when order is threatened, when values, morality, and 
cultural logic are (re)defined. Like a “moral panic” or a “crisis,” this is an integral 
component to the formulation of Ayacucho’s nightlife “problematic.” Faced with the 
sensation that the existing social structure is exposed – revealed and made vulnerable – 
the response on the part of city center residents was to pull out all the stops to perpetuate 
the existing social structure and to reinforce the norms. At the same time, however, even 
in such “transitions,” the game is rarely as undetermined as it may feel and the outcome 
of the “crisis” rarely as unrecognizable as feared. This concept has been illuminated by 
more recent inquiries into the recursivity and insidiousness of power (such as Bourdieu 
1980, 1991; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Foucault 1976, 1983; Gramsci 1971; 
Williams 1977), which propose that hegemonic order manages deviance (and, we could 
add, responds to media hysteria about moral panics and social crisis) by attempting to 
unmark the spectacular deviance and to reincorporate it back into a dominant framework 
of law and semiotic order.17 Marking the circumstance as a crisis is, in and of itself, 
                                               
17 With respect to media and deviant cultural practices (most notably musical), see also Hall 1979; Hebdige 
1988; Slobin 1993; Stokes 1994. 
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fundamentally an act of reincorporating deviance through reasserting and reinforcing the 
dominant framework; as such it is a thoroughly political endeavor. 
As an ideational schema, nightlife ideologies are significant not only for their 
structure and content, but, more importantly for this project, also for their consequences 
throughout the social order. Bourdieu has made the indispensable argument that “social 
divisions become principles of division, organizing the image of the social world” (1984: 
471); how these principles are in turn put into practice – realized, actualized, organized – 
is at the core of this dissertation. As he also reminded us, all parties are continuously 
embedded in a symbolic space and vying for “world-making power,” though “the agents 
involved in this struggle are very unequally armed in the fight to impose their truth, and 
have very different, and even opposed aims” (1987:11). 
As a sociopolitical ideology, the nightlife problematic was profoundly influential 
in motivating the demands, expectations, and strategies of governance. As we will see, 
the rhetoric of a crisis stemming from nightlife in the city center developed in tandem 
with a set of pragmatic concerns for governing such a “crisis.” This dynamic was 
heightened by a resonance with the doctrine of citizen security; as such, it was facilitated 
and justified by the mandates of newly-minted seguridad ciudadana laws, and it 
materialized through the resulting funding and infrastructure that accompanied these 
laws. Through the socio-political agendas driven by the nightlife emergency, 
dichotomous social categories are put into motion, reanimated and re-embodied in 
fundamentally inequitable relationships. As hinted at in this chapter but seen in greater 
relief in subsequent chapters (especially chapters 3 and 8), the geographies of social 
distinction are recursively transposed onto geographies of security through interpretations 
of causal responsibility for the city’s insecurity and simplified notions of 
victim/perpetrator. The ideological processes of erasure do not end there, however. Once 
these familiar relationships are embedded within the national and international 
prioritizations of seguridad ciudadana, we find that they are simultaneously mobilized 
and concealed, justified and depoliticized.  
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Formulating a Problematic, Defining Reality 
Morality provides a context; it provides an issue around which a panic coalesces, 
the content of the panic. It loads the gun, so to speak. Interests help explain the 
timing of moral panics: they act as a kind of triggering device.  
-- Moral Panics (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:142, emphasis added) 
The specific concerns that underlay Ayacucho’s nightlife problematic were initially 
articulated by a small and select group of residents of the city center who worked hard to 
convince a weary municipality and skeptical community that “nightlife” necessitated 
urgent prioritization. As we will see in the following chapters, these residents were 
actively shaping and articulating an ideology about tradition and deviance through a 
“moral crusade” over decency, proper sociality, and wholesome night entertainment. By 
isolating and publicly defining the content of what they identified as a crisis stemming 
from nightlife, a select group of city center residents (“we’re not just anybody, we’re 
huamanguinos”) were thus actively trying to “establish the legitimacy of a specific claim 
about a social condition” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994:116). In essence, this raw 
material of fear and concern “loaded the gun” for the moral panic and the episodic crisis, 
the culmination of which was the declaration of a state of emergency.  
Even with the relatively influential status of the city center residents who were 
unofficially formulating the official and dominant position against the night clubs, and 
despite their personal connections with government officials, their interests alone (which 
were, in practice, limited to closing the night clubs that were next door to their own 
homes) were not enough to explain the timing of the crisis and the emergency 
declaration. The spark that ignited the panic was a series of murders in the city center, 
including a high school student from a prominent family who was stabbed to death 
shortly after leaving a city center night club. Nonetheless, the profound effect that this 
event had in creating “nightlife” as a single issue to be interpreted as a crisis was due in 
part to the efforts of that small group of vocal residents, namely their sustained public 
campaigns and the highly flammable rhetoric of their socially significant moral crusade.  
The group of city center residents who first began articulating the position on the 
“social crisis” formally organized into a neighborhood association just days before a 
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security emergency was declared in response to the urban nightlife scene. Although this 
timing was not in the least bit planned, it is also not coincidental that they formalized 
their own position as influential social actors at precisely the same time as the moral 
panic “exploded” into public consciousness as a public problem: they were always 
already at the heart of the problematic. Thus, official and public reaction to those key 
events was conditioned by the ideological and rhetorical work that a particular interest 
group had already done to load the gun and pull the trigger.  
Despite the formulations of a correlation between nightlife and seguridad 
ciudadana, crime and insecurity were not necessarily primary motivators for social 
mobilization in the city center. In addition to persistent complaints about physical risks 
from street brawls and drunken scenes, residents in the city center were articulating 
concerns about more abstract forms of violence against Huamanga’s heritage, their 
musical and cultural traditions and their image as a religious and historical city of 
significance. For these city center residents, neither insecurity nor abstract concepts of 
democracy and governability would have captured the imagination enough to provoke 
widespread social mobilization were those concepts not also assessed through 
fundamentally moral values simultaneously embedded in concerns over preserving the 
city as a traditional, religious, and historical center. 
Borrowing Gusfield’s language for dissecting how a social issue becomes a 
“public problem,” I suggest that the heart of the problematic, the nightlife emergency, 
was a struggle over “the power to influence the definition of the reality of phenomenon” 
(Gusfield 1981:12, emphasis added). Ongoing struggles over representation, 
categorization, and distinction are part and parcel of the struggles to institutionalize 
cultural difference through the officially-mandated regulation of social life, in this case of 
certain forms of nightlife entertainment. Because politics of judgment about people, 
behaviors, and cultural activities – about deviance – are intimately tied up with social and 
cultural interests and values, different experiential consequences emerge as these 
ideologies are put to social and political ends. As we will see in these opening chapters of 
the dissertation, dominant frameworks of distinction and discrimination (such as concepts 
 50 
of decency) not only serve to interpret deviance and transgression; they also lay the 
foundation for managing and controlling social order through a moral governance that is 
at once spatial and temporal, for deciding what is acceptable in the city center throughout 
the day/night. Although the moral crusade was but one dimension of the problematic, and 
the episodic moral panic was ultimately rather short-lived, the discursive mechanisms 
developed within this context – most significantly the redefinition of nightlife through the 
framework of seguridad ciudadana – not only outlived the moral panic but ultimately 
directed what was to be done in response. In other words, the very process of 
problematizing nightlife kicked the political and social machinery into gear to transform 
these social concerns into a “public problem” and direct the path towards identifying and 




Night Transgressions in the City Center 
Inside these night clubs you find girls and boys … in tight jeans and T-shirts, that 
look like school kids that can’t be older than 15, who move on the dance floor to 
the tune [al son] of “…perrrreo, mamy perrrreo…”, they join their butts and 
their pelvises producing a direct physical contact in acts that go against any 
decency, incompatible with morality, moving their hips sensually, forward and 
back … forward and back, the dance floor seems like an orgy of hundreds of 
couples in sensual litany “…ayyy papiiiiii….” 
This graphic description of activities inside an Ayacuchano night club was part of a 
document titled “Youth: High Risk Night Clubs,” written and circulated in 2006 by a 
young official of seguridad ciudadana in Ayacucho’s municipal government. The 
document, which he referred to as a “reflection upon so much insecurity [inseguridad] in 
the country,” is striking in several respects, not the least of which is its graphic imagery. 
He creates his characters by using supposed quotes which mock the colloquial speech 
stereotypically coded to the lower social classes (mamy/papi). The quotes also evoke the 
sensual singing and speaking style of the reggaeton music associated with the dance 
popularly known as the “perreo” (literally “the doggy”).1 The Caribbean phenomenon of 
reggaeton music and its perreo dance had only recently begun to creep into the youth 
culture of Ayacucho and was far from being a predominant musical favorite (even in the 
night clubs), but it had clearly captured the imagination of the Ayacuchano population, 
including officials. The imagery of the perreo dance was often cited as a prime example 
                                               
1 For more on reggaetón, see Baker 2005 and Negrón-Muntaner and Rivera 2007. 
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of the immorality of the clubs precisely because it plays upon cultural notions of 
innocence and youth chastity. This is particularly true for the young women: in the 
description above we are presented – in bold – first to a young man who tells his girl to 
come in close and dance the perreo with him, then we are forced to witness (again in 
bold) the indecent behaviors. It concludes tragically with the young girl (who looks like a 
school child, remember) calling out suggestively to her man, presumably seduced by the 
collective immorality. As a municipal official, one might expect that the author would 
focus on the legality of the club businesses or address the lack of operating licenses 
(which he does get to eventually), but instead we first encounter a description that is 
laden with value judgments and condemnation, aimed not at the proprietors but at the 
youth who attend the clubs.  
The opinions and critiques of the night clubs that informed the nightlife 
problematic depended upon the operative concepts of youth culture, morality, and 
decency broadly speaking, and they incorporated the imagery of sexuality and gender. 
With an air of moral absolutism, critics refer to these clubs as antros (dives); more 
specifically, they call them antros de perdición (dives of ruin or damnation) or antros de 
mal vivir. Often translated as “disreputable,” mal vivir implies a disreputable way of life 
not just a passing diversion. By extension, attending these “indecent” and “immoral” 
clubs is believed to be directly linked to one’s character. On the one hand, people who go 
to these clubs are said to lack valores, principles or values, and on the other hand these 
night spaces are portrayed as having the power to corrupt anyone who enters, however 
innocent. 
This chapter details how the nightlife problematic portrays “traditional” 
huamanguino nights as threatened by contemporary (youth) nighttime practices that are 
considered deviant and transgressive. This undertaking is interlaced with an ongoing 
discussion of the temporality of night/day. The first chapter introduced the ideological 
system of distinction that supports the nightlife problematic through a range of 
transposable oppositions. In addition to the set of socio-spatial distinctions explored 
previously, this chapter suggests that these distinctions have a significant temporal 
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dimension as well: at the core of the “social crisis” was the fundamental issue of defining 
appropriate social practice in the city center at night. In other words, defining nightlife as 
a transgressive realm entailed defining boundaries that were at once social, geographic 
and temporal. 
§ 
It is for this reason that what is socially peripheral is so frequently symbolically 
central (like long hair in the 1960s). The low-Other is despised and denied at the 
level of political organization and social being whilst it is instrumentally 
constitutive of the shared imaginary repertoires of the dominant culture. 
-- The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (1986:5-6) 
“Nightlife” has come to carry the strong connotations of pleasure, of 
entertainment, and of a particular style of socializing, usually outside of the home. To say 
that somebody “has a nightlife” or “enjoys nightlife” conjures up images of late-night 
parties, probably with alcohol and dancing, maybe even with drugs and promiscuity. 
“Nightlife” invariably carries an undertone of excitement, of approaching the social edge, 
calling attention to social boundaries waiting to be transgressed (c.f. Lovatt and O'Connor 
1995). Whether this transgression is viewed with fascination or repugnance, or more 
likely a combination of the two (Stallybrass and White 1986), the subtext of transgression 
and marginality hinges upon the idea that “nightlife” inherently entails pushing the limits 
of, if not passing all-together, a different and dominant system of social norms.  
In thinking about the transgressions of night activities, however, we often fall 
victim to the assumption that the night transgresses the day. This is because in imagining 
the “ordinary” we most often assume a diurnal order in which the day is normative and 
categorically different from the night. The sensationalized imagery of nightlife further 
obscures the fact that normative sociality is constructed as much during the night as it is 
during the day. Through this exploration of Ayacucho’s nightlife problematic, therefore, I 
want to explicitly draw our attention away from the systems of daytime social norms.  
In this chapter, we see how nightlife (by which is meant night entertainment 
rather than life-at-night) is portrayed as coming tantalizingly close to undoing the city’s 
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religious morals and traditions. At the same time, this discussion highlights the degree to 
which models of sociality also involve norms of nighttime sociality. Specifically, we see 
how the social transgressions of contemporary youth night entertainment are formally 
contrasted with a dominant model of nighttime sociality fostered through “traditional” 
public nighttime entertainment and patterns of socializing. As such, the problematic 
perfectly illustrates that conceptions of social order necessarily and always involve 
evaluations of both day and night. Problematic night-time activities do not merely 
transgress day-time social norms; they transgress norms that are constructed and enacted 
all the time. 
Nightlife in the City Center 
To my North American eyes, Ayacucho’s night club (discoteca) scene was small 
though vibrant and diverse. The intensely complex urban soundscape in the city center 
was amplified through an extreme geographic concentration. The informal “entertainment 
district” was firmly established along three blocks of Jirón Asamblea (a main commercial 
and residential street radiating out from the city’s main plaza) and a block or two in either 
direction along the side streets branching off. Although many of the clubs were short-
lived – opening and closing periodically, or relocating elsewhere (sometimes under the 
same name, sometimes not) – at any given time there were approximately a dozen clubs 
in the heart of the historic city center. The clubs were all behind closed doors, or on 
second and third floors. By and large, the clubs were non-descript, few had signs out 
front and none were very noticeable. On the other hand, virtually none but without sound 
proofing the music poured out into the streets. This was the night soundtrack along the 
few main blocks. Especially on weekends, these streets were crowded and sometimes 
rowdy, brightly lit and alive with open restaurants, internet cafes, a few slot-machines, 
and the ubiquitous portable carts selling salchipapas (french fries with pieces of hotdog), 
popcorn, and warm drinks, often spiked with cheap alcohol (emolientes). 
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PHOTO 2.1 – Popular discoteca KPital on Jirón Asamblea. Parked in front of the entrance 
(marked with brown sign above the door) is a beer truck making a delivery.  
The geographic concentration of night clubs cannot be underemphasized. 
Essentially all of the night clubs in the metropolitan city (as well as the vast majority of 
live performances and concerts) were to be found in or near the city center, in 
neighborhoods with paved and illuminated streets, public transportation, and reliable 
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electrical current. This is in notable contrast to the zonas altas (high zones); although the 
peripheral communities seemed to have an abundance of public spaces for drinking and 
listening to recorded music (mostly bars, known as chicherías or cantinas), as well as a 
number of brothels, there were almost no public venues for music and dance. Those from 
the periphery would thus make the trek into the city center for a night of dancing and 
drinking with friends. 
The clubs catered to a range of tastes and aesthetics. The majority were, without a 
doubt, the stomping ground for city center youth, including university students and young 
professionals, the children of the city’s elite and well-off, family members of politicians 
and officials. A couple of these were prominently featured in tourism guides and were 
frequented by foreign visitors and politicians. There were also two or three that catered to 
youth from the peripheral areas, a couple that received some older patrons now and again, 
and one that had among its clientele the semi-undercover gay community. As in many 
urban night scenes, Ayacucho’s young “clubbers” (they were predominantly youth, after 
all) enjoyed migrating from one discoteca to another, rotating between the clubs 
throughout the long night, ever in search of friends, the best tunes, or the best 
“atmosphere.”2 Aided by the small geographic area in which the clubs were concentrated 
(only a few blocks), it was not uncommon to hang out in any given club just long enough 
to dance to a couple of tunes or join a group of friends for a drink. The clubs were all 
relatively modest by way of decoration, though each promoted its own set of 
distinguishing features, creatively using lights, mirrors, artwork, and simple furniture to 
create different aesthetics and multiple spaces within each club. Few of the clubs had 
passed routine safety inspections: most lacked adequate ventilation and proper escape 
routes, some lacked bathrooms altogether, and most were located in precarious 
constructions, either modified or decrepit structures. And not a single club possessed 
                                               
2 I use the word “atmosphere” here in the English sense, not the common use of the Spanish word 
“ambiente,” which refers to a gay scene. (c.f. Motta 1999, Wright 2000). However, a desire for ambiente 
was certainly a part of what some club-goers were seeking in a good “atmosphere.” While I was doing 
fieldwork, there was one club in particular that was a popular hangout for the young gay crowd in 
Ayacucho, but it was not exclusively gay, and most youth in Ayacucho would not describe it as being “de 
ambiente.” 
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PHOTO 2.2 – Popular discoteca La Noche on Jirón Asamblea. On the morning after it was 
forcibly closed, the window to the discoteca (located on the 3rd floor) displayed a municipal sign 
designating it as forcibly closed. 
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In most of the clubs (except in those few that catered to a more tourist audience), 
the drinking and socializing patterns mirrored traditional customs of communal alcohol 
sources, with one large bottle of beer or, more likely, one jar of dubious mixed drink 
shared among the group of friends. There were a couple of venues that regularly featured 
live bands, though the majority of the clubs relied on young DJs selecting recorded 
music. Often positioned in the middle of the club, the DJs were practically besieged all 
night by enthusiastic dancers wanting to put in musical requests (or complaints). The 
majority of these clubs offered the same array of musical styles, seamlessly uniting sonic 
diversity and dissonance in the universal pleasures of dance, drink, and entertainment: 
Latin pop and rock were favorites, mixed together with spontaneous doses of reggaetón 
or música latinoamericana, followed by cumbias and the occasional ballad, then starting 
all over again. 
When I first arrived in Ayacucho in 2002, intent on doing research about 
changing musical styles and tastes among Ayacucho’s youth, I was blissfully unaware of 
the history of conflict over the night clubs, and the topic had not yet burst into public 
consciousness as a critical site in the city’s security efforts. Excited, nervous, and not 
knowing quite where to begin, I started asking seemingly innocuous and basic questions 
about “when the discotecas came to Ayacucho.” Throughout my research, when the topic 
came up, most people immediately named Peña Machi as the city’s first “discoteca.” 
Accordingly, one of my first formal interviews was with the owner, and Peña Machi 
came up frequently throughout my fieldwork. Despite being cited as the first night club, it 
was clear right from the beginning that this peña nor was not necessarily the “first” of its 
kind; it also bore very little resemblance to most of today’s night clubs.3 One reason for 
its label as “the first discoteca” might be that it was the first permanent venue to achieve 
                                               
3 Around 1965 there was another club (“Rosa del Viento”) that was once cited to me as “the first” discoteca 
(which apparently closed due to legal troubles with drug use) and there was another club called “El 
Retablo” which was cited as “the second” (author interview April 17, 2004). There were also other clubs 
(mostly featuring live music) around the same time as Peña Machi, such as Las Tejas, Los Portales, Arco 
Blanco, or Los Palmeros, and later Los Warpas (author interviews, March 12, 2003; May 7, 2003; April 16, 
2004; September 2, 2004). However, they do not carry the same symbolic currency and were not discussed 
as frequently. 
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notoriety and success by featuring regular live performances of non-local musical genres, 
since one of the most predictable criticisms of today’s night clubs rests precisely on the 
“exclusively” imported music (much of which is Peruvian and Andean music).4  
A more complex answer for why Peña Machi is cited as “the first” traces back to 
its positioning within the “good old days” of “proper” and “decent” entertainment, since 
the characterizations of Peña Machi sharply contrast it with the loaded descriptions of 
today’s clubs, such as the one that opened this section: unlike the young and scantily clad 
kids found in today’s clubs, Peña Machi was said to be frequented by “gente decente” 
(respectable people) like prominent local families, police officers, politicians, and 
tourists. Despite stories that the owner shared of problems with drunk police and military 
patrons (they eventually had a policy that all guns had to be locked in a safe at the 
entrance), Peña Machi was remembered in the public imaginary as having promoted a 
drastically different form of nighttime sociality.5 Unlike the “immoral” and “indecent” 
sensual dancing that seem to be the soul of today’s clubs, Peña Machi was always 
described as sano (wholesome) family affairs with food and live music; unlike today’s 
dark atmospheres catering to “sexual orgies” and illicit behaviors, Peña Machi featured 
decorations that evoked “traditional” Ayacucho; unlike the illegality and shady business 
ethics of today’s clubs, Peña Machi was a “clean” business that met the bureaucratic 
hurdles of an authoritarian government keen on strict regulation and tight curfews; and 
unlike the legal battles and physical threats that plague today’s nightlife industry, Peña 
Machi enjoyed a largely positive rapport within the community.  
                                               
4 In addition to the significant role that Peña Machi played in supporting local upstart bands in música 
latinoamericana, Peña Machi also featured regular nights for live rock music and música criolla (from the 
coast). Although some local huayno artists were featured, most of the huayno artists were from other 
regions. Of course, this is not the first introduction of foreign musical influences. Mambo and Baladas were 
once popular in elite circles of Ayacucho, and Rock and Roll enjoyed a local heyday in the 1970s. In fact, 
Walter Alejos, one of Ayacucho’s congressmen during the time of my fieldwork, was in the popular rock 
band, Los Telestats, in his youth. (Author interviews, February 2, 2003, April 17, 2004) Rumba and mambo 
were also documented as part of the environment surrounding early cumbia developments outside of 
Ayacucho (Romero 2002). 
5 In 1981 the mayor of Huamanga issued a Dry Law for police forces because of drunken scandals and in 
1982 the magazine Caretas published a report claiming that the military presence in the city had led to the 
“proliferation of discotecas” (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2003). 
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Peña Machi thus serves as a marker of a not-so-distant past when the city center 
was for wholesome and legitimate business serving the city’s elite and powerful, 
promoting a specifically-defined collective image of the city as traditional, religious, and 
decent. Many opponents of the night clubs told me that “even we would go if they were 
decent places” and I often heard the young municipal officials who were involved in the 
nightlife problematic tease each other about how they could no longer enjoy a “night out 
on the town” like they used to. 
Losing Oneself in the Urban Night 
Down with the Dives of Damnation! (¡Abajo Los Antros De Perdición!)6 
Close the chinganas! (¡Que cierren esas chinganas!) 
War against the Antros! Neighborhood Organizations Demand Closure of Night 
clubs and Chinganas (¡Guerra a los Antros! Juntas vecinales exigen 
cerrar discotecas y chinganas.) 
“They confuse liberty with licentiousness!” With this powerful language evoking 
immorality, lawlessness, and promiscuity, the president of Jirón Asamblea’s junta vecinal 
positioned their accusations against the nightlife industry and those who promote it.7 The 
phrase evokes the city’s illustrious history as the site of the nation’s battle of 
independence, its pride as la cuna de la libertad de America, America’s “cradle of 
liberty.” The dramatic language of a social emergency – of deviance against a noble past 
and a decent night – articulates the perception that Ayacucho as a whole is being led 
astray, seduced into damnation and ruin at the hands of nightlife. Thus another play of 
words claims that Ayacucho is being rapidly converted from the “cradle of liberty” into 
“the cradle of dives of damnation” – la cuna de los antros de perdición.8 As we will see 
in this chapter, at the crux of the rhetoric of a nightlife problematic is the idea that 
transgression has come to define – with much embarrassment – Ayacucho’s reality. As 
                                               
6 Respectively: Handheld sign, Protest march, December 2, 2004; Chant, Protest march, December 2, 2004; 
Correo, Page 1, December 2, 2004 
7 “Se confunde la libertad con libertinaje.” Radio appearance, December 1, 2004. 
8 Horas de Lucha, September 24, 2007 
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such, the terminology of deviance functions symbolically against the backdrop of 
idealisms that are reflected upon the city’s noble – and decent – past, as well as its decent 
night. 
Among a lurid set of terms supporting the rhetoric of a nightlife emergency, far 
and away the most common is antro – a dive, a seedy joint, a dark and dirty place with a 
bad reputation, where “nice” girls would never go. As in other areas of Latin America, 
the strong derogatory connotations “antro” mean that it never stands as a generic term for 
a nightclub; in Ayacucho this neutral term would be “discoteca.” Antro functions as the 
alter ego in the world of night entertainment, almost always modified with disparaging 
adjectives eliciting disrepute and moral or social danger: antro de mala muerte (rundown 
and shoddy dive) or antro de perdición (dive of ruin or downfall, den of iniquity). These 
antros are places that are frequented by gente de mal vivir, by miscreants, depraved 
people who live a life of ill repute, with drugs and prostitution. The sexual connotations 
of “mal vivir” further reflect a decidedly modern form of unrestrained (or uncontrolled) 
sexuality, licentiousness. 
As seen in the chants and signs above, also within the terminology of deviance 
and transgression is the word chingana. In Peruvian slang, a chingana is a bar, but not 
just any bar; it is a squalid and dirty night establishment, it is a disreputable place to drink 
cheap alcohol and find cheap sex. One way to understand the word chingana would be to 
trace an etymological line to the Spanish word “chingar,” with its proliferation of 
different meanings. In his exploration into the phrase ¡Viva Mexico, Hijos de la 
Chingada! (roughly translated as “Long live Mexico, you sons of bitches!”), Octavio Paz 
(1993) highlights not only the sexual connotations of the verb chingar, but more 
importantly the implications of violence and abuse, the humiliation, and the violation of 
bodies and souls. There are also many local derivations of words with ching- roots that 
are closely related, one of which is the Quechua word chinkana, literally translated as “a 
place where people get lost.” Despite the similarities, Corominas concludes that “it is 
clear, nonetheless, that the semantic evolution of chingana from hidden place 
[escondrijo], [or] shack [tabuco], to bar [taberna] and fun [diversión] was determined by 
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the influx of the non-american verb chingar” (Corominas 1954:57).  
Within the context of the nightlife emergency, however, a consideration of the 
semantic roots of the Quechua term “chinkana” illuminates a dimension of the symbolic 
implications of the term “chingana” as used in Ayacucho that are not addressed in 
Corominas’ etymological entries. At its most basic, the Quechua term “chinkana” denotes 
physical features such as a cave, a labyrinth, or an underground tunnel.9 It could be 
argued, however, that “chinkana” also has a more social meaning, referring to a place 
where people go astray. Illustrating these two senses of the word, chinkanas are also the 
places of legend, deep labyrinthine caves where gold and treasure are said to reside but 
where people are never to enter.10 According to these legends, anyone who has entered 
these chinkanas has not survived; in the rare cases when someone has found the secret 
gold and come out to tell about it, they died immediately. Despite these warnings, the 
story goes, the weak, the hopelessly curious, and the mischievous are continually tempted 
to enter a chinkana, captivated by the allure of the prohibited, drunk with the dream of 
finding the unattainable treasure. 
The chinkana of legend thus serves as a metaphorical backdrop for explaining 
how Ayacucho’s night chinganas have come to occupy such a powerful emblematic 
position in the public imaginary of the city – past, present, and future. First, it reflects 
upon who is believed to frequent the nightlife scene: the weak and the curious, those who 
are attracted to socially “prohibited” and “risky” places and activities, seduced by rumors 
or legends of finding unimaginable bliss. This metaphor further expresses the assumed 
dangers posed by these chinkanas/chinganas. Deemed “places where people get lost,” 
these night venues pose a potential physical danger to the individual, to the extent that 
one is not expected to emerge alive. More abstractly, it is suggested that these night 
                                               
9 Perhaps the most well-known is the labyrinthine Inkan underground tunnels rumored to connect 
Saqsayhuamán and Qoricancha. Mentioned by Guamán Poma (1987:341) and Garcilaso de la Vega 
(1961:236), these tunnels are still a part of Cuzco’s tourist attractions. 
10 These circulating legends are (at least rhetorically) linked to the conquest, most notably through the 
rumors that the Inkas hid their golden “treasures” in these famous underground tunnels (see, for example, 
the pseudo-scientific, though fabulously fantastical, stories developed by Javier Sierra and popularized by 
the likes of Graham Hancock). 
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venues pose a social danger as seductive spaces in which one loses personal control, 
seduced into a-social areas where people pursue individualistic personal gain against the 
community’s interests and warnings, lured into zones and actions that are socially marked 
as prohibited and deviant. 
The night entertainment industry, and youth broadly speaking, are said to lack 
structure and social control, they are lost within their “freedom” to do as they please 
without restrictions. This “licentious liberty,” as I have phrased it, frames Ayacucho not 
as the cradle of liberty but as the cradle of damnation, a city of chinganas, a “place where 
one gets lost.” The idea that this city is now more characterized by nighttime 
licentiousness is powerfully motivating the perception of a social crisis, an emergency of 
the night.  
As the rhetoric of emergency developed around nightlife, the presumed “rupture” 
between traditional and contemporary nights was more and more imagined to be 
complete, and the opposition between night and day became increasingly more 
essentialized and naturalized. With this process, the possibilities for considering the night 
as emblematic of Ayacucho’s traditions (such as religious processes) as opposed to 
emblematic of Ayacucho’s social problems were erased. Instead, the oppositional 
configuration of night and day became recursively transposed onto a patterned set of 
related oppositional configurations. Furthermore, the realm of the day is consistently 
presented as the unmarked “norm” that is threatened by the transgressive configurations 









Night Life … or Life at Night:  
Forward by Day, Backward by Night 
Nora: “Doctor, I have come to ask you to tell me everything you know about the 
night.” 
 
Doctor: “The night has been going on for a long, long time…. To think of the 
acorn it is necessary to become the tree. And the tree of night is the hardest tree to 
mount, the dourest tree to scale, the most difficult to branch, the most febrile to 
the touch, and sweats a resin and drips a pitch against the palm that computation 
has not gambled.” 
 
–  Nightwood (Djuna Barnes 1963 [1936]) 
 
In cities across the world, the contemporary nightlife scene has certainly brought 
many new experiences to urban nights, among them multiple and alternative forms of 
socialization. All the while, this alluring “novelty,” and the imagery of transgression and 
mal vivir of the night, has completely trampled the simple observation that the night has 
always been a space and time of sociality. Thus I state the obvious: in fact we all have a 
night-life, a life at, and in, the night.  
Although pointing out that night-life is always a formative element of subjectivity 
seems obvious, it is too often overlooked; and this “strong case of night blindness” is just 
as severe in the social sciences (Steger and Brunt 2003:3; Schnepel and Ben-Ari 
2005a).11 (Even though the popular concept of the “everyday” contains explicit reference 
to time, this kind of day/night temporality is curiously overlooked in most 
considerations.) It is not likely a mere coincidence that idiomatic expressions about the 
“every-day” – whether colloquial or scholarly – emphasize the happenings, imaginings, 
and functioning of the day over the night. For sake of argument:  
In everyday speech, we rely on a host of parallel concepts for talking about day to 
day social and cultural practices. Nowadays, we hear conversations almost daily 
about how some things never change, continuing day in and day out. At the same 
time, however, we are also reminded day after day that things today are not as 
                                               
11 I am only aware of two interesting compilations that have begun to explore the potentials for an 
“anthropology of the night”: Schnepel and Ben-Ari 2005b and Steger and Brunt 2003. As these collections 
attest, much of the research in this area relates to questions of sleep. An interesting sociological piece on 
sleep is Williams 2007. 
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they were in the past.  
None of these expressions have parallel concepts that explicitly include the night.12 
We can easily mask the significance of these assumptions with a nod to how 
night-time happenings are “symbolic of” or “representative of” social interactions more 
broadly. We could draw out the metaphors and say poetically that the night “illuminates” 
everyday social relations or that night-time is a “shadow” of daytime. Similarly, we could 
play up the imagery and state that the darkness of the night is a “negative image” of the 
clarity of day, or a reflection that appears as the opposite of its source. This metaphoric 
imagery of a negative reflection underlies the pervasive tendency – highlighted in the 
idea of “nightlife” – to consider the night as possessing inherently “liminal” 
characteristics, such that night-time activities are left to be considered “transgressive” by 
nature.  
Freud’s hypothetical dream machine that goes “forward during the day and 
backward at night” (de Certeau 1984:150) is a fabulously rich imagery for thinking about 
the unquestioned conventional idea of time as well as the respective characteristics of the 
disconnected day and night. Daytime thinking, it is assumed, is rational, logical, and 
forward-moving, capable of interpreting the stuff of nighttime dreams, which moves 
backwards, simulating order out of confusion, but always ultimately unreal (Freud 
1918:94). “Night,” disarticulated in this way from “day” – and thus from the “everyday,” 
the mundane, ordinary, common, normal, mainstream, routine, familiar – is set up to 
become the terrain of the mysterious, unknown, strange, abnormal, transgressive, 
enigmatic, shadowy, secretive. Without denying that night and day may have 
fundamentally different characteristics, thinking this way about the night almost parodies 
the idea of a “timeframe,” as if the day and the night are bounded realms, as if we exist in 
one or the other at a given moment, only in the day and thus out of the night, or vice 
                                               
12 Spanish also has equivalent expressions that prioritize the day over the night in thinking about the 
“ordinary,” such as “lo cotidiano,” “diario,” “hoy en día” or “día tras día.” Interestingly, Schnepel and 
Ben-Ari point out that in Judeo-Christian teachings, the “night” existed even before the “day”: according to 




In Lefebvre’s later theorizations on the rhythms of social life (an approach that 
seems rich for the consideration of the day/night) he only begins to hint at the dynamics 
and inter-connections between different modes of sociality and temporality: “as if 
daytime were not enough to carry out repetitive tasks, social practice eats bit by bit into 
the night” (Lefebvre 2004:74). What fascinates me in this is not simply this 
“colonization” of the night (Melbin 1978), nor even the undeniably potent feature of 
night socializing and night lives in most urban areas, especially for those with vibrant 
youth cultures. Instead, I notice the diecentrism that dominates this way of thinking about 
the night: it further assumes and reifies a normative daytime subjectivity, against which 
the night is contrasted or, at best, dismissed and devalued as a mere reflection.  
These conceptualizations of day/night effectively deny that subjectivity also has 
temporality; they deny that the processes, ideologies, and practices of socialization occur 
within a multiplicity of temporal realms, all of which are interrelated but each of which 
has unique characteristics. Notwithstanding the cogent and convincing arguments that 
space tends to be viewed as static and time as dynamic (Massey 1992), frameworks for 
reconsidering space-time as socially constructed rarely explicitly include within their 
discussions the temporality of day/night. Instead, the “temporality” that is so 
convincingly and well elaborated primarily attends to questions of historicity or historical 
time, especially within debates over the chronological and teleological conceptions of 
modernity (c.f. Harootunian 2005; Lefebvre 1991; Massey 1992). In this case, we see 
how it is not just historicity that is territorialized, but also day/night. 
With de Certeau’s classic phrase the “practice of everyday life” (1988) in mind, I 
suggest here that we should think instead along the lines of the “practice of all-the-time 
life,” or of an everynight to accompany the everyday, or simply an everyday/night.13 
Doing so would stress the parity of the “night” in the formation of subjectivity, in 
                                               
13 DeCerteau is one of many to theorize and popularize the idea of the “everyday,” across a range of 
scholarly projects. See for instance Lefebvre 1991 [1947] or Goffman 1959. See Harootunian 2000 for 
more on the history of the “everyday” concept.  
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conceptions of the individual self and the collectivity, in the practice and production of 
social life. In this way, without losing track of different experiential qualities of night and 
day, we can nonetheless see that the meanings that are invested into the duality of day 
and night overshadow an unmarked daytime sociality as well as an unmarked and taken-
for-granted normative nighttime sociality. In the case of Ayacucho’s nightlife 
problematic it is enacted and made visible through an ideological dichotomy that 
contrasts the (transgressive) nightlife of the contemporary youth entertainment scene with 
the (normative) traditional huamanguino life-at-night, depicted as fundamentally moral 
and decent. 
Decency and Damnation 
Deviant, vulgar, perverse, disreputable, antisocial, delinquent are all terms that 
have as their opposite – at least within Ayacucho’s “nightlife problematic” – one singular 
concept: decente, or decent. Significantly, “decent” is used to refer not only to actions 
and places (as in “lugares decentes”) but also to people (as in “gente decente”). As might 
be expected, “decency” is an adjustable concept that is intimately tied to multilayered 
codes of honor and morality.14 More telling for this discussion about the construction of a 
representation of the city center, the concept of “decency” has played a critical role in a 
long history of exclusion in Peru, building connections between moral judgment, space, 
and social categories. Marisol de la Cadena has positioned decencia – decency – as the 
beating heart within 20th century politics of racialized social and cultural hierarchies in 
highland Peru:  
Decency was a flexible norm of conduct for daily life, one that allowed a belief in 
the preeminence of ascribed status to coexist with an acceptance of the liberal 
definition of social equality…. Implicitly – yet not necessarily – associated with 
whiteness, decency was a class discourse the elite used to distinguish racial 
categories culturally and morally in a society where phenotype was useless to 
                                               
14 For more discussion on honor, particularly in the Andes, see Caulfield, et al. 2005, Chambers 1999, 
Gotkowitz 2003, Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera 1998; see Findlay 1999 for a different historical account of 
decency in Latin America, in that case as it relates to race and gender in Puerto Rico. 
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define social boundaries” (2000: 47-48).  
While gente decente – the elites, or “people of worth” – were believed to have “innate 
high morality,” gente del pueblo – their antithesis – were believed to have degenerated 
morally upon migrating to the city. In documenting the multivocality of legitimated 
discrimination based on “culture,” de la Cadena illustrates the degree to which the 
construction of hierarchies were as much about class as they were about phenotypic 
features, or even culture. Since mestizaje marks the hybridity of race and class, it is used 
to tell stories of social conditions. Decency, meanwhile, is a cultured concept, meaning 
that it does not purport innate racial superiority just as it does not equate to “wealth”: 
gente decente or elite were not necessarily relatively “wealthy,” allowing for the phrase 
“poor but decent” (pobre pero decente). Instead, it marks moral and cultural inheritance 
of “domesticated” instincts, delicate manners, or principled actions, in accordance with 
endogamous values of family, sexual responsibility, and domesticity. In direct opposition 
was the cohort of disreputable characteristics applied by the gente decente to “mestizos” 
and other gente del pueblo: ignorance, coarseness, degeneration, and immorality, as well 
as lifestyles of promiscuity, alcoholism, laziness and broken families. Not surprisingly, 
these same characterizations directly associated poverty and lack of formal education 
with delinquency, crime, and violent (“savage”) instincts.  
David Parker concurred with this understanding of how decencia operated as a 
discriminatory social category: “gente decente and gente de pueblo were moral 
categories, signifying intrinsic qualities, not transitory circumstances…. either one was 
born decente or one was not” (Parker 1998:24-25). In contrast to this non-transitory 
quality of the measures of decencia, de la Cadena provides an impressive analysis of 
alternative forms of discrimination at work in Cuzco that employed a different concept of 
essentialized social categories. Practiced by the “mestizos” (as opposed to the elite and 
self-described gente decente), this model counters “decency” with a similar but distinct 
concept of “respect,” and it counters “scandal” with “civic virtue.” Despite a competing 
idea of “mestizaje,” in which changing social conditions did not imply discarding certain 
cultural practices, this model of “respect” (as opposed to the elite model of “decency”) 
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relied equally upon a faith in formal (class) education: “Built on different moral codes, 
respect and decency are nevertheless mutually sustaining discourses. Both the elite and 
mestizo ideologies of distinction share beliefs in the legitimacy of hierarchies that result 
from urbanity and education” (de la Cadena 2000:228). Although categories may have 
fluid membership, the categories themselves can remain fixed; likewise, although the 
boundaries of social categories may not exactly correspond, these alternative conceptions 
share the idea that the nature of social order (groups and individuals) is relational and 
hierarchical.15 
This discussion of decency is not intended to reify racial categories, nor the 
“Andean” dualities featured in classic ethnographies.16 Likewise, this discussion does not 
imply an easy reduction of current debates about the nightlife problematic into a 
simplified language of race, most importantly, it does not suggest that the people engaged 
in those conversations are racist (something that my friends and informants would 
justifiably find very offensive). Nonetheless, the historical potency and depth of the 
concept of decency stands as the vertebral column of the institutionalized language of 
social categories. The long history of notable patterns of social distinction in the Andes 
span the familiar divides of race, class, migration, language (all of which tend to mirror 
the same dichotomous constructions); within this history, the language of “decency” 
                                               
15 Nationalist projects in Peru have attempted to symbolically unify Peru’s “two republics,” ostensibly 
hiding internal divisions though not necessarily undoing internal hierarchies (Thurner 1997). Although 
mestizaje has not necessarily underwritten nationalist political campaigns in Peru in the same was as it has 
in other countries (c.f. Mallon 1992; Skurski 1994; Stutzman 1981), it has served to continually re-mark the 
“other” with contemporary discourses of unequal power and principles of prejudice, further separating 
rather than uniting the population (de la Cadena 2000; Mendoza 2000; Poole 1997). 
16 Classic ethnographies of life in the rural Andes relied heavily upon the somewhat romanticized concept 
of “Andean complimentarity,” even as they sought to illuminate the social construction of the “world of 
dualities” of Andean social life (see, for example, Allen 1988 or Isbell 1978). The traditional focus on an 
idealized image of rural areas as separate or isolated from urban areas and from national-level culture and 
politics has perpetuated a discrepancy in which “lo andino” was portrayed as completely at odds with “lo 
moderno.” Thus underneath these presentations of Andean dualities are unchallenged assumptions of 
parallel divides between rural-urban, Indian-mestizo, center-periphery, elite-peasant, coast-highland, 
capital-provincial. Careful scrutiny and detailed dismantling of the belief in (and effects of) 
institutionalized social categories, presented as homogenous and opposing wholes separated by large social 
gulfs, is by no means new to Andean studies. A sampling from across disciplines includes: Abercrombie 
1998; Chambers 1999; de la Cadena 1995; de la Cadena 2000; Flores Galindo 1988; García 2005; Heilman 
2006; Larson 2002; Mallon 1995; Parker 1998; Poole 1997; Rénique 2004; Spitta 1995; Thurner 1997. 
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stands out among the most powerful tools of racialized discrimination, domination, and 
inequality. 
While decency in this ideological schema is constructed as part of a duality, we 
will see repeatedly through this dissertation the many ways in which these facile 
ideological dichotomies are shattered in the complexities of real-world practices and 
experiences. At the same time, however, we will continue to see the ways in which these 
ideological dualities function as frameworks that guide interpretations of social actions 
and cultural practices (such as night entertainment), channeling those interpretations 
through systems of expectations and representations. While these dichotomies may not 
necessarily reflect the social world, the ideologies of social distinction that perpetuate 
those representations continue to recursively inform interpretations of events as they 
emerge and develop. In this case they are essential to the formulation of changing night 
entertainment practices as detrimental to the moral and social peace in the city. More 
importantly, within the formulation of a nightlife emergency, these ideologically-
constructed dualities continue to pragmatically structure the formal and informal 
responses to nightlife. 
Decency and Musical Traditions in the City Center 
Over the course of my fieldwork, I developed several condensed answers to the 
curious questions about what I was researching. “Nightlife” continues to provoke the 
most enjoyable reaction. In Ayacucho, many people responded almost immediately that 
since I was an anthropologist I should be in the country, adding that there “is no culture” 
in the city. These answers, especially common from residents of the city center, touch 
upon ideologies of authenticity and what’s “worthy” of study, but they also point to fears 
of cultural “death” and deep nostalgia for that which is perceived to be disappearing. An 
idealistic nostalgia for “traditional” cultural practices in Huamanga feeds into an ideology 
of cultural purism and cultural loss that allows for the imagery of the “cradle of liberty” – 
the cradle of “the most authentic” traditional arts – being converted into a cradle of 
damnation. Within the framework of nighttime “decency” and “wholesome” 
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entertainment, musical “tradition” is framed as a singular entity under constant threat by a 
set of urban practices epitomized by the night clubs.  
At the heart of the nightlife problematic’s oppositional model of “tradition” is the 
Peruvian huayno, which is undeniably regarded as the quintessential musical genre of the 
highland Andes, despite infinite variations that mark local and regional styles as well as 
reflect and delineate deep class and racial divisions.17 The huayno carries a suggestive 
symbolic currency that strays dramatically from the strictly musical definition, 
referencing “tradition” (with both negative and positive connotations) and el pueblo (the 
“common people”). The huayno as a socio-musical genre thus serves as a potent social 
reference and marker of distinction. With this archetypal reputation as belonging to 
tradition and to “the people,” the huayno has an unparalleled power to provoke vocal 
opinions, be it nationalism or regionalism, disdain for the indigenous roots it represents, 
pride in a cultural heritage, or an ideological resistance to globalization and contemporary 
cultural practices. The nostalgic idea of traditional music from Huamanga, the huayno 
huamanguino, is idealized as the poetic and intellectual music of “decent” Ayacuchanos. 
The fame and musical prowess of Huamanga’s elite was recognized by no less than 
Peru’s beloved ethnographer José María Arguedas, who wrote in 1977 that “the noble 
class of Huamanga [is] famous not only for their virtuosity in the art of guitar but for 
their talent in composition of huayno lyrics and music” (cited in García Miranda 
1991:22). 
Although the huayno huamanguino is revered for its traditional lyricism, and the 
technical virtuosity of the musicians is widely admired, it is hardly the music of today’s 
youth. In its place, the commercialized genre known as música ayacuchana (Ayacuchano 
music) – with its roots in the guitar-based traditions of the region – enjoys widespread 
popularity and massive airtime on the radio throughout the country. At the same time, 
some of the musicians who have put música ayacuchana on the national charts (such as 
                                               
17 The Peruvian huayno developed as a colonial mestizo transformation of an indigenous musical style 
(known as the kashwa) and it was codified as a “genre” during the 1950s boom of highland Peruvian music 
in Lima (Romero 1988:233-234, Romero 2001). 
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Max Castro) refer to their music broadly as música andina (Andean music). Others refer 
to the commercialized huayno style as “popular” Andean music or “contemporary” 
Andean music, and in the radio industry it is especially common to hear it referred to 
simply as música folklórica (folklore music).18 Rather than referencing Ayacucho 
specifically, therefore, these musicians and their fans are instead referencing a generic 
“Andean” musical style and repertoire releases them from the guitar-dominant 
“ayacuchano” style and opens the door for expanding the repertoire to include musical 
forms and instrumentation from other regions as well (such as saya, san juanito, or even 
cumbias). What these young – and highly popular – Ayacuchano musicians promote as 
musical “fusion,” has not been favorably received by most of the traditional huayno 
huamanguino fans; some young musicians (notably Los Gaitán Castro) have been 
virtually excluded from local consideration as “ayacuchano” precisely because of their 
heavily criticized fusion.19 
At the heart of the moral absolutism shaping local debates over appropriate 
behaviors for Ayacucho’s city center is fear, a fear that the city’s “traditional” culture (lo 
tradicional) is being debased, that contemporary social and cultural change is 
uncontrollable, and that children (and hence the future of the city) are at increased risk. 
The abstract idea that lo tradicional is being supplanted by international or foreign urban 
culture is often heightened to suggest that it is not just any culture that is seeping in, but 
rather a transgressive and threatening culture that is converting the “city of the 33 
churches,” the “cradle of independence,” into a “cradle of dives of damnation” (cuna de 
                                               
18 The term música folklórica is especially ambiguous. It is used by other people to refer to a wide range of 
genres, including some that the elite huaanguinos would call not folklórica but chicha (such as the huayno 
norteño examined in next chapter). 
19 See Tucker 2005 for an extended discussion of the development and popularization of the música 
ayacuchano and the critiques from traditional Ayacuchano musicians of these commercialized variations. 
The popularity of música popular andino rides in part upon the international fame of música 
latinoamericana, as popularized by groups such as Los Kjarkas from Bolivia or Inti Illimani from Chile 
(c.f. Bigenho 2002; Wara Céspedes 1984). Música latinoamericana, which is featured prominently in some 
local night clubs, was also criticized by many local musicians – including young and innovative musicians 
– as being overly simplified for the sole purpose of being easily danceable. For example, the 
commercialized verision of the san juanito (originally from Ecuador) was dismissed by some young and 
self-described folklore musicians as “san peñito,” a word play meant to suggest that it is not the original 
version but a version tailored to a simplified club/peña danceability. 
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los antros de perdición).20 
Normative Nights: Religious Celebration & Night Rituals 
 
PHOTO 2.3 – Night in the main plaza, and the powerful presence of the Cathedral. The municipal 
building is behind the trees to the left of the Cathedral. 
The pervasive discourse of social deviance and the loss of tradition led one 
musical scholar to pessimistically conclude that “the old catholic values of submission 
and obedience that were so internalized in the Andean Quechua world [now] happily 
disappear” (Montoya 1996:494). If ever there was a single iconic image to accompany 
Ayacucho’s reputation as a religious, traditional, and musical center it would be drawn 
from the elaborate and world-renowned celebrations of Semana Santa.21 Holy Week in 
                                               
20 Horas de Lucha, September 24, 2007 
21 In 2002, Ayacucho’s national congresswoman Celina Palomino had sponsored a bill (passed as Law 
27689) declared Ayacucho the Peruvian Capital of Semana Santa. 
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Ayacucho is hands down the most socially and politically charged context for 
representational struggles, during which the rhetorical and ideological dichotomies are 
particularly marked between wholesome, religious, or traditional activities on the one 
hand, and entertainment, tourism, and unbridled festive celebration on the other. Local 
officials drew heavily upon campaigns advocating “religious fervor” during the famed 
celebrations, and they went to great lengths to control entertainment and govern security, 
a topic that will be explored in more detail in chapter 4. What is noteworthy for this 
discussion, however, is the position that non-religious concerts and heavy drinking are 
inappropriate and offensive to the important religious traditions of the city; not only are 




PHOTO 2.4 – Holy Week procession (Holy Friday). 
As the standard local medium of traditionalist messages, local newspapers 
presented readers with daily folkloric and historic descriptions of what is “supposed” to 
happen on each day of Semana Santa, including the intricacies and meanings of each 
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procession. Easter Saturday, which has no procession, was described as follows: “at 
night, the celebrators and pueblo make their way to the main plaza, where four 
[traditional] musical groups liven the atmosphere, groups of musicians stroll with their 
songs, the campesinos [rural peasants] play their violins and sing happily.”22 Not 
surprisingly, the idealistic and folkloric descriptions and supposed “meanings” behind 
each day are not, by any stretch of the imagination, contemporary accounts of Holy Week 
in Ayacucho. This is especially true of Easter Saturday, since most Holy Week celebrants 
were not even in the plaza on Saturday night, but rather enjoying the countless concerts 
and parties throughout the city. This is, after all, explained by many Ayacuchanos as 
being the very purpose of Easter Saturday: after eight days of mourning Christ’s 
persecution and death, beginning on Palm Sunday the week before, Easter Saturday’s 
meaning resides precisely in the uncontrolled celebration anticipating Christ’s 
resurrection. As those concerts end and revelers descend upon the main plaza to wait for 
the spectacular dawn Easter procession, the park fills with national and international 
tourists (though no campesinos), singing, playing guitar (not violin), and wiling away the 
hours drinking and partying.  
The role of extreme alcohol consumption in fiesta and religious life in the Andes 
is amply documented (Castillo Guzmán 2001, Harris 1978, Harvey 1991). Its presence is 
so strong that Olivia Harris argued that public “drunkenness is de rigeuer for men in 
fiestas” (1978:34). Likewise, Penelope Harvey suggests that the public and communal 
drinking practices allow for behaviors and speech patterns that are impermissible during 
non-drinking relations: “drinking brings people into direct confrontation with the 
contradictions and ambiguities under which they live and allows for voicing of this vision 
that has no place in the dominant discourse of power” (1991:23).23 Harvey is also careful 
to note that these festival behaviors are not all socially unifying: drinking “should 
generate social cohesion and ensure social reproduction through the integration of human 
                                               
22 La Voz, April 7, 2004, page 3. 
23 The refrain I heard in Ayacucho was “people drink to show solidarity but they end throwing punches” 
(“se toma para solidarizarse pero se termina tirando puñetazos”). 
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beings … it is also a time when the fragmentary nature of ‘society’ is revealed” 
(1997:38). Studies on evangelical conversion in highland Peru further detail the ubiquity 
and centrality of alcohol consumption in highland fiestas (especially religious 
celebrations), and the perception of many converts that Catholic fiesta culture promotes 
alcoholism and violence rather than “healthy” social and personal practices (del Pino 
1996, Scarritt 2005). In an eloquent statement about the transformation of a town’s main 
plaza during celebrations, Harvey notes that it “is converted from the space in which 
elaborate speeches were made in florid Spanish to the scene of a wild party of 
unrestrained drunkenness” (Harvey 1997:35). 
One newspaper admonished it’s readers through daily front page messages to 
behave appropriately: “We urge you to live Semana Santa with religious sensibility 
[religiosidad]. This is a week of reflection and prayer, not entertainment!”24 However, 
this notion that religiosity and entertainment are mutually exclusive is equally ahistorical 
in Peru. Non-religious, foreign, and danceable parties (often featuring fiestas chichas 
today) are a major economic and social aspect of most festivals in Ayacucho (Semana 
Santa being the most important). They are also historically central to many Andean civic, 
religious and patron saint festivals, especially on the eve before the main celebration, but 
often every night during the duration of the festival (Casas Roque 1993:302, Ráez 
Retamozo 1993, Romero 1989, Mendoza 2000:104). In addition, the serious financial 
demands of cargo [sponsorship of a patron saint celebration] also require individuals or 
groups to gather funds, for which many turn to decidedly non-religious activities. The 
most common such fund-raiser is the ubiquitous parrillada [barbeque meal], which often 
features live music and always brings in the largest funds through heavy alcohol 
consumption.  
As the popularity, attraction, and economic force of Holy Week has become 
increasingly tied to night entertainment, Semana Santa has colloquially been renamed 
through slang as Semana Tranca – instead of being a sacred week of religious fervor, it 
                                               
24 La Voz, April 2, 2004, page 5. 
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has become a week of binge drinking. The term semana tranca now appears on every sort 
of tourist trinket and souvenir, common in jokes and jest. But it is equally a part of the 
new terminology of criticism and traditionalism: “today everything is tourism and 
entertainment so [we] don’t hesitate to describe it as Semana Tranca, in other words 
Week of Drunkenness, Week of Party Sprees, Week of Sexual Orgy.”25 The very same 
newspaper offering daily accounts of the traditional festivities also provided a doomed 
account of Holy Saturday. Under the front page headline of “Today: Vigil of Alcohol, 
Sex, Drugs and Public Dances,” the author wrote: “…we have confidence that today, 
Easter Saturday, beginning in the early hours of the afternoon there will be a damned 
vigil [maldita vigilia] of cheap alcohol [trago] and drugs, as well as sexual orgies and 
parties [fiestas sociales] of all kinds – from huayno to rock – within a delinquent and 
gangster framework which the authorities in charge will do nothing to avoid.”26 These 
perceptions of delinquency were compounded by the crime statistics of Holy Week in 
2004, indicating that nearly 23 percent of visitors experienced some form of “violence” 
(most of which was crime but not necessarily violence) during their visit.27 That this 
aspect of Ayacucho – urban insecurity – was so prominent during the famed religious 
celebrations did not necessarily surprise most Ayacuchanos, but it greatly embarrassed 
and disappointed them.28 
The moral and religious representation of Huamanga is especially emblematic of 
the specific model of normative sociality that motivated the night problematic. The legal 
regulatory procedures issued by the municipality during Semana Santa (to which we will 
return in chapter 4) amounted to the official delimitation of the city center, spatially and 
temporally, as an exclusively religious and traditional space, in which the night was to be 
                                               
25 La Voz, April 9, 2004, page 6 
26 La Voz, April 10, 2004, front page headline, article page 7. Emphasis added. 
27 60% of this “violence” was theft and approximately 12% was attributed to “gangs” (Gobierno Regional 
de Ayacucho 2004). 
28 When I was pick-pocketed while playing violin with the Hermandad de Caballeros Cantores in the 
Wednesday procession during Semana Santa, the response I received from friends and acquaintances was 
“didn’t you know Semana Santa is full of thieves?” Many people also then followed this comment up with 
the intentionally humorous consolation that the thief would pay an extra heavy price for stealing in the 
middle of a holy procession. 
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protected for moral and religious observation, and night spaces would be protected 
against the effects of secular and hedonistic revelry.  
Politicizing Space & Time 
Domesticating the Night 
Apparent through these discussions is that ‘the night’ has a unique association 
with the realm of the intimate and private. Despite the countless forms of “night travels” 
that have marked history (documented so extensively by Palmer, 2000), our simplified 
and oppositional ideology works to erase these; taking us instead in a very gendered 
fashion directly into the home, into the world that includes the most essential behaviors 
such as eating, sleeping, and, of course, sexuality (c.f. Gaissad 2005; Hanna 2004). As 
the reserve of the family it brings us into contact with those activities that create families, 
and that perform and invest “family” with meaning. These indispensible affairs of the 
night are ideologically spatially bounded, they have corresponding spaces designated as 
“appropriate” and hence they are not “supposed” to be conducted publicly. As feminist 
scholars have argued, this structural (spatial-temporal) separation is deeply ideologically 
mediated, since the “profound ambiguity of the liberal conception of the private and 
public obscures and mystifies the social reality it helps constitute” (Pateman 1989:120). 
Domesticated in this way, “night” affairs are too easily assumed to reside in the 
orbit of the Habermassian “private sphere,” outside of the concerns over the “common 
good,” assumed to be less influenced by public intervention and also ostensibly 
“inappropriate” or “inadmissible” in public debate (Habermas 1989; Fraser 1992; Landes 
1995). Just as the historical development of capitalism and gendered labor relations 
influenced the ways in which the domain of the home receded further from public debate, 
so too did these capitalist concerns with productivity influence our conceptualizations the 
night. This consideration of the nightlife problematic further illustrates the feminist 
position that such “private concerns,” and the significance of normative subjectivity 
formed in the private sphere, are in fact very much a part of public debates and regulatory 
policies – the “writ of the state” does not in fact run out “at the gate to the family home” 
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(Pateman 1989:133).29 
The extent to which the private permeates public debates is particularly relevant 
to the formulation of the nightlife problematic. It is nowhere more visible than in the 
frequent references that the organized women of the city center make to a particular 
passage in the Peruvian constitution, which guarantees the right “to peace, tranquility, to 
enjoy free time and rest, as well as a stable environment suitable for developing one’s 
life.”30 Through such references, their “private” concerns are explicitly marked as the 
“public good” and a guaranteed right of the state. Converted into concerns of the “public 
sphere” in this way, they are in turn transformed into priorities of public governance.  
Prohibitions of the Night 
Whatever its contents, the night, narrowly understood as a time or broadly 
perceived as a space, has rarely been welcomed by the day. As a challenge it has 
been legislated against; as a cover it has been historically assailed by the 
intrusions of light, a proliferation of technologies illuminating its dark corners and 
opening it up to the glare, potential stare, and threatening intervention of the 
custodial powers of midday. 
-- Cultures of Darkness (Palmer 2000: 18) 
The political problematization of nightlife was motivated by a desire to control 
and regulate the “unwelcome” spaces and practices of the night, within the circumscribed 
urban space of the city center. As such, the problematic reformulated moral evaluations 
of the “appropriate” use of urban space into concrete measures to achieve and maintain 
social order through what Merry has termed a spatial governmentality (Merry 2001). The 
power of space – or, more precisely, the social production of space – is extensive. In the 
confident words of Lefebvre:  
(Social) space is a (social) product…. [I] further claim that the space thus 
produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in addition to being a 
means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of 
                                               
29 This is corroborated as well by studies demonstrating how poor the public-private binary is as a single 
heuristic for the diversity of societies (Negt and Kluge 1993; c.f. Pearl Kaya 2009, Thompson 2000). 
30 Constitución Política del Perú (1992) Capítulo 1, Artículo 2, Inc. 22. 
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power” (Lefebvre 1991:26).  
But the nightlife problematic in Ayacucho’s city center politicized space and time 
together, revealing clearly that the production of space occurs during the day and the 
night. And in this way, the problematic sits precisely within the socio-political 
intersection of spatiality and temporality. It was not only formulating ideological and 
political stances towards spatial governance but also temporal governance, in the explicit 
sense that it was designed to regulate and control the night, to tame and domesticate the 
night.  
A growing body of literature argues that space is not simply “symbolic” or 
“representative of” society, but that in fact we “perceive the social spatially” (Erdreich 
and Rapoport 2006:172; c.f. Low 1996; Massey 1992). For his part, Lefebvre theorized a 
complex and dialectical relationship between the perceived (the embodied, social 
deciphering of space), the conceived (the more formalized and mental conceptualization 
of space), and the lived. Taking into account our diecentric frameworks for thinking 
about social practice, I would add that the same relationships apply to time or, more 
specifically, how we perceive, conceive, and live time through, and within, 
everyday/night life. We perceive the social both spatially and temporally. In other words, 
since our social practices vary through space and across day/night time, we not only 
construct space temporally, we also construct temporality spatially.  
Lefebvre also wrote that spatial practice constructs associations between different 
places (between the places of “daily routines” and “the places set aside for work, 
‘private’ life and leisure”). Despite paradoxically accepting an inherent separation 
between these places, he makes the important argument that “a spatial practice must have 
a certain cohesiveness, but this does not imply that it is coherent (in the sense of 
intellectually worked out or logically conceived)” (1991:38, emphasis added). Seen from 
a different angle, a similar process happens with temporal practice, by which the 
construction of perceived associations between night and day reinscribe the perception 
that night and day are in fact opposite extremes. All the while, however, as social beings 
we must attend to their inter-relatedness: we must perceive the “every-day” and the 
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“every-night” as cohesive, as naturally consistent with one another. We do not simply 
practice an every-day life; we practice an all-the-time life, an everyday/night life. 
Acknowledging these dynamics opens up the possibility for a model of social life 
(“everyday/night life”) that accounts for the conceptualization of extremes – the stuff of 
social emergencies – as part and parcel of the perception and embodiment of urban space 
as cohesive during the day and night. Shifting our focus to how temporal-spatial practices 
unite night and day through the “subtle logic” of “all-the-time life” we see what might 
seem obvious but remains largely unexamined: quite simply, what one does at night, and 
where one does it, matters just as much for one’s subjectivity and sociality as all those 
other activities typically included in “everyday life” (be it work, school, church, etc).  
Because it matters what people do in certain spaces at certain times, and because 
those times and spaces are socially-constructed, it follows that time and space are, 
together, means of production and power. The beating heart of the emergency rhetoric is 
a particular characterization of urban nights which marks certain entertainment practices 
– though not others – as inconsistent with the everyday/night representations of the city 
center. Central to the ideology upholding the nightlife emergency was a struggle to create 
a particular representation of spatial and temporal cohesiveness. Thus controlling night 
activities, and night spaces, took central stage on the political agenda. Heightened 
through the notable publicness of private life in urban settings with strong architectural 
intimacy (Daniel 2000), the city center cannot be experienced, conceptualized, and 
represented independently from the spatial-temporal considerations of day/night. 
“Inhabitants of large cities are continually being reminded of the fragility of the 
arrangements that make their lives tolerable,” Nottingham observes, “but nowhere is this 
awareness more sharply felt than in the night” (Nottingham 2003:210). 
Especially when examining Ayacucho’s nightlife problematic, we cannot lose 
sight of the fact that the specific details and the nature of the consistency and 
cohesiveness between the night and day are not, by any stretch of the imagination, natural 
or universal. The “night” is systematically domesticated – tamed and controlled, 
imagined, constructed, practiced, and invested with meaning. Through the nightlife 
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problematic, the night is conceived of and designed within institutional settings for 
dialogue and political debate (whether mass media, special organizational meetings, 
official governmental meetings or forums, neighborhood councils, etc). Of course, these 
settings – often referred to as part of the public sphere(s) – are anything but inclusive and 
open. 
As we proceed, we will pursue these elements of the spatial-temporal 
intersections in different realms. What should become increasingly clear as this story 
develops, and as we observe the formulation of the nightlife problematic in action over 
the following chapters, is that the night is ideologized and politicized together. In the next 
chapter we will be begin to explore questions of what is to be done about the nightlife 
problematic, who decides those priorities and who is politically responsible for 
implementing them. The night ideologies that have structured Ayacucho’s nightlife 
problematic depend upon the imagined relationships between night, danger, and 
insecurity. While the nightlife problematic works to continually obscure the power of 
racialized social categories, the next chapter will further reveal how the concept of 
decency plays off of interpretations of criminality, underpinning the representations of 
distinctly racialized geographies of criminality. In practice, the ideological frameworks of 
social distinction – the essential core of the nightlife problematic – serve to structure the 
social and political responses in notably demarcated ways. Through ideological and 
political construction of the nightlife problematic, racialized social distinctions are 
consistently temporalized and spatialized. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Dangerous Spaces:  
Geographies of Entertainment, Deviance, & Delinquency 
Sonia Morales’ latest recording, “Reyna de Corazones” (“Queen of Hearts”), was 
blaring from speakers in the outdoor open stadium just blocks from Ayacucho’s main 
plaza, in anticipation of her arrival on the stage. The music was echoing off the 
surrounding hillsides and pouring into the courtyard of my house as if it were next door, 
drowning out the familiar nightly chorus of dogs. It was a Saturday night, November 1, 
and there were many concerts that weekend celebrating Day of the Dead, all competing 
with each other in Ayacucho’s limited economy. They were also competing with each 
other sonically in the city’s complex soundscape, projected through cheap sound systems 
in ad-hoc open-air venues ranging from mechanic garages to bus stations to private 
courtyards cleared out for the occasion. We hurried through our dinner of bread and 
cheese and drank some hot tea, anticipating a long night out in the cold highland air 
during the concert. It was already hours after the advertised starting time, and the line of 
anxious concert-goers extended for blocks around the stadium. The music was loud, the 
buzz of excitement was palpable, and the street venders selling rice pudding, fries, and 
hard candies were busy at work. At fifteen soles, the ticket price was high (but not as 
high as the rumors had suggested) but I noted how diverse the crowd around me was: 
ladies in straight skirts and colorful sweaters (typical of the young rural migrants to the 
city) were standing next to a middle-aged man with jeans and a new leather coat, who 
stood next to an older woman with full traditional skirt, braids, and hat. There were 
people from all age groups and all backgrounds: couples chewing coca, middle-class 
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couples out on a date dressed in suits and heels, as well as older couples; there were 
entire families (which would amount to quite a large amount for ticket prices); and of 
course there were groups of young men wandering around eyeing the decked-out young 
girls who were standing arm-in-arm giggling with their girlfriends, and sometimes they 
would join together to take turns standing in line. This was the first time Sonia Morales, 
arguably the most popular artist in Peru, had come to Ayacucho, and people were joking 
with their neighbors in line that they had never seen such a huge crowd before, and 
certainly not at a musical concert. Thank goodness it was in the stadium, they agreed, 
because no other place in town could hold all these thousands of people. 
 
 
PHOTO 3.1 – Outside the stadium for Sonia Morales’ concert. (November 1, 2003) 
Onside the stadium, the large stage with colored lights seemed dwarfed by the 
enormous space and the clear night sky. Back by the stadium entrance there were dozens 
of wooden kiosks selling beer and a few kiosks selling other drinks and snacks, lit by 
bare bulbs hanging precariously. The popular and elaborate towers of fireworks were 
ready to be set off later in the show. Singer Robert Pacheco was the opening artist, 
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dressed in his characteristic baggy suit and weaving between his dancers, dressed that 
night in matching red outfits. Below the stage, groups of friends and families were 
clustered around cases of beer, singing and dancing. Typical of these concerts, the 
dancing was energetic and the huayno zapateo was fast and furious, creating an 
impressive cloud of dust that rose from under the feet pounding on the dry dirt. Behind 
the crowd of people dancing there were also many people milling around trying to keep 
warm, checking out the scene, or waiting in the covered bleachers where they could 
converse with friends and family before Sonia Morales began her show. 
I remember the exact moment when rocks began flying over our heads from the 
street side of the outer brick walls surrounding the stadium, and I remember watching as 
dozens (maybe more?) of young men charged into the stadium and disappeared in the 
oblivious dancing crowd with the security guards still distracted from the rocks, and I 
remember seeing the first bottles thrown onto the stage. What followed was a wild blur, 
and then I remember standing towards the back of the stadium where desperate concert-
goers had pushed a locked metal door open just enough to squeeze through and escape 
onto the street, watching as the stage burned and the kiosks were destroyed. The public 
hailed cabs to return home or simply joined the river of people heading into the center of 
town, confused and disappointed (Sonia still hadn’t even begun her show). It seemed that 
it ended as quickly as it had begun, but still after about an hour there were no police 
present. The few of us remaining in the streets nearby just watched as groups of kids 
walked through town, each proudly displaying numerous cases of looted beer. Of course I 
did not see the groups leaving the other end of the stadium with the looted microphones, 
sound equipment, and lighting system. (When I returned to the stadium the next morning 
I found the field littered with pieces of the burnt stage, broken bottles, and handwritten 
notes scribbled on scratch paper or on the backs of beer labels with saludos (greetings) to 
be read aloud.) 
As we left the Sonia Morales concert, marveling at the continued absence of 
police, we arrived at the historic theater Cine Cavero where Ayacuchano huayno guitarist 
and singer Max Castro was playing. On the theater steps outside was one lone woman 
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selling popcorn, dozing off with her child next to her. And then there were seven bored 
policemen leaning against their two police trucks on the street outside the theater, passing 
time until the concert ended. Just blocks away there was complete mayhem with no 
police presence, and meanwhile they were hanging out over here, bored. Five young men 
walked by singing Sonia Morales songs with all their might, carrying 6 stolen cases of 
beer right in front of the police, and they continued leisurely down the street and out of 
sight. Inside the theater there were a couple hundred people dancing and there was one 
tired man selling beer. There were at least a dozen Defensa Civil members walking 
through the theater, and at one point they escorted out a young man who had clearly had 
too much to drink but who didn’t protest and obediently followed them out. At that point 
Max Castro announced to the crowd “there are many different kinds of concerts, but this 
concert deserves respect and there are some people who need to behave a little better.” 
§ 
Sonia Morales’ disastrous concert on November 1, 2003, was the talk of the town 
for days.1 In her police testimony (which was reported widely in the local newspapers, 
complete with photos), Sonia Morales testified that she was already in the stadium and 
ready to perform but that the concert’s promoter was postponing her performance in the 
hopes of selling more alcohol to the public, that her bus had been attacked in the chaos 
and that she had only narrowly escaped being lynched. In outlying areas of the city many 
people ventured explanations for what went wrong, often expressing disappointment in 
the city’s irresponsible youth: that an intoxicated crowd was upset because it was late and 
Sonia still wasn’t playing, that gangs had instigated the trouble, that Sonia hadn’t 
appeared because the promoter hadn’t paid her, or that the promoter had delayed her 
presentation in the interest of selling more alcohol. Despite the police report and the 
many stories spreading the blame across various parties involved, in the city center the 
artist was largely held personally responsible for the event, accused of inciting youth 
                                               
1 This November 1 concert was coordinated as part of celebrations for All Saints Day (Todos Santos). Live 
concerts are a key feature of most festivals, especially All Saints and All Souls Day on November 2. 
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violence simply by promoting and popularizing a genre of music associated with ‘asocial’ 
or socially deviant youth.  
In any case, the outcome of Sonia Morales’ concert stood in stark contrast to the 
concert by Max Castro, the young Ayacuchano singer whose guitar-based commercial 
música ayacuchana has achieved high popularity in Lima and the rest of the country. 
Sonia’s concert seemed to epitomize – indeed, almost parody – the stark generalizations 
that characterize this type of concert, referred to as fiestas chichas, as categorically 
deviant – and the fans as criminal.2 For many of the central players in the nightlife 
problematic, such a display of disorder, violence, crime, and vandalism was exactly what 
they expect from these concerts. That such a violent and extreme outcome is decidedly 
rare for any kind of concert (fiestas chichas included) was categorically erased through an 
ideological framework that firmly positioned fiestas chichas as iconic of a set of social 
ills threatening the city center.3 Likewise, the actions and expectations of the thousands 
of people who were peacefully dancing and waiting for the national star to appear were 
overlooked, dismissed in the excitement over the actions of a handful of people who 
caused such extreme mayhem. 
Following the event, public discussions in the city center gravitated toward the 
idea of musical exclusivity, which assumed that fiestas chichas and música ayacuchana 
have distinct and exclusive audiences, and that they provoke distinct behaviors, one 
wholesome contrasted with one delinquent, one “respectable” and the other not.4 This 
                                               
2 Through the comment that there are “many types of concerts but this one deserves respect,” Max Castro 
himself capitalized upon the notion that while his concert was for respectable and wholesome (sano) 
entertainment, “other” concerts are for the purposes of getting drunk and causing a raucous. He expanded 
on this distinction when he described to me the troubles he had with past promoters who booked him often 
to perform on concerts with huayno norteño artists: at “those” concerts, he explained, “you’re playing and 
[people] are hitting each other or hitting their women…. And that’s the difference, you know…. They fight, 
they kill each other, and there’s no problem!” He decided not to play such joint concerts any more, and 
assured me that we would no longer see scandalous articles in the diario chicha about him (Author 
interview, August 29, 2004). 
3 The only other time that something similar was experienced in Ayacucho was some years before, during a 
concert by Eva Ayllón, the international star of música criolla, a musical genre from Lima and the coast. 
Musica criolla, and Eva Ayllón specifically, do not share the same negative reputation for deviance and 
mass criminality with fiestas chichas. 
4 Similar folk theories about musical exclusivity also appear as misleading analytical categories in local 
ethnographies that rely on statistical surveys. These surveys often separate musical preferences according 
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myth of exclusivity, already not representative of lived musical experiences in the city, 
further assumes that because certain musical practices are associated with deviant 
character, one cannot simply listen to them, or go to spaces associated with them, 
without also being corrupted by them, without those deviant characteristics being 
indicative of one’s own social character as well. This perspective was summed up by a 
radio guest, who stated that it is “impossible, not even in their dreams” (“imposible, ni en 
sus sueños”) that somebody who listens to música ayacuchana (like Max Castro) would 
go to a “fiesta chicha” (like Sonia Morales’ concert).5 
Without doubt, the nightlife problematic targeted the permanent discotecas in the 
city center (examined in the previous chapter) far more directly than the periodic fiestas 
chichas. Nonetheless, this chapter discusses these forms of entertainment together in 
order to interrogate the imagined relationships between night spaces, deviance, and 
criminality. As nightlife was increasingly interpreted within a framework of crisis, these 
musical practices were not simply subtly critiqued according to aesthetic judgments; they 
were said to provoke and even promote social deviance and insecurity. However, the 
politics of judgment fueling the nightlife problematic did not evaluate these spaces of 
night entertainment in the same fashion. On the one hand, the fiestas chichas – so 
strongly associated with the city’s periphery – were imagined first and foremost through 
a fear of physical violence and criminality. On the other hand, the discotecas – the spaces 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
to preconceived categories that assume not only that class and social distinctions will be reflected clearly 
and predictably through musical preference but also that preferences fall into one specific musical category 
at the exclusion of others (c.f. Rojas Orellana 1998; Hurtado Suárez 1997). For a case with profound policy 
implications, consider the challenge faced by the U.S. Census Bureau when they began allowing for 
individuals to choose more than one “race” (c.f. Williams 2006). Such surveys share the challenge of trying 
to identify discrete patterns while simultaneously recognizing overlapping ambiguities and the multiplicity 
of meanings. 
5 On a national level, this divide is frequently breached. Many of these artists are in fact friends (William 
Luna, personal communication, August 28, 2004). In Lima, it is also common to see artists from these 
genres in concert together. In a very atypical event, Lima-based TV and music personality Jeanet Barboza 
brought a large production to Ayacucho during Semana Santa 2004 that included many well-known 
technocumbia bands (though the most well-known, Rosy War, didn’t show) sharing a stage with huayno 
norteño star Abencia Meza and música ayacuchana star Max Castro. Even Max Castro has sought to bridge 
the divide and appeal to a wider audience, by recording with harp and female voice more typical of huayno 
norteño (his greatest hit is actually a song from the huayno norteño tradition). Numerous bands have also 
covered Sonia Morales’ hit songs but recorded them with panpipes and the latinoamericana aesthetic 
frequently heard in música andina. 
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where so many of the city center’s own youth entertained themselves – were decried 
more for moral degradation.  
The nightlife emergency, focused as it was on the city center night clubs, would 
not have gained ground had it not also included a perceived risk of crime and violence 
associated with city center nightlife. However, this criminality and delinquency was 
believed to be perpetrated not by the city center youth themselves but rather by the youth 
from the urban periphery who were also coming into the city center in search of 
entertainment. The alignment between the discourse of transgressive nightlife and the 
paradigm of security hinged upon ideas about the perpetrators of delinquency and the 
social source for insecurity in the city. By the end of this chapter we will see how the 
nightlife problematic served to connect the geographies of social distinction and night 
entertainment with geographies of marginality and criminality. 
Constructing Correlations: Nightlife & Criminality 
“Insecurity in the city has increased due to the indifference of the authorities, who 
do nothing to stop the proliferation of cantinas, discotecas, chicherías and 
brothels, and the chaos from fiestas and peñas….”6 
The emergency declaration of Ordenanza 054 was significant in that it 
institutionalized a correlation between nightlife and urban security. In October 2004, just 
a month after the emergency declaration, the Provincial Committee on Seguridad 
Ciudadana published a “Strategic Plan,” in which they identified 41 “factors” in the 
problem of inseguridad ciudadana and 11 strategies for combating them. The 41 factors 
were as follows: 
 
- Common crime 
- 24 hour sale & consumption of alcohol 
- Sale & consumption of drugs 
- Sale of adulterated alcohol 
- Night establishments 
- Traffic congestion and accidents 
- Weak and slow emergency response 
- Early release for civil rights 
- Discredited authority (desprestigio) 
- Gas stations and sale of gas 
                                               
6 La Calle, 30 August, 2004, page 4. 
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- Gangs in barrios and schools 
- Lack of discipline in educational centers 
- Fiestas chichas and concerts with alcohol 
- Ambulant sellers 
- Public spaces without security 
- Buildings without security 
- Casinos 
- Emolientes and street food 
- Prostitution 
- Pyrotechnic workshops 
- Breeding Pitbull dogs 
- “Slacker” (vaquero) students (playing 
hooky) 
- Crazy people 
- Internet cafés (cabinas) without control 
- “Yanamilla” Prison 
- Adulterated medicine 
- Rotten or poorly prepared foods 
- Defective electrical installations 
- Construction in high risk zones 
- Custom of drinking alcohol on 
corners and parks until late hours of 
the night 
- Violent attitudes with alcohol 
consumption 
- Domestic violence 
- Poor parental control 
- Alarmist news 
- Morbid TV programs 
- Climatological factors 
- Sectors lacking illumination 
- Low self-esteem of many youth 
- Lack of employment 
- Lack of places for healthy diversion 
- Lack of implementing values 
The list begins in the following order: common crime, sale and consumption of alcohol 
24 hours a day, sale and consumption of drugs, sale of adulterated alcohol, night 
establishments (establecimientos nocturnos), barrio gangs, lack of discipline in the 
schools, fiestas chichas and concerts with alcohol, night vendors, and public places 
without security. “Night establishments” – a euphemism for night clubs – were listed 
even before gangs (and the same source estimated there to be 120 gangs in the small 
city), and fiestas chichas immediately follow. The remainder of the list is an impossibly 
ineffective and disorganized mixture that includes the common targets of urban crime 
reduction plans (such as gangs and prostitution) mixed with some less typical targets 
(pitbulls or rotten foods) and a dose of behavioral judgments about slacker school-kids, 
lack of parental control, and violent attitudes. 
The correlation between a vibrant nightlife scene and an increase in crime is 
based in large part on local opinion polls, informal “studies,” and data offered as 
supporting evidence in official policies (e.g. Mesa Jurídica Interinstitucional de 
Ayacucho 2004a); it is not necessarily supported by rigorous academic research (c.f. 
Hanna 2004). This correlation is perceived and interpreted in part through fear, and the 
resulting sensation of causality is especially significant to the eternal perception that 
crime is on the rise. As many scholars working on the effects of fear and the discourse of 
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“heightened crime” have argued, the perception of a correlation is not necessarily 
evidence of direct correlation (Caldeira 2000; Flamm 2005; Glassner 1999; Margold 
1999; Smulovitz 2003). In Ayacucho, the perception that crime is on the rise is further 
invigorated with the frequent circulation of contradictory statistics on gangs in the city, 
many of which are greatly exaggerated.7 
The imagined correlation between nightlife and urban security is – in theory – 
bidirectional: it is expressed within claims that nightlife is dangerous because of crime 
but also that crime is on the rise because of the nightlife scene. In any case, the night 
industry, collectively, is seen as the heartbeat keeping so many of the other security 
“factors” alive: gangs and deviant school kids are thought to waste away their nights at 
these locales, the street vendors park themselves in the entrances or sneak in to sell 
cigarettes and adulterated alcohol all hours of the night, the problematic 24 hour 
availability and consumption of liquor and drugs depends upon these establishments, the 
violence witnessed in the city is interpreted as a direct result of such alcohol 
consumption, and these locales are precisely those which don’t provide adequate security 
to deal with violent outbreaks. 
The perceived correlations between nightlife and criminality seemed to legitimize 
the interpretations of the nightlife scene that marked certain entertainment venues and 
practices as especially dangerous. As evidenced by the Provincial Committee on Citizen 
Security’s list of “factors,” these ideologically invested interpretations entered directly 
into the strategies for maintaining urban security. We will examine the strategies of 
municipal governance through the apparatus of citizen security in greater detail towards 
the end of the chapter. But in order to fully appreciate the experiential significance of the 
correlations between nightlife and criminality, we must first detail how this nightlife 
                                               
7 This is a point emphasized by Cordula Strocka (personal communication, November 29, 2004; c.f. 
Strocka 2006). While the municipality continually claimed that there were “120 gangs” in the city, she 
argued that in fact many of the groups included in that number are not “gangs” at all, but rather competitive 
dance groups. These groups of organized youth arrange dance competitions, often in the night clubs, and 
were only believed to be gangs because they painted their group names on walls around the city. 
Government officials, she reasoned, had simply gathered all the names they had seen painted on walls and 
took that as “evidence” of the quantity of active gangs. 
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problematic encapsulates the interrelated ideas of space, class, gender, race, and 
geography and reframes them through the ideological prism of “nightlife.” 
Dangerous Spaces:  
Gender & Moral Corruption (Discotecas) 
Today’s clubs are continually framed not only as places where indecent things 
happen, but as spaces that will transform those who enter (including good students and 
children from respected and privileged families) into immoral people. The corrupting 
nature of these clubs was not seen to affect all youth abstractly; the idea that these clubs 
affected young girls in a specific way revealed assumptions that girls needed to be 
protected rather than lured into increasingly vulnerable settings and encouraged with 
public promiscuity. Premarital sexual encounters, even “promiscuity,” are a long-
standing Andean tradition, and in rural areas these free and uncommitted encounters are 
in fact expected to take place in “the wild,” outside of the privacy of home (Harris 1980). 
That such uncommitted promiscuity is never considered appropriate in this urban context, 
especially in public, points to a marked divide in notions of morality and respectability, a 
conservative interpretation of Catholic ideals and an urban elite sensibility of “decency.”8 
Ayacucho’s media attention to the involvement of young women and girls in the nightlife 
scene can be aptly described by what Laura Miller observed in Japan as “an odd mixture 
of anxiety and voyeuristic interest” in deviant girls (2004: 239), or what Stallybrass and 
White (1986) refer to as the twin poles of disgust and fascination in the politics of 
transgression. Newspapers often report on rapes and physical abuses against girls that 
occur in these clubs, and the neighborhood organizations frame these in the familiar 
rhetoric that if the girls did not frequent “indecent” settings they would not be susceptible 
to such risks and indignities. Although in the United States such claims are quickly 
countered for appearing to place the blame on the girls themselves (“they asked for it”) 
                                               
8 For a discussion of the efforts of the colonial Catholic church to control the effects of heavy consumption 
of alcohol during religious celebrations, and the parallel fears of “dangerous women,” see Navarrete 
Pellicer 2001. 
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rather than on the perpetrators, in Ayacucho these commentaries were more often 
criticisms of the club owners for allowing, promoting, and profiting from the behaviors 
and environments that make these crimes and disgraces possible. 
The unavoidable and damaging effect that such disreputable spaces are presumed 
to have on those who come in contact with them thus means that anyone associated with 
them or seen to have a role in the activities offered are immediately marked with the 
immoral characteristics of the spaces, and they are viewed with public suspicion. By 
displaying behaviors that are “incompatible with morality,” these venues were believed to 
pose a distinct moral danger. This concern is further gendered in the unofficial but 
dramatically public accusations against club owners and workers, since those leveled 
against men different markedly from those against the female workers in the night clubs.9 
These women are held doubly responsible: for profiting from illegal businesses that 
promote indecent activities and also for failing to stand up to the standards of respectable 
women. Public accusations and insults against male club owners revolved almost 
exclusively around their illicit commercial gain, accused of “corrupting” Ayacucho’s 
youth through their self-interested financial pursuits. Public slander against the female 
workers, however, was almost always about sex, and female employees were most often 
accused of being “prostitutes.”10 One day I accompanied the women in a city center 
neighborhood organization to the State Attorney’s office (Fiscalía) to file a criminal 
charge against the owner of one of the night clubs for armed assault against the junta’s 
president. Each one of these women, in her own words, described the owner as being 
someone “without any scruples” (sin escrúpulos) and who “manipulates everything with 
all his money.” The women who were with the owner during the altercation, however, 
were described as “prostitutes,” mujeres de mal vivir (women who lead a bad way of 
life), women who “work selling drugs and selling themselves, shouting insults that are 
                                               
9 For a look at gendered public accusations in a colonial Andean context, see Borchart de Moreno 2004. 
10 With only two exceptions that I am aware of, these night clubs are owned by men. In all of the clubs, the 
vast majority of the workers are women. I never heard sexual insults hurled against the two female club 
owners; they were treated to the same accusations as their male counterparts. This is not the case for 
chicherías or other bars, especially on the periphery, which are often owned and operated by women. This 
historical tendency of women in chicherías is documented elsewhere as well (Gotkowitz 2003). 
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too crude to be repeated.”11 
The accusations that all female workers are “prostitutes” do not generally center 
on a woman’s faith to her husband, as has been documented elsewhere (Gotkowitz 2003), 
but instead highlight different forms of public influence that women in Ayacucho are 
expected to uphold: the female employees who garnered the most attention (and horror) 
were those who were said to be “teachers” by day and “whores” by night. These insults 
directly link acceptable “hard work” with professional status (or at least legal status) and 
more importantly they link honor and morality with education and respectability (de la 
Cadena 1996). They also reinforce conservative criteria by which nighttime activities are 
by nature suspicious and stigmatized (Gaissad 2005), and by which “natural” behavior 
for women is measured as nurturing and respectful (also, not coincidentally, the 
characteristics of teachers). This directs us toward the stark conclusion that it is especially 
unnatural for women to participate in and promote the vulgar and indecent activities of 
the night club industry. What see is not just gendered urban space (Low 1999; Rosenthal 
2000). In the words of Lamas the “most dangerous of gendered places [is] the nighttime 
street” (Lamas 2002:241). 
The pressure on women, especially teachers, to set an example of decency, 
respectability, and honor clashed dangerously with the contagious and corrupting affect 
that the night club atmosphere was believed to have. The accusation that teachers are 
actively involved in the development of illegal prostitution networks in Ayacucho was 
extremely troubling to most Ayacuchanos, and the fears were compounded by the 
frequent newspaper reports of underage girls exchanging sex for money.12 Although these 
dimensions of honor and shame do not appear in the formal solicitations to the 
municipality or the police reports so carefully compiled in the neighborhood 
organization’s archive of evidence, public slander against female workers are publicized 
                                               
11 Sworn testimony for criminal charges (denuncia penal), filed by members of the Junta Vecinal Jr. 
Asamblea, Fiscalía de la Prevención del Delito, September 3, 2004. 
12 The topic of prostitution and its relationship to the growing urban nightlife atmosphere is itself worthy of 
an entire dissertation, especially focusing on the voices and perspectives of the young women involved. 
Homosexuality and the local nightlife scene would be another rich area of in-depth study (Motta 1999). 
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in radio and newspaper, and were a weighty component of the verbal testimonies in the 
State Attorney’s office. 
Geographies of Deviance & Criminality 
“Let’s place a cross on Jr. Asamblea.”13 With this headline, a newspaper editorial 
framed the discussion of night clubs on Jirón Asamblea – site of the city’s highest 
concentration of clubs – squarely within the religious imagery of a city center that should 
be characterized as decent, wholesome, and moral. Additionally, the tradition of placing a 
cross also marks and blesses the site of death or violence. The image of a cross in the 
heart of the entertainment district thus offers up a symbolic link between the moral threat 
and the physical threat that are posed by night spaces – and nighttime sociality – in the 
heart of the city center. This balancing act is evident in a special report by the Inter-
institutional Legal Forum of Ayacucho (prepared for the Provincial Committee of Citizen 
Security).14 While the final “solution” provided held that night clubs, bars and cantinas 
should be eliminated from the historic center for the “moral health of the residents,” the 
“introduction” immediately establishes that the nightlife industry “generates antisocial 
behavior” that “puts the security” at risk in the “middle of the heart of the city (centro 
histórico)” (Mesa Jurídica Interinstitucional de Ayacucho 2004a). Framed as a security 
risk, nightlife businesses are portrayed as spaces that provoke and promote a host of 
social problems stemming from alcoholism and drug use, including street brawls, rape, 
and murder. This ideological overlap of perceived “dangers” shaped current debates over 
“acceptable” entertainment and guided the development of concrete policies of a moral-
spatial governmentality that could guarantee security and control night spaces, 
particularly the night clubs. 
                                               
13 La Calle, September 1, 2004, page 7 
14 This inter-institutional forum includes representatives most of the city’s governmental institutions, 
including the State Attorney (Ministerio del Público), Justice Department (Corte Superior de Justicia), 
National Police (Policía Nacional), Provincial Council (Consejo Provincial), the human rights ombudsman 
(Defensoría del Pueblo). It also included some members who were not formally members of the 
government. 
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Despite the aesthetic similarities of the discotecas and their geographic 
concentration within a few central city blocks (described in the previous chapter), the 
clubs were in fact not all considered equal, and when asked directly, most clubbers would 
describe the scene as notably segregated. Many of my city center friends never ventured 
into the couple of clubs that catered to an audience from the peripheral areas and played 
more cumbia and chicha music because it was feared that “gangs” frequented those 
venues; likewise other friends from the peripheral areas expressed that they felt 
“unwelcome” in the clubs that catered to a foreign or tourist audience and advertised 
themselves as more “reputable” and “decent.” 
Thus the dichotomy between decent and vulgar contains a parallel dichotomy of 
kinds of deviance and danger: morally or socially deviant is distinguished from 
criminally delinquent and violent. These evaluations and judgments map onto existing 
and historic social divisions of class, privilege, or social status. As such, they reveal 
underlying ideologies about the relationship between patterns of deviance, crime, and 
socio-spatial division within the compact urban environment. “Nightlife” emerged as a 
problematic within a symbolic space ripe for the recreation of boundaries, in which 
representations of entertainment practices coincided with other systems of social 
distinction. These symbolic, social, psychological and geographical boundaries function 
in the absence of (and perhaps especially in the absence of) physical boundaries. 
This segmented scene feeds into the myth of musical exclusivity that rests upon 
firm beliefs about distinct forms of nighttime sociality and spaces for entertainment. In 
turn, this myth then serves to naturalize the claims that people from certain geographic 
and social sectors (and who listen to a particular kind of music, in this case chicha) are 
prone to delinquency and violence and thus directly and causally linked to problems of 
security in the city center. Specifically, the delinquency, crime, and violence that are 
witnessed in the city center discotecas are, by and large, not believed to be perpetrated by 
city center youth from influential or prominent huamanguino families. Instead, the 
trouble found in and around the clubs are said to result from the “hanging out” of gangs 
(la pululación). The Inter-institutional Legal Forum of Ayacucho again serves as a cogent 
 97 
example of this connection. The opening paragraph of their Citizen Security Committee 
states that “one of the most concerning social phenomenon is the indiscriminate 
appearance” of clandestine bars and cantinas in the periphery and discotecas and night 
clubs in the historic center. It goes on to state that these factors corrupt (pervertir) their 
personalities, cause violent behaviors, and bring about the “spiral of gang violence in the 
schools and barrios.” These problems, it concludes “directly and indirectly cause the 
citizen insecurity of the city of Huamanga” (Mesa Jurídica Interinstitucional de 
Ayacucho 2004b). Youth gangs (as in most of the world) are systematically and 
unquestionably marked as being a symptom of, and belong to, the city’s periphery, the 
barrios. But they are also systematically marked as being a primary (if not the primary) 
cause for insecurity in the city as a whole, including the city center.  
As I aim to show in the remainder of this chapter, the ones identified as causing 
the delinquency found in and around city center nightlife scene are identified as youth 
who “come down from the hills” (“que bajan de los cerros”). The same stereotypes that 
target the people who attend fiestas chichas – those from the peripheral areas of the city – 
as especially violent and delinquent are also motivating belief in an external source of 
violence in the city center.15  
Before going on to document how stereotypes about marginality and delinquency 
(particularly youth gangs) play out in Ayacucho, it is important to note that the 
correlation between marginality and criminality is by no means new or unique to 
Ayacucho. This is nowhere clearer than in Aguirre’s research on the making of the 
“criminal class” in Peru: police practices “constituted effective, albeit ambiguous, forms 
of social marginalization, for they targeted specific social, racial, and occupational 
segments of the population. The social stigmas associated with certain forms of identity, 
culture, and socialization were reinforced by the daily behavior of police forces” (Aguirre 
2005:65). Equally illuminating is Goldstein’s discussion of how the “myth of 
                                               
15 Another critique that sources the violence associated with the clubs to external causes holds that club 
owners had “come” to Ayacucho for personal financial interests and to take advantage of youth with no 
regard for the community or the future of the youth that support their business. 
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marginality” continues to motivate ideologies of urban social problems:  
The inhabitants of marginal barrios are themselves seen as marginals: backward, 
aggressive, and primitive or uncivilized in nature, qualities that their geographical 
position on the urban periphery supposedly reflects. As such, marginal barrios are 
frequently identified as “no-go zones”; spaces of violence, danger, and crime (see 
Merry 1996). Residence in such a place, regardless of one's occupation or social 
standing, is sufficient to label one a criminal (2000:12; c.f. Goldstein 1997). 
In the remainder of this paper I lay out how the perceptions and interpretations of 
marginality, deviance, and criminality expressed in the stereotypes about fiestas chichas 
(and fiesta participants) were critical to the development of the nightlife emergency in 
that they naturalize the idea that all marginal neighborhoods are responsible for the city 
center’s insecurity. Likewise, the stereotypes and judgments that construct a correlation 
between marginality and criminality allow for the logical leap that rationalizes and 
depoliticizes the connection between the moral crisis of nightlife and the circulating 
rhetoric of urban security; this connection constituted the very foundation of the nightlife 
emergency. 
Dangerous Spaces:  
Delinquency & the Periphery (Fiestas Chichas) 
Following the Sonia Morales concert, I began asking why police were not 
monitoring an event that involved thousands of citizens but were monitoring another 
concert involving only several hundred people, and the polarized answers that I received 
were very telling of the current social and political divide. Many people in the city center 
were horrified by the violence and infuriated by the official explanation that police were 
concentrated around the cemetery where there was the highest concentration of public 
activities that weekend and problems in prior years (and thus were not in the vicinity of 
the stadium). How is it possible, some wondered aloud, that all the police were at the 
cemetery and none were within four blocks of the city’s main plaza? This perspective – 
that the city center was under-attended by police forces – was strikingly different from 
that in the outlying areas of the city. For those people who openly appreciated Sonia’s 
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music, the question provoked a direct and cynical response: the police priority is always 
the city center and that which “belongs” to the city center, and consistent with this 
perspective, they argued that the police cared more about those within the historic Cine 
Cavero than they did about those in the stadium, since those in power have written off the 
outlying areas as hopeless danger zones and the people from the outlying areas (who 
attended Sonia’s concert in large numbers) were dismissed as delinquents (delincuentes). 
Through the association between particular musical genres and a preconceived 
notion of their fans, fiestas chichas are continuously reinscribed as symbolic of a 
threatening sector of society. For many critics, fiestas chichas seem to be the direct cause 
for urban social problems, presented as musical culture gone awry in urban Peru, 
bringing with it a multitude of societal sins and disregard for established norms (c.f. 
Montoya 1996). Fiestas chichas were stereotyped and essentialized, assumed to be 
inextricably linked with highly politicized societal problems. 
Music and the Periphery 
When seen through the lens of Huamanga’s nightlife problematic, the music of 
Sonia Morales, huayno norteño (northern huayno), is most closely associated with 
another genre that is today known as “chicha” music.16 Together, they are derogatively 
lumped together as fiestas chichas. Chicha music (or more formally cumbia andina) 
developed in the early 1980s, when the famous band Los Shapis championed a new 
                                               
16 There are many versions of the story about how this music took the name “chicha,” which is otherwise 
the name for a popular fermented corn liquor typical of the Andes. Drawing out a striking metaphor, 
Hurtado Suarez points out that “chicha” is synonymous with fermentation, change, and transition, and that 
the Peruvian society in which chicha music has flourished is itself in a state of social fermentation, 
changing and transitioning continuously (Hurtado Suárez 1995:7). Many early cumbia performers did not 
refer to their music as “chicha.” When I asked one Ayacuchano chicha musician about terminology, he 
stammered for a response and finally said “the rhythm is tropical andino, you know how every [genre] has 
a name, salsa is salsa, cumbia is cumbia, here we say chicha for tropical andino, we know of it as chicha … 
chicha, chicha, chicha. Sometimes people discriminate and call us ‘chicherito’….” he said, laughing as he 
exaggerated the voice of somebody looking down on him and calling him by a dismissive name (Author 
interview, April 14, 2004). I have consciously chosen to employ the terms ‘chicha,’ ‘chicheros’ and ‘fiestas 
chichas” in this work, not only because they are the most common terms in Ayacucho but also to highlight 
the loaded political meaning that they often convey, which is part and parcel of the processes of evaluation 
and judgment examined in this chapter. 
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musical aesthetic by taking the lyrics and singing style of the classic Peruvian huayno and 
putting them to the rhythm of cumbia, borrowing rock and pop characteristics through the 
prominent use of lead electric guitar, programmed electric organ or synthesizer, and drum 
machines.17 As the country was experiencing profound social upheaval from the bloody 
civil war, the simultaneous progression and emergence of the chicha style also seemed to 
be on fast-forward, displaying what Raúl Romero referred to as a “contemporary case of 
musical syncretism with important cultural consequences” (Romero 1988:273).18  
Although the musical roots of chicha are firmly within the huayno traditions of 
highland Peru, there are marked differences between chicha and the country’s many 
regional and stylistic variations of huayno. (The contrast with the highly formalized and 
studied urban mestizo huayno huamanguino, characteristically played on acoustic guitar, 
is particularly marked.) Thus chicha was quickly disassociated from its huayno roots and 
treated as its own musical phenomenon. Although musical traditionalists frequently 
lament that chicha has distorted traditional Peruvian music beyond recognition, the 
disassociation between chicha and other traditional genres was not only for the musical 
“distortions”: it was through live events that chicha acquired its infamous reputation 
associated with delinquency and violence.  
The emerging national popularity in the 1990s of huayno norteño which draws 
upon the prominent harp traditions of a particular region in Peru (known as the “norte 
chico”), was very much tied to the wildly popular chicha aesthetic, including a shared 
audience and parallel social environment. 19 Much like the rapid popularization of chicha, 
                                               
17 Although there are numerous good studies on chicha (with a near-exclusive emphasis on Lima), virtually 
no scholarly attention has been given to the incredible popularity of huayno norteño, nor to this relationship 
between chicha and huayno norteño. 
18 For more information on the development of chicha, see Hurtado Suárez 1995; Hurtado Suárez 1997; 
Mathews 1987; Montoya 1996; Rázuri 1983; Romero 2002; Turino 1988; Turino 1990; Vergara Collazos 
1991. The only study I have found on chicha in a highland city is Bullen’s article on Arequipa (Bullen 
1993). Romero 1989 offers an excellent and one-of-a-kind short article on chicha in the rural fiesta context. 
19 After the Sonia Morales concert, radio commentators often called Sonia’s fans “chicheros,” a socially 
loaded term meant in this case to invoke a sense of fear of chaos that these fans are assumed to bring to 
fiestas chichas. Like “chicha music,” this genre doesn’t have an “official” name and there are many 
common terms for it. I have chosen “huayno norteño” because it is the term most commonly used in 
Ayacucho. It is often simply called huayno con arpa (“huayno with harp”) and it is sometimes also called 
“folklore tropical,” a term so vague that it often confused people when I used it. 
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which provoked expressions such as “chicha tsunami” (Turino 1990) and “chichamania,” 
the popularity of huayno norteño is currently referred to by fans and critics alike in 
Ayacucho as a “fever.” Like the common English equivalent “craze,” the terms fever, 
mania, psychosis, disease, and infection that are frequently heard in Ayacucho with 
reference to chicha and huayno norteño all imply that the music contains something 
unnaturally contagious, such that liking it is out of one’s control (Russell 2002). The 
implication that the music’s popularity is a temporary and passing state from which those 
beholden will soon recover, also communicates an underlying message that the music 
lacks true “authenticity.” 
Like popular music the world over (and reminiscent of early theories on ritual), 
fiestas chichas were frequently interpreted through the metaphor of the release of the 
social “pressure valve,” an often violent outlet for disenchanted and frustrated youth 
(Bullen 1993; Romero 1988: 218; Vergara Collazos 1991: 10; Erenberg 1986). It was 
largely within a heavily cultural framework of collective identity formation (with a faint 
hint of class antagonism) that the patterns of musical experience, participation, and 
appreciation within urban youth circles earned the attention of scholars in the 1980s and 
1990s.20 Chicha music was perhaps the most cited example of “identity formation” 
among the migrant youth, and early scholars working on chicha went to great efforts to 
distinguish between different stylistic variations or “generations” of Peruvian cumbia, not 
only documenting its emergence but also reaffirming its social connection to the lower-
class migrant youth community living in urban shantytowns, particularly in Lima. 
Although Los Shapis attracted the attention of the media, the fascination with chicha 
music was early on embedded in an awareness of the ethnic and social roots of the music 
and performers. Peruvian anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya claimed that chicha musicians 
are the contemporary chroniclers of the urban life of provincial migrants (Montoya 1996: 
488). In Ayacucho today, over twenty years after chicha’s initial splash in Lima, fiestas 
chichas remain iconic of young, lower-class, migrant communities. As a social symbol, 
                                               
20 For an excellent argument on the weakness of “identity” as an analytic concept see Brubaker and Cooper 
2000. 
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fiestas chichas are a central component in the nation’s understanding of the patterns and 
effects of migration and youth culture.  
The association between chicha and the urban “popular masses” accumulated 
even more significance on the tense and violent political terrain of the 1980s and 1990s, 
especially in war-plagued Ayacucho. A few key events were burned into local memory, 
most notably the shocking July day in 1988 when the Shining Path detonated explosives 
at a Los Shapis concert just a couple blocks off the main plaza. According to one local 
version of the event, the Shining Path was infuriated (or jealous?) that chicha artists like 
Los Shapis could consistently draw large crowds to their afternoon concerts during times 
of enforced nighttime curfews. According to this interpretation, chicha artists were 
specifically targeted and threatened because the Shining Path believed the artists 
commanded “the thinking of the people” (“llevaban el pensamiento de la masa popular”) 
and were “corrupting and perverting the youth” (“por pervertir, corromper a la 
juventud”) by not advocating a more revolutionary politics.21 According to another 
version, the Shining Path targeted chicha music out of disdain for the lyrics that tell a 
helpless story of the poor rather than carry a social message of proletarian strength. This 
interpretation holds that the Shining Path had a profound disgust for “la gente de mal 
vivir,” those who lived a disreputable and contemptible life of alcohol, women, cheap 
entertainment, and unjustified violence, especially gang violence (c.f. Anonymous 
1995).22 This version is often corroborated by a parallel story of when the Shining Path 
entered a large multi-artist concert in Quinuapata where they sought out and killed some 
                                               
21 Author interviews, May 7, 2003, March 2, 2004,; La Calle, September 6, 2004, page 7. Turino also 
mentions this leftist criticism, but without specific reference to Shining Path (Turino 1990: 27). 
22 It is worth noting that despite the constant threats, huayno norteño artists (and some chicha artists) 
continued to visit Ayacucho frequently during the years of civil war, particularly in the lowland areas 
heavily affected by the violence (author interviews November 2, 2003, March 2, 2004, March 3, 2004, 
October 3, 2004, April 9, 2005). Although the relationship between musicians and the violence has been 
widely acknowledged with respect to “testimonial huayno,” or huayno testimonial (Ritter 2003, Rowe and 
Zúñiga 1995, Vergara Figueroa 1986, Vergara Figueroa 1987), the continued and frequent performances by 
huayno norteño artists during the conflict have not been examined. Also unexamined is the centrality of 
music in the 1960s social movements and protests, an environment that strongly influenced the founding 
members of the Shining Path (a relationship that was emphasized to me by Martina Portocarrero, author 
interview August 29, 2004). 
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half dozen youth gang members.23  
Meanwhile, astute politicians (such as President Alan García and the APRA 
political party in the 1985 elections) took up chicha music and performances as a political 
“in” to that otherwise difficult-to-reach social sector. President Alberto Fujimori 
incorporated chicha artist Chacalón into his early campaigns, and Vergara Collazos added 
“Fujichicha” to the seemingly infinite nicknames given to Fujimori (Vergara Collazos 
1991: 3,153). Later, Fujimori was often seen on stage smiling and dancing to his 
personalized (and hugely popular) technocumbia campaign theme song during the 2000 
elections, “El Ritmo del Chino” (“The Rhythm of El Chino”).24 In 2004, Fujimori’s 
campaign released an “updated” version of the technocumbia theme song, now called “El 
Ritmo del Chino: Versión del Retorno” (The Rhythm of El Chino: The Return). As if 
Fujimori’s changing theme songs could serve as a barometer of musical taste among the 
popular masses, in 2004, during Fujimori’s weekly radio addresses from exile in Japan, 
his campaign also featured a personalized theme song in the huayno norteño style, called 
“Volverás” (“You Will Return”). While the hosts of his radio program reminded listeners 
continuously that these songs carry “social messages,” no listener would miss that these 
theme song titles directly and overtly evoked the classic titles and themes of 
technocumbia and huayno norteño. 
As many Ayacuchanos continue to grieve over a perceived “disappearance” of the 
huayno, the success and popularity of huayno norteño seems to simply not count. Rather 
than being interpreted by the traditional elite in Ayacucho as the hopeful future for an 
appreciation of highland Peru’s “heritage” among the urban youth, it does not meet the 
elite ideal notion of “huayno” – especially the value placed on unadulterated tradition and 
heritage – and is thus disassociated from huayno tradition, viewed merely as a 
problematic new feature of urban society. The distinctions between huayno norteño and 
                                               
23 Author interviews, October 3, 2003, March 2, 2004. 
24 Rossy War and Ana Kohler (from the band Euforia) were the most popular technocumbia artists to throw 
their support behind Fujimori. Technocumbia has long been associated in the minds of Peruvians with 
Fujimori’s government and campaign machinery, and its decline is often interpreted as mirroring that of 
Fujimori. 
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huayno ayacuchano emphasize socio-cultural markers over the standard musical 
distinctions that would otherwise categorize huayno norteño as “huayno.”25  
Despite critics’ predictions that chicha’s increasing popularity would bring on the 
demise of Peru’s huayno traditions, from a sociopolitical perspective chicha in fact 
influenced a rise in popularity of the huayno, particularly among the urban youth, since 
huayno music has swept in on a wave of excitement through huayno norteño. Moreover, 
chicha and huayno norteño are intimately entwined within the realm of sociality: I often 
heard a humorous refrain that as the young patrons get progressively more drunk their 
musical preferences change: “they always start with chicha and end with huaynos,” or as 
one woman put it “chicha is to get them into the mood and huayno is for once they’re in 
the mood.”26 Nonetheless, the urban elites of Ayacucho’s historic city center have largely 
dismissed huayno norteño as a “chicha-cized huayno” (huayno achichado). William 
Luna, another famous artist in the música popular andina genre, expressed a similar 
sentiment when I asked him about the popularity of huayno norteño. Although he 
prefaced his response by stressing that he is friends with Dina Paucar (Sonia Morales’ 
rival in world of contemporary huayno norteño divas), he explained that “70 percent” of 
Peruvian society gains their satisfaction and entertainment through tonterías (idiocies) 
and music that is huachafo, dismissed as a tasteless and inauthentic imitation; they don’t 
have “a hunger for culture.”27 In these opinions, chicha and huayno norteño are 
continuously held up in opposition to the elite constructions of “decency” and “culture. 
Insecurity & the Urban Periphery 
Once chicha music became iconic of social ills such as alcoholism, violence, 
                                               
25 This is also evident in scholarly literature and accounts. While scholars have noted a decline in chicha 
since the 1990s, “similar to the one experienced by the commercial huayno in the 1980s” (Romero 
2002:232), the simultaneous phenomenon of huayno norteño has gone virtually unremarked upon. 
26 Author interview, October 3, 2003. I heard these types of jokes often when interviewing owners of 
cantinas and chicherías in the outlying areas where locals congregate to drink and listen to music (though 
not dance). 
27 Author interview, August 28, 2004. The term huachafo has a long historical usage in social comparison 
(Parker 1998: 31-34). 
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gangs, public disturbances, and other asocial behaviors, the term “chicha” ceased to be 
merely a musical or stylistic descriptor and became a concept that was readily 
transposable onto any social realm. “Chicha” persists as a disparaging term connoting 
cheap entertainment lacking in “culture” (Caretas 831, 1984 cited in Turino 1990:23) and 
promoting uncouth, violent, or asocial behaviors. The most common application of the 
word “chicha” outside of the musical context is the term “diario chicha,” a certain kind 
of tabloid newspapers. Carlos Iván Degregori writes that these tabloids reinscribe the 
association between violence and the popular sectors by focusing not on bank robbers or 
drug traffickers but on neighbors and family members committing grave atrocities against 
their own community, chronicling “the fragility and failure of the popular sector,” their 
readership (Degregori 2001: 138). Combining the imagery of failure (derrota), 
discrimination, fear, and abandonment, with a naturalization of violence, particularly 
within what should be the trusted realms of family and neighborhood, chicha tabloids 
“document” the dark side of popular society. The diario chicha is also where chicha 
music and huayno norteño are featured and followed, gossiped about and ridiculed. In 
addition to concert announcements and brief interviews with musicians, the chicha 
tabloids cover all the scandals, with especially pitiless coverage of the female huayno 
norteño singers: copyright violations, denied international visas, lawsuits for libel or for 
harassment, sexual rumors, embarrassing guffaws, or public humiliations. They feature 
scandals within the lower-class society and their stars, or capitalize on scandals by 
neighbors rather than strangers; they are exaggerated to the point of caricature or farce, 
vilified as something to be ashamed of and embarrassed about.28 The term “chicha” 
therefore does not merely reference class, race or migrant status; it marks something as 
violent, vulgar, sexual, scandalous, and embarrassing. 
Interestingly, the stereotypes and prejudices about fiestas chichas and delinquency 
are by no means uniquely characteristic of Ayacucho’s city center elite, since many in the 
                                               
28 Embarrassment or shame can be seen as features of a politics of judgment. For more on how shared 
embarrassment, public secrets, and cultural intimacy affirm varying degrees of group membership see 
Herzfeld 1997, Taussig 1999. 
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urban periphery (including chicha listeners) expressed similarly disparaging opinions of 
chicha. Young girls explained that they listen to “cumbia” (and showed me cassettes that 
would otherwise be called “chicha”) but later reported that the people who come to their 
store to drink always listen to (giggle, giggle) “chicha”; another man who was listening to 
chicha in his home pointed down the block and said “los borrachitos” (“the little 
drunks”) go over there, referring to a locale that his neighbor described as “abajo es puro 
chicha” (“down there it’s all chicha”). These listeners have a “taste” for certain music (in 
this case chicha) but they don’t participate in – or approve of – many of the stylistic, 
musical, social practices and activities associated with that music (in this case the 
accompanying drinking activities), and they have discursively separated their musical 
taste from the negative behaviors. Many people – especially young women – who said 
they like chicha scowled when I’d ask if they go to chicha concerts (“mucha 
delincuencia” or “mucha borrachera,” too much delinquency or too much drunkenness). 
Many store owners tried to avoid the problematic “chicheros borrachitos” and the 
problems they bring, either by not selling alcohol (for financial and social reasons few 
seemed to opt for this route), by not playing certain music (“la gente se ubica,” people 
will find their place) or by not putting any music at all on (“otra gente viene cuando hay 
música,” a different crowd comes when there’s music). Just as musical taste (preference) 
does not map simply or directly onto musical practice (attending certain concerts), so too 
musical taste and socio-spatial proximity does not map neatly onto preconceived socio-
political opinions. The majority of my interviewees said they listen to chicha but an even 
larger majority said they would not go to the chicha concerts. Many expressed universal 
concerns of money and time, but the most common reason that I received for not 
attending chicha concerts is the shared opinion that they are frequented by “drunks and 
delinquents” (“borrachos y delincuentes”), that they are dangerous.29  
                                               
29 Those involved in fiestas chichas admit that the crowds are often filled with rival gang members, and 
musicians comment that they frequently have to publicly acknowledge (or “greet,” saludar) the different 
gangs by name to keep them “happy.” But they all insist that the violence occurs outside the concerts. 
Inside, they maintain, the concerts themselves are safe and “calm” (“tranquilos”). They frequently lay the 
responsibility for external violence with the lack of police and security presence in the areas of these public 
concerts, expressing a fear not of the concert spaces but the dark and uncertain public space of the 
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It is not insignificant that the stereotypes about the relationships between fiestas 
chichas, youth from peripheral communities, and delinquency, are shared across the city. 
In effect, the circulation of shared narratives of crime, and of public explanations for the 
patterns of delinquency, return to oppositional dichotomies of social difference. 
According to Caldeira, they therefore serve to reinscribe symbolic order:  
This symbolic reordering is expressed in very simplistic terms, relying on the 
creation of clear-cut oppositional categories, the most important of which are 
good and evil…. These narratives and practices impose partitions, build up walls, 
delineate and enclose spaces, establish distances, segregate, differentiate, impose 
prohibitions, multiply rules of avoidance and exclusion, and restrict movements. 
In short, they simplify and enclose the world. Narratives of crime elaborate 
prejudices and try to eliminate ambiguities (Caldeira 2000:20). 
Seen in this light, “talk of crime” (c.f. Moodie 2002), like “crisis talk” (Thomas 2006), 
deploys the same host of ideological devices that are foundational to the problematization 
of nightlife. In line with our earlier discussion about ideological systems of distinction, 
Caldeira carefully documents how these theories about danger and criminality depend 
upon ideological constructs that serve to reduce social and historical complexities and 
essentialize social categories (corrupt, poor, criminal, marginal).  
As we have seen thus far, unequal perceptions of danger (whether moral and 
physical) dovetailed with common perceptions of the patterns of criminality in the city. 
Existing social judgments and prejudices that trace the source of “deviant” and criminal 
behaviors to the city’s peripheral communities have a substantial bearing on the 
interpretations of urban security problems (Arriagada Luco and Morales Lazo 2006).  As 
common crime and gangs emerged in the public consciousness of the city’s social 
problems around the years 1998-2000, it was immediately associated with the barrios, 
the expanding peripheral communities largely populated by recent migrants to the city, 
and the “torn social fabric” resulting from the years of civil war with the Shining Path. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
unpatrolled urban streets. An interesting comparison that was brought to my attention is with riotous youth 
gangs of soccer team fans in Latin America, particularly notorious in Colombia and Argentina (for Lima, 
see Castro 1999). Although this “soccer violence” generally occurs outside of the stadiums and after the 
games (rather than inside the stadiums during the games), the games themselves are frequently portrayed as 
dangerous and uncontrolled settings. 
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The prevalence of this association at that time is exemplified in the inaugural issue of a 
local magazine, which included statements from “people on the street” about youth 
crime: “It all originates in the barrios…. They are the culprits of this social disgrace…. 
There didn’t used to be delinquents” (Somos, Vol. 1, Issue 1, page 19). Reminiscent of 
racist ideologies linking rural and indigenous peoples to inherently non-rational, 
instinctive, and often violent behavior (de la Cadena 2000, Poole 1994, Remy 1991), the 
urban poor are also portrayed as perpetuating a lawlessness, “havens for antisociales” 
(Coronil and Skurski 2004:98, c.f. Aguirre 2005; Bailey 2004; Bengoa 2000; Caldeira 
2000; Dinzey-Flores 2005, 2006; Gregory 1998; Goldstein 2003, 2004; Guano 2004; 
Roth-Gordon 2009; Rotker and Goldman 2002; Salazar 2000; Scheper-Hughes 2006).  
It is not simply that “youth delinquents” live in the outlying neighborhoods but 
that those peripheral – marginal – neighborhoods produce delinquency and other social 
“disgraces.” As this circulating rhetoric of victim/perpetrator is mapped onto the 
imaginary geographic and social duality of center/periphery, the peripheral 
neighborhoods are marked as causally responsible for the city’s security problems.  
More importantly for our discussion, these prejudices and symbolic categories 
were activated through social and political attempts to create order and solve the city’s 
security problems. The rhetoric or doctrine of citizen security was increasingly adopted 
as a parallel interpretive framework within city center efforts to “define the reality” of 
nightlife dangers in the city center. Once the social crisis was formalized as a public 
problem, and specifically as a security problem, the institutional system of Seguridad 
Ciudadana kicked into gear and began to channel the official and civil responses to the 
“crisis.” 
Nightlife & the Citizen Security Apparatus 
Underneath these seemingly straight-forward correlations between nightlife and 
social danger, we also see the overlap of the complex and historically patterned 
geographies of distinction and criminality, as examined in this chapter: the perpetrators of 
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the physical danger and criminality found in the nightlife scene are traced to the urban 
periphery. Thus while the discotecas may be a source of moral corruption for the city’s 
youth, the city center is simultaneously victim to the criminality coming from the 
margins. 
The development of the dissertation charts the process by which the social crisis 
of nightlife – upon which we have been concentrating thus far – became a public problem 
of security. Critical to this transformation is how danger was systematically narrowed 
through the framework of seguridad ciudadana. To conclude this discussion, therefore we 
return to the idea that the politics of nightlife in Ayacucho took shape within an 
interdiscursive field in which seguridad ciudadana was also circulating as a parallel 
interpretive framework for understanding – and defining – current social circumstances.  
As residents of the city center began concentrating their efforts at convincing 
authorities to close night clubs and raising general awareness of their campaign against 
nightlife, they employed the rhetoric of seguridad ciudadana as a crucial resource. 
Because their efforts to define a social crisis and mark nightlife not only as a realm of 
moral transgression but as a distinct social and physical threat, the discourse of “security” 
served to broaden the appeal of their campaign. Whereas their concerns over night clubs 
along a few city blocks demanded continuous justifications and couldn’t gain traction 
within the community, the needs and desires for “security” were virtually taken for 
granted in this community recently racked by political violence and social upheaval. In 
this sense, the initial move to incorporate insecurity into the list of concerns made their 
case for a nightlife crisis more comprehensive, effectively increasing the support from the 
wider community. 
Over time, however, a paradox emerged. While the discourse of security served to 
increase the attention from the broader community, it had an opposite effect within the 
political realm. This is most visible in the transformative moment of the citizen security 
emergency declaration: it directly and formally reduced the broad social emergency (the 
loss of tradition and the moral corruption of the city’s youth) into a much narrower 
citizen security doctrine.  
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For many cities in the world, nightlife would seem to be an almost inherent 
component of urban governance, and the social and political efforts to prevent and 
control youth gangs is a struggle that has continued for decades. For Ayacucho, however, 
these two urban phenomena made their appearance in the public consciousness almost 
simultaneously, and very recently. While the first youth gang formed in the city in the 
late 1980s (during the civil war), it wasn’t until the late 1990s that gangs really registered 
as systematic political concern of urban governance (PAR 2002; c.f. Vergara Figueroa 
and Condori Castillo 2007). As will be examined in greater detail in chapter 7, residents 
began actively organizing, especially in the outlying areas, into neighborhood juntas (or 
rondas urbanas, the urban patrols modeled after the famed rondas campesinas) in the late 
1990s to fight urban crime and youth gangs. Night clubs, meanwhile, first appeared in the 
city center in the very late 1990s and proliferated rapidly; the first public and formal 
articulations of resident concerns over nightlife came right around the year 2000. But 
these specific security concerns – crime, gangs, delinquency – were not, at that time, 
necessarily articulated through a generalized rhetoric of “citizen security.” 
As city center residents were struggling to establish the nightlife problematic as 
an urgent political priority (to “define their reality”), the discourse of “citizen security” 
was also gaining a prominent position in the international socio-political climate. 
According to Neild, the term “citizen security” was coined in Latin America in the late 
1990s to broadly encompass “threats to public, social, and political order posed by rising 
common crime and fear of crime” (Neild 1999:1). The term “seguridad ciudadana” was 
in occasional use at least by the year 1997 in Ayacucho (it appears in the text of a council 
agreement to encourage the participation of neighborhood juntas). It was not until 2003, 
however, that it stood alone as an organizing principle, when seguridad ciudadana 
became national politics through the creation of the National Citizen Security System. In 
January of 2004 the Provincial Municipality of Huamanga opened its office of Citizen 
Security, the Sub-Gerencia de Seguridad Ciudadana.  
At around the same time, the concept of “human security” was being embraced by 
the United Nations in 2000, defined as “freedom from want and freedom from fear” (c.f. 
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Commission on Human Security 2003). Although the concept of “seguridad ciudadana,” 
at least as formulated in Peru, was less abstract than that of “human security,” and 
intended to address urban crime and violence in a more direct way, they both (along with 
other international debates and doctrines of public order) mark a sharp departure from 
traditional policies of state security (or national security).30 Thus we see the significance 
of Goldstein’s assertion that “what might be called ‘security talk’ now stands prominently 
alongside ‘rights talk’ in contemporary geopolitics” (Goldstein 2007:50), so much so that 
the “security paradigm” is not only transnational but also “extraordinarily fundable” 
(2007:59).31  
As we will see in greater detail in chapter 7, this connection between citizen 
security and democratic rights was especially powerful (and complex) within countries 
like Peru, which were undergoing political transitions driven by decentralization and the 
philosophy and political doctrine of participatory democracy (c.f. Bailey 2004). Though 
security remains a powerful criterion of political legitimation in Peru, through its re-
conceptualization as citizen security, “security” has became a social and political 
keyword, encoded with other concepts of freedom and universal rights, and positioned to 
represent the concrete as well as intangible elements of the “public good.”  
Moving forward we will see that the doctrine of seguridad ciudadana increasingly 
served as a common language for discussing social issues. In this way, using it as a tool 
in making the case against nightlife can be seen as an astute political maneuvering to gain 
                                               
30 Seguridad ciudadana will be examined in more detail in chapter 7. in the meantime, it is worth 
mentioning that a fair amount has been written about citizen security in Latin America (and Peru), from a 
range of perspectives, including: Arriagada Luco and Morales Lazo 2006, Bailey 2004, Bailey and 
Dammert 2006, Basombrío Iglesias 2004, Bengoa 2000, Carrión Mena 2003, Carrión Mena and Núñez-
Vega 2006, Costa and Basombrío Iglesias 2004, Dammert 2005, Dammert 2006, Durand Zevallos 2005, 
Estévez 2001, Flora Tristan 2004, Frühling 2007, Frühling and Tulchin 2003, Goldstein 2004, Goldstein 
2007, Hoecker 2000, Mayorga 1997, Muller Solón 2008, Neild 1999, Ramacciotti 2005, Ungar 2009, 
Whitehead 2002b. 
31 Nonetheless, through his research in Cochabamba, Bolivia, Goldstein demonstrates that this discourse of 
rights and security is contradictory for those urban residents who live in the outlying barrios, many of 
whom demonize the discourse of human rights as protecting criminals and thus preventing the effective 
maintenance of security. This criticism, he argues, also functions to justify cases of lynching, in which “the 
poor line up with the rich to administer violence to the poor” under a climate of fear (Goldstein 2007:72; 
c.f. Goldstein 2004, 2005b). 
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the attention of governmental authorities, to include their “issue” within the official 
agenda, and to convince those in power that their concerns should be priorities of local 
governance. Nonetheless, it will become increasingly clear that seguridad ciudadana was 
much more than a discourse; it was a political and institutional system. The concurrent 
development of the seguridad ciudadana apparatus was essential for the formalization of 
the social crisis into a public problem. More importantly, it played a significant role in 
the debates and disagreements over political responsibility for solving the problem. 
By the end of the story, we will come around full circle to fully appreciate how 
the geography of distinction maps onto the geography of criminality in the city, as well as 
onto the geography of citizen participation. Once the peripheral communities were 
believed to be disproportionately responsible for causing the city’s insecurity, they were 
then held disproportionately responsible for solving those social problems through 
participatory programs of the citizen security apparatus.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Prohibition of the Night: 
Controlling Spaces in the City Center 
Qara Uya! [Shameless! Literally: Face of leather]  
 
Taking advantage of her passing popularity and economic power she mocked the 
authorities and the pueblo ayacuchano by not appearing on November 1, 2003…. 
With lots of nerve and no shame for scamming and deceiving the noble pueblo 
ayacuchano, [Sonia Morales], with reckless and provocative intentions, is 
planning to return to our city to create another scandal.”1 
On March 23, 2004, roughly four months after Sonia Morales’ failed concert 
(described in the previous chapter), the artist returned to Ayacucho to hold a closed press 
conference in which she proposed to give a free public concert (without opening bands 
and thus without delayed appearance) to show her apologies and her appreciation for 
Ayacucho. She was publicly denied permission, with great pride and high emotions on 
the part of the Ayacuchanos present (most of whom were media and government 
representatives). Local newspapers were especially relentless, with front page headlines 
like the one above, which used a Quechua phrase accusing her of shamelessness. Another 
newspaper headline warned “Watch out Ayacucho! Sonia Morales has announced 
another concert!”2 Underneath this headline was a photo of an anonymous drunken man 
hunched over on the sidewalk with the caption “Will Sonia’s fans once again end up like 
this?” This photo was undoubtedly not related to the concert, but the coverage and 
commentary about the Sonia Morales concert – and her potential return presence in the 
                                               
1 Frontpage headline, La Voz, March 23, 2004, page 1,4. 
2 La Jornada, March 24, 2004, front page headline. 
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city – draws upon the historic association in the minds of many Ayacuchanos between the 
fiestas chichas and drunkenness, public disturbances, and crime (described in previous 
chapter). 
Sonia Morales’ concert was also a social and political catalyst for some of the 
most significant and sustained efforts to regulate night entertainment. In effect, responses 
to this concert “set the stage” for the development of the nightlife problematic and the 
expansion of particular forms of moral, spatial, and temporal governance in the city 
center. As we have examined throughout the first section of the dissertation, ideologies of 
social difference inform fundamental conceptions of nightlife as a realm of social 
transgression. As moral judgments are transformed into political imperatives, these 
politics of prejudice form the basis for fundamental conceptions of what is morally, 
socially, culturally, politically acceptable (and, thus, legal) in the city center, particularly 
in the night.  
As we see in this chapter, during the months (and now years) following Sonia 
Morales’ concert, the burden upon government authorities to regulate and prohibit these 
undesirable events increased exponentially as local authorities were under increasing 
pressure to guarantee security in the city center by means of entrenched social and moral 
hierarchies. I begin with a discussion of policies issued during Semana Santa in 2004. 
Although they were temporary, they were broad in scope, theoretically affecting all 
businesses and activities alike, no matter the venue and no matter the form of 
entertainment offered. What emerged through the temporary prohibitions was a path 
towards the formalization of moral judgments positing that night-time activities are by 
nature suspicious and dangerous and that certain physical spaces associated with nightlife 
will inevitably transform anyone who passes through them. 
As these efforts at regulation, control, prohibition, and exclusion were made 
permanent through subsequent municipal ordinances, they became increasingly targeted, 
aimed specifically at the burgeoning night club scene radiating out from the city’s main 
plaza. Within the implicit focus on the “city center,” the new policies defined and 
codified internal spatial boundaries for zones deserving and requiring additional 
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protection and vigilance. The difficulties that the municipality faced during the 2004 
Semana Santa celebrations foreshadow the deep-seated challenges inherent in the 
attempts at policy-making and policy enforcement within the nightlife problematic, 
which culminated in the emergency declaration. The increasingly convoluted 
bureaucratic structure of endless resolutions and ordinances eventually took central stage 
in local debates over municipal authority and local governability.  
To fully understand the origins and effects of the nightlife emergency, it is not 
enough to merely document how the nightlife industry itself emerged or the timeline of 
regulations and spectacular prohibitions (such as forced closures). This chapter continues 
the discussion of how the “nightlife problematic” emerged as social crisis by describing 
in detail how moral values and judgments became codified within legislation designed to 
regulate nightlife businesses. Beyond the regulation of business practices (such as hours 
of operation or the admission of minors), and beyond regular safety and operating 
inspections, these regulations further assert that specific spaces were not appropriate for 
nightlife activities: historic buildings declared cultural patrimony, and most of all the 
areas immediately surrounding certain “sacred” zones such as churches and schools. By 
embedding the prohibition of undesirable cultural practices within legal parameters, these 
laws created “fetishized truths” institutionalizing a particular representation of nightlife 
“reality.” Going into the second section of the dissertation, we will see as well that 
through the official declaration of an emergency, this “reality” was increasingly painted 
through correlations between nightlife and urban citizen security.  
Semana Santa: Temporary Moral Regulation 
The public rejection of Sonia Morales must be interpreted within the context of 
Ayacucho’s famous Semana Santa (Holy Week), since the press conference occurred 
only a week and a half before religious celebrations were to begin. Sonia Morales’ 
concert, one of the most publicized disasters in the Ayacuchano music scene of recent 
years, resurfaced right as the city was already in full swing over preparations, fanning the 
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flames of the debate over what is acceptable during the religious Semana Santa festival.  
Many in the city center shared the opinion that fiestas chichas (and the social 
deviance which they promote) ought to be prohibited, specifically during Holy Week: 
“That music instills delinquency. Look how the stadium ended up – we can’t call that 
folklore! … [Semana Santa] is a time for being together with the family and for devotion, 
no? We shouldn’t have those kinds of concerts!”3 In the interests of calming fears of 
increased chaos and bolstering the feeling of religiosity for Holy Week, governmental 
authorities went to great lengths promising to guarantee citizen security during Semana 
Santa and to prevent further public disorder. Despite these promises, local newspapers 
warned readers daily about the gangs that “come from Lima” to abuse Ayacucho and to 
rob Semana Santa visitors. Reinforcing the association between gangs, violence, and 
fiestas chichas, one newspaper warned about the possibility of being assaulted, robbed, or 
killed at fiestas chichas with the bold headline “Be careful with murderous chicha [chicha 
asesina] in Semana Santa!”4 
In response to these moralist and traditionalist fears and criticisms, the 
municipality issued a series of temporary policies that were clear efforts to prohibit, hide, 
and exclude such undesirable or deviant social events from the city center. Among them, 
municipal forces initiated a number of measures aimed at “cleaning up” the city’s image 
immediately before celebrations began. Most of these efforts involved heightened 
operations to close clandestine brothels and cantinas, arresting homosexuals presumed to 
be offering sex on the street corners, repainting public spaces (including park benches 
and lines in the streets), and blocking off the traffic within a four block radius of any 
church with a procession (which amounted to most of the city center). Other early and 
uncontroversial measures were taken by the municipality’s tourism office, which handed 
                                               
3 Author interview, April 16, 2004. 
4 La Voz, March 30, 2004, front page headline, article page 3. In an attempt to “clarify,” the article noted 
that traditional festivals prior to the 1980s (when the Shining Path initiated its armed struggle but also the 
year when chicha music hit mainstream) did not end up with these problems. To complicate matters, the 
article about “chicha asesina” discusses “chichódromos” (which don’t really exist in Ayacucho but is 
presumably meant as a synonym for fiestas chichas) and night clubs (discotecas) as virtually equivalent in 
their damage to the city and to the city’s youth. 
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out fliers urging the “amigo ayacuchano” (friend) to treat tourists well and to “carry out 
one task every day that benefits your city. Ayacucho needs you!” On the back they 
admonished readers that “we are obligated to know [our history] in order to protect it and 
conserve it,” and it provided a list of the do’s and don’ts of “el buen ayacuchano” (the 
good Ayacuchano). 
Beyond the beautification measures, the municipality also passed Mayoral Decree 
No. 012-2004-MPH/A. This official ordinance included a list of activities that it “strictly 
forbids”: the sale and consumption of alcohol in the main plaza, the distribution of signs 
or posters with any kind of advertisement (such as concert announcements) in the entire 
city, the temporary opening of bars, cantinas, or night clubs for Holy Week, and the sale 
of alcohol on the Thursday and Friday before Easter.5 The most controversial aspect was 
the prohibition of all public non-sport shows within the historic center of the city through 
Friday: not only fiestas chichas but any and all concerts, clubs, or public parties. The 
week before the festivities, authorities within the provincial government began making 
public statements that no fiesta social [public dance party] had legal authorization – 
whether inside or outside the city center. Although most authorities specified that no 
promoter had yet submitted the proper paperwork, others began making news headlines 
with bold promises: “There will be no fiestas chichas or folkloric fiestas during Semana 
Santa: Announced fiestas have already been cancelled.”6 Other authorities announced 
that the municipality would be pressing legal charges against the promoters who had used 
the municipal logo on their advertisements (suggesting municipal licenses) without 
actually having municipal authority.7 Just one day before the first procession and the 
formal beginning of Semana Santa, the municipal office of Civil Defense was still 
carrying out inspections (required for official authorization to hold a concert) of the 
                                               
5 Striking a balance between Holy Week religiosity, holiday celebration, and citizen security is an obvious 
challenge to any governing official. Even Hugo Chávez received widespread criticism when he declared a 
Dry Law (Ley Seca) during Holy Week 2007 in Caracas, Venezuela, though ostensibly the concern was not 
for religiosity but increased drunk driving during the holiday. Not unexpectedly, “resourceful Caraqueños” 
found many ways around the law. (New York Times, April 4, 2007, Page A4) 
6 Jornada, March 27, 2004, front page headline, article page 3. 
7 La Calle, March 30, 2004, front page headline, article page 3. 
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locales where advertised concerts were scheduled to take place; and newspapers, 
meanwhile, continued to report on how “authorities couldn’t agree.” Faced with the 
miscommunications between government entities, one newspaper twisted its own 
previous bold headline from a firm declaration that fiestas sociales would be banned to 
one of doubt: “Will there be fiestas folklóricas in Semana Santa?”8  
Across the city, the municipal ordinance was flagrantly disobeyed, or creatively 
avoided. Concerts that were scheduled for Friday night in the city center were simply 
delayed until midnight (which organizers justified to me as being technically Saturday), 
the police were incapable of rounding up the throngs of people drinking alcohol in the 
main plaza and eventually gave up, and the impressive list of fiestas sociales that were 
the talk of the town the previous week went on as advertised – as expected – despite 
lacking official authorizations.9 The public disagreements and war of words between 
different government entities desperately trying to secure public and social order on short 
notice demonstrated that such dramatic promises are nearly impossible to enforce, if for 
                                               
8 Jornada, March 31, 2004, front page headline, article page 3. 
9 For Semana Santa 2004, the number of concerts organized was remarkable, and included chicha, huayno 
norteño, huayno huamanguino, música ayacuchana, música latinoamericana, technocumbia, and a range of 
other música folklórica styles, by local as well as national artists. To give a sense of the magnitude, I am 
including a list of the events that I attended or tried to attend (organized by date and with locale), which is 
fairly representative of the range and variety offered. Sunday 3/28: Pascualillo Corondo (brought by Agira 
Pa’ Gozar, Bosque de la Alameda). Friday 4/2: Las Muchachitas del Amor (“por fin en Ayacucho”) with 
local opening artists Emilia Flores, Rosita Huamán, Elmer Gonzales (Señor de Muruhuay). Saturday 4/3: 
Exporto Brasil and Pedro Suárez (Festival Internacional Semana Santa Ayacucho, Complejo Deportivo 
Cumaná IPD). Sunday 4/4: Roy y Los Gentiles (Agira Pa’ Gozar, Cementerio); Dúo Fortaleza and Los 
Kjarkas (Festival Internacional Semana Santa Ayacucho, Complejo Deportivo Cumaná IPD); Friday 4/9: 
Gran Concierto Evangélico (Cine Cavero); “Noches de Peña Ayacuchana” with local bands Trío Ayacucho 
and Los Tharkas (Thurday concert cancelled due to municipal regluations, scheduled for Coricancha). 
Saturday 4/10: Sonia Morales with William Luna, Los Puntos del Amor, and local band Clave Decisiva 
(Cancelled, Complejo Deportivo Cumaná IPD); Los Olímpicos de Huancayo (Cerro Acuchimay); 
“Caravana Agira” with regular artists Emilia Flores, Rosita Huamán, Elmer Gonzales (El Palmero); China 
María and Danni Mendoza (Cerro Acuchimay); Alegría (Cerro Acuchimay); local band Los Infieles(El 
Palmero); “Caravana Andina” with Sósimo Sacramento, Los Diamantes de Cochamarca, Feliciano Blas, 
Magda Huamaní and others (Alameda Bolognesi); “Noches de Peña Ayacuchana” with local bands Trío 
Ayacucho and Los Tharkas (Coricancha). Sunday 4/11 (Easter Sunday): Dúo Nostalgia de Félix Tenorio, 
with Emilia Flores, Dúo Lloqllas, Los Valientes de Pampa Cangallo, Madrugadores de Munaypata; 
Encantadores de Cusibamba; Hermanitas Quicaño; Triunfadores de Pampa Cangallo; Mario Alarcón y su 
Requinto; Picaflor del Amor; Ecos de Munaypata; (Carrera de Caballos, Complejo Deportivo Mariscal 
Cáceres); La Caravana Millonaria de Jeanet Barboza, with Alma Bella, Lizet, Agua Bella, Rossy War 
(didn’t come), Abencia Meza, Max Castro, Los Apus (Kola Real, Complejo Deportivo Cumaná IPD). 
Sunday 4/18: Caravana Agira, Los Infieles (Carmen Alto plazoleta, Festival del Cuasimodo, Los Infieles 
were away). 
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no other reason because the municipality lacked critical internal coordination.  
It was not in any way a coincidence that the increasingly formalized policies 
regulating and prohibiting nightlife activities in the city center were developed and first 
officially declared within the symbolically tense time of Semana Santa. These policies 
expose the peculiar dilemma that governmental agencies face when it comes to regulating 
night entertainment. On the one hand, the municipality had an interest in conserving the 
traditional and religious details of Ayacucho’s Holy Week, since its fame as a renowned 
historically significant religious celebration is at the heart of Ayacucho’s tourism 
industry. The urgent beautification measures and regulatory policies were not only clear 
efforts to present a clean face to the city before the masses of tourists; they were also 
means of demonstrating effective governance of the use of urban space. Beautification 
measures are often designed to present a “clean and modern city” capable of regulating 
and containing the informal sector (Brown 2006). In this case, by including nightlife 
within the broad definition of the informal sector, officials were faced with the ultimate 
paradox of tourism: the thousands of national and international visitors that arrive in 
Ayacucho to experience the traditional celebrations also come expecting and desiring a 
vibrant tourism industry, including nightlife.  
Moral Regulation of Space: 
The Case against the Night clubs 
Residents of the city center began individually filing police reports (denuncias) 
against the clubs, as well as formal complaints and demands (solicitudes) with the 
municipality in 1999 (although I found complaints in the newspapers predating these 
formal reports). The reports covered everything from violence inside and outside the 
clubs, the stench, the extreme levels of volume, and the shoddy constructions that 
threaten the adjacent homes and businesses, especially in historic buildings. But despite 
years of official resolutions and ordinances for their closure (the first issued in 2000), the 
cited clubs continued to function uninhibited. By 2004 all of the clubs in the city center 
had government resolutions and citations against them for lacking the necessary permits 
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and safety requirements. Although the transition from the “good old days” of wholesome 
peñas to the current nightlife scene seemed to develop very rapidly, official response 
seemed inadequate.  
After years of filing individual complaints against the authorities and the clubs, 
residents in the city center began organizing themselves, informally at first, to file joint 
legal complaints against the clubs. As they grew dissatisfied with what they saw as 
apathy or, worse yet, corruption in the government, they began to form official 
neighborhood organizations (juntas vecinales) to better pressure the municipality into 
taking the nightlife problems seriously. At the time of my research there were four 
organizations in the immediate city center that had made their sole mission to be fighting 
the “centers of nighttime entertainment” (centros nocturnos). By far the most active and 
visible group was the Junta Vecinal for Jirón Asamblea and Neighboring Streets, the area 
with the highest concentration of discotecas and the heart of the city’s nighttime 
activity.10 Initially, the organization’s activities centered around making visits to the 
offices of public officials – the State Attorney for Crime Prevention, the provincial 
Mayor, the Town Councilor, the Prefect, the head of Citizen security – pressuring them to 
pursue the cases already on file and to follow through with public promises to improve 
the situation. This struggle has come to occupy their whole life and guide their every 
activity, taking on an intense symbolic power: as one neighborhood organizer stressed, 
“our elders used to tell us that hell isn’t when you’ve died and sinned – this is hell.”11 
In all the time that I was involved with the Jirón Asamblea’s junta vecinal, I never 
saw the president without her ever-present file folder full of detailed documentation of 
the junta’s cause – it was on the table during her birthday celebration, it stuck 
conspicuously out of the top of her bag as I tagged along on daily chores around town, or 
                                               
10 Officially registered in the municipal records (Registros Públicos) as an “Asociación Civil” (a civil 
organization), the complete name of the organization is Civil Association: Neighborhood Junta for Jirón 
Asamblea and Neighboring Streets, Asociación Civil: Junta Vecinal del Jirón Asamblea y Calles 
Adyacentes. Although it is most often referred to simply as “Junta Vecinal Asamblea,” on official 
documents, the organization uses its full name (or the long acronym AC: JV-JRA&CA), which identifies it 
not only as a neighborhood organization but, importantly, as also having official recognition in the public 
records as an Asociación Civil.  
11 Author interview, September 2, 2004. 
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it served to protect her pants from a dirty chair at a popular cuy restaurant. These 
documents were the foundation and the core of their struggle. The folder contained copies 
of reports and complaints filed by neighbors dating back to 1999, it contained damage 
reports by the National Police and by the State Attorney’s office for crime prevention 
(Fiscalía de la Prevención del Delito), it included files from the National Institute of 
Culture (Instituto Nacional de Cultura) documenting the unauthorized use and 
modification of historic buildings registered as Cultural Patrimony, and it included 
reports from the Institute of Civil Defense (Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil) about 
failed safety inspections for public buildings. It also contained dozens of municipal 
government resolutions and ordinances against the night clubs that had yet to be 
enforced. 
The file folders guarded so carefully by each of the independent neighborhood 
organization leaders archived all the possible legal and administrative evidence for their 
cases against the night clubs. Behind the formally documented evidence of physical 
damage to their personal property were layers upon layers of contributing factors, all of 
which continuously boiled down to one underlying message: these illegal and illicit 
businesses are by nature deviant and problematic through their blatant disregard for 
official regulations, municipal ordinances and community interests. Some of these 
archives also reveal a modification in the approach that the neighborhood organizations 
took in legitimizing their cases. While early documents rested largely on abstract moral 
evaluations about the image of Huamanga, about customs and tradition, and about 
authority (principio de autoridad), later documents marked a gradual and subtle shift 
towards claims that depended increasingly on supporting legal documents. This shift was 
by all means intentional: one neighborhood president let me read and discuss all of the 
historical documents, but would only allow me to photocopy the most recent documents, 
explaining that they were the most “legally substantiated.” The growing strategic interest 
in emphasizing the legal foundations to neighbor complaints and demands – whether this 
was to me or in public statements and media interviews – was in part because their core 
concerns continued to revolve around moral values and other profound motivating factors 
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that could not be supported through “legal substantiation” and official procedure. 
The administrative cases against the night clubs include numerous specific 
citations but mostly concentrated around two accusations in particular. First, the facilities 
did not meet building safety codes. Some were listed as not having adequate emergency 
exits (such as being on the third floor with only one narrow staircase to get out), others 
had made unauthorized structural changes that threatened the building’s stability and that 
of neighboring buildings, and a couple were operating out of historic buildings that were 
protected as Cultural Patrimony or that did not pass structural and technical inspections 
as public buildings (and were not structurally stable enough to withstand dance clubs on 
the second floor).  
Second, although some club owners did have a limited business license (the 
License to Open a Business, Licencia de Apertura de Establecimiento) and some paid 
certain taxes accordingly, not a single one of the owners of the night clubs held the 
proper Special Operating Authorization (Autorización Especial de Funcionamiento) 
which would allow them to function as a “night business” (centro nocturno) after 11pm. 
These two different permits were a source of profound confusion among the general 
populace as well as various government officials. The first is a general business license to 
earn money in an industry or service, while the second pertains only to night businesses 
which meet special requirements such as limited hours of operation (defined as 10pm to 
2am) and services (minors are permitted only into no-alcohol “youth clubs” that function 
until 7pm), specialized inspections, and specialized security personnel.12 Beyond the 
obscure titles of the two substantially different forms of business permits, the core of the 
confusion over licensing is a vague 2004 ordinance that stipulates the new requirement of 
a Special Operating Authorization without providing guidelines for how compliance was 
to be measured and tested and. More confusing still was that it did not clarify what 
specific procedures would be followed for those dozens of businesses already in 
existence prior to passing this new required special operating license. Nonetheless, the 
                                               
12 Ordenanza 047-2004-MPH/A, Chapter IX, Articles 6, 31, 36, 40. April 22, 2004 
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ordinance confidently asserted that these regulations on night businesses were designed 
to “protect the public tranquility and citizen security.” 
There was no evidence (and only one dropped accusation) that any clubs had 
received illegitimate or undeserved safety permits or operating licenses under the table. 
Instead, the frustration around the newly-revised building safety codes and operating 
licenses were largely due to inconclusive and undefined bureaucratic procedures. More 
importantly, this frustration was mounting on virtually all sides, including community 
members, authorities, and club owners alike. Ironically, all of those parties (even club 
owners) voiced similar opinions – publicly as well as privately – that citizen security was 
a major priority and that businesses should comply with the safety standards and petition 
for the required operating licenses. 
Interestingly, within debates over the enforcement challenges of the new licensing 
provisions, officials and club owners shared a single rhetoric about the need to simplify 
and formalize the licensing process to make the community more business-friendly. 
Streamlining the licensing process has been a key proposition in the efforts of other cities 
to curtail problems associated with the nightlife industry, particularly in Britain 
(Chatterton and Hollands 2002; Hollands and Chatterton 2003; Talbot 2004; Thomas and 
Bromley 2000). However, British policies aimed at creating a “24-hour city,” bare little 
resemblance to local policy-making in Ayacucho. While the British approach 
presupposes that existing businesses have licenses and that the goal is to provide 
initiative for more, the sole preoccupation in licensing in Ayacucho at this point in time is 
in making illegitimate businesses legal.  
The shared rhetoric of formalized licensing is further premised on the notion of 
“responsibility” within the licensing process (Talbot 2004). On the one side, government 
entities have the formal duty to coordinate, oversee, evaluate, authorize, and follow-up on 
the multiple requirements, guaranteeing compliance but also facilitating legal business 
operations. On the other hand, this rhetoric about streamlined licensing presupposes 
responsibilities on the part of business owners: owners with full authorization are 
believed to have a degree of business competence, and these owners are assumed to feel a 
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responsibility to control premises around their business and maintain their status by 
cooperating with the government in further regulation and supervision. The further 
implication that licensed business owners agree that full regulation is in their own best 
interest by removing illicit businesses from the competition dovetails with a discourse of 
mutual benefit and cooperation between licensed business owners and competent 
regulatory authorities.  
Public faith in these businesses to comply with these responsibilities was 
remarkably low, and skeptics insist that they have never seen evidence of such 
“responsibility” on the part of the club owners. Despite differences between the club 
owners, few of them appeared to have any intention of complying with the regulations 
(let alone the orders of the subsequent emergency declaration): in flagrant disobedience, 
absolutely all of them continued to provide a dance floor, cheap alcohol, and, of course, 
favorite tunes at full volume. The flagrant disobedience of municipal orders was 
characteristic also of concert promoters, especially of fiestas chichas: in the days 
following the botched Sonia Morales concert, it became known that the promoter (who 
had coordinated with other promoters for staging, lights, and sound equipment) had never 
formally registered in the municipality, and when faced with scandal after the event he 
simply disappeared.  
More suggestive still, the debate highlights how popular mistrust of nightlife 
businesses extends not only to specific club owners but to the industry itself. The 2004 
ordinance regulating operating licenses included several zoning provisions that explicitly 
limited the presence of night businesses in certain areas.13 According to this official 
moral-spatial governance, spaces marked as “appropriate” for schools, churches, and 
municipal buildings by day, cannot simultaneously be morally deviant territories by 
night. The ordinances are thus effectively designed to permanently prohibit the possibility 
of different social occupation – and different forms of sociality – of these particular 
spaces, negating the inter-relationship between day and night activities (c.f. Gaissad 
                                               
13 Ordenanza 047-2004-MPH/A, Chapter IX, Article 39 and First of the Disposiciónes Complementarias y 
Finales. April 22, 2004 
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2005; Thomas and Bromley 2000). A proposed entertainment district outside of 
Ayacucho’s city center provides another explicit version of this moral-spatial 
governance, this time an attempt at preventing future deviance in certain neighborhoods, 
while relegating those activities to presumably “less valued” (marginal) neighborhoods, 
however defined.14  
These regulations clearly reveal a hierarchical valuing of zones and 
neighborhoods as some are protected and shielded from undesirable activities, marked as 
deviant or dangerous, by government ordinances of exclusion. Other neighborhoods are 
not protected. The neighborhoods that benefit from these policies and ordinances, not 
coincidentally, have historically privileged relationships with government institutions. As 
we will see the second half of the dissertation, these relationships shape the dynamic of 
nightlife regulation and control by facilitating shared expectations about the tricky realm 
where moral evaluations become political imperatives. In the final two chapters we will 
revisit these differential connections and working relationships, exploring how they 
become increasingly formalized as neighborhoods in the city center organize themselves 
and mobilize for their limited interests.  
Spectacles of Prohibition & Informality 
The most visible and commented-upon effort to enforce the mounting regulatory 
measures against individual clubs were the large-scale police interventions (operativos) 
involving multiple government institutions to force the closure (clausura) of the clubs.15 
As spectacular public displays of authority, these interventions were highly publicized, 
                                               
14 What I am glossing as “entertainment district” was most often referred to as a bulevar (literally a 
boulevard) or a zona rosada (pink zone), sometimes a zona exclusiva (exclusive zone) by those involved in 
the municipal planning. While brothels were included within the night industries that needed to be 
contained (in order to be regulated), this proposed bulevar would also house night clubs. 
15 The operatives were overseen by the office of Regulatory Enforcement (Ejecución Coactiva). The 
National Police and the various citizen security entities (Seguridad Ciudadana and Defensa Civil) were 
deployed as security forces, and higher officials were often present to observe. The State Attorney’s office 
(Fiscalía de la Prevención del Delito) monitored and officially documented the affairs. Other authorities 
involved in the process were sometimes present (such as the Institute of Culture). 
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political, controversial, and conflictive. Just as Goldstein has argued for a very different 
sort of urban spectacle (2004), these interventions were not so much representative of 
“society” as a whole but rather were orchestrated by a select group of individuals and 
performed for a defined public. 
The forced closures were often confrontational events involving police in riot gear 
and even the city’s one tank, during which the electrical currents were cut off to the clubs 
and their entrances were filled in with bricks and cement.  
 
 




PHOTO 4.2 – Forced closure of discoteca “La Noche” with municipal serenazgos in riot gear 
The spectacle of these clausuras was dramatically heightened through the public removal 
and confiscation of all the items that gave the clubs their distinct feel, from artwork, 
mirrors and furniture, to lighting and sound equipment. The lack of infrastructure for, and 
experience with, these major operatives was highlighted by the procedure itself, which 
was carried out by an improvised team of municipal employees that ranged from trash 
collectors to laborers for the city parks, as well as some independently contracted 
individuals (such as bricklayers). Despite this lack of infrastructure, the municipality’s 
public display was highly orchestrated, all the way down to little blue ribbons, 
intentionally reminiscent of white peace flags (but with the official color of the provincial 




PHOTO 4.3 – Forced closure of discoteca Bamboleo, with municipal employees. (In this case, 
garbage workers had come with their truck to confiscate belongings inside.) 
Adding to the public spectacle, the handful of neighborhood organizations in the 
city center were also frequently called upon to participate in the closures. Although they 
were not authorized to go into the clubs during the operatives (and, indeed, had 
absolutely no interest in going in) government authorities coordinating these operatives 
often pressured them to be out on the streets, acting as “witness” (presenciar) and, even 
more importantly, demonstrating popular support for the controversial government 
actions.16 The organization members began by attending with handmade signs and 
shouting slogans against the clubs and their owners, but as the antagonism increased and 
they received more and more threats from club owners, they abandoned the signs and 
chants and “witnessed” silently from the sidelines. During the later operatives when 
neighborhood organizations were not present, members of other non-governmental 
                                               
16 This will be examined in greater detail in chapter seven. 
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civilian entities were sometimes present to monitor and document the events.17 
Even when the clubs were closed and their entrances bricked over by government 
forces, however, it was rare indeed when they were not back open to the public the very 
next night. In the midst of the cat-and-mouse game of forced closures followed by 
flagrant disobedience, neighbors in the city center were incensed by what they perceived 
as a toxic combination of lack of authority in enforcing the laws mixed with government 
apathy and even corruption. Ayacucho follows many patterns typical of the minutia of 
low-level municipal corruption, and the effects of an often-circulated “fact” that 
Ayacucho is the most corrupt region of the country (Bailey 2004; Gupta 1980). Despite 
issuing seemingly endless government resolutions and citations against the clubs for 
illegal operations, municipal officials were frequently accused of being complicit in their 
continued functioning. In the local parlance of choice, they were said to be “in bed with” 
the club owners.  
In the wake of the failed regulatory measures and internal squabbling, the 
provincial mayor and deputy mayor were put on the defensive to demonstrate effective 
governability. The community had quickly mobilized against them: residents were on the 
radio and television voicing their concerns over the nightlife, local newspapers were 
printing damning evidence of the governments’ inability to enforce its laws, and 
neighborhood organizations were continuously threatening to take to the streets if the 
municipality did not take action. Likewise, club owners were filing reports against the 
municipality for inconsistent legal requirements and for refusal based on political reasons 
to issue licenses to legitimate businesses. On the other side of the equation, frustration 
was mounting even within government offices as the pressure rose under increased public 
scrutiny. Individual officials were beginning to speak publicly against other government 
offices or individuals, and the internal squabbling was eroding whatever façade remained 
of coordinated governance. 
                                               
17 Representatives from the NGO Paz y Esperanza “witnessed” several operativos that I attended, and 
representatives from the government-civil society organization Mesa de Concertación en la Lucha Contra 
la Pobreza were also present at one. 
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One of the most prominent obstacles to closing the illegal clubs turned out to be a 
lack of coordination between the different government entities within the municipality. 
The reliance on decentralized government agencies means that any given “issue” (such as 
regulating the night clubs) falls under the command of many different and autonomous 
agencies (licenses, taxes, safety, work laws, child health laws, etc). The result was an 
impressive series of bureaucratic failures, as each agency pointed fingers at the others and 
in the midst of the tangle nobody could quite seem to figure out what the first step in the 
remedy would actually be. During one closure that received substantial attention, a club 
owner claimed mid-way through the process that the municipal employees didn’t have 
the most current resolutions, and he successfully convinced them to halt the closure and 
return the removed items. This debacle was particularly damaging to the municipality 
because it revealed that the complex network of municipal institutions was highly 
disarticulated, with very little communication between them. As some institutions made 
isolated attempts to regulate nightlife activities according to their office’s functions, other 
institutions and officials simply threw up their hands in frustration. Still others, who were 
intimidated by the tense and violent confrontations with club owners, abandoned the 
enforcement of regulations and laws completely. Frequent public disputes erupted as 
these different institutions each pointed fingers and blamed each other for the lack of 
concrete developments. In short, frustrated neighbors and authorities began playing on 
the official term “indefinite closure” (clausura indefinida) and calling them instead “day-
long closures” (clausura de un día). 
A persistent theme in the debate over the nightlife industry – concerts and clubs 
alike – concerned the duplicitous and symbiotic relationship between informality and 
corruption. One editorialist of the local newspaper evoked the 1988 concert by the chicha 
band Los Shapis that was bombed by Shining Path in broad daylight. Readers were also 
reminded that the musicians had received public death threats previously and did not 
have official authorization for the concert. With this extraordinary historic event as 
“evidence” of the calamities that can occur when precautions aren’t taken despite public 
knowledge of the “risks,” the writer concludes with a provocative question: “Time has 
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passed, and now in the 21st century, have the forms of entertainment and recreation 
changed in our city, or [the forms] of security and safety?”18 
Sonia Morales’ disastrous concert examined in the previous chapter, as well as the 
intensifying night club closure showdowns examined in this chapter, raised awareness 
and heightened the discomfort that many in the city had with the shady business practices 
of nightlife industry: not only of irresponsible concert organizers and contemptuous or 
phantom club owners, but equally with the complacency or complicity of government 
authorities and lack of coordination between different government agencies particularly 
with respect to the issuance of concert permits, official inspections and adequate security. 
These concerns point directly to a common theme in criticisms of Ayacucho’s “lack of 
development” and stagnant economy: the persistent informality and illegality.  
Police responses regarding the lack of security forces in the city center often 
return to the same dead claim that no official permission is granted for concerts and 
clubs, and no security or police presence had been requested, as following protocol. This 
excuse was laughable to many concerned citizens: the city was continuously plastered 
with posters and banners announcing upcoming concerts and special events, the radio 
stations were saturated with pre-recorded advertisements and purchased play-time for 
concerts as well as continuous advertisements for clubs, and even the local “official” 
newspaper (the same one that publishes the municipal ordinances) features 
advertisements and raffle prizes for popular city-center clubs and upcoming concerts. As 
examined in the previous chapter, opinions as to police security forces on the night of the 
Sonia Morales concert demonstrated a marked social and political divide. But there was 
another, unusually frank answer that came from a man who had been struggling for many 
years to change the informality and corruption in Ayacucho’s bureaucracy, particularly 
with respect to these live concerts. He declined to speak on tape and was nervous about 
retribution should his name be associated with the interview, but he gave me a long and 
detailed explanation of the bureaucratic process for requesting licenses, and his analysis 
                                               
18 La Calle, September 6, 2004, page 7 
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was frighteningly simple: the police were at Cine Cavero because at least part of the 
official authorization process had been completed and Defensa Civil was serving as 
security inside, but they were also at Cine Cavero because they were “pagados,” paid 
under the table or bribed to guarantee calm at Max Castro’s concert.19 
The list of corrupt official activities is long, though only some of them were the 
seemingly-obvious accusation of granting licenses for operation despite noncompliance 
with requirements. Instead, scandals regularly featured accusations that so-and-so 
accepted bribes (“recibe por debajo) to turn a blind eye on illicit functioning, and 
accusations that enforcement officials were slow to enforce the regulations because they 
were hiding personal and financial interests in the success of the clubs. Among the more 
distressing public corruption scandals were those accusations made by government 
authorities against other government authorities, and there were several cases of 
municipal institutions pressing formal charges against other institutions for corruption. 
The juiciest and most amusing scandals were featured in the local tabloid “prensa 
chicha” of authorities and government authorities frequenting the clubs themselves, 
where those who are supposed to “watch over the city’s order” are caught, sometimes 
quite literally, with their pants down. 
When the latest Law of Municipalities was passed by the Peruvian Congress in 
2003, it was heralded by many local scholars for dramatically increasing the 
responsibilities of the provincial municipality, including an increased role in economic 
development. Not only must the municipal government maintain a registry of all licensed 
businesses, it must also actively promote economic development and even simplify 
bureaucratic hurdles for acquiring operational licenses (Congreso de la República de Perú 
2003b: Article 86). In practice, however, achieving the goals set out by the Law of 
Municipalities seemed like a distant future, if not completely idealistic. For local 
legislators, extensive laws prioritizing business promotion over regulation are nearly 
irrelevant in the current situation of flagrant disobedience of the existing norms and 
                                               
19 Author interview, November 3, 2003 
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government resolutions.  
For the local population, business promotion that does not strictly follow existing 
legal criteria seems inappropriate, imprudent, and ill advised. The frontpage headline 
from a local newspaper, which read “Is Ayacucho Lawless? Authorities are only present 
for formalities,”20 echoes the frequent accusations that despite an endless bureaucratic 
and regulatory paper trail, the government is responsible for having nurtured an 
effectively “lawless” society over the years: corrupt officials “simplify” the licensing 
process by offering illegitimate businesses licenses, officials too comfortable with their 
desk job abandon the practical enforcement of regulations and laws, and businesses 
“make a joke” of local authority (“burlarse”). 
The evaluation of authority through the lens of nightlife is a central theme 
underlying this dissertation. According to residents around Jirón Asamblea and the city 
center, the local proliferation of night clubs, and the multiple social problems they 
associate with them, corresponds closely to the gradual decline in former president 
Alberto Fujimori’s “firm-hand” control of the region. Indeed, the police reports 
(denuncias) against the night clubs began appearing in 1999, shortly before Fujimori’s 
national government collapsed under the cumulative weight of popular discontent with 
his authoritarian control tactics and mounting corruption scandals. These residents 
frequently reminisce over the days of “decent” nightlife when only “clean” businesses 
received licenses, and their descriptions are often interspersed with explanations that 
Fujimori knew how to regulate nightlife businesses in a way that the current 
administration does not. After years of violence, curfews, and strict control over licensing 
and regulation, the nightlife transformation in recent years was painfully obvious to the 
city center’s residents.21 The culprits for proliferation of nightlife, according to many, 
were an economic system in which private business was catered to even when it served 
no “public good,” a bureaucratic system that complicated formal solutions to the 
problems, and corruption within the local government. Thus the current wave of concern 
                                               
20 La Calle August 31, 2004, page 1. 
21 Author interviews with multiple neighborhood organization presidents, March 31, 2005. 
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over the crossroads of citizen security and nightlife involved a series of related issues 
regarding the uncertainties of new economic policies and the expectations of democracy. 
Getting Rid of the Flies: The Case against the Problematic 
By and large, the city’s youth population was largely absent from the nightlife 
debate. The few youth organizations that were active in local politics and frequently 
attended planning meetings or forums were not especially motivated about the nightlife 
problematic and did not generally attend those meetings. While some youth groups were 
invited to participate in the security workshops or seminars, they typically did not have a 
position with regard to the clubs and the nightlife problematic. Additionally, the youth 
who frequented the clubs were also absent from the public debate in that they were not 
often complaining or protesting to the media about night club closures or other parts of 
the problematic (though they did call in about other issues). Most surprising to me, 
however, was how few of the youth that I talked with about the clubs, whether in 
interviews or informally, expressed much of a position at all in the matter. If I asked what 
they thought of the clausuras they would almost all laugh at the “cat and mouse game,” 
and conclude that the clausuras didn’t much matter since the clubs would open the next 
day anyway. Predictably, they would express more annoyance at the intensification of 
clausuras during religious holidays, sharing the opinion of one young clubber “why’d 
they have to kill the fun right during vacation?!” When I asked if they thought the clubs 
should be closed most expressed opinions like along these lines: “Of course I want a 
place to go out with my friends, to dance, drink, and have fun; but I also think these clubs 
lack adequate security and don’t respect safety codes.” 
Among the youth who frequented the clubs, I found two primary responses to 
nightlife problematic. First, many complained that closing the clubs of the city center 
would not mean that the alcohol consumption, prostitution, and all other activities 
(“vices”) would stop or disappear; they would simply be modified through different 
practices or moved to a different kind of venue or location. As one young partier put it to 
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me, “you can remove the flies from one area but they’ll just go to another.”22 Unlike most 
large metropolitan areas that receive attention for spectacular forced closures of night 
clubs, there are virtually no night clubs outside of the city center in Ayacucho; there are 
bars and cantinas but there are no regular venues for dancing and listening to music as in 
a night club. As a result, there was really nowhere else for “the flies” to go unless (or 
until) the clubs relocated and reopened in other areas less regulated or less monitored. 
Many argued that sending youth to outlying areas where electricity is unreliable and 
streets are not illuminated, where transportation is limited and taxis are reluctant to go, 
where police presence or help is harder to find, would potentially pose an even greater 
security risk to youth. 
The second response had to do with the nature of night clubs themselves: the 
discotecas are not the source of the city’s problems. Because a club might “promote” or 
“lead to” or have “the potential” to harbor prostitution, delinquency, public disturbances, 
or alcohol abuse does not necessarily mean direct or singular correlation. In making this 
point, the youth and the club owners all concurred that closing the night clubs through 
endless operatives would not solve any problems – not the city’s social problems and also 
not the bureaucratic obstructions and irregularities in the licensing process. In their 
criticism of the narrow focus of the municipality on the forced closures, the club owners 
and club supporters found a surprising alibi in their meeting with the Special Commission 
of the Municipal Council that was established to evaluate the night club problematic, 
which concurred that the closures will not offer any long-term or sustainable solution if 
the government was not able to clarify (and enforce, they added) the regulatory 
procedures. 
Perhaps the most convincing – and prominent – critique of the forced closures 
that I heard during my time in Ayacucho was the observation that the city did not have 
proposals for entertainment alternatives for youth (and adults), and they did not have a 
coherent and feasible strategy for motivating and developing an economically vibrant, 
                                               
22 Author interview, March 10, 2005. 
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socially acceptable, and safe environment for nighttime diversion. This was often framed 
as an immediate need for a long-term plan for urban development. While the regulation, 
inspection, and control of business activities falls under the purview of an urban 
development plan, the debate more often led to the conclusion that the city needed to 
construct a “bulevar” or “zona rosada,” an artificially designed entertainment district on 
the outskirts of town, where these businesses would be concentrated and controlled, but 
would not “taint the image” of the historic city center. This plan was supported by the 
critically mobilized neighborhood organizations and formally proposed by numerous 
governmental organizations, most notably the Inter-Institutional Legal Board (Mesa 
Jurídica Interinstitucional de Ayacucho 2004a). The proposal mixes social judgment (the 
clubs are often referred to by member constituents with the value-laden colloquialism 
“dives of damnation” or antros de malvivir) with dubious claims of causality (that the 
clubs “promote” violence and drug use) and with the weight of endless legal documents 
verifying the illegality of the clubs. Although the entertainment district has yet to be 
constructed, the proposal nonetheless serves as a telling and illustrative example of the 
potential for moral universality and social conservatism to be transformed into spatial 
regulations and exclusionary public policy. 
The club owners argued that the economic growth they provided the city was also 
specifically and directly related to the role of entertainment businesses as a pillar of the 
tourism industry. Here the club owners’ responses closely paralleled the responses given 
by most youth who supported the existence of the night clubs: modern societies, they 
argued, depend on vibrant leisure industries (here reminiscent of the “24-hour city” 
concept advocated in Britain). Moreover, tourism, it was stressed cannot survive without 
night entertainment.  
Peru’s tourism hub, the city of Cusco, consistently served as the proverbial 
example of the beneficial outcomes of tourism in the realm of economic incentive and 
exchange. Cusco, they reminded, not only had a vibrant and bustling night industry 
serving the millions of foreign and domestic vacationers to the region, but it is highly 
concentrated in the city center and even “on top” of historical monuments and in colonial 
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buildings. They argued that club owners in Ayacucho were actively sustaining and 
expanding a lively downtown for the city, giving new life to the historic city center that 
attracts tourists. Cusco’s city center is indeed marked off as a tourism zone today, a zone 
that is presented as quintessential but is simultaneously (and not in contradiction) treated 
as outside “the normal” acceptable ream of sociality. In essence, the city center is 
accepted – as long as it is contained – as a regulated and controlled “zone of 
transgression” (Talbot 2004).23 Cusco experienced a provincial form of 
“suburbanization,” in which the traditional elite families vacated the city center and the 
old historic buildings, the center is virtually depopulated, and the historic buildings are 
occupied almost entirely with businesses and services, most of which serve the tourism 
industry. The traditional families, meanwhile, have established newly-prestigious 
residential neighborhoods away from – though still within orbit of – the city center.24 In 
other words, the acceptance of the center as a zone of transgression is predicated on a 
history of social prestige and movement.  
Deborah Talbot succinctly states that government policy “is paradoxically torn 
between the economic benefits of a vibrant night-time economy, open all hours, and the 
regulatory concerns of noise, nuisance, incivilities and violence” (2004:887). While 
Cusco appears to have found a certain tolerable balance, this is precisely where it cannot 
currently stand as a model for Ayacucho’s municipal authorities. Ayacucho has not 
experienced this form of suburbanization, its peripheral areas largely lack the 
infrastructure and services that might make such relocation attractive for the traditionally 
privileged, and the city center continues to be densely populated with elite families and 
profoundly residential. Whereas the influential families in Cusco sleep peacefully at night 
(to quote from the dream of Ayacuchanos) at a safe distance from the transgression in 
                                               
23 I am grateful to Bruce Mannheim and Margarita Huayhua for discussing the contrast between the city 
centers of Cusco and Ayacucho with me, and for offering some details on Cusco’s tourism nightlife that I 
have not found discussed in academic literature. It is interesting to note that de la Cadena offers a different 
picture of Cusco’s city center around the turn of the century, when gente del puebo, as well as stigmatized 
and indecent businesses flourished within the elite zone of the city (2000:34-40). 
24 David Parker (1998) demonstrates how the “suburbanization” of Lima occurred as families moved out of 
the center but within reach of the public services. 
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their city’s center, the Ayacuchano families that have resided in the center’s historic 
buildings for years, sometimes generations, now find themselves co-habitating (and 
unable to sleep) with night clubs, noise, and disruption. 
Underneath these very evident differences in the social and spatial patterns of 
Cusco and Ayacucho, however, lies a shared, though perhaps uncomfortable, reality. 
Although Cusco’s city center may be occupied by countless forms and venues of 
transgression, it is contained within that area; looked at from another point of view, the 
areas where the powerful or elite families reside are also contained, and protected, from 
the influences of the zone of transgression. In this sense, “acceptance” of Cusco’s vibrant 
city center nightlife does not differ dramatically from the politics of judgment and 
evaluation in Ayacucho. On the surface, the proposal in Ayacucho to relocate the night 
clubs out of the city center appears to be the mirror opposite of urban trends that relocate 
inhabitants to other areas deemed more “appropriate” (such as patterns of 
suburbanization and gated communities or the conversion of downtown areas from 
residential to business districts). But beneath this façade we see in both cities a 
remarkably similar notion of a deviant zone, whether it is the city center itself or an 
entertainment district away from the city center.  
Formulating a Position 
Just as the neighborhood organizations were making the rounds to the radio and 
television stations and discussing the nightlife crisis, the club owners also formed two 
counterpart associations of their own. The representatives of the two club owner 
associations (which were noticeably antagonistic to one another despite a common 
mission) soon became new voices in the debate. Members of one association filed their 
own legal charges against neighbors for slander and against local officials for abuse of 
authority but were discredited when they were caught placing death threats against 
residents and officials involved in the forced closures. They were even more discredited 
when they were formally accused of being the mastermind behind the sacking of a family 
business owned by one local official and the repeated bombing of the house of another. 
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These club owners were frequently lambasted in local newspapers for the death threats 
and physical damage attributed to them, as well as subjected to a continuous barrage of 
accusations concerning their shady business practices, particularly of owning several 
clubs each and for changing the names on the business registrations to avoid prosecution. 
The other club owners’ association publicly expressed a desire to comply – to run 
responsible and quality businesses, to garner the respect and support of the community. 
In their public and private statements, they contribute a different angle to numerous 
popular discourses that circulate within the debate over nightlife. First, they share the 
same characterization of the “other” clubs as being dangerous and risky businesses that 
“sell death and violence.”25 These club owners went to great lengths to publicly distance 
themselves from the “illegal” club owners, stating categorically that the differences 
between them and the others “jump out and qualitatively differentiate us from those 
businesses which are a danger to society” (Asociación de Propietarios de Discotecas y 
Video-Pubs APRODIVI 2004). In a public pronouncement, this association borrowed the 
popular terminology for insulting those “other” clubs, referring to them as places of 
“mala muerte,” clandestine brothels, and “refuges for people of mal vivir.”  
In absolving themselves of responsibility for the social ills associated with 
nighttime businesses, therefore, one group of club owners employed the argument that 
“businesses in the recreational industry” (negocios del ramo del esparcimiento) were 
expanding Ayacucho’s local economy. Although the owners of the clubs were often 
present during the operatives, watching over or sometimes protesting and putting up a 
fight, on several occasions groups of employees (virtually all female) were also present, 
protesting and complicating the operatives. According to the sworn testimony of the 
neighborhood organization members, when the president of the organization was 
threatened at knife-point by the owner of one of the clubs, he was accompanied by a 
group of over a dozen women. Although the junta members concentrated on the “insults 
too crude to repeat” that were hurled at them by these “prostitutes,” they also mentioned 
                                               
25 Author interview, April 1, 2005. 
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that the women were shouting “we want to work, we want to work.”26 Nonetheless, 
unlike events in other cities, the workers in these clubs who were suddenly faced with the 
possibility of not having a place of employment did not organize or mobilize in public 
protest.27 Even authorities and city center residents who opposed the clubs (the same ones 
who accused the workers of being prostitutes) made broad statements appealing to the 
general populace, saying that they believe the night clubs could provide the economic 
incentive and development that the city desperately needed – if only they met certain 
social and moral standards. 
The position articulated by the organized club owners held that the ordinances 
were too strict, that the bureaucratic hurdles were unnecessary and prohibitive, and that 
despite their “compliance” with the requirements they were “satanized” to the point that 
they felt they would never receive full authorization.28 As one club owner told me, she 
was in Ayacucho because she loves Ayacucho and she wanted to offer the city an 
entertainment service that was both quality and safe. Rejecting the accusations that club 
owners were “getting off easy” with the municipality’s blind eye, she insisted that she has 
stayed in Ayacucho despite the fact that business was not great and despite the 
“satanization campaign” and bureaucratic nightmares that made her business (and her 
life) so difficult. 
In their complaints about licensing and authorization, club owners are joined by 
many live concert promoters. Although there is only one registered and officially licensed 
concert “promoter” in the city, there are dozens of independent promoters who bring in a 
steady stream of artists arriving from around the country for live performances. 
Municipal employees and others struggling with this bureaucratic process concur that 
although some promoters request “one time” permission for the concerts at the last 
minute (often the day of), many more don’t request them at all and hold the events 
                                               
26 Sworn testimony for criminal charges (denuncia penal), filed by members of the Junta Vecinal Jr. 
Asamblea, Fiscalía de la Prevención del Delito, September 3, 2004. 
27 This is not always the case. For example, workers in the Buenos Aires club República de Cromañón did 
organize to defend themselves after the tragic event of December 2004 (Karen Faulk, personal 
communication; see also Faulk 2008). 
28 Author interviews, March 3, 2004, December 9, 2004, April 5, 2005. 
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without any sort of liquor license, public security, or safety requirements. Those who do 
request authorization are met with a stream of redundant bureaucratic “approvals” (such 
as acquiring detailed floor plans of a venue every time a request is made, even when the 
venue regularly holds concerts and is already on file), prohibitively high “fees” (up to 
30% of all ticket and alcohol sales) that drove those concert promoters who were 
interested in complying and touring Ayacucho to abandon future visits because of 
“financial infeasibility.”29  
Interestingly, the club owners who criticized what they referred to as the 
municipality’s “satanization campaign” that “tossed all [the clubs] in the same bag,” 
eventually joined in the chorus calling for greater regulation of the clubs. By 2004, as the 
citizen security apparatus was being erected upon the broader structures of participatory 
governance, these club owners criticized government entities for not successfully 
implementing a viable urban security strategy and for “leaving the population at the 
mercy of delinquency.” In doing so, they appropriated not only the circulating fears of a 
“loss of values” but also the discourse of a “shared responsibility” in solving the city’s 
security problems:  
The problem of citizen security is a structural problem that has its roots in the 
increasingly precarious financial situation of many sectors of the population, in 
the loss of values, in the presence of organized crime, in pernicious gang activity, 
in the family disintegration and the poor quality of basic public education. In 
other words, it is a responsibility that is shared between the state and society; 
therefore the members of our Association are not the ones responsible for the lack 
of citizen security that has been a complaint in Ayacucho for several years 
(Asociación de Propietarios de Discotecas y Video-Pubs APRODIVI 2004, 
emphasis added).  
Upon the murder of one club owner by a disgruntled gang member, a representative of 
the other night club owner’s association reiterated this insistent argument that 
“delinquency and gang activity does not stem from the discotecas but originate from the 
problematic social and economic circumstances of the country.”30 
                                               
29 Author interview, October 16, 2004. 
30 La Jornada, October 18, 2004, page 3. 
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Policies of Prohibition: Prelude to an Emergency  
During Semana Santa, Ayacucho’s municipal authorities were under heavy 
pressure to guarantee social order and control, and many of the demands were couched in 
the terms of morality and a responsibility to uphold Ayacucho’s noble and religious 
traditions: “Our authorities, almost all of them, completely forgot to carry out 
recommendations about moral behavior for these days.”31 The policies developed reveal 
that nightlife is considered by critics and policy-makers as a “zone of transgression” that 
needs to be contained and controlled (Talbot 2004). The policies of containment, 
prohibition, and exclusion examined in this chapter all develop a particular form of 
“spatial governmentality” (Merry 2001) that blends safety with morality policing, that 
removes businesses and activities from certain zones deemed morally pure (historic 
center, religious orbit, educational orbit). The government-issued resolutions and 
ordinances were effectively attempts to define and physically delimit the “traditional” 
city center by expelling those activities and businesses deemed inappropriate and 
damaging to the image of the historic, religious, and traditional city of Ayacucho. In 
these policies there is not a clear and sharp divide between the management of risk and 
the enforcement of moral norms. They are not only managing the risks (through 
regulations of hours of operation, prohibiting minors from entering, or controlling for 
adulterated alcohol) but also attempting to prevent future transgressions in certain 
neighborhoods by prohibiting them entirely, by relegating them to more distant 
(presumably “less valued” neighborhoods).  
The policies of prohibition necessarily attempt to convert abstract ideologies of 
difference into enforceable social control. Asymmetrical processes of regulation and 
policy-making have been identified by some scholars as controlling mechanisms, as 
strategies of discipline and management that “structure the world into ‘readable spaces’ 
that dominant institutions can understand and control” (Escobar 1992:74, quoted in 
Sanjinés 2001:295). Implicit in these exclusions are a hierarchical valuing of 
                                               
31 La Voz, April 10, 2004, front page headline, article page 7. Emphasis added. 
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neighborhoods as some neighborhoods are protected and shielded from undesirable, 
deviant, or dangerous activities through government ordinances of exclusion. By the end 
of the dissertation we will see that as the municipality cracked down on night clubs, more 
consistently prohibiting them from the heavily-zoned city center, the clubs were moved a 
few blocks away to other nearby zones not (yet) as heavily regulated. As the “problem” 
was kicked down the road, those neighboring areas then began to experience the presence 
of nightlife themselves, and with time they, too, began to organize neighborhood juntas in 
response, only they were working without even the zoning regulations to advance a 
strong legal case. 
As Ayacucho’s municipal government learned the hard way, there are inherent 
challenges in trying to solve society’s disagreements by relying on technical details 
within a bureaucratic quagmire. In the tense climate of public outrage over ineffective 
governance and demands for accountability in controlling night entertainment, the citizen 
security emergency ordinance was part of a highly orchestrated and dramatic – even 
desperate – public display of a political will or commitment to address and prioritize the 
concerns of nightlife. Following a long stream of unsuccessful policy attempts to define 
and control nighttime (dis)order in the city center, the emergency declaration made a 
rather dramatic move to institutionalize the rhetoric of a nightlife crisis. As we have seen 
in the first half of this dissertation, this crisis rhetoric had developed within an 
ideologically mediated system of social distinction in the city center. As such, the 
emergency ordinance was part and parcel of a politics of exclusion, of judgment 
regarding what is appropriate and acceptable in the city center, about what will be 
tolerated “in” this defined space and what must be pushed “out” – literally and 
figuratively. 
Beyond abstract moral values, the calls to expel night entertainment from the city 
center articulate important questions of order and disorder, social control, authority, 
corruption, and the relationship between illegal black market and economic progress. 
Fundamental to the complaints is a pointed questioning of municipal ability and 
willingness to correct disorder and secure order. Just as troubling as the moral 
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degradation of the city center is the government’s blind eye, complacency, or complicity 
(most often dubbed corruption) which further contributed to the chaos and disorder 
already reining the city. With their principle demand for regulation of the clubs, requiring 
that they meet certain safety requirements, residents in the city center began wondering 
what would have to happen before authorities began to take the problem “seriously.” Was 
it necessary for the city’s youth to be murdered? Perhaps Ayacucho needed a “wake-up 
call” such as the disaster in the Lima night club “Utopía,” in which dozens of partying 
patrons died in a fire because the club lacked proper emergency exits? No, they 
concluded, “we cannot wait for another Utopía to occur in Ayacucho!”32 
This interpretive framework of a crisis was vital to the municipality’s symbolic 
effort to re-assert its authority within the community. The emergency declaration marked 
an important turning point in this process. First, it was the “ultimate” spectacular display 
of a public will to prioritize nightlife, to demonstrate a commitment to solving the social 
crisis believed to emanating from the urban night scene. Not only was it intended to be 
the most dramatic of such displays, it was also hoped to be the ultimate political move, 
the final solution for the defined public problem. Responding to rhetorical questions 
about whether Ayacucho’s youth needed to experience a major tragedy or be murdered to 
be protected, the ordinance marked a change in course through the conceptualization, and 
institutionalization, of the social crisis as a public security crisis. The second half of the 
dissertation turns towards the disagreements over governance and the controversial 
approaches to controlling night spaces and governing citizen security.  
                                               
32 Personal communication with members of the junta vecinal Asamblea who gathered to file a report at the 
Fiscalía de la Prevención del Delito, September 3, 2004. 
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PART 2: EMERGENCY 
Public Problem of Security 
CHAPTER 5 
Democratic Emergency: 
Legacies of (Dis)order in Ayacucho 
In August 2004 three young men were brutally murdered in the historic city 
center in three separate incidents. One of the victims caused particular alarm, drew 
disproportionate attention and most directly affected subsequent municipal actions. First, 
he was a high school student from a prominent private school and the nephew of the 
recently-resigned local Prefect. Second, and even more significantly, he was murdered 
almost immediately upon leaving a night club on Jirón Asamblea late at night. In an eerie 
premonition, just the day before the murder, the residents of Jirón Asamblea and the 
surrounding streets appeared on radio stations announcing their newly-formed 
neighborhood organization, the Junta Vecinal de Jirón Asamblea y Calles Adyacentes, 
and warning about problems they thought the night clubs would provoke, including 
murder. 
Within two days of these sudden and dramatic events, the local government 
issued Ordenanza 054, a citizen security emergency in the entire province.1 The 
emergency ordinance was the latest in a long stream of ineffective bureaucratic and legal 
actions intended to regulate and control the nightlife scene in Ayacucho’s city center 
                                               
1 Ordenanza Municipal 054-2004-MPH/A. 
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(described in chapter 4). What set this ordinance apart from the other resolutions – and 
what intensified the controversy and debate – was the fact that it declared an emergency. 
In essence, this ordinance institutionalized the association between nightlife and social 
crisis in the city. 
The murders described above were certainly not the first murders to occur in 
Ayacucho, and not even the only ones associated with the nightclubs. While I was 
conducting fieldwork, a handful of other murders were directly associated with the clubs 
right in the city center. Nonetheless, after this particular murder, concerns over crime and 
nightlife suddenly saturated the local newspapers and radio, and outrage grew over the 
convoluted system that perpetuates the social problems associated with night clubs. 
Particular major events have the effect of shooting everyday concerns into the spotlight 
for public scrutiny and creating “moral panics” (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). Under 
certain social and political circumstances, events which “objectively” may not be 
exemplary instances of social concerns can have disproportionate influence on policy and 
mobilization. Sonia Morales’ disastrous concert examined in chapter 3 and the link 
between the murder of this young man and the night clubs are precisely such events: they 
provoked spectacular policy changes in the city’s security plans and triggered intense 
meta-commentary on the interpretations of the nightlife problematic. 
The high school student’s murder came in the wake of failed regulatory measures 
and internal squabbling, at a moment in which the municipality was faced with a 
population that had quickly mobilized against it: community members were often on the 
radio and television voicing their concerns over the nightlife, local newspapers were 
printing damning evidence of the government’s inability to enforce its laws, and 
neighborhood organizations were continuously threatening to take to the streets if the 
municipality did not take action. Despite the paper trail of citations and evidence 
mounted against the clubs, municipal regulatory policies remained largely un-enforced. 
Thus the emergency declaration was a direct response to the community that was 
suddenly mobilizing around calls that officials perform their “authority” in solving the 
nightlife problematic. 
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Since the emergency declaration Ordenanza 054 amounted to a radical move in 
formalizing the social crisis as a security crisis, this chapter shines the spotlight on the 
declaration itself. Having examined, in the first half, the conceptualization and 
problematization of deviance and crime control, and having seen how residents in the city 
center began to formal organize into neighborhood juntas in order to collectively pressure 
the government to exercise their authority, we now turn our attention in the second half of 
the dissertation to larger questions about the complex and interdependent relationship 
between state authority and democratic governance. As we will see, it was designed in 
part as a display of commitment to taking the city’s nightlife concerns seriously. In 
declaring an emergency, it intentionally gave the impression of “strong-hand” tactics of 
governance. Consequently, part of the weight of the declaration was that it evoked the 
years of the civil war – when the city lived under near-permanent state of emergency – as 
well as the authoritarian government that followed. Only by understanding the historical 
precedents by which current governance was being evaluated and compared will be able 
to understand the disagreements and debates over democratic authority and participatory 
governance that were the justifications for the emergency declaration and the backbone of 
the broader citizen security apparatus. 
 
Ordenanza 054 
[Image: Municipal Coat of Arms] 
HONORABLE PROVINCIAL MUNICIPALITY OF HUAMANGA2 
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE No. 054-2004-MPH/A 
Given in the Municipal Palace and Mayoral Office 
Ayacucho, 
 
HIS EXCELLENCY, MAYOR OF THE HONORABLE PROVINCIAL MUNICIPALITY 
OF HUAMANGA;  
By virtue of the powers invested upon him by Law;  
 
WHEREAS: 
The Council of the Provincial Municipality of Huamanga, in an ordinary session on 
August 31, 2004; by means of the Council Agreement No 111-2004-MPH/CM, approved the 
                                               
2 Italics added, bold and capitalization in original. Please see appendix for complete Spanish text.  
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Municipal Ordinance that DECLARES AN EMERGENCY SITUATION FOR NINETY 
DAYS, WITH REGARD TO CITIZEN SECURITY, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, AND 
TRAFFIC, in the jurisdiction of the Province of Huamanga; and,  
 
CONSIDERING: 
… That, by means of Law No. 27933, the Law of the National System of Citizen Security 
is established to guarantee security, peace, tranquility, the fulfillment and respect of individual 
and collective rights on a national level, creating entities comprising said system, such as 
provincial committees of citizen security, presided over by the Provincial Mayor and made up of 
political, civil, jurisdictional, Military and Police Authorities. 
That, the national system of citizen security is the interrelated set of organizations of the 
public sector and civil society, as well as of norms, resources and doctrine; oriented towards the 
protection of free exercise of rights and liberties, with the goal of promoting the citizen 
participation to guarantee a situation of social peace. 
… That, existing circumstances put the public tranquility and Peace in the city of 
Ayacucho at risk, that threaten the fundamental legal assets, protected by the Constitution, State 
Policies, [and] International Agreements on human rights, the Declaration of Emergency of 
Citizen Security and Public Transportation and Traffic is appropriate. 
 
ORDINANCE: 
FIRSTARTICLE. – DECLARE a situation of Emergency for Citizen Security, Public 
Transportation and Traffic, in the jurisdiction of the Province of Huamanga, for the duration of 90 
calendar days, beginning the day after the publication of the present 
 
SECOND ARTICLE. – ESTABLISH that, during the period of time indicated in the previous 
Article, urgent measures should be enacted that regulate the functioning of commercial activities 
related to discotecas, nightclubs, bars, video pubs, casinos and the likes, as well as to regulate 
transportation and traffic. 
 
THIRD ARTICLE. – AUTHORIZE the Executive to Issue the Mayoral Decree, to supervise the 
above-mentioned activities, granting them the specific guidelines that the situation deserves, 
based upon the parameters stipulated in the Council Agreement No. 111-2004-MPH/CM. 
 
THEREFORE: 
IN NAME OF THE NOBLE AND HONORABLE CITY OF HUAMANGA 
 
I ORDER [THIS ORDINANCE] RECORDED, PUBLISHED, AND FULFILLED. 
 
Council agreement accompanying Ordenanza 054 
COUNCIL AGREEMENT NO 111-2004-MPH/CM 
 
… AGREES: 
FIRST.- APPROVE the Emergency Declaration, regarding Citizen Security, Public 
Transportation and Traffic for ninety days, beginning the day after the publication of the 
respective Ordinance, in the jurisdiction of the Province of Huamanga. 
 
SECOND. – ORDER the issuing and enactment of the respective Municipal Ordinance which 
authorizes the Executive to issue the Mayoral Decree in aspects indicated the previous Article, 
according to the following parameters: 
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IN DISCOTECAS, NIGHT CLUBS, BARS AND RELATED 
• Prohibition of non-sport Public shows where liquor is dispensed, within the province of 
Huamanga for thirty days. 
• Conduct an inventory of night venues devoted to bars, cantinas, peñas, discotecas and related 
in the city. 
• Conduct a program of revision and re-registration of operating licenses. 
• Establish that the operating hours of operation for venues that dispense alcoholic beverages 
will be until 23 hours (11 at night). 
• Incorporate Neighborhood participation in night patrols. 
• Order the closure of discotecas, night clubs and related that do not possess an operating 
License, requesting the logistical support of the National Police. 
• Prohibit the ambulatory sale of liquors by means of emoliente carts.3 
… 
THIRD. – ENTRUST the Office of Urban Development with updating the Master Plan for the 
adequate location of a boulevard for the operation of discotecas, bars, video pup [sic] and 
related.4 
Autopsy of an Emergency 
At the apex of the “crisis” debate, when this young man was killed leaving a 
nightclub, endless regulatory laws and mandates were already on the books regarding 
nightlife businesses, but their contradictory content hindered any lasting enforcement. 
Thus numerous institutions within the municipality were concerned about the daunting 
task of correcting these problematic policies in order to then confront the larger social 
concerns associated with these businesses. Among the motivations for declaring an 
emergency was a desire to temporarily disrupt the existing state of affairs in which the 
nightlife scene was effectively out of the control of local authorities. The municipality as 
a whole could no longer afford to pass nonbinding resolutions regarding specific illegal 
businesses or even limited mandates pertaining only to certain aspects of the industry, as 
had been done in the past. Therefore, where Ordenanza 054 departed most perceptibly 
from previous legislation over the night clubs was in the generalized, non-specific, and 
                                               
3 Emolientes are hot herbal beverages, often of medicinal purpose, that are especially common in the 
Andean region. In cities, they are often sold on street corners from ambulant carts, many of whom mix 
these emolientes with liquor upon request. 
4 The Spanish document uses the word boulevard, borrowed from the English. In this context, however, it 
is used to refer to an urban area more akin to an “entertainment district,” sometimes with connotations 
closer to a “red light district.” 
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radical nature of banning all non-sport public activities for one month and closing all 
late-night businesses for a full six months. In addition, a special citizen security 
commission was designated to investigate the nightlife scene, and formal charges were 
filed against the city-center’s night club owners.5  
Declaring an emergency was not simply a concern over ambiguous regulatory 
laws per se, but rather a justification of investigations into a pre-existing social problem 
over which many battles had already been lost. Emergency declarations are typically 
motivated by sudden or unexpected disasters, and this declaration was no exception: it 
was motivated by the immediate impetus of a moral panic following a series of murders. 
Although the social problems at its core were not new, the growing social “emergency” 
was new, and thus the declaration was, in theory, a justification for any and all measures 
to address the situation. 
The Case for Municipal Emergencies 
This was not the first emergency ordinance declared in response to perceived 
problems emerging from the city’s nightlife scene. When Fernando Moya Medina 
became provincial mayor in 2001, after the disgraced Fujimori-supporter Félix del Solar 
was pressured out of office, he took nightlife on as a central cause of his municipal 
administration. In October of 2001 the Municipal Council declared a “Social Emergency” 
(Acuerdo de Consejo 123-2001-MPH/CM) that resulted in a municipal ordinance 
mandating “extraordinary measures for citizen security and the control of alcoholic 
beverage sales” (Ordenanza Municipal 010-2001-MPH/A). The ordinance called for a 
60-day ban on the sale of alcoholic drinks and the functioning of all night businesses after 
midnight as well as a “definitive closure” of those businesses not in compliance. The 
nature of the 2001 “social emergency” was evident in the language of the ordinance 
                                               
5 Ordenanza Municipal 054-2004-MPH/A, August 31, 2004. These normative details are not actually 
outlined in the Ordenanza 054. They are stipulated in the official regulative agreement that was passed by 
the Municipal Council of the Province, which is a legal precursor to Ordenanza 054 (Acuerdo de Consejo 
111-2004-MPH/CM). 
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itself, which cited a rise in delinquency, gangs, clandestine businesses and unauthorized 
social activities, which it claimed were “attacks against the integrity of the neighborhood, 
with serious harm for the family and the collectivity.”6 
Amilcar Huancahuari Tueros, Deputy Mayor under Moya when the 2001 
emergency ordinance was declared, considered that declaration successful: “we realized 
that the [hospital emergency room cases] dropped, and that the cause was the bars and 
night clubs.”7 The high school student’s murder in 2004 reminded Huancuahuari that the 
2001 ordinance had also been a response to the murder of a young law student near the 
city center, and (as he recounts) he suggested that the current provincial mayor, Gerardo 
Ludeña, declare a similar ordinance.  
According to Huancahuari’s recollection, the purpose of declaring an emergency 
was to buy time in which the municipality could figure out how to adequately legislate in 
order to legally regulate the night clubs and permanently close those that proved 
problematic.  
We began searching, we began to regulate: no establishments within 200 meters 
of a school or a church, and that to get the special authorization they had to meet 
certain requirements, things that were impossible for them to meet, acoustic 
systems … and that they have their own security 200 meters around their 
business. That’s difficult, who’s going to [do that]? They couldn’t meet [the 
requirements]. So we said to them “since you are not complying”…. 
In other words, the ordinance was a way to temporarily suspend the status quo – by 
closing all night businesses temporarily – while they passed the necessary legislation to 
legally close those problematic clubs.8 This power of an emergency decree stems directly 
                                               
6 “se ha incrementado la delincuencia, el pandillaje, la apertura de establecimientos clandestinos de 
expendio de licores … así como la realización de actividades sociales sin autorización Municipal. Hechos 
en la que se generan en su mayoría actos o atentados contra la integridad de la vecindad con grave perjuicio 
para la familia y la colectividad” (Ordenanza Municipal 010-2001-MPH/A, page 2). 
7 Author interview with Amilcar Huancahuari Tueros, April 25, 2005. In 2005, at the time of this interview, 
Huancahuari was the first mayor of Jesús Nazareno, the most recently-established urban district within the 
city of Ayacucho. Jesús Nazareno was known as a dangerous area of the city, but Huancahuari’s 
administration had a sizeable reputation for cracking down on illicit businesses and declaring the district 
“free” of discotecas, bars and cantinas (Ordenanza Municipal 010-MDJN-2004). 
8 A neighborhood organizer gave me a compatible explanation for the power of emergencies, based on 
experiences with his own neighborhood, which formed from a land invasion. The newly formed 
neighborhood organization declared their own shantytown (asentamiento humano) in a state of emergency 
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from the fact that it is not a specific kind of law mandating particular or systematic 
procedures but rather the suspension of existing laws or juridical order (Agamben 2005). 
In this sense, it assumed that that temporarily and indiscriminately suspending all 
nightlife operational permits and putting problematic activities on hold by declaring an 
emergency would create a legal and pragmatic “blank slate” during which time the 
government would be able to efficiently reevaluate, dismantle, and adjust the relevant 
codes and laws. In this case, it was a response to a situation in which existing 
bureaucracy was not only insufficient but actually hindered the normal functioning of the 
government. 
Underneath the extravagant and distracting formalities typical of Peruvian 
mayoral documents, the core structure and argumentation of Ordenanza 054 are tightly 
bound to recent decentralization policies (later established as law following the fall of 
Fujimori’s government) and they expose some of the inner workings of a provincial 
municipality’s negotiations of authority and legitimacy. Perhaps the first complication 
that Ayacucho’s provincial government faced in formulating an emergency decree based 
on superior national laws was that provincial municipalities (unlike the president of the 
nation) are not authorized to declare a generalized “state” of emergency, and no law 
directly allows for a local municipality to take “exceptional measures” or to suspend 
constitutional rights. Instead, according to the national Law of Municipalities, provincial 
governments are permitted to declare limited emergency “situations,” technically 
pertaining only to the administrative or financial workings of the municipality (Title XIII, 
Chapter VI, Article 20). These guidelines for dealing with municipal emergencies are 
ambiguous and highly generalized, lacking in details regarding what measures can or 
should be taken and by whom. Precisely because there are no standard procedures for 
municipal governments to declare emergency situations, the local government in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
because they were “incapable of taking care of paperwork and continuing with their work” when faced with 
another eviction, even after winning all of their legal battles. He applied this reasoning to the current 
provincial emergency declaration: “perhaps [the Mayor] doesn’t have any more solutions. He needs to do 
an investigation, so during the course of the emergency declaration he will carry out his studies to see what 
is working and what is not” (Author interview, April 11, 2005). 
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Ayacucho was able to work around the vague constraints and create their own 
interpretation of “emergency.” They claimed legal municipal responsibilities in the realm 
of citizen security and pieced together an official justification for authority by drawing 
selectively and in unexpected ways from the national laws, minimizing some sections 
while prioritizing, emphasizing, and substantiating others. 
Although Ordenanza 054 formally declares a citizen security emergency, the 
municipality did not make their claims based on the law establishing the National System 
of Citizen Security, as might be expected, since this law also does not directly grant 
provincial municipalities the general authority to decide, control, and plan citizen security 
response strategies.9 The ordinance instead cites vague passages from the Law of 
Municipalities to make its case that citizen security is a responsibility of provincial 
municipalities. As such, this ordinance reveals a complex legal formulation of 
responsibility and authority that depends upon the deliberate selection and prioritization 
of pertinent and convenient sections of superior legal documents. The significance of 
Ordenanza 054 was not in the deliberations over municipal autonomy but in the overall 
impact of declaring an emergency. Ordinances – and especially emergency decrees – are 
distinctly political maneuverings within the contested socio-political realm of policy-
making and democratic governance (Vallenas Gaona 2000). The process of selection and 
prioritization that provided the legal grounds for the formulation and justification of 
Ordenanza 054 also articulated an official (albeit local) legal interpretation of 
“emergency” as a legitimate part of municipal governance. Within a tense social context, 
it was a strategy aimed at heightening the spectacle of the local “nightlife problematic” 
and making an exhibition out of the government’s willingness to address the crisis. 
Since the laws outlining municipal responsibilities do not specifically validate 
municipal emergencies, achieving the desired potency and impact of an “emergency” 
                                               
9 Although the provincial mayor presides over the provincial citizen security commission (Article 15) and 
the commission is responsible for enacting citizen security decrees (Article 18b), these commissions are 
technically non-enforcing and therefore do not provide much substantial legal authority to the Mayor for 
this ordinance. The relative weakness of such nationally-mandated institutions is a pervasive source of 
frustration from within. 
 154 
declaration required a more powerful rhetorical maneuver. Specifically, the ordinance 
includes no mention of the dramatic events that precipitated the ordinance; it only 
mentions a generalized reference to “circumstances threatening the public tranquility and 
peace in the city of Ayacucho” and threatening fundamental rights protected by the 
constitution and “international human rights agreements.” This rhetoric closely parallels 
the “state of emergency” language in the national Constitution and the stated purpose of 
the national Law of Citizen Security, both of which develop an abstract notion of the 
responsibility to maintain “social peace” (paz social) and public tranquility.10 The local 
government claimed a measure of authority by borrowing this non-legislative concept 
and transposing the interpretive framework of national “emergencies” onto provincial 
authority.  
Despite the classic legal formalization of Ordenanza 054, and the careful selection 
of official documents and criteria for substantiating the government’s authority, the 
overall impact of Ordenanza 054 – the potency of an emergency decree – was achieved 
not through these legal details but through a strategy that was based upon a non-
legislative and abstract concept of maintaining “social peace.” By wrapping the specific 
legal justifications for provincial autonomy and authority in an abstract language of a 
need to guarantee security, tranquility, and “social peace,” the local government declared 
an emergency that was technically limited in scope but which appeared on the surface to 
be of the same magnitude as the more familiar national State of Emergency. 
Conflicting Interpretations of Emergency 
At 10am the day after the ordinance was declared, the provincial municipality 
convened an official press conference in the municipal building (described in chapter 1). 
                                               
10 The constitution allows for emergency declarations under circumstances which threaten a “disruption to 
peace and internal order, during catastrophes or grave circumstances that affect the life of a nation” 
Congreso de la República de Perú 1993). The citizen security law that is the backbone of this ordinance has 
as its stated purpose: “to guarantee security, peace, tranquility, compliance with and respect for individual 
and societal guarantees” as well as “to guarantee a situation of social peace”(Congreso de la República de 
Perú 2003a). 
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That evening, an independent meeting (or asamblea) was called by the Front in Defense 
of the People of Ayacucho (Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho, FDPA). Each of 
these meetings had dramatically different agendas – and tenors – and as would be 
expected, the FDPA assembly meeting was much more raucous than the press 
conference. Since many of the voices in the citizen security and nightlife debate were 
present in one or both of these meetings, they clearly exemplified the structure of the 
debate at the time of the initial declaration.  
At the FDPA meeting, one young woman represented the position of the club 
owners and workers, arguing that the clubs are not in fact the source of the society’s 
problems. Instead, she characterized the youth as determined and looking for pretexts to 
party (“if I want to study, I’ll study, if I want to ruin myself, I’ll ruin myself”), 
concluding that closing the city center clubs will simply send them to the streets or non-
regulated areas to drink and party. Likewise, variations of criticism were launched against 
the government as well as city center neighborhood organizations for irresponsibly 
equating discotecas with all problems of seguridad ciudadana. Nonetheless, this meeting 
was dominated by the perspective that the government was not doing enough to solve this 
social problem, despite the absence of representation from most of the institutions 
represented at the morning press conference (including the regional government, MPH, 
and the district municipalities of Carmen Alto or Jesús Nazareno).  
Just as officials in the morning press conference defended themselves through 
claims that urban security was “everybody’s responsibility,” the rhetoric of shared 
responsibility was present in the FDPA meeting as part of a harsh self-reflection and self-
criticism. In the FDPA president’s opening comments he described Ayacuchanos as a 
whole as characterized by apathy (desinterés) and carelessness (descuido), as being quick 
to point fingers and lay blame amongst each other but slow to assume any personal 
responsibility. Throughout the evening a common theme was that parents were at the 
heart of the city’s future and that they need to be involved and actively engaged in the 
“civic education” of their children, teaching morals and values, supporting alternative 
cultural activities. This theme was consistent with the well-articulated FDPA vision that 
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interpreted the detrimental nightlife scene through criticism of neoliberalism and the 
rhetoric of cultural invasion.11 In calling parents to task, participants in the FDPA 
dialogue were not necessarily conceiving of parental responsibility as a preventative 
measure in a plan to maintain citizen security (as governmental officials were framing it 
at the morning press conference); rather, they conceived of parental responsibility as a 
defensive act, a responsibility to maintain Ayacucho’s “cultural identity.” In this line of 
reasoning, one proposition was to expand the declaration from a citizen security 
emergency to a more generalized (and abstract) social emergency. Another proposition 
would have given the nightlife emergency even more teeth, arming it with a legal curfew 
for minors in the geographical area where night clubs are concentrated.  
Although the most prominent criticism of the emergency ordinance was its weak 
enforcement powers, and most Ayacuchanos viewed the ordinance as inadequate at best, 
as empty “words in the air,” in some circles the emergency declaration was criticized for 
being too extreme. From one camp was the predictable criticism from the club owners, 
who declared that the ordinance itself was an abuse of power, an unjustified attempt to 
stymie the advancements of unwanted entrepreneurs. The criticism that I heard more 
frequently rested instead upon the significance of the powerful “emergency” rhetoric and 
the resemblance of this municipal ordinance to national “state of emergency” 
declarations, particularly under centralized authoritarian rule.  
While most critics agreed with the municipality on the potential “crisis” of the 
nightlife scene (even the nightclub owners agreed on a citizen security crisis, though they 
denied a causal link to their clubs), many disagreed over the appropriateness of 
                                               
11 This sentiment was certainly strong in this meeting. Immediately after it was formally concluded, but 
while the public was still somewhat concentrated on the activities at the front of the room, one of the 
representatives jumped off the stage and walked straight towards me. Although I was very familiar with 
FDPA sympathies, it wasn’t clear to me that he would share those, and I was caught off guard by his vocal 
accusations that I was observing their meeting in representation of the CIA. While I was still bewildered 
and searching for an appropriate response, the brother of a friend appeared from behind and told the 
gathering crowd that he knew me “and my politics” and could assure them that I was not an undercover 
CIA agent. Although the person who confronted me was officially there representing the Colegio de 
Abogados, I knew that he was also working as a lawyer for one of the most infamous clubowners, which 
undoubtedly added a layer of suspicion to his mixed social roles. 
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emergency rhetoric and argued that official emergency classification, with its evocation 
of militarization – was not proportionate to the current nightlife situation. One of these 
critics was Salomon Hugo Aedo Mendoza, the district mayor of San Juan Bautista, one of 
the four urban districts that comprise the city of Ayacucho. Although he was obligated by 
law to enforce the ordinances of the provincial government, he explained his opposition 
in the following way:  
[I am] not against closing the night clubs, but [against] this ordinance that 
declares an emergency. I’m against this because, look, … in Lima people think 
that terrorism is coming back. Emergency means chaos and disorder, it means that 
[the situation] can’t be controlled, that the military and the police have to get 
involved. And we’re not in [that situation]. We can move around freely, go out at 
night, go to the clubs…. [Emergency] is something different!”12 
Although District Mayor Aedo, like others, agreed that the situation was urgent and 
needed concerted action, he objected to the formal legal declaration of emergency. His 
criticism foregrounds the idea that emergency declarations imply a state of uncontrollable 
chaos. Moreover, his comments highlight that formal emergency declarations are 
legislatively designed to facilitate certain administrative measures such as the 
militarization of social control and the suspension of civil liberties. In part, the district 
mayor’s criticism involves a conflation between the general concept of an emergency 
with specific measures to resolve the situation and enforce social control. In thinking 
about this conflation, it is important to distinguish, particularly in the abstract, between 
the government’s intentions (the notion of a blank slate) and the critic’s concerns over 
implementation (the potential for militarization); as one community organizer stated to 
me very succinctly, “a state of emergency with military is different than a state of 
emergency in the abstract.” In other words, the application of a “juridical void” is a 
slippery slope, in that it simultaneously offers the hope of a heightened social order while 
flirting with the possibility of an even worse social disaster.  
These critics who contested the meaning of “emergency” voiced their concerns 
                                               
12 Author interview, April 16, 2005. 
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within a debate that was not theoretical or abstract, but which instead rested upon the 
local particularities and intense experiences of past emergency ordinances. The 
application of the familiar and historically drastic “emergency” designation to such 
highly different circumstances raises profound questions about the appropriateness of 
manipulating past crises and existing fears for current political goals. When district 
mayor Aedo insisted that an emergency “is something different,” he was not simply 
exhibiting an abstract naturalization; he was also voicing a pragmatic concern over the 
very real experiential association (historic and current) between emergencies and 
militarization. Ordenanza 054 was soon implicated in larger discourse about Ayacucho’s 
national (even international) image with violence, chaos, a permanent emergency zone. 
The criticism over the application of emergency categorization to the nightlife 
problematic articulates a fear that the declaration will perpetuate this image abroad. As 
District Mayor Aedo warned at the FDPA meeting the day after the ordinance was 
declared, “Ayacucho survives on tourism and what we are doing is scaring away the 
tourists.”13 
This post-civil war hesitation towards emergency declarations could be seen 
elsewhere in Peru around this time. In fact, numerous human rights organizations were 
actively urging then-president Alejandro Toledo and his government to prohibit 
emergency declarations entirely to avoid the potential for military and police abuses. 
Among these advocates was the president of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
who issued a formal statement against state of emergency declarations. In it, he went so 
far as to blame the declaration of emergency for abuses during the civil war: they are “a 
critical factor in the tragedy we lived.” He went on to write that “the country must learn 
that it is not through the use of force that social peace is to be maintained.” Making a 
strong statement about the inappropriateness of emergency declarations in a democracy, 
Lerner urged the former president to learn from past experiences and immediately lift the 
                                               
13 Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho, public assembly meeting, September 1, 2004. See also La 
Voz, September 2, 2004, page 6. 
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emergency declarations (Lerner Febres N.d.).14 
Governing through Emergency 
National politics in the 1980s and 90s were all but completely consumed by the 
raging political violence of the civil war. Emergency decrees were issued repeatedly for 
many regions of the country, but no region endured the virtually-permanent status as an 
“emergency zone” as much as Ayacucho.15 When Alberto Fujimori came to power in 
1990, he legitimized his increasingly-authoritarian government through a well-
orchestrated campaign based on the “crisis of pacification” and the need for “social 
order” and security. Through his 1992 self-coup, Fujimori disbanded the Congress and 
reorganized national governance under a highly-centralized government. He unabashedly 
named this new structure the “Emergency Government for National Reconstruction.” 
Shifting away from emergency decrees, this was now an emergency state. Just as 
Agamben (2005) observes, “the metaphor of war” became integral to conceptions of the 
state, and the rhetoric of emergency, fear, and looming threats were used to convince the 
public of the “necessities” of protecting sovereignty. One prime example is the 
disintegration of the country’s decentralized government and its replacement with the 
departmental Consejo Transitorio de Administración Regional, or Transitional Councils 
of Regional Administration. Rather than autonomous governing agencies, these were 
regional administrative offices for the central government; they could no longer prioritize 
local needs and actions and they no longer had independently controlled budgets. Despite 
the name, this governmental structure was by no means “transitional” in the sense of a 
                                               
14 Similar declarations were also made by the UN High Commission for Human Rights (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 1999) and the (Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1987). 
Regarding a specific case in Puno in 2003, numerous human rights groups that were organized primarily 
around civil war violence made official pronouncements condemning the state of emergency laws and “the 
militarization and criminalization of social conflicts” (Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos 
2003; Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos 2003, Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2003). 
15 In fact, parts of Ayacucho’s lowland areas continue to be listed as national emergency zones, and the 
United States State Department still officially restricts travel to or from the city of Ayacucho to the 
daytime. 
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temporary organization awaiting implementation of a new structure. Like Fujirmori’s 
other emergency measures (control of media, infiltrating civil organizations) these 
slipped from being temporary measures to being permanent social control.  
Throughout this restructuring of power, Fujimori was immensely successful at 
equating spiraling political violence, staggering economic troubles and perpetual civil 
protests during the 1980s with the system of democracy itself. Thus he convinced a 
weary populace that the “social order” Peru needed could only be achieved through the 
“strong arm” tactics of an authoritarian government.16 In the early years of his presidency 
the infringements on constitutional rights and democratic civil participation were 
tolerated, if not applauded (c.f. Degregori 2001, Basombrío Iglesias 2003). Likewise, it 
would be imprudent to underestimate the role of the dramatically improved economic 
stability in levels popular support for Fujimori in these early years, long before the 
capture of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman and Fujimori’s “successes” in 
conquering the political violence (Tanaka 2001a). As Fujimori increasingly centralized 
the government, radically changing the nature of civil participation and local governance, 
he also gradually institutionalized the militarization of social control and the weakening 
of civil society (c.f. Burt 2004). Long after he declared victory over the Shining Path in 
the civil war, state repression continued strong, especially against the political opposition, 
labor unions, student groups, and popular organizations.  
In my interviews with local civil organizers, the imprecise shift to authoritarian 
governance was the point of antagonism and the point at which Fujimori began to lose his 
grip over the general population. What was accepted initially as emergency strategy (his 
self-coup was favorably looked upon by most Peruvians, after all) was not tolerable once 
it was clear that the temporary emergency (the emergency of decree) had become 
dictatorial, an emergency state. After talking with many Ayacuchanos sympathetic to 
Fujimori’s regime, I am quite confident that if the public displays of corruption had been 
exposed years earlier – in the height of Fujimori’s control – they would not have been 
                                               
16 There are several good books that cover Fujimori’s governance through fear, among them: Burt 2004, 
Conaghan 2005, Crabtree 2001, Degregori 2001, Grompone 1998. 
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able to crack his ‘iron fist’, let alone send him immediately into exile, because they 
would have been accepted as ‘the price to pay’ for long-awaited social order and ‘peace’ 
in Ayacucho.17 
Democracy and (In)Security 
Warnings that perhaps too much attention is generally given to the role of social 
movements in the collapse of Fujimori’s government (what Tanaka [2001b] has referred 
to as “movementism”) are important for understanding the complexities of that 
tumultuous period. However, I would not be doing justice to the experiences and stories 
shared with me by local activists who painstakingly maintained wide-spread civil 
pressure during that time, if I did not acknowledge their firm conviction that their public 
– and quintessentially democratic – protests were central to the ultimate collapse of 
Fujimori’s regime. As Peruvians grew increasingly restless under the continued weight of 
authoritarianism and the government’s approval ratings began to falter, Fujimori 
stubbornly continued to play upon the potential threat of a resurgence of violence. 
Specifically, his discussions of disorder and anarchy no longer referred only to political 
violence or acts of terrorism but extended also to labor strikes, civil mobilizations, and 
even urban crime. In this, Fujimori displayed his expertise at manipulating the political 
terrain of fear. In a 1993 speech before Congress, he hyped up his government’s 
successes following his 1992 self-coup (in which he deactivated the congress and 
suspended the national constitution) by saying: “My government has been labeled 
authoritarian for this, but exercising order and authority should be normal in a civilized 
society…. It is abnormal for disorder and anarchy to prevail” (Fujimori 1995:441-442, 
emphasis added). The implicit source of the “abnormal disorder and anarchy” is of course 
democracy, which he later referred to as a myth, a sacred cow: “My government and I are 
simply pragmatic. This means that I do not pay homage to theories, dogmas, or myths. I 
                                               
17 The most infamous of these corruption scandals involved the Vladi-videos, in which Vladimiro 
Montesinos, head of the National Intelligence Service and Fujimori’s right arm, filmed himself bribing 
political leaders, business owners, and the media to support Fujimori’s authoritarian government. 
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am an agronomist, but I do not breed cows and I do not believe in sacred cows” (1995: 
445-446). On the surface, such a statement about disorder being abnormal would seem to 
contradict the “culture of violence” discourse. On the contrary, his logic implies that 
disorder always reigns. The critical component to this logic is the equation of democracy 
with disorder. By reinforcing the idea that “normal” social order can only be maintained 
through strong-arm tactics, this logic in effect argues that to welcome democracy is to 
allow disorder to prevail. 
At this crossroads in Peru’s recent political history – after the civil war had waned 
but before social wounds had healed – we see the deep roots of contemporary opinions 
about links between authoritarianism, democracy, and tendencies for systemic and 
patterned violence of all sorts. It is not coincidental that Fujimori and his advisors rarely 
criticized “democracy” directly. Not only was Fujimori’s incursion into the world of 
authoritarian rule still young, “democracy” was a concept that he desperately needed 
among his own repertoire of keywords. And so they danced around the definitions of 
democracy, dismissing governments of the 1980s as “populist” or “partyocracy” (rule by 
the traditional elite political parties) and portraying them as “enemies” of democracy (c.f. 
Boloña Behr 2002).  
While I cannot give Fujimori credit for having instilled a complete national 
mindset, the role that his government played in local interpretations of the relationship 
between democracy and social instability is crucial. Even while many Ayacuchanos enjoy 
increased political participation in today’s democracy, some express nostalgia for certain 
aspects of decidedly non-democratic rule. The contemporary calls for authoritarian or 
militarized control over citizen security suggest that without a “firm hand” from above 
Ayacuchanos will revert to violence and chaos. One comment that I heard often in 
conversations about increasing urban crime was that Ayacucho needed “a Pinochet” to 
come in and “clean it up.” Drawing currency from Fujimori’s self-referral as “Chinochet” 
(a play on his campaign name, “El Chino,” Caretas 2004), the comment (made only 
partly in jest) assumes that “a Pinochet” would be even “more” authoritarian and 
presumably would be more “effective” than Fujimori’s “dictablanda” (“soft” 
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dictatorship).18  
The idea that a dictatorship would be the most appropriate response to violence – 
whether political violence, social upheaval, or urban crime – masks deeply unequal 
relationships between violence and power, fitting squarely within scholarly observations 
that state violence used for achieving social order is often legitimized, while violence by 
the civil society is condemned as irrational, impulsive, and unrelated to particular 
sociopolitical contexts (c.f. Coronil and Skurski 2004; Foucault 1995, Poole 1994). This 
legitimization of authoritarian measures for securing social order could also be seen as an 
illustration of what Jo-Marie Burt has observed as “a tendency of average citizens to 
value concrete policy successes as opposed to more abstract principles of democratic rule 
and procedures” (Burt 2004:263). Nonetheless, the stories presented in this dissertation, 
especially in the following chapters, illustrate the diverse motivations and experiences of 
Ayacuchanos who are actively engaging with and appreciating the democratic system by 
participating in efforts to secure citizen security. Together these stories strongly support 
the argument that even within a democratic framework, such comparisons between 
current governance and Fujimori’s highly centralized and authoritarian governance are 
viable measures of policy success, both concrete and abstract. The actual comparisons 
and nostalgia expressed for Fujimori’s governing style in securing social order often 
revolve around specific kinds of non-democratic or militarized “emergency” strategies 
and policies, and express desires for certain concrete measures of security. At the same 
time, however, they also convey ideologies about “authoritarianism” and “democracy” 
and abstract principles of governance for a society that is believed to be historically 
incapable of self-control.19 Such nostalgia – which I found across different sectors of 
society – reveals the shared impression (or perhaps a waning hope, in some cases) that 
authoritarian governments are better at securing peace – or better at counteracting the 
presumed “culture of violence” – than are democracies.  
                                               
18 Whether Pinochet’s specific tactics with crime would in fact have this desired outcome, though, may be 
arguable (Paley 2001: 72-73). 
19 Yezer (2007) offers an interesting analysis of the nostalgia for militarization and discipline in a rural 
community in Ayacucho. 
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Democratic Emergencies & Legacies of Insecurity 
Five days into a national strike by the Peruvian teacher’s union, strikers in the city 
of Ayacucho surprised the nation by successfully overtaking and occupying the 
provincial municipal building. As dialogue faltered and tensions increased, civil 
organizations sympathetic with the struggle of the teacher’s union (the Frente de Defensa 
del Pueblo de Ayacucho) announced a local solidarity march to occur on July 1st, 2004. 
At 3am the night before, police began storming the municipality, hoping to forcibly end 
the occupation. The strikers inside the government buildings turned on their megaphones; 
their desperate calls for help ricocheted dramatically off the hillsides surrounding the city 
and compelled many more people to join the next morning’s solidarity march.20 
The real turning point came when Ayacuchanos awoke to radio and television 
reports from the nation’s capital announcing that two local teachers had been killed in the 
confrontation with police. The atmosphere was already weighed down with the historical 
memory of state violence: the beginning of the national labor strike coincided with the 
anniversary of the deadly1969 mobilization for free education, and in Ayacucho, it was 
marked with marches commemorating the “martyrs of education,” the teachers and 
citizens who fell victim on that date. The circulation of a common and everyday rumor of 
police abuse was suddenly transformed into the proverbial “call to arms.” Though it was 
later clarified that nobody had in fact died, thousands of Ayacuchanos spontaneously 
descended on the city’s main plaza; they were not voicing educational demands but 
protesting rumored state violence against unarmed citizens. 
Amidst the commotion of July 1st, mayhem broke out: by noon the court house, 
the provincial municipality, and the regional government buildings had all been looted, 
burned, and destroyed. Conflicting local speculations emerged almost immediately about 
who was responsible for instigating the chaos and committing the most destructive acts. 
The most common accusation was levied against gangs and other “asocial” youth, the 
same characters who are featured prominently in most stories of insecurity, violence and 
                                               
20 Author interview, President of the Junta Vecinal de Piscotambo, April 13, 2005. 
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crime in the city. To others, however, the large-scale destruction could only be explained 
as an orchestrated plan, leading to rumors (yet again) about Shining Path infiltrators in 
the teacher’s union. 
Jumping on the theory postulating Shining Path infiltration, the Peruvian 
government released a nationally broadcast television ad. Although not a single person 
was killed on July 1st, the television spot began with grotesque photographs of dead 
bodies during the civil war and it concluded with old photos of Shining Path graffiti, thus 
visually and rhetorically linking Ayacucho with the Shining Path, terrorism, and violent 
civil unrest. The promise that “we will not tolerate their violent tendencies” (emphasis 
mine) was a dramatic and influential assertion that there was a “culture of violence” in 
Ayacucho, indiscriminately characterizing all Ayacuchanos as “violence-prone.”  
This particular example of “July 1st” encapsulates the complexity of the 
circulating notion of a “culture of violence,” that pessimistic view that can be heard even 
within Ayacucho. First, it began with a ubiquitous labor strike. Second, it escalated 
through profound mistrust and miscommunication between civil society and the state and 
it developed into a spontaneous popular mobilization. Finally, the blame for the violent 
destruction fell upon presumed “terrorists,” belligerent labor unions, “deviant” and 
“asocial” youth, or all of the above, depending on who was assigning the responsibility. 
In other words, although the idea of Ayacucho’s “culture of violence” is profoundly 
linked to its civil war past, the perception that it continues to exist today is equally shaped 
by such diverse social phenomenon as labor strikes, popular antagonism with the 
government, civil protest, and an urban environment complete with gangs and 
troublesome “asocial” youth. 
Three weeks after the July 1st violence, in response to the overwhelmingly 
negative national and international coverage, Ayacucho’s local government held a highly 
organized “peace rally” – the Great March for Peace and for Life (Gran Marcha por la 
Paz y la Vida). The municipality provided limited white T-shirts for participants, as well 
as balloons, plentiful white paper flags, and even paper sun visors for onlookers, all of 
which read “Gran Marcha por la Paz y la Vida” – Great March for Peace and for Life. 
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Workers were still installing metal gates on the destroyed entrance to the provincial 
Supreme Court and repainting the burned colonial arches, their scaffolding and trucks 
spilling out into the main plaza. 
Meanwhile, in symbolically potent discord with the physical reconstruction of the 
city’s administrative buildings, hundreds of participants marched around the plaza. In 
addition to groups familiar from the marches examined previously in the dissertation 
(such as Vaso de Leche) there were some different faces here, most notably numerous 
groups representing nearby rural communities. Perhaps the most noticeable participants, 
however, were the many children dressed in their school uniforms, carrying handmade 
and handwritten signs: 
Peace is not a state of immobility [inmobilidad] but rather a task that will not be 
finished today or even tomorrow. It only depends upon us. 
Let’s kill war, Long live peace 
May peace reign in Ayacucho 
Let’s command peace, not violence 
Also present were representatives of the local office of the Ministry of Education from a 
rural district capital (UGEL Vilcashuamán). Although small in number, they were 
accompanied by a truck plastered with signs advertising the region’s recent tourism 
development (the Vilcasraymi festival, modeled on Cusco’s Intiraymi), with a couple 
standing in the back of the truck dressed up in stylized costumes representing Incan 
nobility. In explicit contrast to the July 1st confrontation with the teachers union, their 
participation – coupled with the strong presence of the school children – communicated a 
critical message that Ayacucho’s educational sector was in support of peace and (perhaps 
more importantly) in support of the local government. The most visible sign in the march 
was a professionally made poster that revealed a message against violence within the 
imagery from Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the torn page), followed by 
the slogan of Ayacucho’s Regional Government: No to chaos and violence! Ayacucho, 
For Peace, Life and Development. 
Standing on the large white stage, local authorities raised their hands and took two 
oaths. The first was to counter the violent image of Ayacucho, which amounted to a 
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moral oath regarding the representation of the colonial city. The second oath was to 
secure a peaceful future for Ayacucho, an administrative commitment to prioritize citizen 
security and stability. 
 
 
PHOTO 5.1 – Stage in the main plaza for the Great March for Peace. At this moment, authorities 
were beginning to take their oath to the city’s future. 
Ordenanza 054, the citizen security emergency ordinance, was declared barely 
one month after this public oath, as an abrupt and desperate reaction to a murder in the 
city center. This ordinance emerged from precisely the juxtaposition on display in the 
Great March for Peace: the provincial mayor and the other officials were caught in the 
trap of demonstrating a tangible “commitment” to urban security while simultaneously 
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promoting a positive image of Ayacucho as a city that is upholding traditional and 
religious moral values, and that is, above all, peaceful and safe.21  
 
 
PHOTO 5.2 – Schoolgirls marching in the Great March for Peace. On the left is the sign 
with the Truth and Reconciliation image and the slogan: No to chaos and violence! 
Ayacucho, For Peace, Life and Development. 
One result of this predicament was the criticism that Ordenanza 054 mimicked the 
rigid dichotomies that indiscriminately place all of Ayacucho on the side of violence and 
social disorder. There are significant and obvious parallels between Fujimori’s rhetoric of 
                                               
21 A much smaller “peace protest” through the city center was organized by the municipal office of the 
Historic City Center (Oficinia Técnica del Centro Histórico de Huamanga) in September of 2004. 
Although not explicitly linked to violence, it occurred only three weeks after the municipality declared the 
citizen security emergency and as the pressure to end the night entertainment industry in the city center had 
saturated public airwaves and newspapers. The message of this march – in which the only participants were 
employees of the municipal office and maybe two hundred school children – emphasized the responsibility 
to value and preserve the historic center: “preserve all that gives our city it’s identity,” “cultural patrimony 
is a rich historical inheritance,” “only what is loved is protected,” “our colonial houses should be 
conserved,” “raise awareness of our historical legacy.” 
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a “crisis of pacification,” which he used to legitimize institutionalized social control, and 
Ayacucho’s recent municipal emergency ordinance, which mandated “urgent measures” 
to achieve “social peace.” Despite superficial resemblances to “firm hand” strategies for 
swift social control, however, the recent declaration backfired on the municipality. In 
essence, it fell victim to the legacy of its own rhetoric, precisely because the notion of 
“social peace” had already been co-opted by an autocratic president, and its meaning 
continues to be informed by such past policies and experiences.  
The second half of the dissertation focuses precisely upon the relationships 
between individual players in the nightlife problematic and critical disagreements of 
democratic governance. As we focus on the expectations and demands of authority and 
responsibility within an emerging framework of security, we see that among the most 
frustrating hurdles for officials in Ayacucho is precisely that the effectiveness of 
democracy is continually evaluated through contrasts with an idealized and nostalgic 
image of stability under Fujimori’s authoritarian “firm hand” governance. After half a 
decade of overhauling the authoritarian administrative structure installed under Fujimori, 
certain interpretive frameworks have remained, awkwardly surviving in the socio-
political field of a fragile democracy. Among them are the historical links between the 
portrayal of violence and the fear of instability, whether social, political, or economic 
instability. At a time when citizen security is flagged as one of the most critical tasks and 
responsibilities for the recently decentralized local governments, particularly in 
Ayacucho, vocal articulations of nostalgia for authoritarian social control are posed 
almost as a direct “prove yourself” challenge to local officials.  
Democratic Authority 
After all of its legal justifications, Ordenanza 054 stood apart from previous 
government resolutions aimed at controlling the city’s nightlife scene precisely through 
the rhetorical and symbolic power of declaring an emergency. As this emergency 
ordinance was opened up to dispute and criticism, it provoked an amazing cacophony of 
accusations. While virtually all of the critics of the ordinance agreed that the city was 
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experiencing a broad social crisis (even club owners, for that matter), criticisms of the 
ordinance ranged the extremes, from “ineffectuality” or “incompetence” to “abuse of 
authority.” Within weeks, the emergency declaration was considered, by all accounts, 
weak, if not an utter failure. The talk of the town quickly turned to how authorities were 
“in bed with” the club owners, or how the club owners were “making a joke” of local 
authority. Enforcing government regulations of night club operations was, after all, the 
alleged purpose of the emergency declaration.  
The mounting bureaucratic failures in regulating the night clubs disappointed the 
local community, raising serious doubts about the provincial mayor’s competence in 
overseeing the coordination of municipal institutions and enforcing resolutions, and 
eventually damaged the authority of the emergency ordinance itself. As we will see in 
Chapter 6, these doubts and dissatisfactions culminated in numerous and extensive 
protest marches calling for the mayor’s renunciation. Individual officials were also being 
held personally responsible, and accusations of corruption circulated wildly. The most 
tantalizing involved a sting operation that caught a member of the municipal council 
patronizing an illegal brothel. The far more common were a series of accusations against 
key officials who were said to have corrupt relationships with the clubs: receiving money, 
authorizing fake licenses, or having conflicting allegiances (such as being related to a 
club owner). As time went on, the neighborhood organizers also began formulating more 
abstract accusations, charging officials (particularly the mayor) with a lack of 
decisiveness and an inability to use of the powers granted by law. 
Local governments are challenged with continually demonstrating their authority 
and legitimacy to their diverse community, and declarations of official resolutions serve 
as orchestrated public displays, not only of governmental command or responsibility but 
also of a willingness to address particular political agendas. “Strong states,” which enjoy 
high measures of compliance, participation and legitimacy (Migdal 2001: 52), would 
presumably be able to successfully use official ordinances in the exercise of social 
control, effectively convincing other societal aggregates to accept such “official” versions 
of the law. However, the inability of the provincial municipality to negotiate their claims 
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regarding Ordenanza 054 exposes a closer resemblance to a “weak state” (Bailey 
2004:10). Drawing from Agamben’s argument that that normative power (potestas) 
necessitates the authority of a “power that grants legitimacy” (auctoritas), we can 
conclude that the challenges that developed once Ordenanza 054 was declared signify 
that the normative act of declaring an emergency was not accompanied by a comparable 
legitimizing power that would enable the municipality to enforce its ordinances, 
guarantee a stable and secure community, and convince the public at large of the 
government’s authority.  
This depiction of weak and non-legitimated governance would also be consistent 
with approaches that detail power as a dialectical and reciprocal relationship between 
coercion and consent (Gramsci 1971), between coordination and complicity (Foucault in 
Burchell, et al. 1991) or between the workings of ideology and hegemony (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 1992; Williams 1977), with a critical element of antagonism embodied within 
the dialectic (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). Authority, or leadership, must be continuously 
justified, and legitimized, outside the strictly political realm, in order for it to be effectual. 
The life of any ordinance is profoundly shaped by the community’s continual and diverse 
evaluations and interpretations, as well as by the symbiotic relationship between 
government institutions and the community at large. We can always expect discord over 
the establishment of meanings, and official norms – especially emergency declarations – 
are highly contested, distinctly local, and never neutral. Looked at another way, policy-
making and policy-enforcement are directly influenced by “strong publics” in which local 
citizens voice informed opinions, argumentations, and strong political prioritizations (cf. 
Paley 2004). 
Because governmental officials are recognized as being in a unique position to 
prioritize political agendas, they face strong pressures to meet the diverse demands of 
multiple interest groups within the community (the classic conundrum of 
“governability”). Ordenanza 054 may have been a public display of authority framed 
through the imagery of firm-hand control over a “crisis” or “emergency” but it was 
insufficient for its skeptical community. This situation begs the following questions: if 
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authority is not in legislative powers, then what/where is it? From a local perspective, 
what are community expectations or measures of “authority”? As Gramsci emphasized in 
his writings, authority – distinct from “power” – stems not from bureaucratic duties or 
even bureaucratic successes (i.e. successfully implementing existing or approved 
ordinances) but from “moral and intellectual leadership.” While the Municipality sought 
to establish authority through a stream of resolutions, Ayacucho’s “strong public” had 
alternative means of measuring “authority” and expectations for what it means to govern 
authoritatively in times of crisis. It is to these disagreements over expectations of 
democratic authority and responsibility that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Hacer Cumplir:  
Authority and Commitment in Times of Crisis 
I’m waiting peacefully for the police to do something. But if they don’t, I will 
take justice into my own hands, I will do it! I will make sure my son is 
respected.… When I burn the assassin in the park, don’t you arrest me, don’t you 
arrest me! Just like the assassin is being harbored, don’t arrest me! … I hope that 
this is addressed because if not, Ayacucho will burn and I will lead it!1 
She was the mother of the high school student murdered upon leaving a night club late at 
night just over a month before. She had been sitting for over an hour listening to the 
standard complaints of a parade of angry neighborhood organizers. She had then listened 
to the president of the Provincial Seguridad Ciudadana Committee congratulate a group 
of women for finally organizing in the city center. And she listened while he lamented the 
lack of dedication on the part of many neighborhood leaders to solve the problems of 
citizen security. Her anger and her pain were raw, her voice was cracking, she didn’t try 
to hold back her tears, and she didn’t try to temper her accusations. The hairs on my arm 
were standing on end and I know that I was not the only one who was completely riveted 
by her presence. During the five minutes that she talked she was interrupted several times 
with applause from the neighborhood organizers present in the audience. It was a sharp 
contrast to the well-rehearsed exchange of complaints that otherwisecharacterized this 
meeting between city center neighborhood organizations and the Provincial Committee 
for Seguridad Ciudadana about the “nightlife problematic.” 
                                               
1 Closed meeting between juntas vecinales from the city center and the Comité Provincial de Seguridad 
Ciudadana, October 12, 2004, Municipalidad Provincial de Huamanga. 
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After the bereaved mother intervened at the meeting, she approached the president 
of Jirón Asamblea’s junta vecinal (neighborhood organization), saying “I should have 
listened to you!” The president was surprised and did not remember speaking with this 
woman previously. The mother explained: the junta president was once handing out 
photocopies of a set of articles that documented what was happening inside of these night 
clubs as part of her continuous efforts to convince the community and the authorities that 
these clubs were morally and physically dangerous spaces. Now the mother was 
regretting that if only she had “paid attention to their warnings,” she wouldn’t have 
allowed her son to go to the clubs and he would still be with her today.  
The seguridad ciudadana meeting was animated – as most such encounters are – 
but calculated, ostensibly organized to reflect upon the citizen security emergency 
declaration issued by the municipality just two days after the high school student’s 
murder. When his mother spoke, nobody dared to challenge her, to calm her, and 
especially to question her authority in speaking about the nightlife crisis. After all, it was 
the murder of her son that had catapulted the “emergency” into public view and that had 
instigated this very meeting. Her outcry was not simply an announcement of a desire to 
seek her own personal revenge against her son’s assassin. With more applause she ended, 
yelling: “Ayacucho will burn! It’s certain. There will be another Ilave here in Ayacucho!” 
Her audience in the municipality’s non-functioning seguridad ciudadana committee most 
certainly understood her reference to Ilave, the rural town in Puno that captivated the 
country’s attention when community members collectively murdered the mayor, in the 
light of day and in the middle of town (c.f. Degregori 2004, Ideele 2005). Her 
comparison amounted to an unconcealed threat that the community was ready to seek 
revenge against corrupt officials who were not heeding the community’s repeated 
warnings, who were not taking appropriate action to prevent further tragedies by solving 
the nightlife crisis. 
This chapter examines the dynamics of authority in circumstances of social crisis. 
I do this by exploring how expectations of “authority” are affected by public debate (if 
not consensus) about whether the situation constitutes a “crisis.” Ethnographically, the 
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heart of this chapter is the extended period surrounding the municipality’s emergency 
ordinance, during which time I often heard evaluations of city governance summed up 
with the phrase “aquí no pasa nada.” This phrase is most often heard in colloquial speech 
to mean “no problem, don’t worry about it,” but when applied in this way to the city’s 
governance, it takes on two interrelated meanings. First, it implies an “all fine and good” 
or “there are no problems here” attitude in which authorities don’t take the city’s 
problems seriously. Second, it implies that this worry-free approach is in turn reflected in 
their governing style and labor: indolence (laziness), impunity, inertia, lack of leadership. 
Literally an accusation that “nothing happens” to solve the city’s problems, it is 
redundantly followed up with “it’s always the same (“siempre es igual” or “siempre es lo 
mismo”). As a corollary to that, the demand we will hear the most about in this chapter is 
hacer cumplir, or to ability to enforce regulations and ordinances. 
The correlation between a worry-free attitude and a lack of development in 
finding solutions to the city’s problems led to the perceptions of disorder and chaos that 
informed the emergency framework. They also led to the accusations that authorities lack 
leadership and the ability to govern. As the bereaved mother accused, directly to the 
authorities in charge of seguridad ciudadana: “If Ayacucho doesn’t develop (no avanza) 
it’s because of the corrupt [officials] in this department…. I’m grieving over a seventeen-
year-old High School student, and what does Ayacucho do? Ayacucho does nothing (no 
hace nada). Because they’re corrupt. Someone tell me they’re not corrupt, someone tell 
me they’re not corrupt!” She was met with silence.  
As we have seen in earlier chapters, public debate over nightlife in the city center 
– from discotecas to fiestas chichas – is dominated by a particular ideology that sees the 
city’s historic and religious center under constant threat from dangerous, nontraditional, 
and immoral night activities. This chapter focuses on how discursive framings in terms of 
crisis reveal competing ideologies about social order and authority in the city. As I 
demonstrate through junta vecinal documents, public debates, and two major public 
protest marches, many powerful alternative expectations of authority rely on 
demonstrations of seeming intangibles: principles and values, love for the pueblo, and 
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commitment. These divergent expectations of authority run parallel to conflicting 
perspectives on the essence of the nightlife “crisis.” All combined, this dynamic played a 
direct role in tense disagreements and negotiations over responsibility in solving the 
city’s problems. 
In Search of a Donkey:  
Imagery of Authority and the Demands of Enforcement  
After the first 90 days of the emergency declaration (Ordenanza 054) expired with 
no tangible results, the junta vecinal of Jirón Asamblea laid out an ultimatum with a 
deadline – if the problems were not addressed by that date they would organize a protest 
march through the city. The women talked with everybody – including government 
workers and clergy – trying to rally support for their cause. Their concern and their effort 
was applauded (excepting the notable disputes and even physical threats from the club 
owners, and the complaints from young kids who frequent those clubs), but their desire to 
take to the streets was unanimously discouraged. The women, however, were not 
dissuaded. They explained that these protests and marches are their democratic right, but 
also that their responsibilities as citizens of a democracy include speaking out when they 
see that the system is not working or not holding to its promises. As they planned a 
“peaceful march” on December 2, 2004, they accentuated their criticisms of the 
municipality through humorous and symbolic imagery of authority, laying out alternative 
claims for authority through the rhetoric of crisis, commitment, morality, and principles. 
§ 
December 1, 2005. I was crammed into a rickety mototaxi with the president and 
vice president of Jirón Asamblea’s junta vecinal as we were leaving the planning meeting 
with the Vaso de Leche base leaders in their office inside the Mariscal Cáceres market. 
They were joking that they wanted to have four donkeys lead the march tomorrow, each 
decorated with the name of an authority: Ludeña (municipal mayor), Omar (regional 
president), Prefecto (prefect), and Fiscal (State Attorney). They were determined to find 
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donkeys but had no idea where to go. I wondered aloud if the nuns at Santa Theresa had 
donkeys at the convent, recalling that during Semana Santa the Domingo de Ramos 
donkeys had disappeared from the convent, causing quite a scandal. They were so 
excited! “Joven!”, they called to the mototaxi driver, asking him to take us straight over 
there. I immediately wondered if I would later regret contributing to this humorous but 
pointed criticism, but it was too late: I was swept into a surreal search for donkeys.  
The search advanced like a treasure hunt, with each stop giving us one more clue 
and sending us to another location that was determined through belabored deciphering of 
cultural and social hints. It began in the receiving room of Santa Teresa, where the nuns 
sell little homemade crackers, religious iconography, and their special “holy juice.” To 
talk with the cloistered nuns, the president went over to the Lazy-Susan-type opening in 
the wall and spoke through the cracks to the nun on the other side. Usually quite adept at 
the standard long-winded Peruvian formalities, and well-polished in her persuasive spiel 
about closing the night clubs, I was surprised that she did not preface her request with an 
introduction about who they were and what they were doing. Instead, she just directly 
stated that they were searching for donkeys. The nun said that they don’t have any 
donkeys, they rent them from somewhere outside of the city; but why, she asked, are you 
searching for donkeys? The president began: they were organizing a march to protect the 
futures of their children, to keep them out of the sinful and immoral night clubs and, well, 
they wanted donkeys to precede the march with the names of the local authorities. The 
nun on the other side of the wall giggled and giggled. She said she was sorry they 
couldn’t help, but that she would be praying that the kids find a better path and that the 
authorities put themselves to the task better. She also told us the name of a family in 
Santa Ana who she thought had donkeys. 
And the hunt for donkeys continued in this vein. The family in Santa Ana sent us 
to the neighborhood of Andamarca. A young boy in Andamarca sent us on a path out of 
town, following a lush micro-climate along the river, such a contrast from the rest of the 
dusty and dry city. We passed an elderly woman picking Calla Lilies below us, 
surrounded by pink and purple flowers. When she saw me pass she called out excitedly 
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“mayman rinki?” asking me in Quechua where I was going. I started to answer but the 
two junta women rushed over and tried talking with the woman, who clearly spoke no 
Spanish. I was a bit surprised to watch them struggle through basic Quechua, since they 
often express pride in being Huamanguina and speaking Quechua. The elderly woman 
called over her grandson and they told us there was nobody in Andamarca who had 
donkeys, but there were some people who had mules over in Carmen Alto. He told us to 
cross over the river, walk up the footpath on the other side, go over to where we could see 
the 3rd electrical post and ask around on that street. 
The path up the hill to Carmen Alto was steep, dusty, and rocky; the women were 
both in heels. By this point we had a fairly good idea that we were not going to find 
donkeys, but maybe mules, so they began to consider whether or not they would use 
mules. Burro, they explained to me, implied “ignorante o terco” (ignorant, stubborn). 
Mula was a similar message, “tonto o cabeza duro” (idiot, hard-headed), but not as 
frequent and recognizable as a symbolic message. That’s when the jokes began. We 
passed a young girl herding some 30 goats, and they mused that if they couldn’t find the 
mules they could just hire some “chivos” (goats) from her, which had them laughing so 
hard they had to stop and support themselves along the path. When they finally gathered 
their breath I asked them what a goat represents, although I was fairly sure what answer I 
would get. They looked at each other and howled again. I was told that it signifies 
“maricón” (fag). It was clear that I was now expected to share in the laughter. I couldn’t, 
but they were undeterred by my discomfort, having too much fun playing with animal 
symbolisms. The continued: they could just take a big fat pig to represent mayor Ludeña 
“and they wouldn’t even have to put a sign on him!” They howled together, and one 
continued: “just like Ludeña,” the pig wouldn’t do anything at all, and even kicking 
wouldn’t work so they’d either have to carry him or leave him behind! I’d never seen 
these two women let loose like this before, and their laughter made the walk up the steep 
hill fly by. 
By the time we reached the top of the long and dusty hill, they were just 
beginning to regain their cool after the good, hard, laugh at authority, a topic they don’t 
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often find very humorous. We started asking around for donkeys or mules, and finally 
found “the house.” The exchange with the young girl was confusing to say the least: yes 
they had one donkey, no they didn’t have any donkeys, yes they had 3 mules, but one was 
a horse…. (This time I was apparently the only one who found humor in these 
quintessentially drawn out and complicated mixed messages). After settling on a deal, 
they paid S/. 45 to rent three animals: one mule that was uncontrollable, one that turned 
out to be a horse, and a well-behaved mule who wouldn’t walk if the horse (mare) didn’t 
go first. They agreed that the owners were going to bring the animals to the Mercado 
Mariscal Cáceres at 8:30am. It’s a long walk from where we were, at least an hour and a 
half, and they said they were going to leave at 6:30am just to be sure. The owners were 
afraid they were going to go all the way there in vain, so the president gave them a 
deposit. They signed a little document that the president stamped with the official Junta 
Vecinal stamp and they all signed it. The document stayed in the junta’s notebook – not 
much help to the owners of the animals. 
Once the deal was settled we walked straight down towards the city center (there 
is no public transportation in those areas). It was getting dark and starting to rain. I had a 
meeting with some members of a youth organization to work on the results from a youth 
survey we were conducting and I knew I was going to be late. I was again surprised to 
note that they felt utterly out of place, literally not recognizing which way to go to get to 
the city center. I think we were all glad that I knew my way through the area, though we 
had to walk all the way to the corner below the Carmen Alto cemetery before we finally 
found a taxi….  
My long day ended at 1am. The next morning was the march and I knew I had to 
get there early. I fell asleep still laughing at the unexpected things that find their way into 
ethnographic research. 
§ 
The next morning I went with the president to the arranged meeting place above 
the Mercado where the animals and their owners were already waiting. Shortly 
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afterwards, Teniente Alcalde Miranda pulled up in a clearly-marked municipal truck, 
dropping off another junta member for the protest march against the municipality. I went 
over to say hello and I commented on the irony; he just laughed and shrugged, así es en 
Ayacucho, “that’s the way it goes in Ayacucho.” One of the women brought signs, 
another brought sticks for poles (carrizo), they borrowed a knife from the butcher in the 
market, and with help from some other women in the junta they began assembling their 
signs. Many people stopped along the way and laughed, observed, asked questions. Some 
voiced support, nobody opposed it, and all were immensely amused. The garbage 
collector walked by with his wheel barrow and noted out loud that the horse didn’t work, 
since “horse” (caballo) signified “gentleman” (caballero). The ladies agreed that this was 
a problem, so they decided they had to make “ears” and the poor horse spent the day with 
enormous paper ears tied around its head. Two police officers parked nearby in their 
oversized SUV, and while one called in to the comisaría to assure that everything was 
under control, the other was reading the signs and laughing inside the car. The ladies 
made a show out of it, holding all the signs up for him to read, calling out comments to 
him that he pretended not to hear. All the while, the women were working out their 
chants, trying to figure out how to get around the fact that they didn’t actually have 
donkeys. They honed in on their theme: “Mules are for prevention, on donkeys we’ll 
remove them” (La mula es prevención, En burro los sacamos”). 
Above all, the mules played upon the symbolism of authority, and they served as 
ludic and temporary imaginings of an alternative power structure, one in which “the 
people” pulled the authorities through the streets in an act of humiliating subservience. 
The jokes about substitute symbols for the same authorities – chivos or pigs – further 
emphasize this imagined and inverted structure in which the authorities are abused and 
humiliated. Writing about politics under Fujimori’s regime, Peruvian anthropologist 
Carlos Iván Degregori argued that “the obsession of the ‘yellow press’ [tabloids, prensa 
chicha, diarios populares] with the feminization of the opposition candidates and/or 
ridiculing their physical traits is intended to convert them into examples of subordinate 
masculinities, incapable of exercising authoritarian control, which implies strength and 
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control” (Degregori 2001:184). Degregori documents in fantastic detail how the “straight 
jacket” of machismo is used against politicians through imagery and language, depicting 
despised authorities as soft, weak, cowardly, tattle-tale, insecure, homosexual, or 
mentally ill. Alternatively, he argues, the yellow press displays a neurotic anxiety about 
the human figure, exaggerating physical features or characteristics. The pig, the chivo, 
and the donkey exhibit all of these. 
Nonetheless, we can also read the humor as statements about authority, 
specifically that authorities are expected to enact the will of the people. The mules were a 
recognizable symbolic statement that Ayacucho’s officials were too stubborn to obey the 
will of the populace. The joke about the pig standing in to represent Mayor Ludeña 
expressed a great deal more than a cartoonish resemblance to his chubby physique. By 
suggesting that Ludeña, like a pig, does not do as told even when hit and pulled, the joke 
implied that Ludeña is either too stupid to understand what is being asked of him or, 
more cynically, that he had other motives, that he was “in bed with” the discotequeros. A 
beautiful illustration of Johan Huizinga’s observation that “contest means play” 
(Huizinga 1950), the simmering of these jokes during this long political contest lends the 
nightlife problematic its “character of play.” 
As the women from Vaso de Leche began to arrive on the morning of the march, 
they would collect some signs and then gather in the shade, chatting, eating and 
distracting the many young children in tow. Eventually the group gathered momentum 
and the march began. Accompanied by the mules – now decorated with the names of 
local authorities and ties around their necks – some one thousand women marched 
through the city streets. Their path was announced by an ad hoc band of local elementary 
students as they wove through the city center, stopping in front of each of the relevant 
government offices: Regional Government, State Attorney, Supreme Court, Prefecture, 




PHOTO 6.1 – Members of Vaso de Leche join the protest against nightclubs and authorities. 
(December 12, 20004) 
The imagery of the donkey was a very clear statement that they were disappointed 
with the ability of various officials to enforce the laws and resolutions. Indeed, one of the 
most common criticisms and demands revolves around “hacer cumplir” – enforcement of 
laws and municipal ordinances. After the murder of the high school student, Mayor 
Ludeña appeared on the local television news broadcast saying that closing the clubs was 
a “question of paperwork” and bureaucracy (trámites) (Canal 25, August 30, 2004). 
These types of comments were fodder for the chatter of criticisms and gossip circulating 
about the lack of enforcement of the laws (incumplimiento de las leyes). During Semana 
Santa of 2006, after I had finished my fieldwork, numerous friends and research 
participants emailed and called to give me updates about the now-perennial struggle to 
control nightlife during the week-long religious festivities. That year, the neighborhood 
organizations in the city center adopted the new strategy of hanging signs along Jirón 
Asamblea and other high-traffic streets in the city center calling attention to the failed 
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resolutions and ordinances. They took two approaches: one was directed to those 
celebrating, which read “Conversion and Mission, Semana Santa is reflection, welcome 
to the historical center tourist friends” and the other was a dry admonishment that read 
“que se cumpla 047-2004,” referencing the 2004 ordinance discussed in the chapter 4 
mandating zonification of the city center and excluding night clubs. According to the 
president of Jirón Asamblea’s junta vecinal, these approaches were considered a “protest 
strategy” (medida de protesta), pressuring the government to enforce their own 
resolutions. 
While the Provincial Municipality is formally in charge of policy-making, the 
tasks of policy enforcement are technically the shared responsibility of numerous arms of 
the government apparatus, most notably the police and the district attorney’s office. 
However, the public demonstrations about the enforcement of Ordenanza 054 were aimed 
at the municipality, which suggests that the provincial mayor was being held responsible 
not only for passing adequate and proportionate laws but also for their implementation. 
Although the police have a historically tainted reputation in Ayacucho (c.f. Basombrío 
Iglesias 2003), in this particular problematic they were only held secondarily responsible 
for the enforcement of the ordinance’s mandates. Years after Mayor Moya Medina left 
office in 2002, residents of Asamblea remembered him fondly for being the first to carry 
out forced closures of the clubs. In December of 2004 they even included him in a 
meeting and official inspection of damages to the homes abutting the clubs. More 
importantly, they muddied the waters between policy making and enforcement by 
drawing a stark contrast between his work ethic and that of the current mayor, praising 
him for “personally” enforcing the closures. That Mayor Moya took personal 
responsibility for the closures was a strong indication to them of internal integrity and 
commitment, true authority, and an honest sense of accountability. 
Evaluations of “hacer cumplir” may be the most evident (and least subjective) 
demonstration of whether officials are “doing their job.” However, this apparent 
objectivity – are they or are they not enforcing their own laws – obfuscates a series of 
more significant characteristics that are being evaluated. Demands of “hacer cumplir” 
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must be understood as part of a broader concern with the intangible and subjective 
characteristics of authority, and of individual authorities. In the nightlife problematic, the 
emphasis on “hacer cumplir” serves as shorthand, a superficial expression of deeper 
characteristics which critics and Ayacuchanos are looking for in their authorities. This is 
clear in the chants and signs that the women in the junta vecinal Jr. Asamblea assembled 
for participants in their protest march against government authorities.2 The most 
prominent demands of “hacer cumplir” in the chants and signs were variations upon an 
admonishment to individual authorities for not fulfilling their promises, not holding their 
word and closing the clubs. As such, they were part of a wider set of accusations of 
incompetence or corruption.  
Alcalde, Corrupto, Cumple Tu Promesa [Corrupt mayor, hold your promise] 
Autoridades Incapaces, Fuera De Ayacucho [Inept authorities, get out of 
Ayacucho] 
Prefecto, Trabaja, Eres Figureti [Prefect, get to work, you’re trying to be a big 
shot] 
¿Qué Hace El Alcalde Y Sus Regidores? [What do the mayor and his councilmen 
do?] 
Basta Ya Del Descaro De Autoridades [Enough with shameless authorities] 
Queremos Paz, No Corrupción [We want peace, not corruption] 
As these signs demonstrate, the majority of these accusations tied the idea of enforcement 
directly to personal character, through condemnations against authorities who didn’t 
work and were only in their job to be noticed as a public figure, or those who were 
considered shameless and having nerve. Another prevalent sign was directed at the 
municipal insiders who tip-off the club-owners about upcoming secret operatives. 
Literally translated as “More work, Less Toads,” and complete with drawing of toads to 
match the Spanish imagery, the sign portrayed them as unscrupulously self-interested 
snitches.3 These assertions communicate a strong subtext that corrupt actions – and the 
                                               
2 Essentially all of the signs carried in the march were made by the junta vecinal de Asamblea, given to the 
Vaso de Leche leaders the day before, and distributed by them among the participants in the march. As will 
be considered in the final chapter, the signs – and the chants – really only reflected the concerns of the city 
center.  
3 In English we use a different animal imagery for this kind of person: a rat. 
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personal characteristics they expose – constitute a betrayal to the interests of the pueblo 
Ayacuchano. 
Taken as a whole, the chants and signs reveal a strong relationship between 
simplified demands of “hacer cumplir” and other salient demands and criticisms, 
particularly those demonstrating principled action and values. Although authorities were 
the most central target, there were also denunciations against the clubs and owners for 
ruining and poisoning the youth, serving as the source for youth crime and acting as 
refuges for drug addiction and prostitution. However, there was also a set of pleas 
directed at the community itself: 
Discotecas Dejen De Envenenar A La Juventud [Night clubs, stop poisoning our 
youth] 
Abajo Los Antros De Perdición [Down with the cradles of damnation] 
Discotecas: No Al Fomento De Drogadicción, Germen De La Delincuencia 
Juvenil [Discotecas: Stop promoting drug addiction, source of youth 
delinquency] 
Discotecas Nido De Drogadicción Y Prostitución [Night clubs, nest of drug 
addiction and prostitution] 
¡Jóvenes! No A Las Discotecas [Youth! No to discotecas] 
Padres De Familia No Permites Que Corrompen A Tus Hijos! [Parents, don’t 
permit that they corrupt your children!] 
Huamanguino No Permitas Que La Juventud Se Hunda En El Alcohol Y Las 
Drogas [Huamanguino, don’t let the youth drown in alcohol and drugs] 
Vecino Únete A Nuestra Protesta [Neighbor, join our protest] 
Rounding out the call for moral leadership within the community, several prominent 
signs at the head of the march stated simply “nos faltan valores” or “nos faltan civismo” 
[sic], declaring categorically that what the community needs are values, courage, and 
civic-mindedness or public-spiritedness. 
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PHOTO 6.2 – March against nightlife and municipal authorities. (December 12, 2004.) 
These abstract nature of these demands over values and civic-mindedness are 
apparently quite a stark contrast with the concrete demands of law enforcement. What 
they demonstrate, however, is that the demands for “hacer cumplir” clearly function as 
convenient shorthand for a host of other characteristics of “authority” that are heavily 
weighted with the same set of moral evaluations and judgments that are wielded against 
the nightlife scene itself. As the demands for tangible and objective evidence of “doing 
their job” are nested within other statements about authority, the parameters of 
assessment and expectations of authority are expanded to include their personal moral 
character and, by extension, also their social character as a responsible community 
member and committed Huamanguino. In essence, the demands were for “moral 
leadership” by demonstrating commitment and responsibility to the community. 
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Principled Governance and Gobernabilidad 
“…THE PROVINCIAL MUNICIPALITY OF HUAMANGA, THROUGH ITS 
CORRESPONDING ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES, [DID] ABSOLUTELY 
NOTHING TO CLOSE [THE CLUB], AND thereby instill principio de 
autoridad before the residents [by] enforcing their legal resolutions.”4  
The strongest indication that the frequent demands of “hacer cumplir” involve 
evaluations of personal and social character can be seen through the concept of principled 
governance, or principio de autoridad. During my fieldwork, I observed how this 
particular concept took center stage in the critical evaluation of moral leadership. 
Contributing to the framework of crisis interpretation, principio de autoridad is 
consistently portrayed as having “been lost,” in need of being “strengthened,” 
“recuperated,” or “reinforced.”5  
It is especially because the complex idea of principio de autoridad does not have 
a clear translation in English that I turn now to an examination of its meaning, 
particularly for the crisis framing. As an operating concept in the evaluation of local 
governance in a time of crisis, there are several interrelated aspects of the meaning and 
significance of principio de autoridad. A basic gloss would highlight issues of legitimacy 
within institutions of authority, such that ordinances and mandates are respected and 
taken seriously. This form of authoritative legitimacy is threatened by the accusations of 
corruption within municipal institutions and also by the impression of indifference on the 
part of the maximum authority, the provincial mayor himself.6 The expectation for this 
form of “legitimacy,” an authority that is respected and taken seriously, offers an 
antithesis to the common refrain that night club owners were systematically “making a 
joke” of authorities. In a formal complaint filed with the State Attorney, the Asamblea 
                                               
4 Letter from resident of Jirón Asamblea to the provincial mayor, dated August 12, 2004 (capitalization in 
original, italics indicate Spanish phrase). 
5 Ejercicio, Retomar, Reforzar, Recuperar, Prevalecer, Establecer, Afirmar 
6 We can see an example of this in the following conclusion: “the citizenry observes the absence of mayor 
Ludeña Gonzales, which means that this administration’s officials are little by little losing the principio de 
autoridad” (La Calle, 11 november, 2005) 
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junta demands that the club owners be charged with “disobeying and resisting authority” 
for not fulfilling the legal demands of the emergency ordinance. They write: the club 
owners “make a joke of the municipal ordinances and disobey the municipal authority 
with the only desire being to generate chaos with respect to Citizen Security.”7  
Other commentators went so far as to suggest that the insufficient or inefficient 
services performed by the current municipal administration were an indication that not 
even the government officials take their authority seriously: 
¿Who is in charge in Ayacucho? It would appear that nobody [is], at least when 
it comes to seguridad ciudadana. Because the operatives to close the night clubs 
are useless when [the clubs] open the next day as if nothing had happened. Either 
principio de autoridad doesn’t exist or the very authorities don’t respect their 
own authority.8  
The idea of legitimacy and the ability to enforce one’s authority is intimately tied to 
concerns over ingobernabilidad. The municipal official in charge of coordinating the 
enforcement of municipal ordinances (coactivo), highlighted this connection in a 
conversation that we had about the flagrant disobedience of night club owners, the cat-
and-mouse game of closures, and the lack of inter-institutional coordination. She was 
understandably emotional, since just days before, while she was overseeing the forced 
closure of a night club (to which I was also a witness), her house was dynamited with her 
baby and father inside. Although her family was unharmed, parts of the house were 
seriously damaged. Shaken by the violent vengeance on the part of the night club owners, 
she was even more frustrated with the lack of institutional support from other responsible 
officials. Specifically, she criticized the district attorneys who point fingers at her to solve 
the problems alone through the punitive measures of fines and repeated forced closures. 
In her analysis, they pretend like they know exactly what she should be doing but they 
lack the will to work together with her to solve the problem. The escalating violence as 
                                               
7 The charge is for “Delito de desobedencia y resistencia a la autoridad.” They write: “Se burlan de las 
ordenanzas municipales y desafían a la autoridad municipal con el único afán de generar el caos” (filed 
November 8, 2004).  
8 Correo, October 29, 2005, page 5 (emphasis original) 
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club owners fight back against the repeated closures, which amounts to the government’s 
incapacity to maintain gobernabilidad, is causally linked to the lack of principio de 
autoridad: 
The District Attorney for Crime Prevention and the other District Attorneys were 
also missing. Why don’t they come show me what they think I should do for a 
“definitive” closure. The first time didn’t work, and it was peaceful. The second 
didn’t work and it was okay (mas o menos). The third, enough! Why don’t they 
come show me because I don’t see any solution here! What is left for me to do? 
To punch a hole through their wall, to destroy their roof? Not even that would 
work. The problem is much more complex and, quite frankly, our authorities have 
lost their authority. I tried to confront [the club owners] and look what happened. 
If the other [officials] don’t participate… [she trailed off and paused]. Maybe the 
grassroots organizations (organizaciones de base) can make them recover 
principio de autoridad. I can’t do it.9  
Beneath the simplistic reading of “legitimacy” lie many layered meanings and 
expectations of principio de autoridad which are directly related to the sensation of deep 
social crisis and ingobernabilidad. I quote at length from an editorial that explicitly links 
the loss of moral character to the loss of principio de autoridad, suggesting that the 
flagrant disregard for moral leadership in fact incites licentiousness and acts of civil 
disobedience on the part of the city’s population: 
Starting some time ago, the city has turned into chaos, where the strong [violent], 
the person who talks or criticizes is the one who prevails; in a Huamanga where 
the principio de autoridad is not respected, many things can happen. This 
principio is very distant for our provincial authorities. One observes, hears, and 
reads information daily some story of authorities involved in a problem: bribery, 
abuse of authority, misuse of funds or other acts that are unbecoming to someone 
of moral character. [Now] the city as a whole begins to voice their own opinions 
or actions within a democratic space, which doesn’t always qualify as freedom of 
expression but licentiousness. When principio de autoridad is lost, all form of 
calm conversation is broken, and the mobilizations begin, the strikes, and even the 
seizing of buildings. This whole scene conspires with popular unease with the 
authorities, with their inefficiency in seeking appropriate solutions to critical 
problems in their jurisdiction. In this way, the State of Law is simply talk, our 
authorities don’t have moral authority to impose the principio de autoridad that is 
                                               
9 Personal communication, April 28, 2005 
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so lacking in our department, because they themselves start to violate it.10 
In other words, by hindering effective communication and violating the community’s 
trust, this editorial suggests that the lack of principio de autoridad is itself a violation of 
democratic governance.  
For others, however, the link between principio de autoridad and governance 
includes connotations of a “firm hand” in government control, and in tracing the 
etymology of the phrase “principio de autoridad” some people direct their interpretation 
to the root of the words “authoritarian” and “authoritarianism.” Local evaluations of 
authority in Ayacucho’s municipal government are profoundly shaped by the historical 
experiences of social control under Fujimori’s authoritarian government, and emergency 
declarations were among the most common strategies. Although some municipal officials 
conclude that Fujimori’s approach to securing citizen security was more effective, it was 
the neighborhood organizers in the city center who were most likely to interpret the 2004 
emergency ordinance through the comparative lens of Fujimori’s government. Many of 
the residents who reminisced about the days of “clean” entertainment under Fujimori also 
recalled the strict curfews under Fujimori that kept tight reign on nightlife, and they 
supported a contemporary proposition that would legalize a permanent curfew for minors 
in the area where these night clubs are concentrated.  
In contrast to Fujimori’s supposed “firm hand” in social control, one 
neighborhood organizer skipped over the frequent criticism of a “weak hand” in the 
current government, and simply stated that “the hand is broken.” It is through such 
contrasts with an idealized and nostalgic image of social and political stability – 
gobernabilidad – under Fujimori that many Ayacuchanos interpret and evaluate 
contemporary officials and their abilities to govern and maintain social order. It is 
specifically through such comparisons with how Fujimori’s government handled the 
nightlife scene that many Ayacuchanos are evaluating the achievements of the local 
government and the effectiveness of the current democratic system of decentralized 
                                               
10 Correo, March 10, 2006, page 4, editorial (emphasis added) 
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governance more broadly. 
Principled Governance and Committed Authority 
If indeed principio de autoridad is a reflection on an ability to govern and 
maintain gobernabilidad, another equally important meaning revolves around the word 
principio itself, relating the concept fundamentally to essential components of authority 
or governance, to the principles and truths that guide one’s conduct, setting moral or 
ethnical standards for action and judgment. It is from this perspective that the phrase – 
which I am glossing as principled authority or to govern by principled action – provides 
the most insight into elemental questions about why so many people were not impressed 
by the bureaucratic declarations and formal ordinances (not even one declaring an 
emergency). It also begins to address related questions about what they were looking for 
in their evaluations of “authority.” In pragmatic terms, “hacer cumplir” is significant for 
the tangible or seemingly objective results that would be rendered in the lives of those 
most affected by the night clubs (i.e. stricter regulation). As an evaluation of authority, 
though, “hacer cumplir” is significant only to the extent that it represents consistency 
between words and action, signaling principled governance rather than corrupted or 
“figureti” [show-off] personal interests that seek a gain without work. Alternatively, it is 
only significant to the extent that it demonstrates a disposition to solve the city’s 
problems rather than exhibiting apathy or indifference (desinterés, indiferencia).  
These complexly intertwined measures of authority can be seen clearly in the first 
document filed with the municipality on behalf of the newly-formed neighborhood 
organization for Jirón Asamblea, on August 24, 2004, just a few days before the highly 
publicized murder of the high school student (and the emergency declaration): 
…the property owners [are] the ones directly responsible for all of this 
abuse against the neighborhood and the pueblo ayacuchano, since all of these 
businesses promote delinquency, prostitution, and drug addiction in our 
ayacuchano youth and children, as well as corruption in the authorities in charge 
of watching over [velar] Ayacucho’s safety.... 
Unfortunately this system and form of life is imposing itself in this city of 
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Ayacucho, where corruption and delinquency are taking control of the system, 
taking over through death threats, threats against public peace, threats against 
health and against education. With the proliferation of these types of businesses, 
[we] are carrying out a protest before the authorities, to whom the closure of these 
types of business corresponds; and we are met with the surprise that we don’t 
have support among our authorities. 
… these people [who] see our reality through different eyes are getting 
stronger, every day more so-called “discotecas” are proliferating and essentially 
all of these locales are run by a group of people creating a kind of mafia that is 
growing, that is gaining in power, that is controlling more authorities to allow for 
their continued functioning; [they] are [assuring] that in this city of Ayacucho 
gangsterism rules, where he who has money and ill-gotten business dominates 
and controls the system and life in this city and as a result of them there are more 
delinquent youth, more chaos in the control of gangs which I would say has 
grown excessively in this city of Ayacucho, more theft, more rapes, more 
prostitution, even murders. 
When the problem is not attacked with decisiveness and with all the 
powers that the law grants you [the provincial mayor] and the relevant authorities, 
we are faced with a system of un-governability [ingobernabilidad], where the law 
of the most powerful exists, but not order and [not] that which is established in the 
Peruvian Constitution. That is why [you the authorities] should make decisions on 
behalf of our pueblo, our youth, and our future. 
I also want to mention that this denunciation is not new, rather it is 
becoming a tradition for the authorities; those of us who suffer from everything 
mentioned here are now uniting ourselves to make our demands with more 
impact, which we will make known to the media. 
Although this document obliquely recognizes the challenges that local officials face when 
trying to confront the noncompliant club owners by referring to them as a “mafia” ruled 
by “gangsterism,” it ultimately depicts the city’s regulatory failures as the result of a 
system that is corrupted and broken.  
This document very clearly brings together several prominent themes in the 
interpretation of authority by contrasting “gangsterism” and the “mafioso” rule of the few 
with decisiveness and effective governance. Through this document, these residents make 
the case that the broken system cannot be blamed simply on “corruption and 
delinquency,” that the problems are not simply due to a few “bad apples” imbedded deep 
within the municipal hierarchy. Instead, they argue that the systemic “un-governability” 
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(ingobernabilidad) seen in the nightlife crisis is due to the indifference of the city’s 
principle authorities, those directly responsible for “attacking” the situation: their 
unresponsiveness to the demands of concerned citizens, lack of decisiveness, inability to 
apply their legal powers and to attack with conviction, and powerlessness in making 
decisions on behalf of the pueblo, the youth, and the city’s future.  
As seen in the previous chapters, many in the city center have internalized a 
semiotic correlation between criminality or deviance and a certain segment of the city’s 
population, all the while placing a good deal of the blame for the social crisis squarely 
upon the shoulders of the club owners who they see as “corrupting” the youth. 
Nonetheless, these same critics also imply that this situation is only made possible 
because of desinterés on the part of officials, a lack of commitment to guaranteeing 
responsible business practices in the city center. It is in this way that the “crisis talk” that 
frames the interpretations and evaluations of nightlife also frames the evaluations of 
“authority.” The expectations for principio de autoridad call attention to this parallel 
through the more abstract subtext of moral and ethical standards of judgment that guide a 
commitment to governance, to social order, to seguridad, to societal and cultural 
betterment and to the city’s future. Once “authority” is measured by moral and ethical 
standards, it is clear that the kinds of evaluations of the nightlife scene and the people 
who inhabit it parallel the kinds of evaluations made of “authority” in the abstract and 
also of specific officials. Moreover, these moral evaluations about responsibility 
(responsibility in cause and in solution) encompass judgments about personal character 
and social character as well as community membership and citizenship. As we will see in 
the subsequent chapter as well, this kind of evaluation and judgment of responsibility in 
personal character and community membership also plays out in the demands made upon 
neighborhood organizations and civil society to also demonstrate their own commitment 
to the city’s future, further expanding the significance of “principio de autoridad” beyond 
institutional authority. 
Returning to the symbolic imagery of the donkey or the pig, however, it is clear 
that although the authorities are evaluated in part according to the decisions they make on 
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behalf of the pueblo, they are not necessarily assumed to know what’s best for the pueblo. 
Instead, they are expected to listen to the pueblo and enact the principles of participatory 
democracy. This lack of commitment in attending to the concerns of the citizens is first 
and foremost treated as a reflection of how well these authorities are carrying out their 
duties and accepting their responsibilities. More importantly, however, this kind of 
commitment is treated as a reflection of moral character as an authority and ultimately 
moral character as an Ayacuchano. As authority is evaluated according to 
demonstrations of “commitment,” it is also evaluated according to a schema of morality 
and values. In this respect, I argue that the moral evaluations underlying the criticisms of 
the nightlife scene (and of the people thought have caused the nightlife crisis) parallel the 
moral evaluations of authority and of the people thought to be responsible for solving the 
nightlife crisis. Through this concluding statement, arguing that expectations of authority 
revolve around a decisive commitment to fighting on behalf of the city as a whole, we see 
the ideas of indiferencia or desinterés as intimately linked within expectations of 
commitment to the critical concept of velar por el pueblo, or watch over the communal 
interests of “the people.” 
Demonstrating Commitment:  
Appeals to Unity 
After the renewed emergency period also ended with no results (now some six 
months after the initial declaration), levels of frustration were high even within the 
municipality, in the very midst of the emergency, and in spite of the municipality’s 
attempted assertion of authority. It was clear that the municipality could not force 
compliance nor achieve authority and legitimacy in the eyes of the community by passing 
official ordinances alone. Those officials most directly involved in coordinating and 
strategizing the municipal approach to the nightlife problematic were the target of the 
most piercing criticism from the junta vecinal women. Their public statements were 
regularly featured on local radio and television and they frequently appeared on live news 
programs. Their campaign for municipal and official responsibility – demanding that 
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officials commit themselves and take risks in securing citizen security – gained 
momentum and attention. As these same authorities met the demands of the 
neighborhood organizations and suffered personal attacks for their efforts, they also 
began calling upon the neighborhood organizers to cease their constant criticism and to 
use the very same “citizen vigilance” to report to the community that at least certain 
municipal officials were taking responsibility.  
The day after the municipal official Sammy Betalleluz’s house was dynamited, 
three women from the Jirón Asamblea junta vecinal visited Alexi Avilez, then-director of 
seguridad ciudadana, in his modest office several blocks up the hill from the main plaza 
and the main municipal center. With the gravity and shock of the situation, the dynamic 
was different from most encounters between the junta women and municipal authorities. 
The women were more sympathetic than usual and Mr. Avilez was agitated, especially as 
he recounted the “hundreds” of threatening phone calls he had received the day before, 
the last one just 10 minutes before the dynamiting. He read out loud the statements in 
newspapers in which club owners accused him and his colleagues of abuse of authority. 
On the other side he recited tabloid press attacks on the personal lives of some officials, 
and accusations that they were complicit with the club owners. During his time in charge 
of seguridad ciudadana, Mr. Avilez was undeniably the municipality’s public face in the 
nightlife controversy and as a result he received a disproportionate share of criticism, 
accusations, rumors and slander, not to mention countless threats and at least one attack 
against his family’s restaurant business.  
Stating simply that the municipality needed the support of the juntas vecinales 
right now, Mr. Avilez practically begged the junta women to come out with a public 
statement (comunicado) categorically rejecting the threats and attacks and firmly 
supporting the work that the municipality was doing: the comunicado can not come from 
the municipality, he stressed, it must come from the pueblo, and it must come out 
immediately (March 9, 2005). The junta women responded accordingly, despite what they 
considered to be few tangible (or satisfactory) advances in the politics of forced closures. 
The marked shift in their public relationship is exceptionally clear when this statement is 
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compared with one released just a few months prior: 
December 2004: The Federation of Juntas Vecinales of Ayacucho addresses the 
Ayacuchano community at large to denounce the authorities of the Provincial 
Municipality of Huamnaga, the Ministerio Publico, the Poder Judicial, National 
Police, Prefecture, and Regional Government, for their inability to definitively 
close the night clubs, cantinas, peñas, and other clandestine corrupting places…. 
 
Parents, don’t allow them to corrupt your children and attend in mass the great 




March 2005: The Federation of Juntas Vecinales of Ayacucho supports and 
applauds the work that the PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON SEGURIDAD 
CIUDADANA is carrying out in the definitive closures of the ill-named night 
clubs, which function clandestinely and outside of the law and municipal 
mandates….  
 
We support the recovery of principle of authority of the Mayor, who, in defense 
of the moral values, personal integrity, and the Ayacuchano community, works 
enthusiastically against the illegal owners of the ill-named night clubs….  
 
We support the workers of the PROVINCIAL MUNICIPALITY OF 
HUAMANGA who, in their work to reestablish order and security for the 
Ayacuchano population, suffer threats, terrorist attacks, and even homicide 
attempts as is the case with the Director of Cobranza Coactiva Doctor Samy [sic] 
Betalleluz, with whom we are united and we recognize her professional 
qualities….12 
The junta president paid out of her own pocket for this statement to be read – in its 
entirety – on all of the local news programs, three times a day for two days. This public 
shift marks a moment of solidarity and reciprocity (albeit relatively short-lived) in the 
continual negotiation of making demands and expecting returns, of doing one’s part to 
advance the community’s development (deberes) and exercising one’s rights (derechos). 
This public shift in solidarity also set the stage for the municipality’s next public 
display of unity. The day after the junta women met with Alexi Avilez, he and Sammy 
                                               
11 Announcement for the Junta Vecinal march against discotecas, held on December 2, 2004. 
12 Public statement, written by the president of the Junta Vecinal de Jirón Asamblea, released March 10, 
2005. 
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Betalleluz went personally to the house of the president of the Jirón Asamblea Junta 
Vecinal to request participation from the city center organizations in a protest march they 
were organizing for the following Monday, less than a week after the dynamiting.13 
Unlike the December march in favor of forced closures, which was decidedly against 
municipal officials, this one was in support of the municipality’s efforts and, more 
importantly, individual officials.  
Unable to suppress the accusations that the government did not prioritize the 
community’s concerns over nightlife, the officials in charge of the new seguridad 
ciudadana apparatus changed course and adopted the protest idiom of the neighborhood 
organizations; in an ironic turn of events they organized their own protest march against 
the clubs.  
On March 14, 2005, thousands of women marched again through the city’s streets 
with a protest against the city’s nightlife. By superficial appearances, the protest march 
closely resembled the one held three months before. Base committees of Vaso de Leche 
(the state-run assistance program “Glass of Milk”) gathered in plazas and markets 
surrounding the city center, unfolded their banners, and by the dozens walked to meet 
other base committee groups, growing into the hundreds and drawing increasing attention 
as they approached the city center. Meanwhile, key members of city center juntas 
vecinales were also gathering, unfolding their banners, and waiting at the María Parado 
de Bellido plaza just a few blocks from the main plaza. Once assembled, the groups 
proceeded slowly – and loudly – towards the provincial municipality on the main plaza. 
Some of the chants and handmade signs also seemed familiar:  
“Fuera disctecas / del centro de Ayacucho!” [Discotecas out / of the center of 
Ayacuho!] 
“Dueños de discoteca / fuera de ayacucho!”[Owners of discotecas / out of 
Ayacucho!] 
 
Cárcel a proxenetas y dueños de discotecas ilegales [Prison for pimps and illegal 
club owners] 
Cierre de discotecas ilegales [Close the illegal night clubs] 
                                               
13 Personal communication, March 12, 2005 
 198 
Abajo las discotecas clandestinas [Down with the clandestine night clubs] 
Alto a delincuentes y pandillaje [Stop the delinquents and gang activity] 
Queremos una ciudad de paz [We want a city in peace] 
Ayacucho, ciudad tranquila, acogedora para los turistas [Ayacucho, peaceful city, 
welcoming for tourists] 
Upon closer inspection, however, it was quickly apparent to all who were witness that 
this was no ordinary protest march. As the Vaso de Leche and Junta Vecinal women 
arrived at the main plaza, they were joined at the first corner by a group of women, all of 
whom were identically dressed in the fully stylized huamanguina dress (the uniform of 
“traditional” food vendors), and carryings signs that read “Semana Santa, week of hope 
and faith.” They were then joined by a group of youth in school uniforms, carrying signs 
with quotes from the bible, kids admonishing other kids to behave properly because God 
is watching. At the end of the parade was another new addition, a group of men 
representing a Comité de Autodefensa, the rural organizations started under Fujimori’s 
administration to fight against the Shining Path. 
Another noticeable feature was the divergence from the established route through 
town, which targeted all of the state offices, from the Regional Government offices to the 
State Attorney’s office, then down to the Prefecture and the Provincial Municipality, and 
ending with the National Institute of Culture (which oversees the protected colonial 
buildings of the historic center). Instead, this route was much shorter but much more 
daring: it directly targeted the most well-known clubs, hung incriminating signs on their 
doors, and changed on the street outside. With veiled threats of what would happen if 
clubs continued to resist closure, the shouts of “they’ve been warned!” were met with 
cheers and clapping from the crowd. Women threw rocks at the doors and windows, fists 
raised high in victory. They were undoubtedly emboldened by another obvious 
difference: in this protest march, the women were protected by police support. 
This protest march was clearly modeled on the neighborhood-organized march, 
indistinguishable in form from the ubiquitous rallies and demonstrations of dissatisfaction 
with municipal governance. Nonetheless, it had significant features indicating that a 
different set of alliances were at work. Instead of protesting the inability of government 
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officials to regulate the nightlife industry, this march revolved around a direct challenge 
to the increasingly belligerent club-owners themselves. This protest march is part of a 
halted stream of events and ordinances that illustrate exactly how officials in the 
municipality attempted to respond directly to popular expectations of that officials 
demonstrate their commitment (compromiso). 
Another feature that marks this march as noteworthy was the central act of 
organizing a “protest march” as a display or demonstration of unity between the 
municipality and “the pueblo.” This image of unity, in which municipal officials are 
joined with a united pueblo behind a shared cause (which may well have been solidarity 
against violent threats more than shared priorities), also involved recruiting the 
participation of a diverse swath of organized civil society, from the Vaso de Leche base 
organizations, to Juntas Vecinales in the city center as well as the peripheral areas, to 
those Comités de Autodefensa that were actively seeking to reassert their centrality in the 
fight against violence and citizen insecurity. 
As the marchers wound their way around the main plaza, they passed under a 
banner in the city’s official blue, which hung from the municipality. Simple and 
unadorned, it announced: Citizen Security, Everybody’s Task (Seguridad Ciudadana, 
Tarea de Todos). This alone would not have sufficed for making an appeal to unity, since 
even the club owners had, by this point, taken up the “tarea de todos” refrain to argue 
that they were not the sole culprits and that citizen security was a complex problem in 
which “everybody” had a role.  
The shift in solidarity was perhaps most symbolically marked in the hand-held 
placards. The common accusations against government officials as corrupt or inept were 
replaced with alternative messages: 
Alcalde, Cierra discotecas con el apoyo de madres de la Zona 3 [Mayor, close 
night clubs with the support of Mothers from Zone 3] 
El pueblo y las autoridades juntos por una ciudad segura [The pueblo and the 
authorities united for a safe city] 
Una ciudad tranquila, compromiso de todos [A peaceful city, everybody’s 
responsibility] 
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Even more interesting as an illustration of atypical allegiance between officials and the 
junta women was the modification featured in the march’s principle chant. Evoking the 
traditions of radical social protest movements across Latin America, the chant was a play 
on the legendary song “el pueblo, unido, jamás será vencido,” the pueblo, united, will 
never be defeated.14 Instead, it was modified to “the pueblo, united, demands closure” 
(el pueblo, unido, demanda el cierre). 
This march was organized by municipal officials. As a municipal display it was a 
far cry from the typical setup of a stage in the plaza and a symbolic march around the 
plaza (such as the March for Peace examined in Chapter 5. The appropriation and 
adaptation of the protest idiom – from the physicality of a mass march to the recognizable 
chants of social protest – was itself designed to suggest mass popular support for 
municipal authority in regulating nightlife. By stepping into the terrain of popular protest 
– physically and metaphorically – the municipal organizers intended this event to 
publically mark shifting allegiances as critics became accomplices in the shared goal of 
securing citizen security through controlling and regulating nightlife. 
 
                                               
14 “El Pueblo, Unido, Jamás Será Vencido” has its roots in Chilean Protest Song, dating to the years of 
Unidad Popular and Salvador Allende’s government. It reached international fame through the famous 
Nueva Canción musical group Inti-Illimani. As a stand-alone phrase or protest chant, it is ubiquitous in 
Ayacucho’s protest marches. Although I would venture to guess that most in Ayacucho are unfamiliar with 
the details of its history, I am confident that it would unanimously be attributed to leftist political 
movements in Latin America. 
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PHOTO 6.3 – Municipality-organized protest march against nightlife. They are marching in front 
of the Provincial Municipality, under a government banter that reads: “Citizen sEcurity, 
Everybody’s Task.” (March 14, 2005) 
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PHOTO 6.4 – Head of Citizen Security talking during the municipality-organized march. (March 
14, 2005) 
Demonstrating Commitment:  
Authority and Regulatory Processes 
The municipality-organized protest march had little effect: the government 
officials were uncomfortable, the city center residents were largely unimpressed, and club 
owners paid no attention at all. The municipality needed to gain the trust and confidence 
of the population by conveying a strong message of intolerance for illegal and dangerous 
business activities, but they needed alternative strategies that would not bring the same 
criticisms as the emergency declaration did. Returning to the realm most familiar to 
municipal governance, displays of compromiso and authority can also be seen in two 
official municipal ordinances declared one and two years after the 2004 emergency 
declaration (Ordenanza 054).  
In October of 2005, one year after Ordenanza 054, the municipality issued another 
citizen security ordinance as an attempt to use official legislation as a display of authority 
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and commitment. Learning the hard way that the emergency rhetoric of the first 
ordinance had potentially damaging consequences for Ayacucho, and that its message 
was fundamentally antithetical to the image of peace and social stability that the 
government was trying to maintain and promote, they reconsidered the emergency 
framework and revised the ordinance. The 2005 ordinance mandated the same curfews 
and closures as did Ordenanza 054, but with different terminology: this time they 
declared an official “situation of urgency” (Acuerdo de Consejo 274-2005 MPH/CM, 28 
octubre, 2005). When I asked the deputy provincial mayor (and one of the document’s 
authors), why they changed the language, he responded that one reason was to 
differentiate the local ordinances from the nationally declared emergencies due to 
“narcoterrorism” in the jungle. In addition, he noted, they changed the ordinance “to 
lighten the word choice, or at any rate the term is softer.”15 By changing the formal 
terminology, although not the actual content of the ordinance, the officials were 
rhetorically – and intentionally – skirting the problematic “emergency” rhetoric all-
together. A subsequent municipal council decision regarding budgetary allocations for 
the logistics of seguridad ciudadana also specifically mentions that one goal is to 
guarantee “the presence of the Municipal Authority in the real realm of seguridad 
ciudadana” (Acuerdo de Concejo 0291-2005-MPH/CM). 
Towards the end of October of 2006 Mayor Ludeña had just months left with his 
administration. In the two years since passing the 2004 emergency declaration, their 
struggle to regulate the nightlife scene was still ongoing, and the major changes were 
largely superficial. The first two blocks of Jirón Asamblea near the main plaza had been 
converted into a pedestrian walkway. The two most established and most “reputable” 
clubs were no longer there (one had closed voluntarily and another had moved a few 
blocks further away from the controversial area surrounding the main plaza). Some of the 
other club owners had also relocated their businesses just several blocks away, in less-
regulated city zones and just barely out of the reach of the most vocal juntas vecinales. In 
                                               
15 Gotardo Miranda Gutiérrez, letter to author, February 14, 2006 
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response, some new juntas vecinales were forming in those neighborhoods, just now 
beginning to mobilize in ways that older juntas had been begging from them for years. 
Municipal campaigning was underway and candidates drew heavily upon the promises of 
innovative official approaches to citizen security in general and the nightlife problematic 
in particular.  
In this context, Ordenanza 034-2006 is particularly interesting. Where the 2004 
emergency declaration included absolutely no reference to local details and relied solely 
on abstract notions of social peace and standardized (though selective) statements of 
municipal jurisdiction, the ordinance passed by the outgoing administration was chock 
full of local details about the ills of the nightlife scene and club industry and included 
direct responses to club owners, refuting their accusations that forced closures are illegal 
and impinge on legal business initiatives. Even more noteworthy, however, is the 
underlying oblique self-reflection on the administration’s effectiveness at implementing 
and enforcing its own resolutions and ordinances: 
Sanctioning procedures against the aforementioned offending commercial 
businesses is regulated in the Ordenanza Municipal 006-2005-MPH/A … 
nevertheless in order to impose the principio de autoridad to aid the residents [of 
the city center], and mandate immediate and effective measures in defense of the 
Ayacuchano population, attending to the duties of the society and of the State 
which is to guarantee the complete enforcement of human rights, as an expression 
of the supremacy of the human being, aim and purpose of every democratic 
system, the establishment of a new procedure is appropriate, for the immediate, 
effective and efficient intervention with the application of the most drastic 
administrative sanction upon the facilities that do not fulfill the conditions 
mandated by the legal norms in force (emphasis added).16 
This statement about a need to “impose the principio de autoridad” is a profound 
inclusion for a municipal ordinance, and the tone marks a drastic differentiation from past 
reliance on national laws and legalese, as displayed in Ordenanza 054. I suggest that it 
also marks an expanded perspective on the role that municipal ordinances play as 
displays of authority, altered by the demands and expectations of a different kind of 
                                               
16 Ordenanza Municipal 034-2006-MPH/A, October 2006 
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authority, namely one that is guided by amor por el pueblo, that treats the duty to defend, 
aid and velar por el pueblo as the ultimate goal of democratic governance, and that 
demonstrates principio de autoridiad and compromiso. 
Defining Crisis & Allocating Responsibility 
The essence or meaning of authority and political responsibility is clearly at stake 
in the disagreements over what constitutes the nightlife problematic. Although the 
obsession with the nightlife crisis that some officials shared with the juntas vecinales in 
the city center is remarkable (consider the municipality’s protest march), the 
confrontational relationship between them stems in large part from a struggle over agency 
in ownership of the “problem” (in Gusfield’s words), or the ability to define the problem. 
This approach necessitates a close look at the salient instruments of meaning, in this case 
the weight of “experience” and the persuasiveness of numbers and statistics to create a 
compelling argument for “knowing” how and why “nightlife” constitutes a public 
problem, a crisis, an emergency. This involves building a framework of knowledge by 
establishing a set of “social facts” for the interpretation of nightlife as a crisis. The power 
to define the reality of the nightlife scene in Ayacucho is also intimately linked to the 
power to explain causal responsibility for the “crisis” and to demand political 
responsibility for its solution. In other words, although these three social roles – 
ownership, causal responsibility, and political responsibility – are rarely one and the 
same, they are interrelated in significant and patterned ways. 
Disagreements over rhetoric categorizing Ayacucho’s nightlife as a “crisis” or an 
“emergency” take on added significance when viewed through the prism of “public 
problems”: the issue of “ownership” would not be significant if the opposing frameworks 
of knowledge did not also draw alternative connections between causation and political 
obligation. Part of the question of “authority” lies in a disagreement over who is more 
“qualified” to identify the problem, organize the facts and draw the most relevant and 
accurate connections for making causal attribution. In construing the problem of night 
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clubs through the rhetoric of crisis, neighborhood organizations are emphasizing that 
causal responsibility lies not only with the discotequeros but also with government 
institutions for being complacent and showing desinterés. This thread of causation directs 
junta vecinal critics to lay political responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the same 
governmental institutions for the task of remedying the broken system and wrestling back 
social and political control.  
The persuasiveness of the junta vecinal case for understanding the nightlife reality 
draws its strength from the power of experience. It was not uncommon, for instance, for 
residents of the city center to publically challenge those in charge to “spend a night” in 
their homes and experience firsthand what it is like for them to live in close proximity to 
the clubs, to feel their fear of arriving or leaving their homes after dark because of the 
“chaos” in the streets surrounding their homes. On one of the many occasions that 
members of the Asamblea neighborhood organization paid an unannounced visit to Alex 
Avilez’s office of seguridad ciudadana to share their well-polished dramatic accounts of 
the horrors they witness outside their homes, he responded, as if to suggest that they were 
exaggerating, that they should bring in videotape evidence of these horrors. To add extra 
punch, he offered to find them a video camera if they would stay up all night to record 
from their windows. They did eventually create such a videotape (with their own 
equipment), but instead of providing it to the municipal officials, they sent it to César 
Hildebrandt, the provocative and controversial host of the political talkshow based in 
Lima, La Boca del Lobo. Hildebrandt eventually took up the junta vecinal’s cause in a 
nationally-broadcast show, and in that moment the junta’s homemade nighttime video 
was transformed into ammunition in their case for ownership of the definition of 
Ayacucho’s nightlife scene as a social and public crisis. This is but one illustrative 
instance of the influence wielded by the city center juntas vecinales that occupy a 
historically powerful social position, particularly when it comes to defining the meaning 
of reality in the city’s center. Although one of the members of the junta vecinal went to 
court to defend herself against charges from one of the club owners of defamation for her 
statements on the Hildebrandt show, the crux of the program was about the government 
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corruption which allowed for the situation to develop into a public crisis.17 
At the crux of the disagreements over the limits of government responsibility is 
therefore a concurrent disagreement over the cause of security problems. Whereas the 
juntas vecinales locate municipal officials at the heart of the relationship between causal 
and political responsibility, charging them with the ultimate obligation to remedy the 
crisis and govern security, the calculus of the municipal officials reaches a somewhat 
different conclusion. Their rhetoric depends upon a presumed natural link between a 
causal responsibility of a torn social fabric [tejido social] and political responsibility as 
therefore belonging to the community as a whole. Compromiso and principio de 
autoridad predominate in the expectations that the juntas vecinales have outlined for 
authority, both vital components in their depiction of causal and political responsibility in 
the nightlife crisis.  
Along with the development of the Citizen Security apparatus, the perception of 
the peculiar relationship between “security” and “democracy” was also evolving. As 
Whitehead observed in his extended discussion of democratization, there is an “essential 
but elusive distinction between public insecurity perceived as a problem for the 
government and a state of insecurity judged by the public to be the problem of 
government” (Whitehead 2002a:173; c.f. Estévez 2001). This (semi-)elusive distinction is 
an essential component of disagreements over the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
Citizen Security programs. In this chapter we have seen how critics argued that the 
government’s inefficiencies and layers of corruption were part and parcel of the city’s 
insecurity. The government presents the problem as one for the government and the 
citizenry to solve together. As such, this distinction is essential – and not always elusive – 
to the local evaluations of the current model of democratic governance.  
As we will see in the subsequent chapter, the measures of authority discussed in 
this chapter – compromiso and a willingness to take risks for the pueblo – were also 
adopted by municipal authorities within their conception of citizen participation, used to 
                                               
17 The judge dismissed the case arguing that giving one’s opinion in an interview for a third party news 
program was not the same as publishing a defamatory account on one’s own. 
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measure junta vecinal members’ own sense of responsibility and commitment in solving 
the city’s safety issues. Government responses evolved from requesting public voicing of 
support to demanding active participation and risk. 
When looked at from this perspective, the national slogans evoking seguridad 
ciudadana as tarea de todos have a particular ideological derivation in Ayacucho that is 
consistent with local definitions of “the reality,” or the “crisis” in the city’s nightlife 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, in the next chapter it will become clear that the implied 
impartiality or universalism of the “everybody’s task” (tarea de todos) slogans masks 
deeply ingrained social differentiation within the allocations of political responsibility 
that are ascribed to different social sectors. The existing social judgments and prejudices 
that equate particular “deviant” behaviors with the city’s peripheral communities have a 
substantial bearing on the interpretations of “the reality” behind the nightlife problem, 
and the corresponding alignment between causal responsibility and political obligation. 
The cognitive and symbolic processes operating in the conception the nightlife 
“emergency” work to reinscribe and reinforce existing social distinctions through 
differential expectations and demands of “participation” in solving the city’s “crisis” and 




Governing Security through Participation 
On the morning of a planned police intervention (operativo) to close illegal 
nightclubs in the city center, I arrived early at the provincial municipality. Access inside 
was tightly restricted that morning, but the security guard recognized me, cracked open 
the large wooden doors, and quietly pushed me through. Tension was clearly very high 
inside; some municipal employees and hired workers were reciting the Our Father in 
anticipation of more violent confrontations with the club owners. Sammy Betalleluz, the 
authority in charge of overseeing and coordinating the closure (Gerente de Ejecución 
Coactiva), was nervous, frightened, and immensely frustrated that members of the 
neighborhood juntas from the city center were not participating as they had done for past 
interventions. On this morning, the president of the Jirón Asamblea neighborhood 
organization had decided that even being present was too much of a risk for them. 
Instead, she informed municipal authorities through a third party that I would be going on 
their behalf. (This was, I might add, as surprising and confounding to me as it was to the 
authorities in charge.1) When Ms. Betalleluz saw me enter the municipal compound that 
morning, she approached me and barked out: 
You have to help me, you have to tell the women in the junta to support me 
(apoyar)! I cannot do this alone. If they don’t want to, and if they tell me “it’s not 
my responsibility,” well, I won’t do it either. I am not going to risk my life for 
                                               
1 This kind of event elucidates the difficulty I had in maintaining “neutrality” within this starkly divided 
community, and explains why club owners were at best reluctant to talk to me, many simply refusing. 
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them if they won’t back me up and if they are not going to commit themselves to 
this! They at least have to go out on the streets when we have a closure….2 
The risk that she perceived was indeed well-founded: later that day, while we were all at 
the operation together, her house was dynamited (as mentioned in the previous chapter). 
The assertion that she “cannot do this alone” suggested that she needed and wanted 
support from the community as she undertook the emergency measures they had so 
forcefully demanded. It also suggested that she believed her work would not be as 
successful without their participation.  
At the same time, it is clear in this exchange that core relationships between city 
center neighborhood organizations and municipal officials were strained by conflicting 
expectations about the distribution of responsibilities in citizen security strategies. In the 
previous chapter, we saw how authorities were under increasing pressure from residents 
of the city center to perform their authority – not only to enforce their laws but also to 
demonstrate a personal commitment (compromiso) to the city’s future. From the 
perspective of this official, the risks of her work, as well as the boundaries of her 
responsibilities, needed to be evaluated not only according to her official functions 
(whether standard actions or measures taken during an emergency) but also as an 
individual citizen. In demanding that other interested parties from civil society take 
similar personal risks, she was challenging neighborhood organizations to demonstrate 
their own personal commitment to the city by actively and visibly participating (and 
taking risks) in municipal strategies of citizen security.  
Finally, in addition to notions of risk and commitment, the official’s assessment 
of resident participation reveals a philosophy of democratic responsibility, that those 
people defining the nightlife “emergency” have a responsibility to also participate in 
resolving the crisis. This philosophy of participation and shared responsibility was a 
central tenet of the moral, temporal, and spatial governing strategies that took shape from 
the nightlife problematic. The demands that residents participate in municipal citizen 
                                               
2 Author communication, March 8, 2005, emphasis added 
 211 
security programs points directly to an emerging model of what I am calling 
participatory security: a broad political strategy for governing urban security through the 
mechanisms of democratic participation. 
This chapter focuses on how the seguridad ciudadana doctrine (as a set of political 
beliefs, priorities, and laws) was formalized and institutionalized as a government system 
(as a set of concrete political imperatives and structured relationships), intentionally 
imagined and designed to promote the new national model of participatory democracy. 
Throughout the dissertation we have seen how the doctrine of citizen security, circulating 
within an interdiscursive political sphere, was adopted as a powerful resource in the 
formulation of the nightlife problematic. To be sure, many specific concerns that are now 
articulated through the discourse of “seguridad ciudadana” existed prior to the 
formalization in 2003 of the National Citizen Security System and its instatement in 
Ayacucho in the beginning of 2004. But these specific security concerns were not 
necessarily articulated through a generalized rhetoric of security. Perhaps more important 
still, these efforts were not structured through a consistent political philosophy of 
democratic participatory governance. The goal of this and the next chapter is to 
demonstrate that citizen security paradigms are more than a doctrine; they are also part of 
political and institutional systems. As such “citizen security” does not merely prioritize 
political agendas through a shared ideological framework; it also organizes complex 
relationships and directs concrete strategies for governing security. 
Participatory Security 
As documented elsewhere in Latin America (Dammert 2005, Dammert 2006, 
Estévez 2001, Frühling 2007, Hoecker 2000), the development of Peru’s National Citizen 
Security System was accompanied by significant institutional developments, most 
notably: newly defined roles for police and other security forces (such as municipal 
police teams, known as serenazgo), new institutional configurations (such as the 
formation of a Municipal Office of Citizen Security, the Subgerencia de Seguridad 
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Ciudadana), and the implementation of official security plans and programs (which in 
turn channeled the allocation of resources and mobilized different political actors). 
Peru’s model of citizen security was inseparable from the simultaneous 
formulation of its model of democratic citizen participation (participación ciudadana): 
the soul of the citizen security paradigm involved not just a shift to emphasize individual 
securities but, more importantly, an ideology of collective responsibility and 
organization.3 In order to highlight the deep ideological, philosophical, and legislative 
connections that were forged between the nascent Citizen Security System and the 
popular ideals of democratic participation, I am referring to this model of governing 
urban security participatory security. The new participatory security paradigm champions 
a model of participatory democracy that frames the tasks of governance, and specifically 
of governing security, as shared responsibilities between government institutions and 
local citizens. Indeed, the team who originally designed the country’s Citizen Security 
plan held as a “guiding principle” that “without the participation of the citizenry, 
insecurity cannot be confronted” (Costa and Basombrío Iglesias 2004:68).4 Today in 
Ayacucho, the rhetoric implicating the entire community in citizen security is spread 
through abundant government campaigns, such as the slogan of the National Citizen 
Security System: “Citizen Safety, Everybody’s Task” (Seguridad Ciudadana, Tarea de 
Todos). This incorporation of “participation” is visible throughout the laws establishing 
Citizen Security as an institutional system. For example, according to the national citizen 
security law, the mandate of the provincial citizen security committees is to “promote the 
organization of neighborhood juntas vecinales in their jurisdiction.” Locally we see 
participation framed even more directly as a tool of governing security. The “strategic 
                                               
3 “Participation” translates in Spanish as participar (verb) and participación (noun). But the concept is just 
as frequently communicated as “collaboration,” “support,” or “help” through the Spanish words colaborar 
(verb), apoyar (verb), and apoyo (noun). As in the incident described above, one example would be: díles 
que me apoyen! (tell them to support me, to help me in this effort). Other common examples which we will 
see are: queremos que nos apoyen (meaning we want for them to help us or to participate in what we are 
doing) or no colaboran (they don’t help us and support us). 
4 The National System of Citizen Security was designed by the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del 
Interior). Since the main responsibility of this ministry is overseeing the Peruvian National Police, the 
closest parallel in the United States would likely be the Justice Department.  
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plan” written by the provincial citizen security committee states that: its objective is to 
“consolidate security and tranquility” and to “recover the youth and spread values”; its 
vision is “a changed city, where the people’s behavior is constructive”; and its mission is 
to “reduce common crime and hazards with the participation of civil society.”5  
As a model for governance, the participatory security apparatus (including new 
urban security institutions and programs) was, in many instances, layered upon new and 
existing programs and institutions of citizen participation (particularly the offices of 
Citizen Participation and Neighborhood Participation). These alliances are crucial to the 
impact that the new citizen security paradigm had on the government’s efforts to 
(re)define notions of urban citizenship as dependent upon collective efforts to promote 
and maintain security, now identified squarely within the realm of the “public good.” 
Legislating Participation, Limiting Organization 
The language of “participation” is not new to Peru; it was converted into everyday 
currency through a complex trajectory of governmental aid policies designed by highly 
centralized governments. A key moment along this path was the “participatory 
revolution” (revolución participativo) designed by president Juan Velasco (1968-1975), 
complete with slogans such as “A Society in Full Participation” (Una Sociedad en Plena 
Participación) and a national agency charged with promoting participation in government 
policies (SINAMOS, Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social) (c.f. Franco 
1975). Despite the wealth of information on organization and mobilization in Lima in 
recent decades, it would be inaccurate and irresponsible to abstractly apply those forms to 
Ayacucho. Although there is very little literature on what was happening in Ayacucho at 
that time, it is clear that a certain politically mobilized population in Huamanga [the city] 
considered the “revolution” of Velasco anything but revolutionary; instead, activists such 
as the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho (FDPA, Front in Defense of the People 
of Ayacucho) considered it “genuine representation of the right wing that resorts 
                                               
5 Comité Provincial de Seguridad Ciudadana de Huamanga 2004a 
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‘nationalist’ and ‘anti-imperialist’ demagogy in order to numb the social unrest and favor 
the oligarchy” (Federación de Barrios de Ayacucho 2004:9).  
This perspective of governmental attempts to streamline popular participation 
fueled social mobilization in the region, and during the 1960s and 1970s, Ayacucho was 
among a select number of pioneering regions in the country when it came to 
neighborhood organization and mobilization (Tovar 1982:18). Several of these popular 
organizations, all with deep political roots in the Peruvian left, have played a critical role 
in city politics, most notably the University’s student organization (FUSCH), the 
Federation of Neighborhoods of Ayacucho (FAB), and the Front in Defense of the People 
of Ayacucho (FDPA).6 Top on the agenda for all of these organizations has been to keep 
a watchful eye over government institutions and make demands to the State on behalf of 
the people: “the objective of Frente de Defensa [FDPA] is to demand more attention for 
the needs of the population and more supervision of the public expenses of State 
institutions. It is necessary for the Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho to make 
citizen rights be respected” (La Calle, June 30, 1999). As would be expected of such 
politicized organizations, these groups also have their vocal critics, some of whom 
continue to reference their origins in “Maoist” ideologies formed in the University of 
Huamanga in parallel to those of Abimael Guzmán and the Sendero Luminoso (see 
Rebelión, October 13, 2004, for a lengthy example). Others, principally the prominent 
members of Huamanga’s political and social elite, question the FDPA’s true “defense” of 
the “pueblo” Ayacuchano, arguing that their politicized interests hurt (or even “attack”) 
the communal interests of the city.  
The intensity surrounding the often contentious consolidation and official 
formation of peripheral neighborhoods (many of which were originally land grabs) was 
                                               
6 The University’s student organization (Federación Universitaria de San Cristóbal de 
Huamanga,FUSCH) formed in 1961, the Federation of Neighborhoods of Ayacucho (Federación de 
Barrios de Ayacucho, FAB) formed in 1964, and the Front in Defense of the People of Ayacucho (Frente 
de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho, FDPA) formed in 1966 (Federación de Barrios de Ayacucho 2004:1). 
The connection between these organizations is historically very strong, with “progressive intellectuals” 
primary actors in all of them (Degregori 1990:120-121). All of these organizations have suffered (and still 
suffer) countless internal struggles and divisions, played out in public scandals and controversies. 
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driven by the mass mobilization of residents placing demands upon municipal budgets 
and infrastructures.7 As in other areas of Peru, organizations such as the Federation of 
Neighborhoods (Federación de Barrios), were only one branch of popular mobilization 
in Ayacucho. While it has been suggested that, as intellectuals (who were not all that 
socio-culturally distanced from Huamanga’s center of power), they never did represent 
“the masses” very well, it is certainly the case that as the struggle with Shining Path 
intensified and the city swelled with migrants fleeing violence in the countryside, they 
were not afforded the opportunity to respond to the new demands: virtually every such 
organization was completely disactivated. In the years following the fall of Sendero 
Luminoso, President Fujimori’s centralized government continued to tighten their 
authoritarian control over popular organizations through the infiltration of local groups, 
and accusations against the most “radical” groups of inciting terrorism or supporting 
rebel groups. All of these organizations in Ayacucho were suspected and at times accused 
of being rebel sympethizers, local student organizations were prohibited, and classes at 
the University were tightly monitored (author interview April 1, 2003). Under the guise 
of “security” and “social order,” Fujimori’s government guaranteed the elimination of 
popular organization at all levels, from one extreme of infiltrating formal political parties 
to another extreme of arresting youth gathered on a street corner for suspected “gang” 
activity.  
At the same time that he systematically decimated independent social 
organization, Fujimori actively developed a complex system of “participation” through 
aid programs that were aimed predominantly at calming the increasingly aggressive 
demands for basic services in marginalized communities. Ironically, pre-existing systems 
of communal aid in poor neighborhoods (most notably the comedores, or communal 
kitchens, and the Mothers’ Clubs, the Clubes de Madres) were explicitly excised from 
Fujimori’s initial governing plans: upon first taking office, Fujimori deliberately 
                                               
7 For more details on mobilization and organization in marginal neighborhoods, especially in Lima, see 
Blondet 1986; Dietz 1998; Schönwälder 2002; Stokes 1995; Tovar 1982; Trigos Jayo, et al. 2004. 
Interestingly, this body of literature is surprisingly thin on ethnography. 
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abandoned these forms of local organization, arguably in an effort to “starve” them (no 
pun intended) of social and political significance in their neighborhoods (Burt 2004). 
This strategy changed in the later part of his regime as he co-opted local organizations 
through the construction of relationships of clientelism (not necessarily populism) with 
the centralized state through the Programa Nacional de Asistencia Alimentaria, 
PRONAA (Blondet and Trivelli 2004). These historical experiences linking civil 
participation with government aid programs have led many scholars and political 
activists, as well as local commentators, to persistently exaggerate a presumed reliance 
upon government handouts within the popular organizations of peripheral communities 
(often referred to locally as asistencialismo, or dependence upon temporary band-aid 
handouts). Some critics go so far as to claim that populism, “paternalism” and 
“clientelism” operate together as “a new model of dictatorship, a new form of control.”8 
It is in contrast to this that the model of “democratic participation” is widely heralded in 
Peru as the cornerstone of decentralization, where citizens are said to have a political and 
social obligation to take control of the betterment of their community. 
Within the rhetoric of “social pacification,” Fujimori devised programs to 
incorporate local communities into security policies through neighborhood organizations. 
To be sure, the traditional political “defense fronts” (frentes de defensa) were not the 
model used and promoted by government institutions for incorporating the population 
into local governance. When examined specifically through the lens of a growing concern 
over crime and urban security, we see one of the most important junctures at which 
Ayacucho’s local history of neighborhood organization diverges sharply with that 
documented in Lima and other parts of the country. As Fujimori’s popularity began to 
wane at the end of his second term in the late 1990s, he initiated an aggressive campaign 
to maintain the support of the peasant rondas (patrols, also known as Comités de 
Autodefensa, CADs) by recognizing their indispensible role in the fight against Shining 
Path. Simultaneously, however, he also began to disarm these organizations. Through 
                                               
8 Author interview with Luis Nunes, Senior Representative in Peru of the National Democratic Institute, 
November 13, 2004. 
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creative arguments about how the possession of weapons was no longer necessary 
“thanks to your hard work and dedication,” he began to reclaim the weapons given to 
them by the government (author interview, December 20, 2004).9 As part of this delicate 
dance, around 1997 Fujimori began to develop a semi-experimental program creating 
rondas urbanas, or urban patrols, in which neighborhoods would be militarily trained to 
protect security and order in their own communities. In 1998 the country’s first formally 
recognized urban ronda was registered in an asentamiento humano (shantytown) in 
Ayacucho (Vivas 1999). The organizational model drew directly from the experiences 
with the rural rondas by featuring rotating community patrols and local justice. Although 
“rondas urbanas” emerged in most departments by 1997 (INEI (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística e Informática) 1997), what distinguished these formalized relationships in 
Ayacucho was their expanded working relationship with the Peruvian military.  
In addition to regular meetings on the military base, and local leaders who were 
licensed military, the training provided by rondas mirrored the military training received 
on the base. According to one of the founding leaders of the ronda, every day at five in 
the morning the young ronderos met for an hour of the same physical training given at 
the base, with the sole exception that it was held in the neighborhood plazas. And every 
evening they rotated through their neighborhood watch duties, capturing and holding 
delinquents when necessary (author interview, September 3, 2004). Most importantly, 
completing two years of service to the ronda in their community would qualify as 
obligatory military service, earning young men their libreta militar. 
In 1999, military service was made voluntary and almost instantaneously a core 
incentive for participation in the urban rondas was removed. This change in military code 
                                               
9 Most people confirm the close historical relationship between the military and the CADs, or the 
“appropriation” by the military of the CADs (Starn 1995). At the same time, many also recount that in 
some areas the control of Shining Path was so pervasive that even members of the rondas campesinas were 
included on the rosters of Shining Path (author interview, December 20, 2004). There is also a strong 
political division between some organizations of “victims of the war” in which one side states categorically 
that those killed by government forces – even the ronderos – were in fact members of Shining Path (author 
interview, December 1, 2004). They vehemently protest the incorporation of CADs today in the security 
debates because they believe strongly that ronderos today are disgruntled senderistas who should not be re-
armed (c.f. Starn 1995:567). 
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coincided with local legislation regarding the formation of “juntas vecinales,” and within 
a couple of years the new organizational model largely replaced the short-lived ronda 
experiment. Unlike the rondas, who responded to the military command, the new juntas 
responded directly to municipal officials and the National Police. For many local ronda 
leaders, reorganizing into the new system of juntas vecinales was a disillusion. One 
leader told me that with the “law of autodefensa” the rondas had legal authority to “beat 
the shit out of” delinquents and they were able to keep order, whereas the current juntas 
were completely powerless (author interview, April 13, 2005). Another leader recalled 
the level of security during the time of the ronda urbana and laughed, “it was awesome” 
(buenazo)! He all but completely withdrew from the junta vecinal out of distrust for the 
National Police who now had a role in the oversight of junta activities relating to citizen 
security (author interview, December 17, 2004). 
The organizational model of “juntas vecinales” was first proposed nationally in 
1981 through the Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades and the accompanying Regulatory 
Plan for Juntas Vecinales (Proyecto de Reglamento de Juntas Vecinales) (Tovar 
1982:36). This legislation proposed a particular form of neighborhood organization 
(under municipal control) which would officially override all existing forms of popular 
organization. In doing so, it sparked popular widespread protest in Lima. In Ayacucho, 
however, this model of municipal “junta de vecinos” was not implemented until 1998.10 
Prominently included among the functions of the juntas is to “participate in (participar) 
and support (apoyar) actions regarding Civil Defense and Citizen Security within the 
scope of its constituency, in coordination with the respective authorities.”11 
As Fujimori’s disgraced government came to an end, so too the Provincial Mayor 
in Ayacucho, Felix de Solar, was removed from office, and the department of Ayacucho 
rode out the latest cycle of democratic transitions. Although political parties motivated by 
unified ideologies were slow to regain strength in Ayacucho, the population instead 
                                               
10 Ordenanza Municipal 001-97-MPH/A, dated February 3, 1998 
11 Statute for the Junta de Vecinos in the District of Ayacucho, proposed by the Committee for Communal 
Promotion and Participation, approved by Acuerdo Municipal No. 281-97-MPH/A, September 30, 1997 
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mobilized around more short-term “thematic axes” such as human rights abuses during 
the years of violence or around problems with urban security (author interview, 
December 14, 2004).12 It was in this wave that the Frente de Defensa reorganized in 1999 
and the Federación de Barrios was reconstituted in 2003 as the “backbone” to the FDPA. 
Political Engagement, Democracy & Protest 
Activists in Ayacucho often reminded their fellow citizens (and me) that 
“participation is a constitutional right,” un derecho constitucional. The expansive rhetoric 
presents participation as a prominent marker of Peru’s democratic transition, and it 
portrays the “voice” that participation affords the general population as essential to 
democratic governance. In this section I would like to expand the discussion of 
democratic “participation” to encompass broader consideration of forms and patterns of 
political engagement. This shift allows us to see that just as often, the right to publicly 
protest – to hold officials accountable and demand citizen rights – is also framed in this 
same light. Protest and participation were both framed as essential ingredients for a 
robust democracy. Just as much as “participation,” protests are framed as the very 
enactment and embodiment of democracy. 
While constant street protests plagued much of the 1980s, the early 1990s under 
Fujimori’s administration were remarkably calm. When I asked Ayacuchanos why this 
was the case, many described in detail the sense of relief that came with feeling the 
strong and effective presence of the government and the end to the armed conflict. For 
them, the tight control of the initial years seemed like a small price to pay for the 
possibility of a strong future. A related explanation that I received frequently held that 
Ayacuchanos were not in the streets because in fact they had little to protest. Government 
funds poured into the region to transform its image and build it up as a tourist destination 
                                               
12 As part of Fujimori’s own political strategy of shunning the appearance of a singular and traditional 
political party, his party was renamed and “rebranded” for each election campaign, including: Cambio 90 
(Change ’90), Nueva Mayoría (New Majority), Vamos Vecino (Let’s Go Neighbor), Perú 2000, Sí Cumple 
(He Fulfills) and Alianza por el Futuro (Alliance for the Future). 
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under the government’s national promotion agency, PromPeru. Alternatively, a small 
repertoire of stories was recounted with vivid detail about Fujimori’s “respect” for 
Ayacucho and their culture, how he slept in humble homes in the countryside and ate 
soup from their wooden spoons.13  
Most attribute the years without constant protest to governmental mechanisms of 
control and fear. As this tight grip gradually began to unravel by the end of Fujimori’s 
second term in office, complaints mounted and the rumblings of dissatisfaction with 
authoritarian control became louder and more public. In June of 2000 I watched as 
hundreds marched through Ayacucho’s streets protesting Fujimori’s election to a third 
term. In July, I went to Lima to participate in the Marcha de los Cuatro Suyus, the march 
that was organized by Alejandro Toledo and which marked a watershed moment in 
Fujimori’s fall from power. In both of these instances, I witnessed how protest played a 
prominent role in the overthrow of Fujimori, leading to the installment of Paniagua’s 
transition government, and Toledo’s eventual democratic election in 2001 (c.f. Coronil 
and Skurski 1991for discussion of the centrality of violence in democratic transitions).  
Protest – and, yes, sometimes violent social upheaval – remained central 
characteristics of Alejandro Toledo’s administration (c.f. DESCO 2004). The frequent 
media coverage of these protests focused almost exclusively upon relatively limited 
portrayals of the most common messages yelled at full volume: dissatisfaction with weak 
governments, complaints of pervasive corruption, the lack of authority, and the “failures” 
of democratic processes or “unfinished” transitions. This coverage was consistent with 
Latin America’s broad reputation as being tainted by social unrest and volatile political 
and social relations. Within international news, these characterizations tend to be lumped 
                                               
13 Even after leaving into exile in Japan, Fujimori continued to nurture his support in the country and his 
ongoing campaign for “peace, progress, and development.” Building a symbolic connection to Ayacucho 
was critical to his focused rhetoric of controlling instability and chaos: on April 5, 2003 (the anniversary of 
his 1992 self-coup) he officially launched his 2006 campaign (Sí Cumple) in Ayacucho with a video made 
specifically for the region. The growing network of organized supporters in Ayacucho had begun holding 
regular and public meetings (some of which I attended) and the well-organized event included a live 
folklore performance by the music and dance group Huamanga Señorial. I would be remiss, however, to 
not also acknowledge the protests outside the historic theater where the event was held: Fujimori’s local 
organizers were forced to leave out a back door in order to avoid the eggs being thrown by protesters. 
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under several general themes: local discontent with neoliberal international economic 
policies and disagreement over national political-economic agendas (Venezuela is a 
frequent punching bag); democratic elections and challenges to democratic rule (Fujimori 
being only one president whose overthrow involved intense social protest); or popular 
uprisings that turn violent (Ayacucho being an unfortunate example). Bolivia’s 2006 
elections (in which Evo Morales came to power) exemplified all of these trends, and also 
renewed international interest in Latin America’s economic and political “turn to the 
left,” the “pink tide” (see Gustafson 2008 for a sharp criticism of international coverage 
of Bolivian politics).  
Today, marches, demonstrations, strikes, and work stoppages are still a prominent 
feature of life in Ayacucho (as in many Peruvian cities). For certain, many Ayacuchanos 
see the continuous stream of protests as a painful reminder that the population is 
dissatisfied with persisting social divisions and with the acting government’s apparent 
inability to tackle these profound concerns. In this calculation, the social protests that 
have become a central feature of Ayacucho’s society are evaluated as a barometer for 
democracy, authority, and social order. However, as the protest march staged by 
municipal authorities illustrates very clearly, we cannot simply report on the events, 
observe the upheaval, note western fears, and focus on how such protest marches reveal 
“dissatisfactions” and “failures” of democratic processes in Latin America. While this 
form of social unrest contributes to an acute sense of chaos, loss of control, and urgency, 
it remains an important resource and strategy of political engagement, including efforts to 
sway political priorities about citizen security.  
This dynamic seems paradoxical. At the same time that these protest marches 
embody the principals of democratic engagement, they also obstruct the local authorities’ 
abilities to secure and maintain stability and “peaceful” order. Although social order is – 
even by the assessment of the Asamblea junta that organized social protests – a critical 
measure of democratic success, by intensifying the democratic “noise” they are in 
practice heightening a sense of disorder and insecurity. Nonetheless, even those very 
mobilizations that turn violent (such as the July 1st protest described in the previous 
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chapter) are, right up to that precise breaking point, frequently explained – sometimes 
even justified – in terms of civic duty and democratic responsibilities. 
Throughout the second section of the dissertation I have presented an array of 
very distinct social protests and marches: one organized by neighborhood organizations 
against the municipality, a second one organized by the municipality against the nightlife 
industry, and another one organized by the municipality as a peace march. What I have 
shown are not examples of mass social mobilization working to redefine the state (as seen 
in the Marcha de los Cuatro Suyus). Instead, these protests are part of a related, though 
much quieter (at least from a national or international perspective), mobilization to 
redefine local practices of governance.  
My analysis of these encounters argues for the centrality of protest, right 
alongside participation, in the contemporary model of democracy being advanced in 
Ayacucho. First and foremost, this examination suggests that the local significance and 
meanings of protest marches are not limited to criticism of internationally popular 
economic and political themes. Instead, I argue that it is crucial to consider marches as an 
idiom in-and-of-themselves, one that has most salience and meaning within the dialogue 
over the definition and expectations of democracy and citizenship, and most impact as a 
fundamental form of socio-political engagement. Protest marches are not only conceived 
as characteristic of democracy (of the right to demand accountability and voice 
priorities), they are a mechanism of democracy, right alongside participation. Protesting, 
in this light, is not considered to be an inherent transgression of established norms of 
social order but is rather repositioned to be fully within socially responsible practice.14 By 
effectively putting into practice many of the theoretical underpinnings of “democracy,” 
they are in fact profoundly constitutive of democracy. In this way, participation and 
protest both allow participants to embody the very soul of the democracy that is being 
imagined.  
                                               
14 This is not to say, however, that participants within those protests won’t draw attention to their cause 
through the public transgression of established social norms. Although none of the cases I have witnessed 
or described have resorted to dramatic measures, one prominent example, found in Peru and elsewhere, is 
women removing blouses and exposing bare chests (for Peru see Gandolfo 2009). 
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Democratic Engagement 
Although some Ayacuchanos are indeed committed to the democratic system (or 
at least to mechanisms of engagement in local governance), many others are not, 
questioning whether democracy is even capable of the reforms necessary. During the 
time of my fieldwork, the country also watched as Toledo dismissed his entire cabinet 
every couple of months in response to criticisms of ineffectual governance. Meanwhile, 
in Ayacucho the same calls were occasionally made and at times the municipal 
government responded by shuffling employees around and removing “bad apples.” Such 
overhauls happened several times during the intense period of debate over the “nightlife 
problematic” and public security. While I heard these demands voiced within 
neighborhood organizations across the city, I just as frequently heard pessimistic 
murmurings that life was simply “better” prior to the democratic transition. Under 
Fujimori there was corruption in Lima, yes, but Ayacucho was stable and safe and social 
order was maintained. These skeptics were not at all wedded to the “ideal” system of 
representative democracy, and were willing to consider giving it up again in exchange for 
solutions to pressing social problems and instability.  
In fact, I will go so far as to suggest that this ambivalence is not precisely about 
the democratic system, per se, but rather that many Ayacuchanos can’t imagine being 
dedicated to any particular governing system. This impression was solidified during a 
lively discussion following a showing of Michael Moore’s film Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004), 
organized as part of the program celebrating International Youth Day. I was already a 
part of the preparations (which were coordinated by a handful of youth organizations), 
but I was asked to give a presentation before the film and to lead a discussion afterwards. 
We began by discussing the significance of one of the opening scenes, in which Al Gore 
was presiding over complaints in Congress of voting irregularities, essentially presiding 
over the demise of his own aspirations for presidency. Knowing that the socialist youth 
organization (Juventud Socialista) had proposed showing the film, I braced myself for a 
conversation about how the United States waves its finger against elections across the 
globe, despite its own disturbing and flawed democratic electoral process. I was fully 
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surprised by what transpired. Instead, this group of some fifty young Ayacuchanos, 
representing the political spectrum (from socialist to Aprista to non-political), was 
unanimously shocked by Gore’s faith and respect for the system to which he belonged. 
After joking about how no Peruvian politician would be so stupid, they engaged in an 
animated conversation for over forty-five minutes about their own inability to fathom 
such conviction in any political system. 
Also at the time of my research, Fujimori was actively campaigning for the 2006 
elections from abroad (he had fled to Japan in self-exile) and I asked many Ayacuchanos 
– in interviews and in casual conversation – whether they thought Peru would return to 
authoritarian rule. Such conversations inevitably included bemused reflections on the fact 
that the only two candidates campaigning at that particular moment were Fujimori and 
Alan García, equally disgraced former presidents. “Only in Peru,” many would say with a 
shrug and embarrassed laugh. For an answer to whether Peru would return to 
authoritarian rule, however, most thought about it, weighed the continuing appreciation 
for Fujimori’s work in the region, but concluded with a resounding “no.” As one leader 
from a peripheral community told me, “no, we’ve become accustomed to participating, 
we like making noise!”15 Ayacuchanos are dedicated to the notion that democracy is, 
very literally, noisy and messy: democracy not only allows for protests but it may 
actually demand protests, especially when it is going through expected growing pains. As 
if invoking an oversimplified “complexity theory,” stability could suggest a “deadened” 
civil society, whereas an apparently un-stable society can potentially be a robustly 
functioning democratic system.  
As illustrated so clearly under Fujimori, opposition to an authoritarian 
government can operate through and within the dominant frame of “democracy”: social 
movements and Fujimori alike shared the frame of democracy to legitimate radically 
different goals and different kinds of actions (Castillo 1997; for more on “collective 
action frames” see especially Gamson 1992, Snow and Benford 1988). Considering 
                                               
15 Personal communication, December 20, 2004 
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“protest” as an idiom in-and-of-itself further validates the warning provided by Noonan 
about the analytical model of “collective action frames”: we “should not assume that 
oppositional movements are using an oppositional frame” (Noonan 1995:106). My 
research suggests that we could extend this to argue that “protest” has itself become a 
“frame” which is shaping a diversity of ideologies about democracy itself: protest is 
democratic, it is the ultimate embodiment of democratic principles and practices. Not 
only is it not a contradiction that protest is being framed as democratic, but, even more 
striking, it is also not a contradiction that government officials are using democratic 
protest to frame their responses to contemporary social challenges. “Democracy” and 
“protest” remain salient frames of opposition, no longer against a non-democratic 
government but now against a democratically-elected government and even particular 
segments of the local population. 
Formalizing Participation, Institutionalizing Relationships 
On a cold June morning I stood outside the municipal compound hoping to 
observe the public meetings of the participatory budget (presupuesto participativo). I was 
carrying an invitation in the name of the president of the Jirón Asamblea junta vecinal, 
which contained the following disclaimer at the very bottom of the page: “only one 
representative per grassroots social organization will be authorized and will participate 
with voice and vote in the prioritization of projects” (Oficio Multiple No. 063-2007-
MPH/A). Although she assured me that this meant that only one person could vote but 
anybody could participate, it was clear as soon as I arrived that this was not necessarily 
the case. For over an hour I watched as one person after another presented the same 
invitation and tried in vain to get in the door, turned away because their name did not 
appear on the Municipality’s official roster as the “one authorized representative” of their 
organization. They each protested individually at first, pulling out official identification 
cards issued by the municipality to demonstrate that they legitimately represented their 
community organization. By the time the media arrived, the protests were loud and 
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forceful. Some people accused officials individually of “political manipulation” while 
others waved physical copies of the National Law of Participation in their faces arguing 
that even if they could not vote, they had a constitutional right to participate, to listen and 
learn. Many complained that the continuous radio announcements of the public meeting – 
in Spanish and Quechua – were deceptive (why invite us if we aren’t allowed to attend?). 
After a couple of hours the doors were opened and hundreds of “unauthorized” 
community organizers (and I) entered the meetings; fortunately, hora peruana was in 
order and the meeting was only just beginning. 
The disagreements and protests that morning were the result of a set of nested 
hierarchies and fissures that are written into local governing models of participation. The 
rapid creation and registration of officially sanctioned neighborhood organizations 
(organizaciones vecinales) became the benchmark by which the municipality strived to 
enhance – and control – organized participation in local governance. Although overseen 
by the office of Neighborhood Participation (Subgerencia de Participación Vecinal), the 
day-to-day promotion of “participation” was carried by an entire cohort of municipal 
institutions, with each branch reaching out individually to involve the population through 
their own jurisdiction.16 The weak coordination among them often resulted in mixed 
communications as each developed and presented a different set of explanations and a 
different line of incentive and motivation. 
The category of “neighborhood organization” was defined broadly enough to 
include resident groups (by Asociación de Vivienda, for example), youth organizations, 
artisan groups, or grassroots organizations (such as communal kitchens or Vaso de 
                                               
16 Although Neighborhood Participation offices were implemented in Lima in 1984 (Schönwälder 
2002:134), once again we see a different history in Ayacucho, where this office apparently opened around 
2001. I say “apparently” because I was not able to date the “creation” of this subgerencia. I searched in the 
Municipal Archives with little success: although I did find reference to an Ordinance regarding 
Participación Vecinal for the district of Ayacucho (not necessarily the provincial municipality as a whole) 
the text of the ordinance (Ordenanza Municipal 003-98-MPH/A) was missing so I cannot conclude that this 
marked the formal constitution of the office. I asked a previous director of the office who simply pleaded 
ignorance. The current director of the office stated categorically that the office itself had absolutely no 
documentation of the original mandate; the earliest documentation that they have dates to 2001 and this is 
when she believes it opened. 
 227 
Leche) (Ordenanza No. 009-2001-MPH/A). Despite this diversity in organizational 
purpose, the legislation providing for formal registration with the municipality required a 
set of strict stipulations for how the organizations would be directed and their activities 
documented, verified, and monitored. Only those organizations which met the criteria and 
completed the procedures to be officially registered with the municipality would be 
eligible and invited to “participate” in government programs and activities (such as voting 
on the project priorities for the participatory budget). According to numerous 
neighborhood organizers, they were not invited to participate and not taken seriously as 
representatives of their community until they had completed the bureaucratic (and 
financial) hurdles to formally register with the Municipality. Moreover, only those 
privileged organizers listed personally by name on the Municipality’s master list would 
be authorized to enter, participate, and vote; no substitutions, no replacements, and no 
unauthorized change in personnel would be accepted. 
The participatory budget is the most publicized and celebrated opportunity 
provided under the democratic model of citizen participation for organized civil society 
to voice their concerns and to potentially convert their interests and priorities into official 
policies. During the event described above, however, hundreds of people demanded that 
discussions setting municipal priorities and agendas be open to the general public, not 
limited only to privileged neighborhood organizers who function as “brokers” (Tanaka 
2001b) in the relationships of participation.  
Although only occasionally articulated in such an explicit fashion, hierarchies and 
fissures permeated the layered relationships of participation, in spite of the presumed 
equalizing effect of institutionalization. Moreover, the degree of influence of civil 
representatives is actively limited through mechanisms of formalizing participation and 
institutionalizing certain kinds of relationships. Organizers often carried manila folders 
stocked full of documentation for their organization and they would immediately and 
rapidly whip out official member identification cards. This form of democratic 
participation legislates a formalized mode of interaction between organizations and 
municipal institutions, such that in key moments of official participation, vastly different 
 228 
civil organizations are expected to form the same kind of formalized relationships with 
government institutions. 
Governing Security through Participation 
Ordenanza 054, the citizen security emergency declaration issued in response to 
the mounting nightlife problematic, drew a direct connection between governing security 
and citizen participation:  
That, the national system of citizen security is the interrelated set of organizations 
of the public sector and civil society, as well as of norms, resources and doctrine; 
oriented towards the protection of free exercise of rights and liberties, with the 
goal of promoting the citizen participation to guarantee a situation of social 
peace.17 
Despite these statements of ideal relationships, the episode on the morning of the 
operation (that opened this chapter) is a moving and intimate snapshot of the raw 
antagonisms over the precise terms of the relationships between Ayacucho’s provincial 
municipality and neighborhood organizations. These disagreements over the limits of 
responsibility are key to understanding the last underlying question in this dissertation: 
once the citizen security doctrine was mobilized as a resource in the nightlife 
problematic, what were the practical consequences of the concomitant citizen security 
system? Understanding the distinction between the circulation of a discourse of security 
and the highly structured system of Citizen Security – especially one that is tied so tightly 
to citizen participation – is essential for understanding the conflicts and controversies 
within Ayacucho’s nightlife problematic.  
City center residents adopted the rhetoric of seguridad ciudadana as an astute 
political maneuver in their cause against nightlife. Interestingly, one consequence (largely 
unintentional) of the move to frame their cause through the generalized discourse of 
insecurity (or, alternately, “seguridad ciudadana”) was that these residents of the city 
                                               
17 Ordenanza 054-2004-MPH/A (emphasis added) 
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center were among the first local citizen organizations to actively publicize the seguridad 
ciudadana doctrine without support and affiliation with municipal offices or other local 
institutions of governance. Although these residents did not have a history of community 
organization, nor established networks, their work dovetailed with the numerous official 
campaigns underway, and together their efforts served to systematically popularize the 
seguridad ciudadana discourse and, consequently, also raise awareness of the doctrine 
that was now state policy. At the same time, their articulation diverged markedly from 
official campaigns: whereas official programs were advocating shared and communal 
responsibility for solving security concerns of the city as a whole, the statements by 
neighborhood organizations heightened the public demands upon local institutions to 
guarantee security for the citizenry.  
Despite the role of the Asamblea junta in the circulation and prominence of 
security concerns in the city center, numerous conflicts arose as a direct result of their 
decisions to frame the nightlife problematic as one of “citizen security.” First, their initial 
motivations had less to do with specific concerns of urban insecurity that were prioritized 
through the seguridad ciudadana programs, and more to do with protecting the city center 
as a traditional and religious space and with the fears of moral corruption of  the city’s 
youth. This core motivation resurfaced periodically, sometimes straining already tense 
relationships. One instance of this occurred during the first protest march that they 
organized against nightclubs and government officials. As will be described in greater 
detail in chapter 8, their proposed protest over “security” convinced organizers of Vaso 
de Leche to participate, bringing hundreds of women into the march. Once underway, 
however, many of these women felt deceived, since the signs and chants were far from 
comprehensive of “citizen security” and were, instead, focused predominantly on the 
specific concerns over city center night clubs.  
Second, although the junta members adopted the discourse of security, they were 
not especially comfortable with all of the dimensions of the seguridad ciudadana system. 
This is perhaps most evident with respect to the increasing emphasis of community 
participation in the maintenance of security. As illustrated in the opening scene, in which 
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the official in charge a nightclub clausura voiced frustration with the absence of junta 
members, they were not always willing to engage in the expected forms of participation. 
In essence, these events highlighted profound disagreements over the boundaries of state 
responsibility; likewise, they underscore the degree of disagreement over the political 
demands of the citizen security system, which framed citizenship as embodied through 
the collective enactment of security.  
With much less dramatic flare, the discomforts felt by city center residents with 
the systemic shifts towards decentralized participatory democracy are also evident in 
their perception of the allocation of resources through the participatory budget, which 
uniquely features the democratic ideal of guaranteeing the prioritization of citizen 
concerns. The city center residents hoped to present their case over a need for greater 
(night club) security in the city center but they expressed frustration knowing that their 
concerns would be out-voted by the much more plentiful representatives of the outlying 
areas whose priorities – security and otherwise – would not be addressed by such specific 
(non-comprehensive) issues of security.  
As we have seen, the principle of citizen participation (participación ciudadana) 
is formally constituted as an official political strategy in Peru (política estatal), not only 
promoted but also mandated through national policies and local ordinances, including the 
citizen security apparatus. This official politics establishes “participation” as a dominant 
discourse, championed as a guarantee of constitutional equality and democratic 
citizenship. But the legal parameters of “citizen participation” are extended when 
government institutions effectively appropriate the language of participation and 
modified it to emphasize not only democratic rights but also the responsibilities of 
citizenship. Thus, where the contemporary language of participation differs markedly 
from previous legislation is in the symbolic emphasis on “rights and duties.” This 
conscientious politics of citizen responsibilities hinges upon what are identified as the 
vestiges of populism lingering in previous conceptualizations of participation as merely 
“rights” that citizens could “demand.” Through official slogans such as “Citizen Security, 
Everybody’s Task,” the concept of citizen participation is highlighted not only within the 
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solutions to urban violence but also within the democratic transition itself. As the new 
head of Seguridad Ciudadana explained to me recently, he sees his primary responsibility 
to be one of making the population aware of their democratic responsibilities as citizens 
(“concientizar sobre deberes ciudadanos”).18 
Key officials in the provincial municipality of Ayacucho consider civil awareness 
of the importance of “participation” to be a measure of democratic success broadly, as 
well as of their own administration (author interview, Gotardo Miranda Gutiérrez, former 
Deputy Mayor, June 22, 2007). However, this index is not entirely by their own design, 
nor does it fit the idyllic imagery of reciprocal or mutual engagement in policy-making 
and enforcement. To begin with, several recent national laws mandate that local 
governments incorporate the citizen population into their policy-making prioritizations 
and strategizing.19 Civil participation is not only a guaranteed right of the citizenry – 
local governments are obligated by law to promote (fomentar) and foster civil 
participation. These national laws structure and inform local governance, and the 
principles of participation are substantiated through municipal ordinances and policies 
intended to codify mechanisms for promoting such civil participation.  
But governments, and individual officials, are adept at reframing the terms of the 
game and actively redirecting the language of participation. Through ordinances such as 
the declaration of a citizen security emergency in 2004, citizen participation is construed 
in conjunction with other legislative articles as an official procedure. Through the legal 
justifications of the ordinance, citizen participation is featured prominently as a solution 
in the struggle to confront urban insecurity associated with night.20 The implication is that 
                                               
18 Author interview, Jorge Antonio Antezana, July 5, 2007 
19 Most notable here are the Law of Municipalities (Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades), the Law of Citizen 
Participation (Ley de Participación Ciudadana), and the law establishing a National System of Citizen 
Security (Ley del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana). 
20 Although the structure, argumentation, and considerations incorporated into an ordinance are expected to 
defend the right to declare an ordinance – in this case to substantiate the municipality’s right to claim 
decision-making powers regarding citizen security – considerations two and three of this ordinance are 
noteworthy for minimizing the sole power of the municipality. Instead, this ordinance elaborates a discourse 
of institutional integration and cooperation and featuring the role of “the set of interrelated institutions from 
the public sector and the civil society.”  
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the municipality does not believe itself to be the sole party responsible for securing urban 
security generally, for taking the “urgent measures” necessary to end the “emergency,” 
and more specifically to regulate the nightlife scene as stipulated in the ordinance.21  
The opening scene of this chapter demonstrates that the expectations of 
participation, especially the distribution of responsibilities, are not mutually agreed-upon. 
Unequal negotiations over the boundaries of state responsibility create tensions that 
directly effect municipal interest in the successful implementation of a model of 
participatory democracy. In the following chapter I will consider the forms of 
“participation” – or support and collaboration – that are desired and promoted by the 
municipality through the citizen security programs. Despite the campaign slogans and 
forums on citizen vigilance, transparency and making one’s voice heard, this model of 
democracy does not necessarily deem these activities appropriate forms of 
“participation.” Instead, governmental “participation” programs can also be leveraged as 
a means of transference of political responsibility from government agencies to civil 
organizations. Citizens have rights and government has responsibility, but government 
responsibility also has limits and citizens also have responsibilities. This is similar to 
what Julia Paley refers to as the “paradoxes of participation” (Paley 2001), in which 
“participation” motivates a population by providing a sense of meaning to citizenship 
while simultaneously limiting public action. “Participation” in this way functions as a 
hegemonic control mechanism, used by governments – sometimes deliberately – to 
alleviate themselves of certain responsibilities by expecting civil organizations to carry 
out those tasks. From the perspective of neighborhood organizations in Ayacucho these 
mandates for formal inclusion in local governance manifest themselves in the form of 
bureaucratic nightmares, unnecessary restrictions, and invented hierarchies.  
While civil participation is widely heralded as a cornerstone of decentralized 
democracy, I challenge common conceptions of its idealistic potential for egalitarian 
cooperation between the state and civil society. Instead, I scrutinize the risks of 
                                               
21 Acuerdo de Concejo No. 111-2004-MPH/CM.  
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participation and the many points of contention that arise as the expectations and 
demands of participation are negotiated. Believing that the diversity of political 
engagement demands an interrogation into the interplay between policy-making and 
community activism, I demonstrate that tensions and disagreements frequently arise over 
the terms of this relationship and over the meaning of “democratic participation” more 
broadly. Efforts by the provincial municipality to direct community participation in 
citizen security programs are fraught with disagreements over the expectations of 
authority, responsibility, and commitment. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Derechos y Deberes: 
Urban Citizenship and the Geographies of Participation 
 
PHOTO 8.1 – “Derechos y Deberes” poster. Displayed on a bulletin board in District Municipal 
Office of Jesus Nazareno, the poster reads: I exercise my citizenship with responsibility. I fulfill 
my duties and demand my rights! The words “citizenship,” “duties,” and “rights” are highlighted 
in red. 
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Glossy posters hanging in local municipal offices continuously remind visitors of 
the governing national official policies of “citizen participation.” The cartoonish cast of 
characters – generically representing a culturally (and presumably socially) diverse but 
united nation – is involved in what can only be assumed to be “laboring for the good of 
the community.”   
Displayed through an assortment of font, color, italics, and bold prints, the text 
reads: “I exercise my citizenship with responsibility. I fulfill my duties and demand my 
rights!” This deceptively simple and potent declarative statement also seems to suggest 
that this communal labor – an embodiment of citizenship – is also essential to the health 
of the nation. The imagery and the text, together, further emphasize the explicit ways in 
which current models of governance link democratic “responsibility” to the twin concepts 
of derechos y deberes, or the rights and duties, of citizenship. 
In this chapter, I offer ethnographic examples of inequitable community 
participation within municipal citizen security programs in order to challenge this official 
definition of citizenship, which implies an idealized and uncomplicated equation by 
which democratic rights and responsibilities assure social equality. I argue that the nexus 
of rights and responsibilities is, in practice, highly problematic; as a result, these 
“participatory security” programs serve as sites for the active (re)construction of 
profoundly disjunctured urban citizenship.  
Writing about seguridad ciudadana in Bolivia, Goldstein states that “rather than 
pitting rights against security, seguridad ciudadana acknowledges security to be a right, 
guaranteed by the state to its citizens” (Goldstein 2007:59, emphasis added). The 
experiences described in this chapter, however, paint a very different picture of the 
possible relationships between rights and security. The official discourse of rights and 
responsibilities, particularly when put into motion through seguridad ciudadana 
programs, has the effect of pitting rights directly against security. With resources and 
infrastructure stretched beyond their limits, government officials and institutions were 
forced to make selective decisions in the implementation of security measures. Quite 
simply, security could not be guaranteed an equal right of urban citizenship. To be sure, 
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the city center often received disproportionate benefits from the presence of security 
forces (such as the National Police and Municipal Serenazgo). What we will see in this 
chapter is that one of the most influential factors in the overall calculation was the 
assessment of a given community’s own participation in the security efforts, their own 
embodied practice of security. All of this suggests the rather provocative addition to the 
observation that security itself was not, in fact, an unconditional right guaranteed equally 
to all citizens: the official assessment of participatory commitment to security was 
leveraged in a tight calculation of differential, and differentially earned, rights to 
institutional support from the seguridad ciudadana apparatus. As the provincial 
municipality’s Director of Citizen Security stated to me, carefully calculating his words, 
“any citizen who fulfills his duties is more than welcome to exercise his rights.”1 
The idealism of democratic “participation” is highly seductive, offering the 
potential for egalitarianism or horizontality, inclusive cooperation, and the dream that 
social inequalities can be remedied or at least minimized. However, as we see trough the 
examples of participation within Ayacucho’s citizen security programs, the inequitable 
allocation of rights corresponds directly to the inequitable allocation of “responsibility” 
to solve problems of urban insecurity. Revealing additional dimensions to what Julia 
Paley has termed “the paradoxes of participation” (2001), these examples demonstrate 
how “citizen participation” is in fact valued and promoted differently across urban 
neighborhoods. In short, peripheral and city center neighborhoods were expected to 
participate in markedly different fashions. Parallel to the ideology of inclusion,  therefore, 
“participation” simultaneously functions as a strong organizational model, not only of 
governmental tasks and priorities but also of social differences, extending the well-worn 
paths of class and racial divides.  
The power to interpret “reality” and define a public “crisis” (such as a nightlife 
emergency), garners its political weight in the realm of defining responsibility. More 
precisely, it involves the power to draw connections between causal responsibility for the 
                                               
1 Author interview with José Antonio Antezana, Subgerente de Seguridad Ciudadana, July 5, 2007, his 
emphasis 
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“social problem” and political responsibility for solving it (Gusfield 1981). The causal 
responsibility for Ayacucho’s insecurity is converted into political responsibility in part 
through the ideology of “participation” espoused in municipal citizen security policies 
and strategies, which assert that democratic rights are predicated upon meeting certain 
responsibilities. In defining the role of civil “participation” – what those duties or 
responsibilities are – local citizen security policies and programs project unequal 
expectations upon diverse segments of the population. By differentiating responsibilities 
for residents of the city center (casco urbano) and residents of the peripheral areas 
(cinturón de la ciudad), these programs have created a geography of participation that has 
served to further reinforce and institutionalize social inequality. 
A core principle of the local citizen security programs is that in addition to 
“punitive” control measures (such as the forced closure of night venues or punishment for 
committing crime) any effective long-term strategy primarily involves “prevention” 
(Costa and Basombrío Iglesias 2004). Prevention, as formulated in the municipality’s 
Strategic Plan for Citizen Security (Comité Provincial de Seguridad Ciudadana de 
Huamanga 2004a), involves everything from coordinated patrols to “public awareness” 
campaigns aimed at “recuperating values” and cultivating a “culture of peace.” The 
Lieutenant Mayor during the period of my research considered the creation of Youth 
Centers and the initiation of neighborhood organizations in peripheral zones to be among 
the most substantial achievements of his administration (author interview, Gotardo 
Miranda Gutiérrez, June 20, 2007; c.f. Comisionado Para la Paz y el Desarrollo 2004). In 
the process of distinguishing repressive and preventative strategies, however, a strong 
fissure develops in the patterns of participation. City center organizations are by and large 
engaged in the “repressive” measures of securing order, such as being present during 
police interventions, filing police reports, and holding officials publicly accountable for 
enforcing laws and bringing justice to criminals. Organizations in the peripheral 
neighborhoods, on the other hand, are allocated the “preventative” measures, including 
night patrols, constructing community centers, organizing youth groups, and generally 
promoting “civic values.” Linked to the source of the citizen security crisis (as seen in 
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Chapter 3 as well), they are consequently held politically responsible for preventing 
future problems.  
The “Achilles’ heal of communal prevention” programs, Dammert wrote, is the 
“tendency towards exclusion, creating a threatening ‘other,’ stigmatized as dangerous and 
allegedly legitimized by the community” (Dammert 2005:3). Although she concluded 
that this tendency can be countered through “the design of inclusive politics of 
participation in initiatives that generate higher quality of life for all citizens” (reminiscent 
of the language of “human security”), this chapter presents instances in which 
participatory initiatives have had precisely the opposite effect. As I demonstrate 
ethnographically, government campaigns promoting citizen security as “everybody’s 
task” masked deep disjunctures of participatory governance. In practice, the 
“responsibility” to solve problems of urban insecurity was allocated differentially, such 
that peripheral and city center neighborhoods were expected to participate in markedly 
different fashions. As participants come to embody citizenship unequally, I argue that 
these “participatory security” programs effectively institutionalize new dimensions to the 
layered imbalances of urban citizenship. In spite of programs purporting to promote 
“inclusive” participation, we instead see how directly “the map of exclusion goes hand-
in-hand with the map of citizen security” (Bengoa 2000:53). 
Faces of “Seguridad Ciudadana” 
Documenting Insecurity: Neighborhood Organization of Jirón Asamblea 
Just one day after Ayacucho’s provincial municipality declared a ninety-day 
citizen security emergency resulting from violence attributed to the city’s nightlife, 
government officials carried out the latest in a long stream of interventions to forcefully 
close several unlicensed nightclubs. The clubs in question were concentrated along the 
first two blocks of Jirón Asamblea, radiating out from the city’s historic main plaza. 
Following requests from municipal officials organizing the closures, a group of women 
from the street’s neighborhood organization (junta vecinal) took a public stand, holding 
signs and chanting outside of the clubs being closed. Towards the end of the operation, 
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while the State Attorney for Crime Prevention (Fiscal de la Prevención del Delito) was 
finishing his report and the police were still on guard, the president of the neighborhood 
organization was allegedly held at knife-point by the infamous owner of one of the clubs, 
who threatened that if she continued to press for closures she would be killed. 
The next morning (September 2, 2004) seven of those women went to file an 
official report with formal testimonies in the State Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía). 
One at a time, the women took a seat at one of the three large metal desks crammed into 
the small room, opposite a government employee who took their testimonies, guiding 
their answers in what seemed to be to be a less-than-objective fashion: “The guy was 
wearing a yellow jacket, right? Yes.” Música latinoamericana was playing on a small 
battery-operated radio sitting on one of the other desks. The rest of the women waited on 
the balcony overlooking the colonial courtyard as they recounted the previous night’s 
events and shared their own stories of living amidst the nightclubs. Despite the scripted 
quality to their narratives, it was clear that the personal stories had not yet circulated 
within their newly-formed organization, and although most of them were long-time 
residents of the neighborhood, they did not know each other.  
The women also intended to talk personally with Jaime Cuadros, the State 
Attorney who was present during the incident, hoping to include his testimony in their 
report. They were polite but relentless as they returned time after time to request an 
appointment, repeatedly turned away by his secretary (“he’s busy, come back later”). The 
turning point came when a separate group of young women were given an appointment, 
and the members of the neighborhood organization began to cause commotion. They 
recognized the women as employees in the closed nightclubs, and considered this the 
ultimate offense: How is it possible, they objected loudly, that the doors are open for 
those women who work in illegal businesses, who are prostitutes [their most frequent 
accusation against the female workers], but they are closed to us when we were just 




PHOTO 8.2 – Jirón Asamblea junta vecinal member, giving testimony in the Fiscalía. (September 
2, 2004.) 
Given the prominent position of Fiscal Cuadros in the city’s administration, his 
office was notably unequipped. He had no computer (that was on his secretary’s desk 
outside) nor type-writer (also on his secretary’s desk). There was no office phone. Only 
countless manila folders labeled across the front with highlighter, and loose A4 paper on 
which he jotted random notes and scribbles. He was cordial to the women but adamant 
that he would not provide a testimony and defensive against their pleas. As they stressed 
the risks that they ran as common citizens he interjected continuously with comments 
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reminding them that he was also at risk: “They easily could have stuck a knife in me, 
too…. All of us there last night exposed ourselves, not just you.” As the women reiterated 
that “we are witness to [these problems] and we are here fighting on behalf of the whole 
community (pueblo),” the Fiscal snapped back: “do you think I’m not working?” The 
conversation ended abruptly, dissatisfying for all parties. 
This neighborhood organization had a singular mission that was intimately tied to 
the continuing operation of nightclubs in the city center, but their forms of engagement 
were often not by their own design. As they explained to the Fiscal, “we were told [by the 
mayor] that our presence was important [during the police intervention]. That’s the only 
reason that we were there!” Despite being visibly shaken from the previous night’s 
events, and still lacking assurances that their safety was protected, the same group of 
women gathered together again that night, determined to be a part of the municipality’s 
ongoing efforts. The mood at the beginning was decidedly somber, and they agreed that 
they would not carry signs and certainly not shout their well-known and provocative 
chants. Instead, their task was to “just observe,” to participate through being present 
(presenciar). They waited until the streets were thoroughly closed with police blockades 
and even the city’s one tank, and they stationed themselves across the street from the 
action, well-blocked by police dogs with muzzles and municipal security (serenazgo) in 
riot gear. The women watched until it started to get dark and then they walked home 
together for safety. 
These women requested that I accompany them on countless visits to most of the 
city’s governmental offices.2 Sometimes they requested that I accompany them in their 
activities because they thought my presence would bring more attention to their cause 
(which was certainly the case for their protest marches). For the trip to the Fiscalía, 
                                               
2 The list of offices involved in this nightlife problematic is indeed impressive. It includes: Provincial 
Mayoral Office (Municipalidad Provincial de Huamanga), Regional Government (Gobierno Retional), 
State Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía), Prefecture (Prefectura), State Supreme Court (Corte Suprema), 
as well as the Municipal Offices of Citizen security (Subgerencia de Seguridad Ciudadana), Neighborhood 
Participation (Subgerencia de Participación Vecinal), Historic Center (Subgerencia de Centro Histórico), 
Municipal Enforcement (Unidad de Ejecución Coactiva). Also on the list of regular visits were the local 
offices of the National Institute of Civil Defense (INDECI, Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil) and the 
National Institute of Culture (Instituto Nacional de Cultura). 
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however, my presence was requested because they thought that they would be taken more 
seriously – and treated better – if I was there as a “witness” to their testimony, even 
though I was not a witness to the attack itself. Afterwards, the women all agreed that the 
Fiscal himself had “never before” been as nice to them as he was that day. Nonetheless, 
one junta member wondered aloud after the visit, “is it worth the effort” (valdrá la pena)? 
Even the president could veer toward pessimism, but would catch herself midstream, 
returning to her promises and her commitment to the community: “sometimes I just want 
to throw in the towel, I’m tired, but I think that [to be] defeated would be worse, it would 
be to disappoint so many people” (personal communication, April 20, 2005). 
Enforcing seguridad: Neighborhood Organization in Los Olivos 
On a sunny Sunday morning (April 10, 2005), hundreds of residents of Los 
Olivos, one of the sprawling neighborhoods on the far southeast side of the city, were 
gathered for a communal work party (faena). They were preparing a newly-acquired dirt 
plot for the construction of a community center, and it was dusty and hot as they worked 
with picks and shovels, women and men, young and old: they dug large trenches, piled 
the dirt into high mounds, brought in more dirt on plastic tarps from the unpaved street 
outside, mixed it together, filled the trenches back in, packed it down hard, and then 
repeated the routine. At the back of the plot, under a blue plastic tarp precariously 
attached to a one-room adobe building, another team of women worked around open 
fires, preparing several huge pots of hominy and tripe stew for the crew doing the heavy 
labor. After several hours, the president called an end to the work and began a general 
meeting of the relatively new neighborhood organization for the Asociación de Los 




PHOTO 8.3 – Work party (faena) in Los Olivos. (April 10, 2005) 
Shortly after initiating the meeting, the president of the Association abandoned his 
finicky microphone and, at full voice, launched into a plea for greater participation from 
the neighborhood members in the affairs of the association. He reminded them 
emphatically of the risks associated with being community leaders (dirigentes) who were 
trying to “do something for our zone.” They received frequent threats and “could die at 
any moment,” he said, and they needed everybody to get involved (meter la mano), to 
demonstrate dedication, commitment, enthusiasm, and “love.” Today is not like 
yesteryear, he said, when “everything was obligation and punishment” from community 
elders. Today “we live in a democracy,” and the wellbeing of Los Olivos depends not 





PHOTO 8.4 – Neighborhood security meeting in Los Olivos. (April 10, 2005) 
Los Olivos reaches into the most marginalized geographic corners of the city, one 
of the many urban expanses that are barely illuminated at night and serviced by only a 
few wide and dusty unpaved arteries. It is located in the district municipality of San Juan 
Bautista, infamous for being the most dangerous district of the city.3 Nonetheless, 
residents of Los Olivos were proud of their past successes in reducing the common crime 
and gang activities that were rampant in the early years when it  was first populated and 
was considered a “no-man’s land.” They now claimed to have not a single active gang in 
their zone, having instead incorporated former members into the community’s many 
grassroots organizations and youth groups.4 
Central on the agenda that day was a discussion about alternative strategies that 
Los Olivos could adopt for maintaining their security. This agenda was propelled by the 
                                               
3 As I found during my neighborhood surveys, this reputation of the district of San Juan is held throughout 
the city, including in its own marginalized neighborhoods. See also Reynaga Farfán and Pantoja 2007. 
4 This process of incorporating gang members into formally registered “youth organizations” is by no 
means isolated to Los Olivos (c.f. Strocka 2006). There are also several former gang members who have 
been incorporated into the provincial municipality’s serenazgo force (author interviews, April 5, 2005 and 
April 8, 2005). See also Instituto de Defensa Legal 2005. 
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presence and emotional appeals of the young man who was working as the sole night 
patrol for the zone, “risking his life” in confrontations every night with “gang members 
and drunks.” He had come to the meeting because his boss refused to pay him, saying 
that residents of Los Olivos were not paying their monthly quota for the security service. 
He preemptively responded to allegations that residents “don’t see him on their street,” 
and therefore didn’t feel obliged to pay for the service, by saying that he cannot service 
all places at once: “I’m not a machine and I can’t fly.” It’s not fair, he concluded, to make 
him work if they weren’t going to pay him. By the end of the meeting the options were 
clear: either community members could vote to pay monthly quotas to continue hiring 
security service through an agreement overseen by the Association, or community 
members could vote to organize themselves in nightly patrols for their own neighborhood 
security, as they had done for years in the past and as other areas continued to do.  
Throughout the conversation, as opinions and perspectives were voiced, the two 
options were repeatedly framed within the discourse of responsibility and the need to 
“organize” in order to fight for their own community’s needs. A youth organizer lectured 
fellow youth about fighting for their future: “there is still a lot to be done, we need to 
organize ourselves and commit ourselves.” Someone grabbed a radio provided by the 
municipality and radioed the central command to demonstrate that they indeed worked, 
but immediately the municipal serenazgo representative (and fellow resident) explained 
in detail how it was up to residents to use their whistles when there was a problem, to 
“surround a thief from all sides so he can’t escape.” Another member in charge of 
neighborhood security (seguridad vecinal) reprimanded residents for not making proper 
use of the whistles that had been provided to the Association by the municipality for the 
purposes of local security measures, saying that they were only being used in carnival: 
“We can’t wait for the authorities to take care of our problems, everybody has to help, 
don’t wait for the whip to be thrown like old times!” 
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Geographies of Seguridad, Geographies of Citizenship 
These two moments of neighborhood organization demonstrate certain critical 
differences in forms of participation and patterns of engagement in citizen security 
strategies in the city. Quite literally, members of these different communities were 
embodying differential citizenship: while city center residents participated through 
indirect security activities such as filing police reports or “witnessing” police 
interventions, residents of the peripheral community participated directly and physically 
through manual labor such as building their own community center or performing their 
own neighborhood night security patrols.5 
Moreover, the relationships and interactions that these neighborhood 
organizations have with municipal officials expose fault lines within the rubric of 
“participation” and the definition of “democratic responsibility.” The power dynamics 
involved are evident in the perspective of the current director of Citizen Security, who 
qualified an explanation of possible institutional support for neighborhood organizations 
by saying “but first, we want to see that the population and the neighborhood 
organizations meet their responsibilities as citizens.”6 In setting the parameters of these 
“responsibilities,” municipal citizen security programs value and cultivate certain kinds 
of relationships and activities over others, and the criteria that are formulated for 
evaluating exemplary forms of participation vary from one segment of the population to 
another. 
Most members of city center juntas vecinales occupied an influential structural 
position in the city’s society, in which they were socially, politically, and economically 
capable of putting considerable pressure on specific authorities. Junta members often had 
familial ties to specific acting officials or relationships with governing political parties 
(which was APRA at that time). They often had extensive experience with the hierarchies 
                                               
5 Lund Lund 2001) provides an ethnographically rich account of the inequitable and patterned embodiment 
of citizenship in Peru, describing how the process of acquiring official documents requires citizens to 
physically perform the layers of State bureaucracy by walking from one office to another, waiting in lines, 
acquiring a relationship that is at once intimate and marginalizing. 
6 Author interview, José Antonio Antezana, July 5, 2007, emphasis added 
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and infrastructure of local government and were comfortable and confident moving 
around the government offices that were scattered throughout the city center. They could 
also apply pressure through the very public and powerful medium of the media, since as 
prominent families, important local business owners, and respected professionals, their 
complaints and accusations appeared frequently in print, radio, and television news. 
Where they encountered lukewarm reception from reporters or news sources they were 
neither intimidated nor inconvenienced by the fees charged to have their prepared 
statements read in their entirety. Despite wielding enormous public pressure and 
possessing direct and personal relationships with key government officials, however, 
neighborhood organization members in the city center most often felt that their efforts 
were futile and that they were not taken seriously. More palpable still was the sense that 
their role in the city’s citizen security controversies, and the associated risks, went 
unacknowledged. 
Many non-governmental agencies and government forums for dialogue and 
consensus (such as the mesas de concertación) endorse “citizen vigilance” (vigilancia 
ciudadana) as a “principal tool” of democratic participation and the abstract civil 
responsibility to hold government authorities accountable in their official duties 
(fiscalizar) (Transparencia n.d.). This is precisely the civic activity that most occupied the 
agendas of juntas vecinales such as Jirón Asamblea’s. Their principal actions were 
limited to a particular category of formalized interactions with state institutions: filing 
continuous official documents in government institutions, such as complaints (denuncias, 
reclamos) or demands (solicitudes, memoriales). While some of their complaints were 
against other members of civil society (such as discoteca owners, as in the case described 
above), the vast majority of complaints were against specific government officials for not 
enforcing municipal resolutions and ordinances and for not carrying out their duties. 
Another form of their civic engagement with citizen security policies was through a 
powerful campaign for municipal accountability, raising public awareness of corruption 
and incompetence in the municipality and demanding that officials commit themselves to 
securing citizen security. 
 248 
Inside of the municipal offices, however, “participation” is defined and evaluated 
through another set of criteria. This is nowhere stronger than in the realm of citizen 
security, where participation is framed as synonymous with collaboration in the practical 
implementation of municipal security strategies. “Vigilance” as practiced by the city 
center organizations is perceived as an obstacle to effective collaboration and a hindrance 
to realizing the municipality’s “broad” agenda of citizen security. One critical component 
to the relationship that city center neighborhood organizations had with municipal 
officials is that they all organized on their own accord and were not representative of the 
municipality’s official initiatives in the formation of neighborhood organizations. Not 
only were they often antagonistic towards government officials, they did not follow the 
municipality’s priorities in identifying citizen security concerns, and as a result they 
received no institutional support (logistical or material) from civil participation programs. 
Alexi Avilez, then-director of the municipal office of Neighborhood Participation 
(Subgerencia de Participación Vecinal) justified this decision very explicitly by 
observing that they were too “limited” to their singular concern over nightlife in the city 
center and did not work for “citizen safety at every level” (author interview, April 5, 
2005), meaning that they did not share the same set of priorities outlined in the provincial 
municipality’s “forty-one identified factors” for insecurity in the city (Comité Provincial 
de Seguridad Ciudadana de Huamanga 2004b). As long as the city center neighborhood 
organizations did not share this agenda, with the same approximate idea of priorities, then 
they would receive no institutional support, they would be hard pressed for warm 
welcomes, and they would not be considered an “exemplary” form of civil participation. 
Although municipal officials wished that the city center organizations shared the 
municipality’s citizen security agenda and they were sometimes visibly exasperated by 
the physical absence of residents when the going got tough, there were limits to what was 
expected or needed from them. In practice, the women were not expected to take physical 
action in the realm of citizen security, such as manual labor in constructing civic centers 
or performing night rounds themselves. Such expectations were held, by contrast , of 
neighborhood organizations in the peripheral areas, and the forms of engagement 
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practiced by residents in Los Olivos fit squarely into municipal conceptions of ideal 
forms of participation. 
The high value placed upon activities in areas such as Los Olivos reflects the 
city’s concept of participation in general, in which local control over these activities was 
an integral part of its citizen security strategies. In the world of circulating statistics about 
insecurity in Ayacucho, one of the most-repeated concerned the “three hundred” police 
officers allocated for the entire metropolitan city. This dreadfully small force was barely 
enough, the argument went, for protecting the city center and it was certainly not 
sufficient to reach the peripheral areas. District security forces (serenazgo) were equally 
undersized: the district of San Juan Bautista (in which Los Olivos was located) was home 
to over thirty-five thousand residents but boasted only six individuals in their municipal 
security forces. One of those members articulated very clearly how their effort worked:  
We are only six … but we work in coordination with all of the juntas vecinales. 
They have been given [handheld] communication devices and they coordinate 
directly with us in the central command in the case of an emergency. It’s because 
of this [coordination] that we are a bit more at ease [tranquilos] in our work 
(author interview, April 6, 2005). 
While working the night shift, one week after expressing this relative “ease,” this 
serenazgo member was severely beaten, from which he was hospitalized and bedridden 
for some time. Chronically under-staffed and confronting direct physical attacks on their 
personnel, municipal security forces depended upon the kind of coordinated local control 
over security (mainly at night) that was being negotiated in the Los Olivos meeting.  
The district of San Juan Bautista was the first in the city to establish a serenazgo 
force in 1998, two years before the provincial municipality (Acuerdo de Concejo No. 
059-2000-MPH/CM). From its initial conception, it was designed to function as a joint 
effort between the municipality and organized civil groups, such as neighborhood 
organizations. In fact, initially all district residents were required to pay monthly dues for 
the security operation with the specific amount varying according to the individual’s 
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residency zone.7 Coordinated participation of grassroots organizations continues to fill 
the persistent funding gaps in municipal security programs. While the municipality 
provides organizations in peripheral areas with some provisions, these supplies were so 
limited that neighborhood groups frequently had to organize their own events and 
activities to raise money to purchase additional supplies, such as whistles, sticks, or 
whips (chicotes), in order to outfit their night patrols (author interview, April 6, 2005). 
The municipality trusted and depended upon the neighborhood organizations in 
Los Olivos, providing them with precious resources reserved only for the most exemplary 
neighborhood organizations. Local organizers in Los Olivos, however, held an alternative 
interpretation of their relationship with the municipality. Underlying the discussion 
during the citizen security meeting was the tacit – and sometimes clearly articulated – 
assumption that local problems in Los Olivos will not be solved through formalized 
relationships with the municipality or institutionalized avenues of engagement with 
government institutions. Police and serenazgo are secondary affairs, necessary for 
subsequent formal procedures but not to be relied upon for the critical tasks of capturing 
delinquents, protecting their neighborhood, and assuring security and order. 
Justice in Our Own Hands:  
Geographies of Security Revisited 
Throughout this dissertation, our discussion has touched upon many layers to the 
perception of a geography of criminality or violent dispositions. First, it began with a 
discussion of how particular forms of youth entertainment are widely associated with 
violent encounters and criminal actions, and how a myth of musical exclusivity assumes 
that those entertainment practices correspond neatly with geographic sectors of the city. 
Second, upon this layer of judgment and morality came an additional layer as these ideas 
were translated into public policies that sought to expel certain forms of entertainment 
from the city center in an effort to prevent crime and preserve security and “order” in the 
                                               
7 La Calle, January 12, 1998 page 4. 
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city center. Third, in this chapter we have just added a layer, revealed in citizen security 
programs that developed different expectations of “participation” for different segments 
of the population, particularly along the lines of punitive and preventative measures. 
These programs are thoroughly entwined in ongoing demonstrations of authority and 
commitment and debates over the boundaries of responsibility in solving the city’s 
problems.  
A final dimension to this consideration of geographies of criminality is the 
paradoxical treatment of vigilante violence, which is thought to be especially 
characteristic of peripheral communities. While acts of “popular justice” are often 
portrayed as evidence of an ingrained tendency towards violence, they are almost always 
recognized as stemming from a lack of government presence in the peripheral areas and a 
profound distrust of police forces (c.f. Goldstein 2004, Goldstein 2005a). One newspaper 
article, for instance, quoted a neighbor, stating: 
It’s time for the juntas vecinales to get organized because it’s not right to live in 
anxiety while these delinquents raise hell (haga de las suyas), taking advantage of 
the darkness and the remote zones where security forces (efectivos del orden) 
almost never patrol. 
The rationale provided in the media for the anger and the recourse of “popular justice” 
was very straight-forward: crime is on the rise and the lack of police in the peripheral 
areas leaves neighborhoods “abandoned” with no choice but to “take measures into our 
own hands.” 
Paradoxically, communal policing – neighborhoods organizing into juntas to 
maintain security in their own communities – is a central strategy of the seguridad 
ciudadana paradigm. As examined in the opening chapters, these peripheral 
neighborhoods – marginal zones – are characterized as vulnerable to a torn social fabric 
and repeatedly marked as producing delinquency and being the source for the city’s 
problems with crime and violence. As we have seen in this chapter, peripheral areas are, 
as a result, targeted in particular ways for participation in municipal citizen security 
programs, encouraged and logistically supported to conduct their own night patrols and 
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crime prevention strategies. In other words, these acts of popular justice, carried out with 
the whistles, sticks, and whips, provided by the municipality, were an expected and 
anticipated part of crime prevention programs in the city’s peripheral neighborhoods.  
Time after time stories of popular justice reach front page headlines and each time 
they tell a similar story of neighbors responding to the calls or whistles of other 
neighbors, mobilizing to detain – and sometimes punish – petty thieves, criminals, or 
occasionally suspected murderers. The frontpage headlines were dramatic: 
“We’ll bring justice with our own hands!” 
Assassin almost lynched by the pueblo 
2 are saved from being burned alive 
Thief captured and almost strangled 
Although these vigilante acts never ended in death during the time of my fieldwork, the 
language of total vengeance was alarming: we’ll teach them a lesson, “our hand won’t 
shake,” tomorrow they won’t get away alive. Although many of the cases of vigilante 
violence or attempted “popular justice” were spontaneous responses from passersby, 
many others were highly coordinated. I was always shocked and saddened by the acts of 
violence in areas that I knew, and even more so when it was at the hands of neighborhood 
organizations that I knew and respected, whose dedication and concern I admired. Los 
Olivos was no exception, as evident in this statement from one organizer (someone who 
helped me in the field) as he warned officials not to let the murder of a neighbor go 
unpunished: “We want justice….  Los Olivos is organized, the Clubes de Madres, Vaso 
de Leche, the youth, the neighborhood organizations [and] we will take justice into our 
own hands.”8  
Media reports about “popular justice” against criminals were dramatic, and 
perhaps exaggerated, even in local “mainstream” newspapers. One such issue ran a bold 
headline above the fold that read “two are saved from being burned alive” with the 
secondary line “neighbors tired of crime capture delinquents.”9 Below the fold was a 
                                               
8 Correo, July 2, 2005, page 2 
9 Correo, February 8, 2005, pages 1, 4 
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color photo of two men tied to a lamp post, one with his pants around his ankles, and a 
crowd standing around them watching. In bold font, another secondary line reported that 
“the detained are minors”; in accordance, black strips were covering their faces to block 
their identities. After purchasing this breathtaking issue from my regular vendor on the 
street corner I entered the journal’s newly initiated webpage later that evening and 
clicked on the image to get a better look. What opened was a photo without the black 
strips. After my initial surprise at suddenly seeing two faces, what struck my attention 
was that the two men in the photo were without a doubt not minors of 14 and 16 years of 
age, as indicated in the text, but two middle-aged men with potbellies and balding heads. 
They were also clearly not the same people in the photo on page four, the two skinny kids 
showed stripped to their underwear and being dragged around by their hair.  
It is imminently apparent to me that this kind sensationalism around stories 
involving delinquency and popular justice is a critical component not only of the city’s 
fear of crime but also its imagery of a fed-up and organized citizenry on the periphery 
who is also willing to go to violent measures for crime prevention. I suggest that this 
framing is part of the local perception of a geography violence – not only violence 
committed by “criminals” but also that committed by a population that turns to violence 
as a means to combat it. Thus popular perceptions of these neighborhood responses to 
crime are equally informed by the stigma of a violent social character. Consider this 
framing of events in one of the above articles: after finding the victim “savagely beaten” 
and “bathed in blood,” the family and neighbors “immediately went after capturing the 
perpetrators, succeeding in catching them. The enraged relatives didn’t hesitate even one 
instant in beating them and then tying them to the electrical post.”10 
These characterizations of the peripheral areas as prone to violence, evidenced by 
acts popular justice, are tenacious. Importantly, the threat of popular justice was not in 
fact limited to the peripheral areas. A more dramatic and emotional example of this could 
not have been found than the appearance that Luís Zúñiga’s mother made before the 
                                               
10 Correo, February 8, 2004, page 4 
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Provincial Seguridad Ciudadana Committee. As we saw in Chapter 6, her plea was 
emotional and forceful:  
I’m waiting peacefully for the police to do something. But if they don’t, I will 
take justice into my own hands, I will do it! I will make sure my son is 
respected.… When I burn the assassin in the park, don’t you arrest me, don’t you 
arrest me! Just like the assassin is being harbored, don’t arrest me! … I hope that 
this is addressed because if not, Ayacucho will burn and I will lead it! … There 
will be another Ilave here in Ayacucho!11 
Although she accused the officials of not taking the murder seriously because it wasn’t 
the son of “a general” or “the president of the supreme court,” and although she 
rhetorically asked the officials present when they were going to bring justice for the 
pueblo, Luís Zúñiga was the nephew of the recently-resigned local Prefect, and as such 
his family in many ways embodied the city center both socially and politically. Two 
years later, following the murders of several university students after leaving the 
nightclubs, this bereaved mother continued with her battle cry: “I will lead the demand to 
take justice into our own hands if those assassins are not sentenced, jailed, and I ask for 
the death penalty.”12 It was undeniably unusual to hear such direct public threats of 
vigilante justice in the city center – particularly at a government meeting – but in fact I 
was reminded every day of the prevalence and the power of this warning. On my own 
street, a crooked cobble-stone street one block long at the very southern edge of the city 
center’s paved side-streets, hung five hand-written signs. The most visible of them hung 
on the corner of the well-traveled 2 de mayo, and read: “Anyone suspicious / couples – 
cars and strangers will be captured and burned.” Hung by the “señoras de la cuadra,” the 
women of the block (and members of the active junta vecinal), nobody dared remove the 
signs, including the one that hung on the exterior of the home I lived in for nearly two 
and a half years: “Petty thief will be captured and lynched by all of the neighbors.” 
                                               
11 Closed meeting between juntas vecinales from the city center and the Comité Provincial de Seguridad 
Ciudadana, October 12, 2004, Municipalidad Provincial de Huamanga. 
12 Correo, August 10, 2006 
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Presenting a United Front:  
Mediated Relationships, Fissures and Disagreements 
In December 2004, after two failed emergency declarations, the members of the 
Jirón Asamblea neighborhood organization coordinated a well-publicized protest march 
against nightclubs and against specific municipal officials who they deemed incapable or 
unwilling to enforce relevant legislation (examined in detail in chapter 6). Although the 
march was conceived of and organized by a very small group of junta members from 
Jirón Asamblea, the public statements and announcements went out in the name of the 
Federation of Neighborhood Organizations (Federación de Juntas Vecinales). On the day 
of the march, they carried a large banner that simply read “Juntas Vecinales, Ayacucho,” 
stretched across the street between five people. 
The organizers (there were really only two active organizers) proceeded 
confidently in their determination to incorporate a broad spectrum of civil groups in their 
protest march. In addition to the other city center organizations, they calculated that the 
most efficient manner in which to ensure the wide participation of massive numbers of 
people was to go through the central coordinating office for Vaso de Leche. Thus the day 
before the march I accompanied them to the office in Mariscal Cáceres market to make 
arrangements. The electricity had been cut off and the only window in the back room 
opened into the covered market itself so it was quite dark. The women giggled as we 
entered and expressed our surprise. The citywide coordinator was seated behind a large 
metal desk, and there were some ten women sitting in plastic chairs along the wall in a 
circle, most with babies on their backs or attached to one breast, all in skirts, and most 
with hats. After the women introduced themselves and the neighborhood base they 
represented, the junta president began to explain that they needed the strong presence of 
women who are concerned about the future of their kids and all the bad things they’re 
getting involved in at nights. The women nodded, took an informal vote without much 
deliberation, and agreed to participate in the march. In doing so, each one of them 
committed themselves to inform all of the women in their individual base groups of the 
decision, mandating each and every member to participate in the march.  
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The junta vecinal women had brought with them piles – maybe hundreds – of 
handmade placards of large white poster board and a few cloth banners that were to be 
hung on sticks as flags. The messages were themes relating to “children’s rights,” 
decorated with cartoon drawings of kids or roses. They distributed the signs to each 
representative, who would then circulate them to her group the next morning. The junta 
president informed them that the posters, signs, and flags were to stay with Vaso and its 
members in case they were of any use to them later. This surprised the other junta leader 
and she later complained to the president that maybe they could use them for a future 
march or something. No, the president responded, they could always make more and this 
was a nice gesture. By convincing the Vaso de Leche representatives that this was a cause 
worth fighting for, as fellow mothers (madres de familia) concerned about their 
children’s future, these neighborhood organizers tapped into an enormous resource: on 
the day of the march, some one thousand women marched through the city streets 
protesting the city’s nightlife problematic. 
Creating the impression of a broad-based campaign against nightclubs depended 
on further critical, though subtle, suggestions of unity. Just as with the impetus to 
officially register as neighborhood organizations, the increased effect on their ability to 
pressure the government is potentially significant when they are perceived as a 
conglomerate of organized neighborhoods rather than “a couple of residents” (author 




PHOTO 8.5 – “Juntas Vecinales – Ayacucho” banner. The banner was part of a coordinated effort 
to create the appearance of a “united front” against nightclubs and inseguridad. (December 2, 
2004) 
What’s noteworthy, however, is that such an umbrella organization – either a Federación 
de Juntas Vecinales or a conglomerated organizations of “Juntas Vecianles – Ayacucho” 
does not in fact exist. It does not exist in name, nor in practice. During the march, it 
became painfully evident that these groups are also not necessarily united behind a single 
cause. As I walked through and among the marchers that day I came away with the 
distinct impression that most shared a profound concern for the city’s youth and the range 
of social problems such as gangs and drugs. In practice, however, these topics were not 
the guiding purpose of the march. Like a game of telephone, the long line of mediated 
exchanges over what this march was meant to protest resulted in vastly different 
expectations and strong disagreements. While the city center junta vecinal members were 
continuously starting chants and trying to unify the criticisms against the mayor and other 
officials, renegade groups of women towards the back began their own chants, avoiding 
those about nightclubs and repeating their own about youth. For some marchers, the 
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cacophony of complaints was amusing (“everything is here, anything is included!”).  
For other marchers, the disagreements over chants and complaints indicated a 
much deeper rift over the goal of the march and the target of the protest. One disgruntled 
marcher told me: “we came because of gang activity (pandillaje) but they’ve given us 
something else” (namely, nightclubs). Perhaps these kinds of comments were what led 
many media sources afterwards to make pointed accusations that the city center junta 
vecinal members had “bribed” and “deceived” the women from Vaso de Leche (and the 
Comedores Populares) into participating in their march, or even threatened them that if 
they did not participate they would not receive their monthly rations.13 At one point 
during the march I witnessed an awkward exchange between the junta vecinal president 
and the city coordinator for Vaso de Leche, the same two women who had coordinated 
the previous day’s meeting in the market: you told us this would be a peaceful (pacífica), 
why do you have to insult the Mayor when he’s the one who supports our program! (She 
was perturbed above all by the sign on one of the donkeys at the front of the march, 
which hung a nametag reading “I am Mayor Ludeña.”) After the march some of the 
women warned the junta president to not continue dealing with their leader because she is 
a supporter of the Mayor and “doesn’t let them” say what they want.  
While some accusations held that the junta vecinal organizers had tried to 
manipulate the women into a particular kind of protest, others accused the Vaso de Leche 
organizers of trying to manipulate the women into a particular kind of acquiescence. As a 
government program, the member list for Vaso de Leche is maintained by the local 
municipality (author interview, November 13, 2004), which facilitates the suspicions, 
fears, and accusations that the municipality has leverage not only over the purse strings 
but over individuals. The fissures and disagreements that are readily detectable “just 
                                               
13 Having witnessed some of these arrangements, I am comfortable concluding that nobody was threatened 
in this fashion directly by the junta vecinal members. Nonetheless, the hierarchical structure of these 
organizations means that when the representatives agree that the organization will participate in any given 
event, by default all members are required to participate. Their continued good standing (and, eventually, 
their rations) is indeed connected to their cooperation and participation in such events. This is not unique to 
this march and it is not directly related to the proposal from the junta vecinal members or the agreements 
they reached. 
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below the surface” of this march are indications of the mediated relations behind these 
kinds of events. Within the determined attempts to create the impression of unity over a 
shared cause, certain individuals function as “brokers” (Tanaka 2001b), holding 
privileged positions in the relationships of “participation.” 
Participatory Citizenship:  
Paradoxes and Disjunctions 
At first glance it would seem paradoxical that the civic activities found in the 
peripheral neighborhoods, such as Los Olivos are, at least in certain contexts, more 
highly valued by municipal officials than those of the city center and considered more 
exemplary forms of participation. After all, there is a long history of antagonism in Peru 
between civil organizations in marginalized urban areas and the various local and 
national government entities. But an over-simplified dichotomy between center and 
periphery precludes an understanding of this local dynamic. Informed by the historical 
context of the previous chapter, it is now exceptionally clear that forms of organization 
found today in the city center and in peripheral areas (such as Los Olivos) are only the 
most current incarnation in a history of formal relationships with government entities that 
have stipulated the differential involvement and incorporation of neighborhood 
organizations. 
The perspective that marginalized communities are uniquely vulnerable to the 
effects of a “torn social fabric” also informs the common belief that organizations in the 
periphery are better organized, more committed, and more motivated to participate. 
Residents of the city center, it is argued, “don’t participate” (no colaboran) in 
government citizen security programs because they have become too complacent. When 
contrasted with a movementist model, city center forms of engagement (such as 
denuncias or solicitudes) are further interpreted not as legitimate forms of participation 
but as markers of disillusionment and discouragement. Reflecting an ideology about poor 
communities and migrant populations, the theory suggests that residents of the peripheral 
neighborhoods “need” to organize in order “to survive,” or that they organize because 
 260 
they have “more to lose.” An urban version of the essentialized characteristics of “lo 
andino” adds a further overlay, which is beautifully illustrated in municipal legislation 
for the “Participation of Neighborhood Self-Development Organizations.”14 Through the 
language of underdevelopment and marginalized communities, this ordinance celebrates 
the virtues of a hardworking population with high moral and ethical virtues who are 
concerned about the wellbeing of the community, and stipulates that the “foundation” of 
the self-development work carried out in these communities is “the minka – communal 
work and ayni, as a tradition of reciprocity” (Article 10). In addition to maintaining moral 
prestige and rejecting bribery, laziness and gossip, other “obligations” of organization 
members are “obligatory active participation in the work parties (faenas) and scheduled 
shifts (jornada)” as well as “participating actively in the work of citizen security” 
(Article 12). 
A common line of argument in Ayacucho reasons that civil organizations in 
peripheral areas (such as communal kitchens or Mother’s Clubs) were converted by 
Fujimori into mere distributors of centralized and hieararchical clientelist government 
control, and the protests from members of these aid programs are commonly discredited 
in local media as being the voice of populism. As the lasting popularity (and efficacy) of 
government aid programs are likewise dismissed as merely “recycling the misery,” they 
are stripped of any other meaning. In response to the racist tinges of these 
characterizations, Peruvian scholars researching these forms of barrio organization have 
gone to great lengths to demonstrate that they are not social spaces devoid of political 
action and meaning.15 Today, organizations such as the communal kitchens are framed as 
examples par excellence of the possibilities and potentials of democracy to incorporate 
barrio residents in governance through participatory venues such as the Mesas de 
Concertación (Blondet and Trivelli 2004).  
A markedly different line of analysis argues that as Toledo’s new government 
                                               
14 Ordenanza Municipal No 18-2001-MPH/A 
15 Steven Gregory observed a similar trend in scholarship on black inner-city communities in the United 
States (Gregory 1998:8-9). 
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sought to disassociate these aid programs from previous populist politics by eliminating 
the payouts to participants, they took an ideology that it is “not good” to simply give 
handouts to the poor, and they converted it into the expectation that poor women (in 
particular) should volunteer their time to projects aimed at improving their 
neighborhoods (Mortensen 2009). In this chapter we have seen similar patterns in the 
model of participatory security, whereby communities on the periphery of the city are 
expected to govern their own security, to volunteer their own time and bodies. It is in this 
vein that my analysis of differential and exclusionary geographies of participation 
likewise challenges a facile assumption that their involvement in “participation” 
programs results in governing practices that better respond to their priorities, let alone a 
radical change toward more inclusionary citizenship. Instead we see how ideologies of 
social difference (including class and race) are projected through democratic programs of 
“participation” and engagement in local governance.  
By examining patterns of civil participation and protest in relation to one another, 
my consideration of political engagement throughout the dissertation diverges from some 
of the most common bodies of literature on popular involvement in democratic politics 
and the relationships between community organizations and government programs. On 
the one hand, research on social movements, whether looking at “instrumentalist” and 
“resource-management” movements or the “new” movements organized around issues of 
“identity” (c.f. Alvarez et al. 1998 Alvarez, et al. 1998 or Escobar and Alvarez 1992), 
largely places prime emphasis on movements that are at best peripheral to state 
institutions but usually extra-institutional and often antagonistic to those state institutions. 
On the other hand – and in sharp contrast – contemporary literature on “democratic 
participation” emphasizes those forms of collective action that are defined precisely 
through their institutionalized affiliation with government programs such as regional or 
municipal consensus forums (mesas de concertación) or coordinating councils (consejos 
de coordinación) (c.f. Carrión 2004, Quintero 2001, Remy 2005, Tanaka 1999, Zárate 
Ardela 2005). (Where social protest is included as a form of participation, it is often the 
exception that proves the rule.) As my own research in Ayacucho suggests, these forums 
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are less instrumental than motivated by abstract idealisms of “democratic participation” 
for the end-goal of democratic “inclusivity” itself, or, in the local parlance, offering a 
space for el pueblo to have voice. They are also dominated by a distinctly center-oriented 
frame of reference with little to no involvement from peripheral organizations.  
Crosscutting these bodies of literature is a parallel distinction regarding direct and 
indirect participation, in which electoral politics (formal participation) is contrasted with 
all other forms of civic engagement in the betterment of community affairs. This broad 
category of “informal” or “direct” participation (participación directa) can include 
anything from grassroots activities such as physical labor, petitioning the government, or 
holding neighborhood meetings, to “citizen vigilance” or involvement in institutional 
forums (c.f. Dietz 1998, Remy 2005). The social organizations and collective actions 
discussed throughout this dissertation cross all of these imaginary divides and complicate 
these relationships. Neighborhood organizations – whether or not they are officially 
“institutionalized” – have a variety of different interactions with the municipal 
government, and these in turn affect their relationships with each other.  
The variety of forms of political engagement presented in this dissertation shifts 
the focus away from “end-goal” motivations and more towards how these forms of 
engagement forge distinct kinds of human relationships. This move avoids the simplistic 
characterization that peripheral organizations are motivated by receiving material goods 
from the government while city center organizations are motivated by the idealisms of 
“inclusion.” It also allows us to see how informal and institutional actions are not 
mutually exclusive but rather that any form of collective action potentially exhibits both 
in varying degrees. Distinctions between “direct” and “indirect” participation, especially 
when mapped onto distinctions between “instrumental” (making demands) and 
“inclusive” (building consensus) participation, are not helpful for understanding patterns 
within different forms of local engagement. Coordinated citizen security efforts such as 
those seen in Los Olivos are a formalized component of municipal policies and strategies, 
although local participants would certainly not characterize this relationship as “direct” or 
“inclusive.” Although the coordination is instrumental in nature, it is equally so for both 
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parties rather than a unidirectional demand upon the government. On the other hand, the 
use of official avenues for filing formal complaints against government officials is an 
instrumental mobilization of city center residents, while at the same time functioning as 
an act of democratic participation through vigilance and accountability. Clearly, 
neighborhood organizations – whether or not they are officially “institutionalized” (either 
by government initiative or by formal registering) – have a variety of different 
interactions with the municipal government, and these in turn affect their relationships 
with each other. 
By examining different forms of protest together with different forms of 
neighborhood organization and civil mobilization, I suggest that these different models of 
engagement, and especially the disagreements over responsibility, reflect distinct 
conceptions of urban citizenship and the rights that accompany it (Holston and Appadurai 
1999). The ideologies of social and spatial segmentation that were explored earlier in the 
dissertation have a substantial bearing on corresponding alignments between causal 
responsibility and political obligation in solving the city’s problems, and as such they lay 
the foundation for understanding the patterns of engagement in government programs 
based upon “citizen participation.” These debates, policies, and practices further reinforce 
existing social differences by placing unequal expectations and demands on different 
segments of the population. While the dominant national and international democratic 
paradigms present security as a right of citizenship, we have seen here that this right is 
not necessarily an inalienable one guaranteed by the state; in some instances, institutional 
programs of citizen security have effectively redirected security to be an earned right of 
urban citizenship. The inequitable result – a disjunctive citizenship  (Holston and 
Caldeira 1998; Mohanty and Tandon 2006) – is effectively naturalized and depoliticized 
through the doctrines of citizen security and participatory democracy. 
I have juxtaposed this array of ethnographic examples in an effort to illuminate 
some of the precise mechanisms by which the ideals of democratic inclusion in public 
governance through civil participation are overpowered by the promotion of differential 
forms of participation and engagement. The disparities in the forms of participation and 
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experiences of engagement examined in this chapter are not simply examples of an 
imperfect system failing to meet an attainable goal of inclusivity. Rather, they remind us 
how highly misleading it would be to suggest that “participation” can ever be fully direct, 
inclusive, or equal; it is by nature filtered through layers of historical relationships and 
experiences, and as such it is highly exclusionary. Interrogating how evaluations of 
“ideal” modes of participation are calibrated to diverse social contexts exposes some of 
these structures of exclusion. In addition, the examples in this chapter illustrate that the 
structured model of neighborhood organization and political participation – which 
champions a myth of unity through (participatory) citizenship – obscures a range of 
important internal fissures. 
It is also at this juncture that we see the full effect of government programs 
espousing that democratic citizenship involves rights as well as responsibilities, derechos 
y deberes. In essence, only the citizens who fulfill their duties (as defined by certain 
institutional programs) are then eligible to exercise their rights, or, in any case, to have 
their demands prioritized and respected by those same institutions. By translating 
geographies of causal and political responsibility for urban insecurity into geographies of 
participation, the citizen security paradigm has the effect of actively reinscribing existing 




Imagine a landscape, one that provides a view of the geographic contours and 
physical characteristics of a small slice of the world; while the vista may be of an 
expansive panorama, it is nevertheless one that is appreciated in that precise way from 
only that precise vantage point. Now make that image a cityscape, revealing the contours 
and characteristics of a specific urban setting, sparking reflection upon the similarities 
and contrasts of urban worlds and curiosities about distinctly urban characteristics. 
Perhaps we can mix this with a soundscape, and further appreciate a unique atmosphere 
and environment fashioned through a slightly less tangible soundtrack that is the 
cacophony of urban sounds, including those of the day and the night. Now take just one 
more step, to imagine these as situated together within a nightscape. I propose this move 
by recalling Appadurai’s creative applications of the suffix –scape, used to explore the 
disjunctures of economic, cultural, and political relationships and to “point to the fluid, 
irregular shapes of these landscapes” (1996:33).  
Through the story of Ayacucho’s nightlife emergency we have been ideally 
positioned to explore a nightscape, evoking not only the physical contours of night spaces 
and the intangible or abstract aspects of night atmospheres, but also the layered 
subjectivities and socialities of the night and the dynamics of night lives. Given that the 
concepts of subjectivity and sociality are the virtual lifeblood of anthropology and its 
sister disciplines, this dissertation suggests the importance of anthropological inquiry into 
the relationship between the night and those core concepts. 
 266 
When the night has appeared as an object of study – or, more often, when the 
people who inhabit the night are taken as an object of study – the most common tendency 
seems to be to subsume it within existing theories of deviance. The result is that many of 
the characteristics ascribed to deviant cultures – and perhaps to subcultures at large – are 
ascribed to the night itself: transgressive and threatening, uncontrollable and unavoidably 
tempting or corrupting. Underneath this portrayal is also a less obvious subtext regarding 
intentionality, suggesting that deviant cultures, and perhaps also transgressive nights, are 
intentional and emphatic, deliberate affronts to hegemonic order.  
There are a few notable alternative portrayals of the night. For one, literature, 
poetry and music is full of imagery of the night as a time and space of loneliness and 
profound suffering. While these portrayals are not of intentional affronts to societal 
norms, they are a-social in a very different way, marking the night as a private and non-
public domain. Another alternative perspective on the night comes from scholarly 
literature on sleep, an equally private and no-public domain, what would appear to be (in 
this literature, in any case) to be an equally un-social activity and domain. These 
portrayals of the night nonetheless share a general lack of attention to how subjectivity 
and sociality are shaped in private and public nights. Even “a-social” or “private” 
activities are intimately and profoundly social in the sense that our behaviors (and 
ideologies) are culturally conditioned and produced, invested with social and cultural 
meanings. Thus we cannot consider sociality and subjectivity in any way apart from the 
night just as we cannot rely upon facile separations between private and public nights.  
These portrayals of the night obscure a critical point: the night does not merely 
transgress daytime norms but also nighttime norms of subjectivity and sociality. By 
narrowly focusing our diecentric theoretical gaze, prioritizing the social and cultural work 
of the day – much of it indeed intentional – we miss the profound spatial-temporal 
dimensions of day-night within the core concepts of subjectivity and sociality. Thus in 
laying the groundwork for a future anthropology of the night, this dissertation offers the 
basic premise that the night is an essential realm of subjectivity, spanning and occupying 
time and space in ways that are fully normalized, internalized, and unmarked. What’s 
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more, the night is an essential realm of sociality, of learning and reproducing what it 
means to be a social being in a given context.  
Through this research we see very clearly that among the first components to the 
relationship between the night and sociality is that the night is deeply ideologized. Like 
most ideologies, these temporal ideologies are largely implicit within our every-day, and 
every-night, thought and practice. They are part and parcel of those very social models – 
the ideological schemes and interpretive frameworks – that give our subjectivity, 
personhood, and sociality direction and meaning.  
Through the nightlife problematic we see how nightlife ideologies encompass 
ideas about urban space and day-night temporality, but also how it extends to serve as a 
potent filter for interpreting urban security and structuring a model of participatory 
security. In more pointed language, therefore, we see how these nightlife ideologies, as 
ideational systems, work to structure, and legitimate, historical patterns of power and 
social inequality in highly consequential ways. 
Reading most contemporary ethnographies of the Andes, one would come away 
probably blissfully unaware of a thriving urban night-life, particularly of night clubs, the 
discotecas. (This is especially true for provincial cities such as Ayacucho, but just as true 
for capital cities as well.) Although a central ethnographic locus of this dissertation was 
indeed this nightlife scene, the journey has not led us into the world of night 
entertainment so much as into the realm of nightlife ideologies and day-night normativity: 
what kinds of spaces and activities were deemed appropriate and acceptable within the 
city center during the day and the night.  
What we see through this study of the debate over nightlife in Ayacucho’s city 
center is that nightlife ideologies – indeed any ideology – cannot be separated from 
concrete social action and the lived experiences of social distinction. The nightlife 
emergency did not only reflect hegemonic ideas about the moral geographies of social 
distinction; instead, these normative ideologies about the night were embodied and 
enacted through the formulation of the nightlife problematic. As these nightlife 
ideologies informed the social and political responses to the debate over nightlife and, in 
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turn, the formulation of the nightlife emergency effectively created social distinctions. In 
other words, it was precisely through the formulation of a nightlife emergency – shaped 
as it was by ideologies of social difference – that the historical patterns of prejudice, of 
power and inequality, were reinscribed.   
This brings us to a second important component of the relationships between the 
night and the nature or formation of subjectivity and sociality: in some instances the night 
is not only ideologized but also highly politicized. Moreover, as we see clearly in the case 
of Ayacucho’s nightlife emergency, time and space are ideologized and politicized 
together. We see this most clearly in the political struggle that emerged as a response to 
the nightlife emergency, namely the struggle to define, control and regulate night space in 
the city center. By saying ‘night spaces,’ however, I draw attention to the multiple layers 
of overlap between the spatial and the temporal. The most obvious of the “night spaces” 
are those venues set aside for night entertainment through a nightlife industry, such as the 
discotecas, the concert venues, or the spaces temporarily converted to host a chicha 
concert. But spatial-temporal ideologies also fundamentally concern the socially 
produced space of the “city center” itself, which depends upon a continuous reproduction 
of a certain degree of coherence between its days and its nights. 
While these relationships between the spatial and temporal are politicized 
together, they are nonetheless often politicized differently. On the one hand, the 
individual venues were most frequently targeted by the increasing number of political and 
legal directives. The clubs were repeatedly cited for violating municipal regulations and 
slapped with countless fines. They were also central players in the spectacular cat-and-
mouse game of forced closures and confiscations. However, these regulations and 
directives were more like little political bullets aimed only at individual venues. They 
were guided by a differently politicized moral politics that shaped the range of spatial and 
temporal governing strategies in the city in other ways as well. For example, this moral 
politics motivated the much-contested two-block rule that was designed to “protect” 
schools, churches, and the main plaza from the corrupting influence of the night industry. 
Extending the dimensions of prohibition even further was the proposal to expel night 
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venues from the city center entirely by creating a designated “entertainment district” in 
the city’s periphery. 
Thus, another central proposition emerging from this research is that these 
political struggles involve deep imbalances of urban citizenship. This is perhaps most 
visible through the recursive appearances of the ideologies of social distinction. 
Crosscutting the temporal duality of day and night as well as the spatial imagery of city 
center and periphery we see the oppositions of decent versus transgressive night spaces; 
likewise, we see how the dichotomies of healthy versus dangerous activities are mirrored 
in the perceptions of social victim versus social perpetrator of patterns of criminality. 
This blueprint is then repeated, as the geographies of social distinction map directly 
(though maybe not neatly) onto geographies of urban insecurity. Over the course of the 
dissertation we see the complex junctures where ideologies of social distinction are fully 
entwined with mechanisms of governance within the same social field and the same 
ideological domain.  
The nightlife emergency thus positioned us perfectly to interrogate the cultural 
and social disjunctures of the “imagined worlds” of the day and the night, the economic 
paradoxes in concerns about the night, the patterned inequities that are embodied through 
the night, as well as the political imperatives that emerge from the night. In this 
dissertation we have seen how a model of normative sociality that includes the night 
provides novel insights into the spatial and temporal dimensions of urban governance and 
municipal responses to urban “social problems.” From the specific and defined vantage 
point of Ayacucho’s nightlife problematic we have cast our gaze along the panorama of 
the cultural, social, and political contours of this urban space.  
This inquiry into the politics of night space and night life in Ayacucho thus 
extended well beyond an investigation into the process of problematizing nightlife. This 
conceptualization of nightlife ideologies further unifies the story by connecting the initial 
sphere of fears over changing night socialities to the vastly different terrain of 
participatory governance and disjunctive citizenship. A social issue, once defined as a 
“problem” in this way (and even a crisis or emergency), compels response, it demands 
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that something be done to rectify the discord, to solve the problem. Thus the nightlife 
emergency served also as an entryway for the close examination of how the politics of 
prejudice and discrimination that initially problematized night lives in certain (and 
predictable) ways, were then converted into tangible and defined policies of prohibition 
and prevention. Not only do we see how ideas of transgression and danger coalesced into 
a security emergency, we also see how a social crisis was translated into concrete 
political strategies of social order through the paradigm of citizen security.  
The circulating and increasingly popular doctrine of citizen security that was 
adopted as a rhetorical tool in the formulation of the nightlife problematic was persuasive 
in the public definition of a social and political crisis. Because this doctrine did not exist 
in isolation, but was instead embedded in a defined set of institutions and relationships, it 
effectively transported the nightlife emergency directly into a particular model of 
governance that was beginning to combine the principles of democratic participation with 
the goals and conceptualizations of urban security. By this point, “citizen security” was 
circulating widely within an interdiscursive field. While the formulation of a public 
position against nightlife in the city center dovetailed with the institutionalization and 
circulation of a fresh citizen security doctrine and apparatus, the relationship between 
these two parts was far from straightforward. Looked at from one vantage point, we see 
that the nightlife problematic – as a political agenda – depended heavily upon an existing 
ideology of social distinction. The convergence of certain key ideological interpretations 
of the nightlife scene with the circulating discourse of security thrust the new political 
system of seguridad ciudadana into public consciousness with an unexpected urgency. 
With the official declaration of an emergency, the nightlife problematic endowed the 
citizen security apparatus with immediate and timely social and political significance.  
Looked at from another vantage point, however, we also see that the old systems 
of distinction were already falling on deaf ears: the frequent lamentations over how “the 
good old days” were being lost, corrupted by new night entertainment practices, were no 
longer powerful enough (if in fact they ever were) to inspire broad concern and motivate 
sustained political action. While these public statements increased exponentially, as 
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residents focused their campaign against the night clubs and organized into a formal 
neighborhood organization, few Ayacuchanos seemed to take their initial pleas very 
seriously. While some people found their initial moral crusade rather humorous, the 
reactions changed quite dramatically once the concerns were recast from moral 
corruption to physical security. Who could deny these women the desire to raise their 
children and grandchildren in safe environments? Who would not be moved by the 
personal stories of sleep-deprived school kids and young children frightened by the racket 
on the street outside their windows? Who could turn a blind eye on the mounting 
concerns that nights in the historic city center were becoming increasingly more 
dangerous, more violent, and more criminal? 
The process of adopting the citizen security doctrine as a resource in the case 
against the dangers of the city’s nightlife scene infused existing nightlife ideologies with 
new energy. In spite of the nagging disagreements and sometimes antagonistic 
relationships between different factions involved in the debate over the regulation of 
night spaces, the unification of these interpretive frameworks – social distinction and 
urban security – made the nightlife problematic into a powerful, albeit short-lived, social 
and political engine. This shift to incorporate the discourse of security was critical, and 
the persuasive power of “security” cannot be underestimated – probably not in most 
circumstances, but absolutely not in this case. When the high school student from a 
prominent family was murdered leaving a night club, the case was all but closed and the 
social emergency was converted into a public problem virtually over night.  
At the apex of the official response was the emergency declaration. Though aimed 
directly at governing, regulating, and controlling the nightlife scene in the city center, the 
ordinance declared the entire province to be in an urban security emergency. In 
considering how such an emergency declaration became a plausible response to nightlife, 
we first saw that rhetoric alone (whether of morality or security or both) was not enough 
to bring about such a dramatic change in governing strategies. The widely-publicized 
murder provided that grain of truth that the moral panic needed buried within. All the 
same, that murder alone would also not have been enough. The sustained ideological 
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campaign already at work against the city’s nightlife was the interpretive framework that 
catapulted the murder into public consciousness not merely as a tragic event but as 
indicative of a much broader public problem of urban security. It was this potent 
combination of morality and security that made an emergency declaration a plausible 
response to nightlife concerns.  
As we have seen, “citizen security” was in many ways a ready tool to be adopted 
and adapted in the moral and legal campaign against nightlife in the city center. At the 
same time, however, citizen security was also much more than a doctrine, or a set of 
political beliefs and priorities. Its persuasive power – and influence – extended well into 
the realm of governance as well. It was also a political system, institutionalized through 
official political apparatuses and programs into a set of concrete imperatives and 
structured relationships, complete with infrastructure and budgets. Moreover, the design 
of this apparatus was modeled upon the existing paradigms of citizen participation. And 
“participation,” much more than a discourse, operates as a form of governmentality, a 
political strategy of social control (c.f. Paley 2001). 
I have termed these municipal security programs “participatory security” in order 
to draw attention to the complicated relationships between the doctrines of citizen 
security and the philosophies underpinning participatory democracy. What we see 
through these experiences with “participatory security” is a rather different dimension to 
the “paradoxes of participation,” one that holds significant implications for our 
understandings of participatory governance more broadly. The rhetoric of “commitment” 
and “risk” for the future of the city operated through a powerful ideology of the 
“common good” that was, in practice, anything but common since the allocation of 
“responsibility” to maintain urban security was highly differential. Quite simply, 
communities, residents, and citizens were not all expected to participate equally. Even 
more noteworthy, far from an inalienable right provided by the state, “security” was, in 
practice, in fact an earned right. 
In the cases examined here, “citizen security” and “citizen participation” – as 
ideologies, philosophies and doctrines – served to naturalize social inequalities by erasing 
 273 
or eliding the layers of underlying structural factors. Perhaps more importantly, we also 
see that as the doctrine of “citizen participation” in urban security was further 
institutionalized, it effectively depoliticized the lived or experiential disjunctures of urban 
citizenship. Seen from this perspective, the juxtaposition of the different experiences 
within the citizen security system casts a rather dark shadow over an idealism regarding 
the possibilities for participatory governance to foster inclusivity and equality in a 
radically new fashion. 
By the end of the dissertation, therefore, we are able to fully appreciate the weight 
of the ideological constructions held within the problematic. Once marked the 
communities in the periphery were marked as the socio-cultural source of crime and 
violence – held causally responsible for the whole city’s insecurity – they were then also 
held responsible for solving the problems of insecurity. Coming full circle, the 
fundamental social and political distinctions were thus reinscribed in the philosophy of 
citizen participation, whereby communities were differentially expected to perform and 
embody the city’s security. Although the transformation of the social crisis into a public 
problem effectively politicized certain moral evaluations of social difference, the 
philosophy of participation that guided the political response effectively depoliticized the 
internal divisions and inequities. Through the disproportionate burden to uphold the city’s 
“common good,” and rights conditional upon unequal participation, we see the 
fundamental disjunctures of urban citizenship in new light. 
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EPILOGUE 
The Episodic Problematic 
I returned to Ayacucho in 2007, exactly two years after finishing my primary 
period of fieldwork. Although I knew of the plans to close Jirón Asamblea to traffic 
(these proposals were already under discussion during my fieldwork), it was still 
shocking to see the street converted into a pedestrian walkway. All but one of the night 
clubs that were located there – such central figures in the recent social and political scene 
and in my own research – had since closed, at last “indefinitely,” or so it would seem. 
One had become a clothing store (though supposedly owned by the same person who ran 
the club), another a restaurant, a third remained empty with a “for rent” sign in the 
window…. The most recognized and celebrated club/peña had also closed, and the 
owners had moved away from Ayacucho (rumor had it that they had opened another club 
in an upscale neighborhood of Lima). The historic building that had been in the owner’s 
family for generations was sold. I admit to feeling the overwhelming strength of absence 
as I looked at the shuttered second floor balconies and recalled with fondness the hours I 
spent talking with the owner, about Ayacucho, business, entertainment, faith, and life, 
though certainly not always in that order. I didn’t have the opportunity on that visit to 
return and talk again with the young musicians who had been broken-in to the world of 
live performance in that venue; how I wondered what the permanent closure meant to 
them now and how they were responding. The owner had been president of one of the 
club-owner organizations, a frequent public face defending the business and the young 
musicians and employees who spent their nights working in the club. And I recalled how 
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often she stressed to me that she was certainly not in Ayacucho because business was so 
great and easy (raising her eyebrows to suggest the opposite) but because she loved 
Ayacucho. 
As the president of the junta vecinal Asamblea wrote to me in an email 
communication “you cannot imagine how peaceful and safe it is now.”16 Although some 
of the business-owners along Jirón Asamblea (especially hotel owners) feared that they 
might lose business by closing it to cars, by all appearances businesses were thriving. 
Several nice hotels had opened, the spaces in the city’s one vertical “mall” were 
occupied, the streets were jam-packed with people throughout the day. In fact, however, 
one single club continued to operate on the end of the second block of Jirón Asamblea. 
And its presence continued to disturb the hotel next door. But the junta had given up, and 
in a cold and calculated manner the president explained that no, they were not pressing 
the case even though the hotel owners were practically begging: the hotel owners had 
always been “too busy” to come to meetings, they never “collaborated” before, when the 
junta organizers were in the trenches fighting with the municipality and club owners, so 
why should they risk their lives again now for them. 
Once the specific clubs that most offended the organized residents of Jirón 
Asamblea left their immediate surroundings, the junta lost its steam and the organized 
efforts “on behalf of the pueblo” simply fizzled. In addition, one of the main ringleaders 
of the junta’s campaign to publically pressure the municipality had moved away with no 
plans to return, and the president simply didn’t have the time or energy to pursue the 
struggle alone. That, and the fact that the government offices they spent the most time 
visiting had moved, the mayoral office was no longer on the main plaza but four blocks 
up the hill, and the Fiscalía had moved to a new building out near the cemetery. It was 
“too complicated” and “inconvenient” to continually go and pressure them. The 
Asamblea president joked that the Fiscalía had moved that far away “purposely” so they 
wouldn’t be harassed so often by the women in the city center junta. Of course, this was 
                                               
16 Author communication, December 21, 2006. 
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only a joke: in the big picture the mono-cause of night clubs along Jirón Asamblea was 
“but one small part” of the major issues on the plates of local government officials; for 
that matter, nightlife was only one of many concerns even for those officials involved in 
seguridad ciudadana. By that point, those officials most intimately involved in the city’s 
nightlife and security concerns had also resigned: one because he had received too many 
threats and the other because he tired of being a municipal representative without any 
power to actually do anything. 
As I wandered through the city center I could not identify a venue that had 
stepped in to fill the scene in the same way as the one most prominent club/peña had 
welcomed the tourists, travelling professionals and politicians who had for years wiled 
away their evenings in this locale listening and dancing to live music. The other 
consistent peña venue just a block away was a likely option, with owners who had been 
important musicians in the local music scene for many years, particularly in música 
latinoamericana and música ayacuchana. Although they continued to provide live music, 
they had moved their locale out of the very heart of the historic city center and relocated 
several blocks up the hill to a nondescript, and significantly less touristy, neighborhood. 
The area was not in the periphery and it did not in any way constitute a hub of night 
entertainment as Jirón Asamblea had during my research; it was certainly a far cry from 
the proposed “bulevar” on the city’s outskirts.  
The (previously) organized residents in the city center had absolutely no doubts 
that the intense pressure they had put on the government officials had paid off – or, at 
least, the clubs were out of their neighborhood. Ironically, the president offered as 
evidence the mere fact that the night clubs on Jirón Asamblea that were closed 
“indefinitely” have only reopened several blocks away, still in the city center but now out 
of the reach of the most proactive and vocal neighborhood organization. “You can 
imagine how disgruntled those residents are,” she concluded. Those neighbors who live 
side-by-side with these new clubs were now just beginning to head down the long path of 
formal organization and protest, and in the months surrounding my 2007 visit several 
neighborhood organizations launched public campaigns of their own to have clubs, bars 
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and brothels closed, including the streets around Manco Cápac, and the neighborhood of 
La Magdalena and others: 
The residents of the intersections of Bellido and Liberty … demand closure of the 
[peña] for going against the tranquility and security of the neighbors who live in 
the zone. They base their demand on the grounds that in this locale, wrongly 
called a peña discoteca they hold fiestas chichas in which many people enter, 
many of them people of mal vivir that are responsible for violent acts that are 
against the integrity of the neighbors. The establishment is located across the 
street from María Auxiliadora High School and a few meters from Nazareno High 
School.17 
They were not only taking Asamblea as a model but, in many senses, they were picking 
up where the Asamblea junta left off, in this case pursuing the closure of a relocated 
peña, one that had also figured in the formal complaints of Jirón Asamblea in the 
previous years. 
Meanwhile, the new municipal administration continued with the parade of police 
interventions to forcibly close the clubs, now focused especially along Mariscal Cáceres 
and Manco Cápac. With the campaign “Plan Zanahoria, literally “OperationCarrot,” a 
humorous nod to the colloquial expression for a straight-laced person who doesn’t go out 
at night, a non-partier, they are explicit about their intentions: “We will carry out the 
interventions constantly with the aim of preserving the order and the tranquility of the 
huamanguinos.”18 And we recognize many of the same public accusations: club-owners 
are making a joke of the authorities: 
There are too many bars, cantinas, chicherías, clubs, and other locales to count 
that sell liquor – even to minors – and that operate without proper authorization 
within the historic center (casco urbano) of the city, whose owners evade and 
laugh at the existing laws and continue with their desire to sacarle la vuelta [give 
the run-around] to the existing municipal presence, despite the constant 
interventions.19 
The drop in the public activity of the city center juntas was observed in the outer areas of 
                                               
17 Correo, March 13, 2007, page 5 
18 Correo, April 22, 2007, page 6 
19 Correo, May 18, 2007, page 6 
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the city as well. As one organizer observed, the “dynamism” had disappeared, “the juntas 
have deteriorated even though the insecurity has increased.”20 
When I returned to talk with one of the organizers from another city center 
organization, he first complained that Jirón Asamblea leaders had ceased to organize all 
of the other juntas. I was slightly surprised because such inter-group meetings were never 
really all that frequent even in the height of the struggle. But he pressed on, explaining 
that without the Asamblea junta the process was different; now his organization was in 
the midst of getting formally registered with the municipality as a “junta vecinal” so that 
they would be taken seriously on their own. Nonetheless, the Asamblea junta continued 
to weigh in on the fight to close the clubs in these other neighborhoods, issuing more 
public statements (memoriales) reiterating their long struggle: “the crime that is observed 
… to a certain degree is due to the operation of these locales that are outside of the law 
… and we have been demanding the closure of these nightclubs since August 25, 2004” 
(less than a week before the emergency declaration).21 
The diminished organizational efforts of the Asamblea junta (as well as others) 
are further evidence of the conflicting ideas about democratic responsibility seen 
previously in the dissertation: whose responsibility is it, after all, to solve the city’s 
problems? This later development could be construed as evidence of a short-lived “moral 
panic” that subsided once the main contributors to the panic determined that their central 
interests (in this case the night clubs along a few city center blocks) were addressed. It 
could also, however, be construed as indicative of greater structural problems within the 
participatory model. The most immediate problem could be identified as a lack of 
incentive to continue organizing. The more profound structural problem is perhaps an 
unsustainable expectation that community members can and will organize to protect a 
“common good” even when it is not directly affecting their everyday/nihgt lives. 
After finishing my main fieldwork, I returned to the United States to process my 
fieldnotes and begin writing, and I was more and more impressed with the increasingly 
                                               
20 Author interview, June 19, 2007 
21 Correo, October, 24, 2004, page 4 
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strong references to democratic responsibilities that I found throughout my notes. During 
this same time, encompassing my own process of reflection upon my notes and 
experiences in Peru, U.S. efforts at “exporting” democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan were 
faltering and across radio and television I was hearing variations upon the same 
explanations about how democracy does not materialize upon elections but requires 
consistent and sustained efforts from all citizens in order to enact true political and social 
change. And although it was “our” model of democracy that was being so actively 
promoted across the world, the corresponding polished rhetoric of democratic 
responsibility and duty seemed strikingly foreign here at home, politically unfamiliar but 
also culturally and socially rather exotic. 
Thus in 2007, as the world reflected upon the characteristics (and contradictions) 
of a successful “democracy,” I returned to Ayacucho and was again hit with the dramatic 
language of “democratic participation.” Wondering how current strategies and projects 
for “participation” were different from the time of my fieldwork, I asked the new Citizen 
Security director about current patterns of participation throughout the city: 
Normally those that have the most impetus to participate are in the rural zones [of 
the city] but those of the historic center, the famous mistis [mestizos] as we say, 
don’t collaborate. They just ask and demand their rights. And they don’t fulfill 
their duties. Why? Because they know that here in the historic center, the national 
police are around…. But also because they don’t have that conviction to 
participate. So that is what we have to work on changing, so that they collaborate 
as citizens.22 
Hearing this explicit statement from an appointed politician about the goal of educating 
the population about their duties to collaborate as citizens, I took the opportunity to ask a 
somewhat crazy question: why do you think that we don’t have these kinds of 
comprehensive campaigns saturating our lives in the United States, and that the average 
citizen probably wouldn’t even recognize this concept of “democratic participation”?  
Of course, what happens is that in developed countries like the U.S. … you know 
                                               
22 Author interview, José Antonio Antezana, Subgerente Seguridad Ciudadana, July 5, 2007, emphasis 
added. 
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they are many years ahead of us in terms of culture, education, and even 
training…. Although it may be true that they aren’t participating very strongly … 
they automatically and necessarily know that it is their duty to contribute to the 
state, it is their duty to educate their kids, it is their duty to develop their society. 
But here, unfortunately, we are underdeveloped. In Peru, basically in these zones 
… there is ignorance [incultura], a large percentage of the population doesn’t 
really know what responsibility is, a large percentage of the population doesn’t 
have civic values, a large percentage of the population doesn’t have self-esteem, 
in other words they don’t love themselves … as Ayacuchanos. We lack respect, 
we lack identity, pride that we are wallpa suwas, that we are 100% Ayacuchanos. 
I was struck by this answer for several reasons. First, I noted an interesting twist: it isn’t 
all about abstract democratic “civic values” but local cultural values, it isn’t all about 
abstract duties as “citizens” but as Ayacuchanos. In other words, even here, the 
conception of democratic “participation” is just as much a measure of commitment, of 
pride in their identity and history. In this sense I immediately heard echoes of the 
demands to see demonstrations of a willingness to take a risk for their community, 
apostar por Ayacucho.  
I was also struck by this vision of my country. For one, it seemed to fly in the face 
of the most common characterizations I heard about the United States while in Peru: self-
interested and individualistic. But it also did not seem to match my own perception of the 
United States. Beyond paying taxes (and even this is silently contested by many, if not 
most) I would not necessarily have described our citizens as “automatically knowing” 
that we have a duty to contribute to the state, and certainly not in the ways advocated by 
this citizen security office in Peru. I did not regularly watch nationalized television 
programs led by prominent local government officials about “civic duty” and democracy 
and I did not see billboards admonishing me to be an honest citizen and to participate in 
the betterment of my community. Most people, if asked on the street, would say that our 
democratic rights are “inalienable,” not directly dependent on our “civic” performance in 
society. The key phrase we have internalized as the essence of our democracy – the right 
to “the pursuit of happiness” – has become almost an all-encompassing ideology of 
individualism, the bedrock of our nation’s self-representation. With the rare exception of 
a few decontextualized – and now fetishized – fragments of famous speeches (“ask not 
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what your country can do for you…”), it seemed, at that time, almost incomprehensible 
to imagine a politician demanding, “day in and day out,” that all individuals have a duty 
to “contribute to the state” or to “develop our society,” and that this is not simply a moral 
or ethical duty but rather a democratic responsibility, an obligation of citizenship. 
It is with irony and humility as a scholar, and also with great pleasure as a citizen, 
that as I write this epilogue in early 2009, the words of my own new president’s inaugural 
address still ring in my ears:  
For as much as government can do and must do, it is ultimately the faith and 
determination of the American people upon which this nation relies….  
 
What is required of us now is a new era of responsibility – a recognition, on the 
part of every American, that we have duties to ourselves, our nation, and the 
world, duties that we do not grudgingly accept but rather seize gladly, firm in the 
knowledge that there is nothing so satisfying to the spirit, so defining of our 
character, than giving our all to a difficult task.  
 
This is the price and the promise of citizenship.23 
 
                                               
23 Barack Obama, Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2009, emphasis added. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Timeline of Key Events 
1/28/03 Ley 27933; Law establishing the National Citizen Security System (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana) 
11/1/03 Sonia Morales Concert (All Saints Day) 
1/1/04 Office of Seguridad Ciudadana (Sub-Gerencia de Seguridad Ciudadana) established in the Provincial Municipality 
4/12/04 Holy Week (Semana Santa) 
8/24/04 Residents of Jirón Asamblea formally register as a Neighborhood Organization (Junta Vecinal) 
8/29/04 Murder of high school student (3 murders that week) 
8/31/04 Emergency Ordinance, Ordenanza 054-2004  
9/1/04 Press Conference, Provincial Municipality, 10am Citizen Security Meeting, Frente de Defensa del Pueblo de Ayacucho, 5pm 
12/1/04 Emergency Declaration (renewed) 
12/2/04 March against night clubs (organized by Asamblea junta) 




Ordenanza 054 - Spanish text 
HONORABLE MUNICIPALIDAD PROVINCIAL DE HUAMANGA 
 
ORDENANZA MUNICIPAL No. 054 -2004-MPHIA  
 
Dado en el Palacio Municipal y Despacho de Alcaldía  
Ayacucho. 3 1 AGO. 2004  
EL EXCMO. SENOR ALCALDE DE LA HONORABLE MUNICIPALIDAD 
PROVINCIAL DE HUAMANGA;  
 
En uso de sus atribuciones que por Ley son propias de su investidura:  
 
POR CUANTO:  
EI Concejo de la municipalidad Provincial de Huamanga, en Sesi6n 
Ordinaria de fecha 31 de a90sto de 2004: mediante el Acuerdo de Concejo N 111-2004-
MPH/CM, se aprob6 la Ordenanza Municipal que DEC LARA EN SITUACION DE 
EMERGENCIA POR NOVENTA DIAS, EN MATERIA DE SEGURIDAD 
CIUDADANA Y TRANSPORTE PUBLICO Y CIRCULACION VIAL, en la 
jurisdicción de la Provincia de Huamanga; y,  
CONSIDERANDO:  
Que, los gobiernos locales gozan de autonomía política, económica y 
administrativa en los asuntos de su competencia, de conformidad a 10 dispuesto en el 
Articulo II del Titulo Preliminar de la Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades, Ley N° 27972, 
concordante con el Articulo 194
 
de la Constituci6n Política del Estado, modificado por la 
Ley N° 27680, Ley de Reforma Constitucional del Capitulo XIV del Titulo IV, sobre 
descentralización:  
Que mediante Ley Nro. 27933, Ley del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad 
Ciudadana, se establece garantizar la seguridad, paz, tranquilidad, el cumplimiento y 
respeto de las garantías individuales y sociales a nivel nacional, creando instancias 
integrantes de dicho sistema, como los comités provinciales de seguridad ciudadana, 
siendo este presidido par el Alcalde Provincial e integrado por Autoridades políticas, 
civiles, jurisdiccionales, Militares y Policiales.  
Que, el sistema Nacional de seguridad ciudadana es el conjunto 
interrelacionado de organismos del sector público y la sociedad civil. y de normas, 
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recursos y doctrina: orientados a la protección del libre ejercicio de los derechos y 
libertades, con el objeto de promover la participación ciudadana para garantizar una 
situación de paz social.  
Que. de conformid8d a 10 establecido en el numeral 2 del Art. 73,81, 85 
de la Ley orgánica de municipalidades Nro. 27972, los gobiernos locales tienen 
competencias y funciones especificas en seguridad ciudadana y transito, circulación y 
transporte público, siendo los entes competentes de planear, organizar, ejecutar, 
coordinar y controlar los planes, programas y proyectos que se desarrolla en el ámbito de 
su Jurisdicción  
Que, literal a) del numeral 18.1 del Articulo 18 de la Ley General de 
Transporte y Transito Terrestre. Ley N° 27181, dispone que las Municipalidades son 
competentes en materia de transporte en general, las que deben ceñirse a los reglamentos 
nacionales y las normas emitidas por la Municipalidad Provincial de Su jurisdicción.  
Que, existiendo circunstancias que peligran la tranquilidad publica y Paz 
en la ciudad de Ayacucho, que atentan contra bienes jurídicos fundamentales, protegidos 
por la Constitución Políticas [sic] del Estado, Tratados Internacionales sobre derechos 
humanos, es pertinente la Declaratoria en Emergencia De la Seguridad Ciudadana y 
Transporte Público y Circulación Vial.  
  
Estando a 18S facultades conferidas en el numeral 5 del articulo 20° 
concordante con los artículos 39 y 40° de 121 Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades, Ley N° 
27972, en virtud del cual se promulga la siguiente:  
 
ORDENANZA:  
ARTÍCULO PRIMERO.-DEDARAR, en situación de Emergencia el 
Sistema de Seguridad Ciudadana y Transporte Público y Circulación Vial, en la 
Jurisdicción de la Provincia de Huamanga, por el termino de 90 días naturales, contados a 
partir del día siguiente de la publicación de la presente.  
ARTICULO SEGUNDO.-ESTABLECER, que, durante el plazo señalado 
en el Articulo precedente, debe dictarse medidas urgentes que regulen el funcionamiento 
de actividades comerciales relacionadas a discotecas, club nocturnos, bares, video pup, 
tragamonedas y afines, así como regular el transporte y Circulación vial.  
ARTICULO TERCERO.-FACULTAR, al Ejecutivo Emitir el Decreto de 
Alcaldía, que norrne las actividades antes señaladas, otorgándoles lineamientos 
específicos que la situación amerite, en base a los parámetros estipulados en el Acuerdo 
de Concejo Nro. 111-2004-MPH/CM .. 
  





Excerpt from the first document filed by Junta Vecinal de Jirón Asamblea –  
Spanish Text. (August 24, 2004) 
… siendo en el fondo los propietarios de dichos bienes inmuebles los 
responsables directos de todo este atropello en contra de la vecindad y del pueblo 
ayacuchano, por que todos estos locales promueven la delincuencia, prostitución, 
drogadicción en nuestra juventud y niñez ayacuchana, así como la corrupción de 
funcionarios encargados de velar por la seguridad ayacuchana…. 
 Es desgraciadamente este sistema o tipo de vida que se esta imponiendo en esta 
ciudad de Ayacucho, en donde la corrupción, la delincuencia esta tomando el control del 
sistema, tomando a través de amenazas contra la vida, amenazas contra la tranquilidad 
publica, amenazas contra la salud y en contra la educación; con la proliferación de este 
tipo de negocios, yo y la personas que vivimos en estas dos cuadras del Jirón asamblea, 
estamos efectuando nuestra protesta ante todas las autoridades que corresponden para el 
cierre de este tipo de negocios y nos damos con la sorpresa que no tenemos mucho apoyo 
por parte de las autoridades…. 
 … estas personas ven con otros ojos nuestra realidad están tomando mas cuerpo, 
cada día se esta proliferando de mas locales denominados “discotecas” y que en el fondo 
se esta manejado todos estos locales por un grupo de personas, creando un tipo de mafia 
que va creciendo, que va teniendo mas poder, va controlando mas autoridades para que 
permitan que esto funcione; haciendo que en esta ciudad de Ayacucho impere lo gansteril 
donde el que tiene dinero y negocio mal habido domine y controle el sistema de vida en 
nuestra ciudad, y como consecuencia de ellos se tenga mas juventud delincuencial, mas 
caos en el control de pandillaje que donde mucho y exageradamente diría yo, ha crecido 
en esta ciudad de ayacucho, mas robo, mas violaciones, mas prostitución, hasta 
asesinatos. 
 Cuando no se ataca con decisión y con las facultades que les otorga la ley a Ud. y 
a las autoridades competentes estamos ante un sistema de ingobernabilidad en donde 
existe la ley del mas fuerte y no el orden y lo establecido en la constitución del Perú; es 
por eso que deben tomar decisiones por nuestro pueblo, por nuestra juventud, por nuestro 
futuro. 
 Quiero también hacerle presente que esta denuncia no es de ahora, es mas viene 
haciéndose una costumbre para las autoridades, y los que padecemos todo lo expresado 
aquí, ahora nos estamos agrupando para hacer de nuestra petición y mayor eco, del cual 
haremos de conocimiento a los de comunicación. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Public statement from Junta Vecinal de Jirón Asamblea supporting municipal 
officials – Spanish Text 
COMUNICADO 
 
La federación de juntas vecinales de Ayacucho respalda y aplaude el trabajo que viene 
realizando el COMITÉ PROVINCIAL DE SEGURIDAD CIUDADANA en la clausura 
definitiva de las mal llamadas discotecas, las cuales funcionan clandestinamente al 
margen de la ley y de las disposiciones municipales, causando inseguridad en la 
población y en particular de nuestra juventud y niñez. 
 
Respaldamos la retoma de principio de autoridad del señor Alcalde quien en salvaguardia 
de los valores morales, la integridad de la persona y la comunidad Ayacuchana actúa 
enérgicamente contra los propietarios ilegales de las mal llamadas discotecas, quienes en 
su afán de saciar sus apetitos económicos ponen en riesgo la seguridad de las personas 
que acuden en estos centros, los cuales no cuentan con las mínimas medidas de seguridad 
que exige el INDECI, fomentando el caos, desorden e incluso muerte de nuestro jóvenes 
Ayacuchanos. 
 
Apoyamos a los trabajadores de la MUNICIPALIDAD PROVINCIAL DE 
HUAMANGA que en su labor de restablecer el orden y la seguridad de la población 
Ayacuchana sufren amenazas, atentados terroristas e incluso tentativas de homicidio 
como es el caso de la Gerente de Cobranza Coactiva Doctora Samy Betalleluz, con quien 
nos solidarizamos y reconocemos su calidad profesional.  Repudiamos estos actos de 
amedrentamiento y exigimos a la Policía Nacional del Perú la más profunda investigación 
y se capture a los responsables para ser procesados ante la ley. 
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